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i
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1 1638
May Young Ofiate's embassy to England ends
Cardenas's mission to England begins
Duchess of Chevreuse arrives in England
June
j
July
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; English loan to Charles Louis for
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j Imperialists take Meppen
; Bernard defeats Imperialists in
! the Breisgau
I Roe's mission to congress at Hamburg
begins
' Aston's embassy to Spain ends
i Gerbier's negotiations with the Princess
Phalzburg
Hopton's embassy to Spain begins
Princess Phalzburg's proposal
; News of Scottish troubles impedes Taylor's
negotiation
Taylor requests his recall
' Giustinian's embassy to England begins
| October Queen Mother arrives in England
J November Charles Louis arrives in Hamburg
t J
; December Cardenas in disgrace at court
i i
; i
j 1639
I January ' Charles Louis leaves Hamburg for Holland
February \ Taylor recalled
: Collapse of Anglo-French treaty negotiations
I Scudamore's embassy to France ends
Baner advances into Pomerania
: Bernard begins siege of Breisach
Bauer's campaign in Brunswick
Bernard's campaign in Upper
Burgundy
i
Charles Louis defeated at Vlotho;
Rupert taken prisoner
Increased Franco-Swedish
pressure on Imperialists
Bernard takes Breisach
XV
Date Political/Diplomatic Events
1639
March
April
May
! June
i
| July
j Nassau selected as Imperial plenipotentiary,
Richel as Bavarian plenipotentiary to
[ Brussels conference
; Taylor's mission to Emperor ends
j First Bishops' War
. Taylor arrives in England
Anglo-Danish treaty (Treaty of Hamburg)
Investigation of Taylor launched
Pacification of Berwick
September < Taylor committed to the Tower
October ' Charles Louis captured at Moulins,
| imprisoned at Vicennes
i Imperialists defeated at Chemnitz
j Charles Louis's overtures to
Bernard
Sweden invades Bohemia (to
1640)
Death of Bernard, France inherits
all his conquests
I Charles Louis plans to command
Bernard's army
i French capture Salces
I
j i
! Dutch navy destroys Spanish
fleet at the Downs
: France takes over Bernard's army !

1Introduction
In the midst of the Thirty Years' War, a series ofdiplomatic missions exchanged between the King
of England and the Holy Roman Emperor stirred hopes for a peaceful settlement of the hostilities.
Negotiations between the two rulers revolved around the settlement of the Palatinate question, one
of the most vexing issues of the war. This dissertation focuses specifically on the missions of the
three diplomats most intimately involved in Anglo-Imperial negotiations of the later 1630s.
However, unlike previous work, this study investigates the European as well as the British context
ofearly Stuart foreign policy. Drawing upon not only British archival sources but also the abundant
material concerning Britain in Continental repositories, it presents a detailed analysis of the
negotiations and shows that English foreign policy in these years, though it produced no tangible
results, had the potential to succeed. Although historians have traditionally downplayed England's
influence on Continental powers, the evidence shows that Charles I's favor was highly valued at the
Habsburg courts and that he had more foreign policy options in the later 1630s than has been
commonly assumed.
In the aftermath of the Peace of Prague in 1635, Charles I sent the first ofthese missions, led
by John Taylor, to the Imperial court in an attempt to come to an agreement on the Palatinate
question. The satisfactory resolution of this nagging problem had the potential to expand into a
peaceful settlement of the hostilities in the Empire, which had already dragged on for seventeen long
years. Once Taylor had laid a basis for further discussions, the King sent one ofhis most illustrious
noblemen, Thomas Howard, 2nd Earl ofArundel, as ambassador extraordinary with plenipotentiary
2powers to conclude a settlement. Arundel's embassy was the grandest of the attempts of the early
Stuart monarchs to find a peaceful solution to the question that had been feeding the Continental
strife for years. At the same time that Arundel was sent to Vienna, the Emperor Ferdinand II
dispatched Clement Radolt, a councillor of the Hqfkammer, or Imperial treasury, as an envoy to the
English court to promote a settlement there. However, the interests of the major powers with a stake
in the negotiations — England and the Emperor, but also Bavaria and Spain — proved difficult to
reconcile. In the end, both Arundel and Radolt returned to their respective courts, but Taylor was
ordered to remain with the Emperor for two more years in the hope of bringing the negotiations to
a favorable conclusion. Ultimately, however, his endeavor was in vain; a compromise settlement
was not reached until the conclusion of the Peace of Westphalia almost a decade later.
The Palatinate question was sparked by the acceptance of the Bohemian crown by
Frederick V, Calvinist Elector Palatine, from Czech rebels in 16 19. This act ultimately lost him not
only his newly acquired kingdom but also bis ancestral lands and titles, for soon after Imperial forces
defeated him at the Battle of White Mountain, the Emperor proscribed him under the ban of the
Empire. These events might not have attracted undue attention in England if the victim had been
any German prince other than Frederick; but he was the husband ofElizabeth Stuart, daughter ofthe
English King James I and sister of the future Charles I. As matters stood, English dynastic interests
and the Protestant cause in the Empire had suffered a crushing blow. Soon after Frederick's
proscription, he and his family were forced into exile in Holland.
Although from a dynastic perspective the English kings were concerned with supporting the
Prince Palatine's claims, they avoided making his affairs the ground for English military involvement
3in the Thirty Years' War.1 Instead they turned to diplomacy as the main avenue to address what
came to be known as the Palatinate question — if, when, and how much of the Palatine lands and
dignities would be restored to the Prince Palatine. To complicate matters, English attempts to reach
a reasonable compromise with the powers which now held a stake in the Palatinate — the Emperor,
Spain, and Bavaria — were violently opposed by both Frederick and Elizabeth, who would not be
satisfied with anything less than the full restoration of their lands and dignities.2 They feared that
ifa partial restoration were accepted, even with promises ofa full restoration in time, those promises
would be breached, and the Prince Palatine would be left with only a portion of his former
possessions. Elizabeth and Frederick believed that force was the only means to regain their right
permanently. After the death of her husband in 1632, Elizabeth continued to favor this strategy for
the restoration of their son, Charles Louis.3
Meanwhile, the violence and devastation caused by the ongoing war, not to mention its
expense, convinced many parties in the Empire and most particularly the Emperor that the time had
come for compromise. The Peace ofPrague, concluded in 1635 between the Emperor and Saxony,
1G. M. D. Howat, Stuart and Cromwellian Foreign Policy, Modem British Foreign Policy, ed.
Malcolm Robinson (London: Adam & Charles Black, 1974), 2.
2Francis C. Springell, Connoisseur & Diplomat: The Earl ofArundel's Embassy to Germany in
1636 as Recounted in William Crowne's Diary, the Earl's Letters and Other Contemporary Sources with
a Catalogue of the Topographical Drawings Made on the Journey by Wenceslaus Hollar (London:
Maggs Bros., 1963), 1.
3See, for instance, Elizabeth, Queen of Bohemia, The Letters ofElizabeth, Queen ofBohemia, ed.
L. M. Baker, with an introduction by C. V. Wedgwood (London: The Bodley Head, 1953), 92-4: 1 June
1636,' Elizabeth, Queen of Bohemia, to Archbishop Laud. Charles Louis, Prince Palatine and Elector
Palatine (after 1648, when the Peace of Westphalia restored the electoral dignity to his line) is referenced
throughout this work as Charles Louis to avoid confusing him with his uncle Charles I, King of England.
Charles standing alone always refers to Charles I.
4was rapidly accepted by most of the Protestant states and free cities. Charles Louis, however, was
excluded from the amnesty granted to the Protestant states accepting the Peace. Maximilian I of
Bavaria, to whom the Emperor had transferred the Upper Palatinate and electoral dignity in return
for his military assistance against the unfortunate Frederick, was confirmed in these possessions.
Charles Louis's position further deteriorated later the same year when Maximilian wed the Emperor's
daughter, his own niece, for this union presented the possibility ofa permanent Bavarian succession
to the Upper Palatinate and electoral dignity. Without a secure succession, there was still hope that
the Palatine lands and dignities would revert back to the Palatine line of the Wittelsbach family.
Thus the Peace of Prague and the union of Maximilian with his niece were serious setbacks to
Charles I's policy of Palatine restoration.4
At about the same time that these events were taking place, England's importance in Europe
was growing. English naval strength was reinforced in the 1630s by the ship money fleet, and
France's declaration ofwar on Spain enhanced England's desirability as an ally or at least a neutral
for both parties. English sympathy during these years was particularly important to Spain's war
effort in the Low Countries, where Spanish troops had been fighting the Dutch rebels for over sixty
years. In the mid 1630s, France's occupation of key territories blocked Spain's land supply routes
to Flanders. Maintaining the Channel route, or "English road," became critical for Spain and
depended heavily on the cooperation or at least neutrality of England with its large, modem fleet.5
'"Springell, 2.
'Geoffrey Parker's work on the army of Flanders, Jose Alcala-Zamora's on the Spanish navy, and
Harland Taylor's on the English Road all emphasize the importance of England to Spain's maintenance of
an open line of communication to the Low Countries (Geoffrey Parker, The Army of Flanders and the
Spanish Road, 1567-1659, Cambridge Studies in Early Modem History, ed. H. G. Koenigsberger and J.
H. Elliott [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972]; Jose Alcala-Zamora y Queipo de Llano,
sWith renewed negotiating power, Charles was determined to explore his options for the recovery of
the Palatinate lands and dignities: he sent Sir Thomas Aston to Madrid, John Taylor to Vienna, and
the Earl of Leicester to Paris.
Charles sent Taylor to Vienna as a resident agent to urge the Emperor Ferdinand II to reverse
the decisions made at Prague and to negotiate for the restoration of the Prince Palatine to his right.6
Taylor reported optimistically that the Emperor was ready to offer full restoration, albeit in time —
the revocation of the ban and the Lower Palatinate immediately, and the Upper Palatinate and the
electoral dignity after the death of the Duke of Bavaria.7 Taylor's news led the King to believe that
all that was necessary for the final settlement of the Palatinate question was the dispatch of an
ambassador to conclude the treaty. In late March of 1636, therefore, he selected the Earl of Arundel
to lead an extraordinary embassy to the court of Ferdinand II. Arundel was to press Charles Louis's
claims for full reinstatement with the Emperor and at the upcoming electoral meeting at
Regensburg.* At approximately the same time that Arundel was sent to Vienna, Ferdinand II sent
Clement Radolt as his envoy to promote a settlement at the English court. Because of the interests
Espana, Fiandes y el Mar del Norte (1618-1639): La ultima ofenslva europea de los Austria* madrileHos,
Ensayos Planeta de historia y humanidades, vol. 13 [Barcelona: Planeta, 1975]; Harland Taylor, "Trade,
Neutrality, and the 'English Road,' 1630-1648," Economic History Review, ser. 2, 25 [1972]: 236-60).
6Taylor was not a resident ambassador but an agent—a resident envoy without ambassadorial rank
who did not represent his sovereign in the first degree.
7Edward Hyde, Earl of Clarendon, State Papers Collected by Edward, Earl of Clarendon,
Commencing from the Year 1621. containing the materials from which his History of the great rebellion
was composed, and the authorities on which the truth ofhis relation isfounded (Oxford: Clarendon
Printing- House, 1767-86) [CSP], vol. 1, 446-7: 3 Feb. 1636, John Taylor to Secretary Francis
Windcbank.
'The German place name Regensburg is used rather than Ratisbon, which was widely used at the
time.
6of the major powers involved, however, both Radolt's and Arundel's negotiations failed to produce
an agreement. And even though Taylor remained at the Imperial court until 1639 in the hope of
bringing the negotiations to a favorable conclusion, this active period ofAnglo-Imperial negotiation
remained inconclusive. Soon after Taylor returned to England, the Second Bishop's War and then
the Civil War increasingly turned the King's attention away from the Continent and toward his
troublesome domestic situation.
These missions and the foreign policy that guided them are often considered failures, at least
from the English perspective. One might ask, then, why they merit this close description and
analysis. In retrospect, when one is fully informed of the political and financial realities facing both
the Stuart government and the Emperor in these years, it might appear that their negotiations were
doomed from the outset. However, we should not assume that because things did not happen, that
they could not have. As much as possible, it is incumbent upon us to try to see these events and
relationships as the statesmen of the day saw them. That perspective in and of itself provides
valuable insights into their hopes and motivations. And, most importantly, failure can convey as
much, and sometimes more, about past events as successes; as J. H. Elliott eloquently points out,
"the study of the past is, or should be, something more than the study of successful men and
successful designs. Failures have their histories, no less than successes, and they can tell us at least
as much, and sometimes more, about that strange blend ofcircumstance, intention and personality
of which the course of events is fashioned."9
9J. H. Elliott, "The Year of the Three Ambassadors," in History and Imagination: Essays in
Honor ofH. R. Trevor-Roper, ed. Hugh Lloyd-Jones, Valerie Pearl, and Blair Worden (New York:
Holmes and Meier, 1981), 180.
7Furthermore, this dissertation views Anglo-Imperial relations from a new perspective. It
incorporates a narrative account of the negotiations between Charles I and the emperors Ferdinand
II and Ferdinand III that is generally more well-balanced or more detailed than those that currently
exist as well as the perspective of the two other players in the best position to influence their
progress and outcome, namely Bavaria and Spain. A variety of sources, both English and
Continental, were used to construct this account, some of which have not previously been used for
this purpose.
Most studies in early modem British history have been presented primarily from an English,
or more recently a British, perspective that often ignores the wider European context of English
politics. They clearly bear the imprint of what Conrad Russell has referred to as "the cloven hoof
of Anglocentricity."10 This is the situation despite recent calls by several distinguished European
historians — including Geoffrey Parker, H. G. Koenigsberger, Conrad Russell, J. H. Elliott, and
Jonathan Israel — for developments at the English court to be placed in their broader European
context. On this subject, Israel has inquired perceptively:
if the study of English history has long suffered from the mistaken but deeply
entrenched habit of separating English from the rest of British history, what of the
equally unwarranted and entrenched practice ofviewing English history apart from
that of continental Europe, the tradition based on the premise that everything of
significance which happens in England must be due to English causes?"
10Conrad Russell, The Fall of the British Monarchies. 1637-42 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991),
vii; quoted in Geoffrey Parker, "The World Beyond Whitehall: British Historiography and European
Archives," in The Stuart Court and Europe: Essays in Politics and Political Culture, ed. R. Malcolm
Smuts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 275.
11Jonathan Israel, ed., The Anglo-Dutch Moment: Essays on the Glorious Revolution and Its
World Impact (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 11; quoted in Parker, "World Beyond
Whitehall," 274. However, the influence of the Thirty Years' War on English domestic politics has not
been ignored completely; for instance, Thomas Cogswell, Simon Adams, Caroline Hibbard, Conrad
8Nowhere should the placement ofEnglish affairs in European context be a more natural impulse than
in the study of foreign relations, and yet treatments have remained surprisingly, even shockingly,
Anglocentric. Over a hundred years ago, S. R. Gardiner drew upon Continental sources for his
magisterial ten-volume political history ofEngland from 1603 to 1642, particularly for the portions
relating to foreign affairs. 12 But few have followed his lead. Early modem European historians, and
not just English historians, tend to treat diplomacy from a national perspective.
This study, however, seeks to bring a more contextually situated approach to the foreign
relations ofearly Stuart government. It investigates its foreign policy and international relations and
sets them in a European context. This requires a more traditional approach, in the Gardnerian sense
that non-English sources should be consulted to do so. Thus unlike the vast majority of works
addressing English foreign policy of this period, it draws not only upon British archival sources but
also upon the abundant material concerning Britain in Continental repositories.
In addition to contextualizing English foreign policy, this study will help to fill a gap in the
historical coverage of this crucial period. Although most scholars of British history agree that the
foreign policy pressures of the later years of the Personal Rule played an important role in the
conflict between the King and his subjects that eventually erupted into civil war, there is an
unfortunate dearth of detailed studies of foreign relations during this period.13 The main foreign
policy issues confronting Charles I's government in these years revolved around the Palatinate and
Russell, and Kevin Sharpe all address this subject in their work.
12Samuel R. Gardiner, History ofEngland from the Accession ofJames I. to the Outbreak of the
Civil War. 1603-1642, 10 vols. (London: Longmans, Green, 1884).
13Foreign affairs remains a comparatively neglected topic for the early Stuart period (Malcolm
Smuts, "Introduction," in Stuart Court and Europe, 6).
England's potential role in the Thirty Years' War. These questions were highly charged with
religious significance for many Englishmen, and public opinion was consequently divided. Some,
particularly those with Puritan sympathies, believed that the King should actively intervene in
Germany to support his nephew, thus striking a blow for the Protestant cause. Others, including the
King and Secretary Windebank, saw the wisdom of negotiating with the Catholic Habsburgs, who
were in the best position to restore Charles Louis to the Palatine lands and dignities. While many
of his subjects favored a foreign policy motivated by confessional interests, Charles followed one
that was largely dynastic. In the sensitive years of the later 1630s, his decision to negotiate mainly
with the "popish" Habsburg powers instead of supporting international Protestantism contributed to
the hardening of Protestant opinion against him that was manifested in the Long Parliament and
eventually resulted in civil war.
In keeping with the lack of attention accorded to the foreign relations of the Personal Rule
and the later 1630s in particular, there is little detailed information available on Anglo-Imperial
diplomatic relations in this period.14 The foreign policy of the Personal Rule is often dismissed as
vacillating, ineffective, and doomed to failure. This dissertation, in contrast, will examine English
foreign policy of the later 1630s through a detailed account of the diplomatic relations between the
Stuart and Imperial courts. The in-depth knowledge of early seventeenth-century international
relations produced by this approach is integral to a proper understanding of Stuart foreign policy in
the years leading up to the Civil War.
14The studies that do exist tend to focus on the 1620s, the period of active English intervention in
the war.
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A close analysis of the negotiations between Charles I and the Habsburgs also reveals much
about the King's foreign policy strategy and his intentions in these years. It offers a view into the
King's secret foreign policy with the Habsburgs, which resulted in a system where select members
of the peace party — Weston, Cottington, and particularly Windebank — helped Charles make and
implement a foreign policy hidden from many of his prominent councillors and courtiers. These
trusted few established direct lines of communication with the diplomats who carried out the policy
on the ground, at times bypassing the official reporting channels.
This detailed study will also shed light on the attitude of Continental powers toward England
in these years. Although traditionally historians have downplayed the impact of English policy on
these powers, evidence suggests that Charles' favor was more highly valued at the Habsburg courts
than previously assumed. English negotiating power with the Habsburgs increased in the latter half
of the 1630s for a variety of reasons, including the French entry into the war and the expansion of
the English fleet In 1635, England's conduct of foreign relations became more active to take
advantage of the situation. Soon three embassies — one to the Emperor, one to Spain, and one to
France — were dispatched to reassert the claims of the Prince Palatine.
England could use its assets to apply pressure to the Emperor, who had the power to remove
the ban, invest Charles Louis as a prince of the Empire, and restore the electoral dignity, and to the
two states occupying Palatine lands, Bavaria and Spain. The Emperor sincerely wished to put an end
to the destructive war in the Empire and recognized the key role the settlement of the Palatinate
question played in this work. He also wanted to avoid English entry into the war on any level,
whether by direct military intervention or by providing naval and financial support to the anti-
Habsburg cause. The Spaniards, for their part, were particularly concerned with the English fleet,
II
since they relied upon its assistance to transport men, money, and munitions through the Channel
to supply their ongoing war against the Dutch. And the Duke ofBavaria saw new reasons to make
some measured concessions in the Palatinate in the later 1630s.
In order to assess efFectively Charles I's Habsburg foreign policy in the later 1630s, and more
specifically his diplomatic overtures to the Emperor, it is critical to understand the religious and
political motivations of and the relationships between the Emperor and his major allies, Spain and
Bavaria. The Palatinate question is a complex diplomatic issue that cannot be understood without
a clear view of the foreign policy priorities of the main powers involved. By taking these priorities
and relationships into account, particularly those of the Emperor, this dissertation will help to shed
light on not only on the motivations of the major players, but also on England's place in this power
relationship.
A further reason for concentrating on the later 1630s is that this period has been neglected
from a Continental as well as a British perspective. The history of the Thirty Years' War between
the Peace of Prague and the beginning of the negotiations leading up to the Peace of Westphalia is
barely researched — one needs only to pick up any study of the war to see how little attention it has
received.15 These eight years are often considered a period of stagnation, undistinguished by great
political or military triumphs.16 They were, however, a time of transition during which crucial
changes ofattitude took place that allowed Europeans to lay the basis for peace. This account of the
"Konrad Repgen, "Liber die Geschichte der Geschichtsschrcibung des DreiBigjahrigen Krieges:
Begriff und Konzeption," in Krieg und Politik. 1618-1648: Europdische Probleme und Perspekiiven, ed.
Konrad Repgen, Schriften des Historischen Kollegs, Kolloquien, vol. 8 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1988), 1.
l6Adam Wandmszka, Reichspatriotismus und Reichspolitik zur Zeit des Prager Friedens von
1635: eine Studie zur Geschichte des deutschen Nationalbewuptseins (Graz: BShlau, 1955), 7.
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missions exchanged between England and the Emperor in that later 1630s, then, will make a
contribution to the political and diplomatic history of this under-researched period of the war.
Finally, the 1630s were also an important period because the basis ofpolitical and diplomatic
decision making was changing. From the early to the mid-seventeenth century there was a general
trend away from confessional toward secular politics, a trend which was slowly reversing that of the
half-century before. Developments in diplomacy paralleled this change. The disruption caused by
religious war led Europeans to have second thoughts about the benefits of religious conflict.17
Religious adversaries cautiously repaired and re-established diplomatic contacts that had been
strained and broken in the latter half of the sixteenth century because "negotiations with the enemies
of one's faith looked more and more like heresy and treason."1* Questions that had ceased to be
negotiable because of religious disagreements were again open for discussion. European rulers and
their diplomats were guided less and less by ideological considerations; compromise and negotiation
in the secular interests of the state were ascendant. This shift in outlook did not come soon enough
to avert the Thirty Years' War, but it certainly helped to end it, as it was imperative for the successful
conclusion of the Peace of Westphalia." The missions of Arundel and Taylor to the Emperor and
Radolt to England took place in the midst of this momentous reversal. They therefore provide a
convenient opportunity to draw some tentative conclusions about the extent to which religious
17GaiTett Mattingly, "International Diplomacy and International Law," in The New Cambridge
Modern History, vol. 3, The Counter-Reformation and Price Revolution 1559-1610, ed. R. B. Wemham
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), 165.
"Ibid., 156, 165.
"Garrett Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy, Bedford Historical Series, no. 17 (London:
Jonathan Cape, 1962), 207.
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concerns intruded upon the relations of states of differing religions in the later 1630s. In this way,
they can shed some light on the nature and timing of the crucial transition from confessional to
secular diplomacy during the Thirty Years' War.
There is a solid foundation of primary source material relating to the missions exchanged
between Charles I and the Emperor, most of it residing in English and Austrian archives. State
papers dealing with the official side of the mission are abundant. A fair amount of the English
papers were fortunately either printed or calendared (or in the case of the Clarendon Manuscripts,
both). Whenever possible, the more relevant calendared documents were consulted in their original
form, as were some printed documents that have never been reproduced in their entirety. The
Austrian source material exists almost exclusively in manuscript form; very few are printed and none
are calendared.20
A good deal of the research for this study was centered on the state papers relating to English
foreign affairs and central government housed in the Public Record Office in London. The State
Paper Office, the forerunner of the Public Record Office, was established in 1578 for the reception
and safe keeping of state papers, including those accumulated by the secretaries of state in the course
oftheir duties. Unfortunately, in the early Stuart period this policy was followed only sporadically,
with varying degrees of success. The result was that only a portion of the secretaries' papers relating
to the missions to the Emperor in the 1630s, mainly Coke's official correspondence (or what he
'0Because of the close involvement of Maximilian I, a body of material related to Anglo-Imperial
negotiations also exists in the Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv in Munich, particularly in the collection
Kastenschwarz. However, these documents are duplicated in part and supplemented by the holdings of
the Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv in Vienna, mainly the collections Palatina and Bavarica.
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understood it to be), were ever deposited in the State Paper Office.21 These are presently found in
collection State Papers Foreign, German Empire and3 Hungary, which consists chiefly of official
correspondence with the English representatives, theirx instructions and credentials, correspondence
between heads ofstate, and miscellaneous documents relating to the missions.22 Unfortunately there
no calendars to help the researcher exploit the riches oof the State Papers Foreign for the early Stuart
period.23 One series does exist, however, that summarLzes the reports ofthe Venetian representatives
at foreign courts, including those of the Emperor amd Charles I — the Calendar ofState Papers
Venetian.24 These reports give many valuable insigtnts into the political attitudes and diplomatic
events of the time, but often the facts related by theem are difficult to confirm and thus must be
accepted carefully.25
21Coke was first and foremost an administrator, and he was a strong advocate of preserving and
organizing government records (Kevin Sharpe, The Persoonal Rule ofCharles I [New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1992], 155). It follows that he would plaice at least some of his papers in the
government archive. However, it is apparent that he did n-:ot turn over everything, because a portion of his
official correspondence is found with his private papers irn the Coke Papers, now housed in the British
Library.
—Public Record Office [PRO], State Papers Forei..gn, German Empire and Hungary [SP 80]. In
addition, those for Flanders [SP 77] and Spain [SP 94] corntain information about English negotiations on
the Palatinate question with these countries.
23The Calendar ofSlate Papers Foreign, which iss invaluable to the study of English foreign
relations in the sixteenth century, halts in the 1590s.
-^Calendar ofState Papers and Manuscripts Relating to English Affairs Existing in the Archives
and Collections of Venice and Other Libraries in Northerm Italy, 37 vols. (London: H. M. Stationery
Office [HMSO], 1864-1947; reprint, Nendeln, Liechtenstein: Kraus Reprint, 1970) [CSPV]. It should be
noted that a Calendar ofState Papers Spanish also exists,, but it ends with the reign of El izabeth in 1603 .
"In particular, Corrcr's interpretations were at tunics colored by his belief that Spanish influence
dominated at the English court.
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In addition to the State Papers Foreign, the Public Record Office houses the State Papers
Domestic. These are documents of the most varied nature, from those produced by the daily
functioning ofgovernment to private letters. As such they contain valuable information on a variety
of subjects, including the King's negotiations with the Habsburgs and his policy making more
generally, as well as public perception of them. Included in this collection, for instance, are some
of the many letters that passed between Elizabeth, Queen of Bohemia, and courtiers such as Sir
Thomas Roe and Archbishop Laud.26 The hodge-podge of material included in the State Papers
Domestic also gives insights into the non-diplomatic aspects of the lives of Arundel and Taylor.
These papers are fortunately summarized, some in more detail than others, in the Calendar ofState
Papers Domestic.™
Because early modem secretaries tended to keep their papers as private possessions even
after the creation of the State Paper Office, many collections of state papers are to be found outside
of the Public Record Office.2' Windebank must have kept the records of his office as private
26For Elizabeth's letters, see also The Letters ofElizabeth, Queen ofBohemia.
r''Calendar ofState Papers, Domestic Series, of the Reign ofCharles I. 1625-[1649], 23 vols.
(London: HMSO, 1858-97; reprint, Nendeln, Liechtenstein: Kraus Reprint, 1967) [CSPD].
J*In the later sixteenth century, the tendency was for office-holders to "convert public offices into
personal domains, wherever possible into bureaucratic fiefs. ..[retarding] the keeping of proper records."
(Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy, 229). As previously noted, the State Paper Office was established in
1578, but office holders did not necessarily follow the policy of depositing state papers in the early Stuart
period. Robert Beale complained in 1592 that "heretofore towards the latter end of King Henry VIII,
there was a chamber in Westminster where such things [dispatches, instructions and other documents]
were kept and they were not in the Secretary's private custody. But, since that, order hath been neglected,
and those things which were public have been culled out and gathered into private books, whereby no
means are left to see what was done before, or to give any light of service to young beginners, which is
not well: And therefore I would wish a secretary to keep such things apart in a chest or place and not to
confound them with his own." (ibid., 230). Although English archives were still considered incomplete
under James I, attitudes towards the archives of an office were slowly changing in the early seventeenth
century (ibid.; Sharpe, Personal Rule, 154). The deposit ofgovernmental records was still left up to the
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property, as a large portion of his official papers are preserved in the Clarendon Manuscripts in the
Bodleian Library, University of Oxford.29 Since he was unofficially responsible for coordinating
the secret negotiations with the Habs burgs, much of the correspondence in this very important
collection is with diplomats at Habsburg courts, including Aston, Hopton, Arundel, and Taylor, as
well as some of their secret instructions. These documents are made much more accessible by two
publications. They are summarized in the Calendar ofClarendon State Papers, and a good selection
ofthem is printed in the eighteenth-century volumes ofClarendon State Papers?" In addition to the
Bodleian Library, the British Library also contains much source material in its unbelievably diverse
array of manuscript collections that is relevant to Anglo-Habsburg relations of the 1630s. Chief
among them are the Additional Manuscripts, which include some of the papers of Lord Aston and
Secretary Coke as well as the private correspondence of the Earl of Arundel,31 and the Egerton
Manuscripts, which incorporate Sir Arthur Hopton's letter book.
discretion of the individual secretaries in the reign of Charles I.
^Bodleian Library, University of Oxford [Bodl. Lib.], Clarendon Manuscripts [Gar. Mss.].
Although these documents are included in a portion of the collection that was assembled from a variety of
sources in the nineteenth century, one may conclude that they came with the original bequest Clarendon's
descendants made in 1759, since almost all of them were printed in the first volume of the Clarendon
State Papers (1 767). It is not certain how Windebank's papers came into Clarendon's hands, but many of
the letters contained in the collection were given to Clarendon to aid him in his writing of 77ie History of
the Rebellion {Calendar of the Clarendon State Papers Preserved in the Bodleian Library [Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1869-1970] [CCSP], vol. I, vi).
MCited above.
-"British Library [BL], Additional Manuscripts [Add. Mss.] IS970 contains many of Arundel's
letters to his art agent the Reverend William Petty. Many of these are printed in: Springell, app. C; Mary
F. S. Hervey, The Life. Correspondence and Collections of Thomas Howard Earl ofArundel (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 192 1); and M. A. Tierney, 77ie History and Antiquities of the Castle and
Town ofArundel: Including a Biography of Its Earls, from the Conquest to the Present Time (London: G.
and W. Nichol, 1834), vol. 2.
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Finally, the Historical Manuscripts Commission has printed a large selection ofcalendars and
primary source material from the period in question. Its mammoth series of reports has also yielded
a good deal of information relating to the missions and the envoys who led them. The most
important are Denbigh V, which contains Taylor's letters to Lord Feilding, the English ambassador
in Venice, and the Sixth Report, which include the letters of Arundel and Windebank to Feilding.32
The Earl ofArundel's mission is particularly well-documented because two gentlemen in his
retinue published accounts of it. A Trve Relation ofAll the Remarkable Places and Passages
Observed in the Travels of the right honourable Thomas Lord Howard, Earle ofAntndell and
Surrey . . . Ambassadour Extraordinary to his sacred Majesty Ferdinando, the second, Emperour
of Germanie. Anno Domini 1636 was written by William Crowne, whom Arundel employed to
record the events of his journey across the Empire.33 Despite its dry, factual style and omission of
diplomatic events, it remains a valuable source for its detailed description of the places Arundel
visited in Germany and of the misery wrought by the Thirty Years' War. Francis SpringelPs study
of Arundel's embassy reprints Crowne's work along with many of Wenceslaus Hollar's artworks
from the journey.34 Sir Edward Walker, the Earl's personal secretary, also treats the embassy in bis
"Historical Manuscripts Commission [HMC], Report on the Manuscripts ofthe Earl ofDenbigh,
vol. 5 (London: HMSO, 191 1) [Denbigh V\; ibid., Sixth Report, with app. (London: HMSO, 1877-8).
33William Crowne, A Trve Relation ofAll the Remarkable Places and Passages Observed in the
Travels of the right honourable Thomas Lord Howard, Earle ofArundell and Surrey...Ambassadour
Extraordinary to his sacred Majesty Ferdinando. the second, Emperour of Germanie. Anno Domini 1636
(London: Printed (by F. Kingston] forHenr. Seile, 1637).
34See below, 21.
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Historical Discourses?5 The combination of the textual and visual in these works gives us
uncommonly rich insight into the experiences of Arundel and his retinue as they traveled across
Germany.
Additional correspondence and references to Arundel dealing with topics other than the
embassy are to be found in his official and private papers preserved in the Arundel Castle Archives
in Sussex, most particularly in the Autograph Letters and Norris Collection,36 as well as in assorted
collections of printed documents and calendars.37 David Lloyd's Memoires, though unreliable in
many respects, can still be used with caution to help draw conclusions about Arundel's religious
Sir Edward Walker, Historical discourses upon several occasions ...IV. The life and actions of
Thomas Howard. earl ofArundel and Surrey, earl-marshal ofEngland.... (London: W. B. for S. Keblc,
1705); ms. copy in BL, Harleian Mss. 6272.
36Arundel Castle Archives [ACA], Autograph Letters [AL] 1617-32; ibid., AL 1632-1723;
ibid., Norris Collection [NC]. Some of these documents are reprinted in Hervey and Tiemey.
37Additional correspondence relating to Arundel is found in William Laud, 77ie Works ofthe
Most Reverend Father in God William Laud, Library of Anglo-Catholic Theology, vols. 51-7 (Oxford:
John Henry Parker, 1860), vol. 7; John Chamberlain, The Letters of John Chamberlain, ed. Norman
Egbert McClure, Memoirs of the American Philosophical Society, vol. 12 (Philadelphia: American
Philosophical Society, 1939); Thomas Birch, ed., The Court and Times of Charles the First. Illustrated by
Authentic and Confidential Letters from Various Public and Private Collections, 2 vols. (London: H.
Colburn, 1848); Edmund Lodge, ed., Illustrations ofBritish History, Biography, and Manners in the
Reigns ofHenry VIII, Edward VI. Mary, Elizabeth. & James I. Exhibited in a Series of Original Papers,
Selected from the Mss. of the Noble Families ofHoward. Talbot, and Cecil..., 2d ed., 3 vols. (London:
John Chidley, 1838); John Evelyn, 77ie Diary ofJohn Evelyn and the Private Correspondence between
King Charles I. and Sir Edward Nicholas and between Sir Edward Hyde (afterwards Earl ofClarendon)
and Sir Richard Browne, ed. William Bray, new ed., with a life of the author and a new preface by Henry
B. Wheatley, 4 vols. (London: Bickers and Son, 1906); and Thomas Wentworth, Earl of Strafford, The
Earl ofStrafforde's Letters and Dispatches, ed. William Knowler (London: Printed for the Editor, 1739).
The CSPD and CSPVrtso contain numerous references to Arundel and his family.
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leanings.3* For John Taylor, the wills, parish registers, and ecclesiastical court books of the
Borthwick Institute in York, provided rare insight into his family background39
Where Continental sources are concerned, much of the material for this study was drawn
from manuscript collections in the main archive of the Habsburg court, the Haus-, Hof- und
Staatsarchiv in Vienna. The official diplomatic correspondence and records ofcentral government
preserved there are crucial to understanding Imperial foreign policy and the course of Anglo-
Imperial negotiations during the Thirty Years' War. The most important materials consulted
included the following collections: Staatenabteilung England, the Imperial equivalent of the State
Papers Foreign for England, which includes the instructions, credentials, and reports of Imperial
diplomats in England, memorials presented by English envoys, and correspondence between heads
of state; Staatenabteilung Palatina, which contains correspondence, memorials, and Imperial privy
council documents related to the Palatinate question; Staatskanzlei, Vortrage, which houses the
records of the privy council; and Reichskanzlei, Kriegsakten, which consists of documents ofmixed
import relating to the war.40
The collections of the Hofkammerarchiv offered valuable information about Radolt and his
career, particularly the following: Familienakten R-10, which pertain to the Radolt family; the
"David Lloyd, Memoires ofthe Lives, Actions, Suffering & Deaths of Those Noble, Reverend,
and Excellent Personages That Suffered by Death, Sequestration, Decimation, or Otherwise for the
Protestant Religion. And the great Principle therecf.With the Life & Martyrdom ofKing Charles I.
(London: Printed for Samuel Speed. 1668).
"Borthwick Institute, University of York [BI], Archdiocese of York, Archepiscopal Visitation
Court Books [AVCB]; ibid., Parish Registers for Bilton in Ainsty, County York.
40Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv [HHStA], Staatenabteilung [StA] England; ibid., StA Palatina;
ibid., Staatskanzlei [StK] Vortrage; ibid., Reichskanzlei [RK] Kriegsakten [KrA].
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Hoffinanzbucher, financial records; the Hofquartierungsbucher, Imperial court quarter records; and
the Niederosterreichische Herrschaftsakten, which contain information regarding Radolt's
construction projects at the Imperial palace.41 The Hofcahlamtsbuchcr, the main financial records
of the Imperial court, not only contain information helpful to reconstructing Radolt's career, but
Taylor's as well.42 Other collections useful for the former task were the heraldic documents of the
AJlgemeines Verwaltungsarchi v, the parish registers at the DiSsezanarchiv, and the wills ofImperial
officials in the Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, army records at the Kriegsarchiv, and the real estate
records at the Wiener Stadt- und Landesarchiv.43
As previously noted, few printed primary sources exist for the Austrian portion ofthis study.
The main one is Franz Christoph Khevenhuller's Annales Ferdinandei, a contemporary chronicle of
the reign of Ferdinand II written by one of his privy councillors. This work offers an account of the
events at the Imperial court from an insider's perspective and reprints some useful documents.44
However its coverage ends in 1637 with the death of Ferdinand II, and of the missions discussed
here, it only touches upon Arundel's in a meaningful way. All of the primary sources mentioned
""Hofkammerarchiv [HKA], Familienakten [FA] R-10; ibid., HoffinanzbCicher [HFB]; ibid.,
Hofquartier [HQ], Quartierbucher [QB]; ibid., Niederosterreichische Herrschaftsakten.
4Jlbid., Hofzahlamt, Rechnungsbiicher (Hofzahlamtsbacher) [HZAB].
43Allgemeines Verwaltungsarchiv [AVA], Hofadelsakten; ibid., Reichadelsakten; Pfarrarchiv St.
Stephan, Barleihbucher, HHStA, Oberstmarschallamt, Testamente; Kriegsarchiv [KA], Hofkriegsrat,
Protokolle; Wiener Stadt- und Landesarchiv [WStLA], Grundbucher [GB].
'"Franz Christoph Khevenhiiller, Count Frankenburg, Annates Ferdinandei; oder Wahrhaffte
Beschreibung Kaysers Ferdinandi des Andern. mildesien Gedachtniss. Geburth, Aufferziehung und
bisshero in Krieg und Friedens-Zeilen vollbrachten thaten.... 12 vols. in 7, plus supplements (Leipzig: M.
G. Weidmann, 1721-6). For more information about this work, see Kurt Peball, "Zur Quellenlage der
'Annates Ferdinandei' des Grafen Franz Christoph KhevcnhO Her- Frankenburg," Mitteilungen des
Osterreichischen Staatsarchivs 9 (1956): 1-22.
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here, manuscript and printed, together have allowed for the d3e tailed analysis of Anglo-Imperial
relations in the later 1630s that is integral to a proper understanding ofEnglish foreign policy in the
period leading up to civil war.
Also, historians have written little about the AngIo-Imp*erial negotiations of the later 1630s.
Since these negotiations were unsuccessful in their attempt to settle the question of the Palatinate
or to effect any type of compromise, they may superficially appear to be of little consequence. This
is, perhaps, the reason they barely receive a passing mention in most works covering the 1630s. Few
studies address the missions discussed in this work in any meaningful way. The exceptions,
however, are discussed below.
F. C. Springell's Connoisseur & Diplomat is the only mionographic study devoted to any of
the missions to the Emperor, namely Arundel's embassy, discuossed in this dissertation. His is the
most detailed account of any of the missions, and it reprfints Crowne's True Relation with
explanatory notes and some of Hollar's topographical drawing: s. However, while it devotes some
space to the negotiations themselves, the work does not env.phasize the politics of diplomacy.
Springell is an art historian, and not surprisingly a significant portion of his book is dedicated to
addressing the art historical aspects of the embassy: almost all of Arundel's letters that are printed
in this work have to do with procuring works of art rather than "with official embassy business; and
it also includes biographical chapters on Hollar and Arundel's friend, art agent, and chaplain, the
Reverend William Petty. Despite this focus, Springell's work provides the most thorough, albeit
uneven, treatment of Arundel's negotiations. Its greatest values from the diplomatic perspective is
that it is one of the few works that incorporates some Conltinental sources, mainly Bavarian.
However he did not consult the rich array of Imperial recorcLs available at the Haus-, Hof- und
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Staatsarchiv, particularly in the collections StA Palatina and England, that are mentioned above.4S
Since Arundel's negotiations were with the Emperor, this is a major omission.
A few other historians devote a chapter or section of their more general works to the
missions. The best of these is Patricia Haskell's study of the career of Sir Francis Windebank, one
of Charles I's two secretaries ofstate during much of the Personal Rule. She devotes a good deal of
space to the diplomacy of the time, not only to the English missions sent abroad during Windebank' s
tenure but also foreign missions received at the English court. She therefore discusses not only the
missions of Arundel and Taylor to the Emperor, but also that of Radolt to the King. She presents
a well-balanced account based on a close reading of her largely English source material.46 E. A.
Beller also devotes a chapter to the missions of Arundel and Taylor in his dissertation on Anglo-
German diplomatic relations during the Thirty Years' War. He presents asolid and enjoyable though
less detailed narrative account, also based mostly upon English source material.47 Mary F. S.
Hervey's description ofArundel's embassy is encompassed in two chapters of her biography of the
Earl. The several official dispatches she reprints and her overall framework ofevents are useful, but
her account focuses more on interesting sidelights and Arundel's personality than the official
negotiations. Kevin Sharpe's Personal Rule ofCharles I gives a summary of Arundel's, and to a
45In addition, Heiner Haan points out the oversight of reports of Bavarian officials in the
Baycrisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, Kastenschwarz 101, which include those of the Bavarian Vice Chancellor
Richel at Regensburg (Heiner Haan, Der Regensburger Kwrfursteniag von 1636/1637, Schriftenreihe der
Vereinigung zur Erforschung der neueren Geschichte, vol. 3 [Munster: Aschendorff, 1967], 233 n. 38).
4'Patricia Haskell, "Sir Francis Windebank and the Personal Rule of Charles I" (Ph.D. diss.,
University of Southampton, 1978), 208-19, 3 19-23.
47Elmer A. Beller, "The Diplomatic Relations between England and Germany during the Thirty
Years' War: With an Introductory Chapter on Their Relations between 1603 and 1618" (Ph.D. diss.,
University of Oxford, [1924?]), 348-78.
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lesser extent Taylor's negotiations, as does Samuel Rawson Gardiner's brief account in his History
ofEngland.4*
Very few historians writing from the Imperial perspective have touched on the negotiations
in a significant way. Heiner Haan, who has written a meticulous study of the 1636 electoral meeting
at Regensburg, touches on the negotiations of Arundel and Taylor there. His short section on the
Imperial negotiations with England is the most considered and reliable account available from the
German standpoint, utilizing mainly Bavarian and Austrian sources.49 Taylor's negotiations for a
conference in Brussels are treated briefly in M. Koch's study of the reign ofFerdinand III.50 Finally,
Jflrgen Steiner"s work on the fate of the Palatine electorate and lands during the Thirty Years' War
provides good coverage of this question generally, based on printed sources, but it is thin on the later
1630s and barely mentions the English missions under discussion here.51
Several secondary sources have been helpful for tracing the policy and motivations of the
Emperor's allies in the later 1630s. For Spanish politics during this period the essential work
remains J. H. Elliott's Count-Duke of Olivares, which contains excellent insights on Spain's
involvement in Germany, its relationship with the Emperor and Bavaria, and its negotiations with
'"Gardiner, vol. 8, 100-2, 158-61, 377-8; Sharpe. Personal Rule, 515-25.
""Haan, Regensburger Kurfiirstentag, 233-50.
HM. Koch, Geschichie des Deutschen Reiches unter der Regierung Ferdinands III. (Vienna: Carl
Gerald's Sohn. 1865-6), 93-4, 98-100. This work must be used cautiously, however, because Koch takes
an uncritically pro-Imperial stance and incorporates misleading interpretations and factual errors into it.
Unfortunately it is the only work covering Ferdinand Ill's reign that makes mention of Taylor's
negotiations.
5lJurgen Steiner, Die pfalzische Kurwurde wahrenddes Dreifiigjdhrigen Krieges (1618-1648),
VerOffentlichungen der Pfalzischen Gesellschaft zur Forderung der Wissenschaften, vol. 76 (Speyer:
PfSlzische Gesellschaft zur Forderung der Wissenschaften, 1985).
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England on the Palatinate and other issues.52 The background, goals, and outlook ofMaximilian I
are covered admirably in a host of publications by Dieter Albrecht Maximilian's changing attitude
toward the restitution of the Palatinate in the latter half of the 1630s can best be traced in Albrecht's
magisterial biography of Maximilian and his article on the war and peace aims of the German states
during the Thirty Years' War.53 Further information on the tail end of the decade can be gleaned
from Karl Schweinesbein's published dissertation on Maximilian's policy towards France from 1639
to 1645.*
Much more has been written, almost exclusively by English historians, about the formation,
nature, and impact ofCharles I's foreign policy in the later 1630s. By and large, historians have not
taken a favorable viewof his largely neutral, pro-Habsburg foreign policy during the Personal Rule.
Traditionally these historians, led by nineteenth-century giant S. R. Gardiner, have branded his
foreign policy — and thus the missions guided by it — at best as ineffective and inconsistent, "futile"
diplomacy in every sense of the word. Gardiner described the flurry of English diplomatic activity
at the major European courts in this period, including the missions of Taylor, Arundel, Aston,
nJ. H. Elliott, The Count-Duke ofOlivares: The Statesman in an Age of Decline (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1986).
"Dieter Albrecht, Maximilian I. von Bayern. 1573-1651 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1998); idem,
"Die Kriegs- und Friedensziele der deutschen Reichsstande," in Krieg und Politik, 241-73. See also:
idem, "Bayern und die pfälzische Frage auf dem Westfälischen Friedenskongreß," in Der Westfälische
Friede, ed. Heinz Duchhardt, 46 1-8, Historische Zeitschrift, suppl. vol. 26 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1998);
idem, "Das konfessionelle Zeitalter, zweiter Teil: Die Herzöge Wilhelm V. and Maximilian I," in
Handbuch der Bayerischen Geschichte, ed. Max Spindler, 2d rev. cd. (Munich: Beck, 1977), vol. 2; and
idem, Die auswärtige Politik Maximilians von Bayern. 16 18- 1635, Schriftenreihe der Historischen
Kommission bei der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, vol. 6 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck &
Ruprecht, 1962).
54Karl Schweinesbein, "Die Frankreichpolitik Kurfürst Maximilians I von Bayern, 1639-1645,"
(Ph.D. diss., Ludwig-Maximilians-Univcrsitat [Munich], 1967).
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Hopton, and Leicester, as "so complicated and unreal, that they only served to make the brain
dizzy."55 Charles used these concurrent and overlapping dealings to try to play off one state against
another and thus negotiate the most advantageous deal possible for his nephew. In the view of
Gardiner, these tactics were unethical and it was near impossible for them to result in a successful
foreign policy: "no word of condemnation is too strong for the manner in which Charles treated the
whole subject of his relations with the Continent. It had all the weakness of a purely selfish policy,
without any of the apparent and momentary strength which a selfish policy receives from vigour of
conception and boldness of action."56 Despite — or perhaps because of — these myriad negotiations,
it has been quite difficult for these historians to uncover a consistent English foreign policy. In
Gardiner's opinion, the only constant aim ofCaroline policy during these years was the reinstatement
of his nephew in the Palatinate; this reflected its essentially dynastic nature.57
In the view of traditional historians, this goal could not be achieved without calling
Parliament, because without subsidies, the King could not finance the active foreign policy required
to give him sufficient leverage with Continental rulers. The result of this weakness was that,
according to J. R. Jones, "Charles's remarkably inconsistent intrigues during the 1630s possessed no
practical importance. "ss Although the major protagonists, France and the Habsburg states, were
continually engaged in negotiations with England in the later 1630s, Gardiner argues that these
"Gardiner, vol. 7, 352.
MIbid.,391.
"Ibid., 169-219,352-3,391.
5*J. R. Jones. Britain and Europe in the Seventeenth Century, Foundations of Modem History, ed.
A.Goodwin (London: Edward Arnold, 1966), 24.
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powers were merely spinning out time with the intention of preserving English neutrality. As long
as England was not actively engaged against them, they did not require its friendship.59 A century
later, L. J. Reeve was even more censorious. In his view, the King's pro-Spanish policy reduced
England to "a non-combatant satellite of Spain."60 Both Gardiner and Reeve, like the English pan-
Protestants of the day, saw alliance with the anti-Habsburg powers, most particularly Sweden and
the United Provinces, as the best and surest way for England to recover the Palatinate and strike a
blow for the Protestant cause.61
More recently the traditional interpretation of Charles I's futile and inconsistent foreign
policy that was propagated by Gardiner and accepted by many others has been questioned by several
historians who view England's foreign relations during the Personal Rule in a more positive light,
among them Kevin Sharpe, Patricia Haskell, and Caroline Hibbard. In contrast to the opinions
evinced by Gardiner, Reeve, Jones, and others, these historians argue that the English government
had more bargaining power and diplomatic options in the later 1630s than has previously been
assumed. While in the past, the King's apparent reluctance to ally with the anti-Habsburg side was
considered imprudent, and by some even a betrayal of the Protestant cause, these "revisionist"
historians have interpreted his foreign policy as a pragmatic policy based upon English dynastic and
national interests.
"Gardiner, vol. 8, 218.
6°L. I. Reeve, Charles I and the Road to Personal Rule, Cambridge Studies in Early Modern
British History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 256.
61lbid., 238-9, 251, 259, 268; idem, "The Politics of War Finance in an Age of Confessional
Strife: A Comparative Anglo-European View," Parergon 14, no. I (July 1996): 102, 105; Gardiner, vol.
7,205-6,352-3.
27
Sharpe's Personal Rule presents the most thoroughgoing reevaluation of the English foreign
relations in this period. He challenges the traditional view that Charles conducted "futile diplomacy"
and that the missions sent to European courts in the later 1630s were doomed to failure from the
outset. According to Sharpe, Charles pursued pragmatic and even coherent foreign policy
objectives. He argues that England indeed was in a good bargaining position based upon its
neutrality and formidable fleet, which the major European protagonists recognized could make a
decisive difference in the course of the war. These powers therefore saw English neutrality and the
assistance of its fleet as prizes worth bargaining for, actively sought an alliance with England, and
took seriously the threat of English entry into the war. Although Charles did not intervene actively
on one side or the other during these years, argues Sharpe, "the possibility of war was always a
dimension of his diplomacy."62 In addressing the issue of Parliament and the royal finances, Sharpe
contends that the importance of these considerations in policy making should not be exaggerated.
Charles's foreign policy was not hog-tied by his reticence to call Parliament, and in any case there
was no certainty that there would be any need to call one if he did decide to intervene actively. He
points out, for instance, that the war with the Scots was fought without the financial backing of
Parliament"
Regarding the sagacity of England's negotiations with the Habsburg powers in these years,
Sharpe, Haskell, and others maintain this was simply the best course to regaining the lost Palatine
lands and dignities since the Habsburgs were in the best position to restore them. This, they point
"Sharpe, Personal Rule, 88.
"Ibid., 86-7; Caroline M. Hibbard, Charles I and the Popish Plot (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 1983), 28-9.
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out, helps explain the willingness of the King and some of his advisors to negotiate with the
Habsburgs despite the objections of many English Protestants. Indeed, one of the few points that
most traditional historians and their critics, including Gardiner and Sharpe, seem to agree upon is
that the restitution of the Palatinate was the King's most important foreign policy objective.64
Haskell has questioned this, instead asserting that the protection of Flanders from Dutch and French
encroachment was much more important to England than recovering the Palatinate, which actually
ranked low in practicalities ofdiplomacy .65 Haskell, Sharpe, and Simon Adams, among others, agree
that Charles actually showed political foresight in his recognition of the up-and-coming Dutch and
French rivalry with England.66 And neutrality accorded England the profits generated by helping
Spain transport troops and supplies to Flanders and by the increased carrying trade more generally.67
Spain's greater reliance on English friendship and its fleet in these years, particularly after France's
open entry into the war in 1635, for safe passage through tlie Channel gave England bargaining
leverage.6* Recast in this light, the King's foreign policy and his concurrent negotiations at various
*4Gardiner, vol. 7, 169; Sharpe, Personal Rule, 88.
"Haskell, 282, and more generally chaps. 5-6.
^Simon Adams, "Spain or the Netherlands?: The Dilemmas of Early Stuart Foreign Policy," in
Before the English Civil War: Essays on Early Stuart Politics and Government, ed. Howard Tomlinson
(London: Macmillan, 1983), 101; Sharpe, Personal Rule, 75-8, 89-90.
67J. S. Kepler, "Fiscal Aspects of the English Carrying Trade during the Thirty Years War,"
Economic History Review, ser. 2, 25 (1972): 261-83; Taylor, "Trade," 236-60; Hibbard, 25-8; Haskell,
185-6; Sharpe, Personal Rule, 90-2.
"Hibbard, 28-9; Sharpe, Persona! Rule, 509-1 1.
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European courts were far from aimless and doomed to failure — they were a pragmatic exploration
of the diplomatic options available.69
It will be argued in this dissertation that English foreign policy in the latter halfof the 1630s,
though in the end it produced no tangible results where the restoration of the Palatinate was
concerned and was in that sense futile, did have potential for success. Given the King's financial
limitations and the realities of European politics, his diplomatic tactics were acceptable, pragmatic,
and based upon the dynastic aim of restoring his sister's house to prominence in the Empire. He
consistently pursued his primary objective, the restoration of the Palatinate, and was willing to do
what he could to recover it without committing England to a full-scale military intervention on the
Continent It is true that Charles was limited by his antipathy to calling Parliament, which would
have been the surest way for him to finance such an intervention over an extended period of time.10
However, it is not clear that this is what would have been required to achieve his aims, and it
certainly did not mean that he was unable to engage himself in a more limited way — by offering the
services of the fleet, which he was already financing without Parliamentary subsidies — in return for
concessions in the Palatinate. What this did mean, however, was that Charles was willing to accept
a partial restoration to reach what he considered to be an acceptable compromise settlement, in spite
of his sister's objections. He went about this along the most pragmatic route possible, that is via
negotiations with the Habsburgs, since they were in the best position to restore the Palatine lands and
dignities. His negotiations with the Emperor were an integral part of this strategy, as Ferdinand was
69Ibid., 93-6.
70Even if the King called Parliament, it is uncertain it would be willing to vote subsidies on the
scale that a land war to regain the Palatinate would require.
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in the position to remove the ban and reinstate Charles Louis as a prince of the Empire. In theory
it was also within his power to restore the Palatine lands and dignities; in practice he needed to win
the support of his allies, Bavaria and Spain, among whom these prizes had been distributed.
Although this put the Emperor in a difficult position, he was the best placed to modify their demands
for the advantage of all involved.
Even though the Habsburg option seemed the most promising to the King and some of his
closest advisors (in particular Windebank, who conducted much of the King's secret business with
the Habsburgs), they saw the wisdom of keeping their diplomatic options open and continued to
negotiate with the anti-Habsburg powers, France in particular. If these powers did not make a more
enticing offer, English negotiations with them would at least apply pressure to the Habsburgs to
reach a satisfactory agreement Although this conduct has offended the sensibilities of later-day
historians, it was not unethical for the time; other nations used similar tactics.
Just as the King's policy had potential for success, so did the spate of missions he sent to the
Continent in the later 1630s. All the players with a stake in the Palatinate were willing to make some
concessions in the interests of finally settling this nettlesome issue. Most importantly, the Emperor
and his allies were willing to yield more than most English historians have previously supposed
Their positions were strongly influenced by the fortunes of war, so England had more leverage in
the negotiations at some times than others. The Emperor was keen to come to an agreement with
England on the question of the Palatinate. By 1635, war had desolated the Empire, and France's
entry into the conflict left no end in sight. The Emperor earnestly desired peace and knew that
settlement of the Palatinate question was required to achieve this end. He was therefore motivated
to find a compromise agreement that would satisfy both England and his allies. Maximilian of
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Bavaria, who was in possession of the Upper Palatinate, right bank of the Lower Palatinate, and the
electorate, had historically been a staunch opponent of restoration ofany sort. His Palatine gains had
been confirmed by the Peace of Prague in 1635, but soon afterwards — once it became apparent that
this agreement had failed to bring peace to the Empire or secure his Palatine acquisitions — he
gradually began to reconsider his recalcitrant stance. Maximilian decided that making some
measured concessions in the Palatinate would be the most effective way to retain his hold on the
parts he really valued (the Upper Palatinate and electoral dignity), and the settlement of the
Palatinate question thus became central to his goals for peace.
Spain, which occupied the left bank of the Lower Palatinate, also had good reason to reach
an agreement with England, particularly after the outbreak of war with France in 1635. The French
occupation of Alsace and Lorraine in the mid- 1630s closed Spain's overland military supply routes
to Flanders, leaving it reliant on the sea route and the assistance, or at least the benevolent neutrality,
of England to maintain its war effort against the Dutch. In 1638, the importance of the sea route
redoubled when the Habsburgs lost the bridgehead fortress ofBreisach. Under these circumstances,
though Olivares preferred the active support of England (the convenientias of the secret Cottington
Treaty), he regarded the protection England's fleet provided in the Channel as invaluable to Spain's
campaigns in the Netherlands. If Charles played his cards right to maximize his leverage (for
instance by withdrawing these privileges and transferring them to France), he very well could have
been successful in obtaining a partial restoration of the Prince Palatine's patrimony on the strength
of the fleet, which until that time he had been able to maintain without Parliament. Finally, despite
what Charles at times projected for the benefit of critics of his policy, he was himself willing to
accept less than the plenary restoration of his nephew.
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The King's objectives abroad and his political and diplomatic situation, while difficult, did
not preclude an agreement with the Habsburgs on the Palatinate question. It is possible that an
English monarch with the same foreign policy goals and in the same situation but with more
foresight and fortitude could have brought the negotiations to a successful conclusion. The real
problem was Charles himself and the way he made and conducted his foreign policy. Unfortunately
but characteristically, he failed to make the most of the opportunities available to him and instead
took steps that undermined its effectiveness. The Habsburg states saw the advantages of English
friendship, but the King did not give them the necessary incentive to make concessions in the
Palatinate in exchange. A case in point is Spain and the fleet. While English assistance in the
Channel was of the utmost importance to the Spaniards, Charles was unsuccessful at transforming
this need into concessions in the Palatinate for two reasons. The first was that he was too willing
to help Spain transport men and supplies to Flanders. He only tried to extract concessions in return
after the feet, without making any real threat to withdraw the aid of the fleet.71 The financial reward
for providing this assistance was obviously too tempting for Charles to resist The second reason
was that the Spaniards were able to maintain an amazing "poker face" regarding the value of the fleet
to their war enterprise. While they acknowledged its assistance, they refused to make any
concessions in the Palatinate in return. If the King were to change their minds, he needed to
convince the Spaniards that England's help would be of greater value to winning their war with the
Dutch and French than the retention of the Lower Palatinate. But Charles did not take the steps
71The King squandered a similar advantage when negotiating the Treaty of Madrid (1630). He
was in a good position to incorporate Spanish concessions in the Palatinate into the peace treaty, but he
allowed himself to be swayed by Spanish professions of goodwill and promises that the problem would
be dealt with at the next Imperial electoral meeting.
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required to increase his leverage, namely withholding the assistance of the fleet and offering its
services elsewhere, and instead allowed the Spaniards to draw out their negotiations with him. He
thus offered them no further inducement to make the concessions he sought and frittered away
advantages he could have used to strengthen his bargaining position.
England's failure to reach an agreement with any of the states with which it was treating can
also be attributed to the secrecy the King maintained about his foreign policy with his own
government. Through Windebank and a stable of diplomats — Taylor, Aston, and Hopton among
them — Charles conducted negotiations with the Habsburgs that were hidden from the view ofmost
courtiers, diplomats, and members of the foreign committee of the privy council, which was charged
with advising the King in matters of foreign policy. From the King's perspective, this stratagem
alleviated some of the criticism of his policies emanating from the war lobby, which included
supporters of the Protestant cause and alliance with France, and allowed them time to bear fruit. Its
pernicious effects can be seen in Arundel's embassy. Arundel's ignorance of the secret Habsburg
negotiations, in spite of his status as a leading member of the peace party, negatively affected his
ability to bring his negotiations to a successful conclusion.
If leaving most ofhis councillors and diplomats in the dark about his secret negotiations with
the Habsburgs were not bad enough, Charles also kept information from the very envoys conducting
them. His double dealing hampered their effectiveness because they were unaware or ill-informed
about negotiations on the Palatinate being conducted at other European courts. John Taylor, for
instance, knew little about the negotiations that Sir Balthazar Gerbier was carrying on in Brussels
on the Palatinate, even though they had direct bearing on his negotiations in Vienna. In addition,
the English diplomats at Habsburg courts were unable to get a clear idea of what terms were
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acceptable to the King or what he would offer the Habsburgs in return, which presented a further
impediment to their negotiations. The King's covert conduct of his foreign policy, therefore,
undermined rather than strengthened his chances for diplomatic success.
In the end, Caroline foreign policy did prove to be "futile diplomacy," as Gardiner declared,
but this was not its necessary outcome. The King had more foreign policy options in the later 1630s
than historians have commonly assumed, and he could have achieved his main objective — the
restoration of the Palatinate — through negotiations with the Habsburgs, and thus without active
intervention in the war. If he had exploited his advantages, particularly given the military setbacks
faced by the Habsburgs in the later 1630s, they could have reached a compromise settlement similar
to that eventually accepted at Westphalia. This foreign policy, however, would have required more
artful and resolute direction than Charles Stuart could provide. Still, the fact that many Protestants
strongly disapproved of his negotiations with these Catholic powers and some of them eventually
took up arms against the King should not be allowed to obscure the fact that his foreign policy had
prospects for success.
The story ofAnglo-Imperial relations in the 1630s will be told in the pages that follow. Part
one of this dissertation sets the European political, military, and diplomatic backdrop for the Anglo-
Imperial negotiations that took place from 1635 to 1639. Chapter one gives an overview of the
course, outcome, and significance of the Thirty Years' War in order to contextualize the negotiations
and the political and diplomatic developments leading up to them. Chapters two through four
describe the major events of the war as well as the personalities and foreign policy of the major
powers involved in the negotiations — the Emperor, Spain, and Bavaria on the one hand, and England
on the other — from the outbreak of war until 1635, when the negotiations under discussion
commenced. Particular attention is accorded to the development of the Palatinate question in these
years.
Part two provides a survey ofthe background, religious leanings, education, and political and
diplomatic careers of the three diplomats most intimately involved in these negotiations. This will
provide insights into why they were chosen for their missions and the ways they perceived and dealt
with their diplomatic responsibilities. In many ways, the three men could not be more different.
Chapter five discusses John Taylor, an optimistic Catholic gentleman from Yorkshire who made a
career in the English diplomatic service serving at Habsburg courts. Chapter six delves into the life
of Thomas Howard, 2nd Earl of Arundel, a proud, honorable nobleman, who through a strategic
marriage and devoted service to his monarch almost singlehandedly restored his family to its
previous eminence and ancient titles. As will be shown here, he privately leaned toward
Catholicism, but he conformed out of intense loyalty to the Stuart dynasty; above all, the latter drove
his actions. Chapter seven discusses the background and career of Clement Radolt, a lawyer by
training who faithfully served the Emperor for over fifty years in various government positions,
envoy to Charles I being one of many. Radolt rose through the ranks of the Imperial bureaucracy
and social order, leaving his family a rich legacy to build upon.
Finally, part three gives a detailed description of the course of Anglo-Imperial negotiations
conducted in these years and the various personalities and events affecting them, based mainly upon
primary source material found in English and Austrian archives. This treatment gives a fuller view
of the aims, motivations, and actions of the major players than previous studies. Chapter eight
explores John Taylor's opening negotiations at the Imperial court following the Peace of Prague,
which took place from November 1635 until the arrival of the Earl of Arundel as ambassador
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extraordinary in June 1636. In fact Taylor's positive reports ofhis negotiations prompted the sending
of an ambassador and led to Arundel's appointment in March 1636. Chapters nine and ten examine
the Earl of Arundel's negotiations with the Emperor from June to November 1636, first at the
Imperial court at Linz and then at the electoral meeting at Regensburg, with particular attention
given to the interests of the powers involved and the obstacles to an agreement that arose. Moreover,
they describe the adventures of Arundel and his retinue during their journey across the war-torn
Empire. These chapters also detail Radolt's concurrent mission to England from May 1636 to March
1637, his activities at the English court, and the impact ofhis reports on Arundel's negotiations in
Germany. Chapter eleven looks at the final stage of the Anglo-Imperial negotiations treated here.
It recounts the resumption of Taylor's negotiation with the Emperor from Arundel's departure in
November 1636 until Taylor's return to England in May 1639. In addition, it covers the inquiry into
Taylor's conduct of the negotiations and his ultimate commitment to the Tower in September 1639,
as a scapegoat for the secret Habsburg foreign policy conducted by the King and Windebank. The
epilogue briefly recounts the story ofAnglo-Imperial negotiations on the Palatinate question up until
their effective conclusion with the outbreak of civil war in England. Finally, the concluding chapter
evaluates the King's foreign policy toward the Emperor from 1635 to 1639, the expectations,
interests, and willingness to compromise of the powers involved as evidenced in the negotiations,
and reasons for their ultimate failure.
As a final note, every attempt has been made to present the events as they unfolded, and not
only those consistent with the arguments made here. In doing so, this study attempts to convey the
vacillation and inconsistency that was very much the reality ofearly seventeenth-century diplomatic
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relations. It is hoped that this will help to reveal, rather than obscure, the political and diplomatic
ethos of the time.
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Part I: Background
39
1
The Thirty Years' War
The diplomatic missions that are the focus of this dissertation took place in the middle years of the
Thirty Years' War, a time of great transition in European political and religious life. In order to set
these missions and the wider Anglo-Imperial negotiations of the period in context, this chapter
surveys the background, course, and outcomes of the conflict. First, it describes the political and
religious developments of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, more particularly the
confessionalization of European states and subsequent polarization of international politics. Then,
while charting the political, military, and diplomatic course of the war, it illustrates the importance
of the Palatinate, explains the dissipation of the religious aspects of the conflict and the rise of a
more secular view in European politics. Finally, it evaluates the importance of the Peace of
Westphalia to the European state system and its political and religious legacy.
Cinder and Tinder
On May 23, 1618, Count Henry ofThum with a band of followers burst into the room
in the castle of Prague where the royal commissioners were seated, and, after an
altercation, threw them bodily out of the window from a height of seventy feet above
the moat, into which they dropped. "Jesus! Mary!" was the cry of Martinitz, as he fell.
"Let us see if his Mary will help Him," said one of the crowd. "By God, his Mary has
helped him!" was the exclamation as he, his associate Slawata, and their secretary crept
out of the moat unhurt.
David Jayne Hill, A History ofEuropean Diplomacy
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The infamous Defenestration of Prague marks the beginning of the series of military conflicts
spanning the years 16 18 to 1648 that came to be known as the Thirty Years' War. 1 Defenestration,
while shocking to our sensibilities, was a traditional — if grotesque — gesture of Bohemian
independence against established authority.2 The Defenestration of 16 18, then, is unsurprising when
one considers its circumstances. Bohemian Protestants, who had only recently been granted
religious liberties by their Habsburg ruler Rudolf II in the Letter of Majesty (1609), saw these
liberties gradually eroded under his successor Matthias. This process was accelerated in 16 17 when
Ferdinand of Styria, a ruthless counter-reformer, was crowned King of Bohemia. In response to the
anti-Protestant policies of Ferdinand's council of regents, a predominantly Protestant assembly of
the Bohemian estates convened in Prague in May 1618 to mount a protest. The regents promptly
ordered the delegates to disperse. This so incensed the assembly leaders that they forced their way
into the council chamber in the Hradcany Palace to confront the regents about their offensive
policies. In the brawl that ensued the former proceeded to heave two ofthe most outspoken Catholic
1Geoffrey Parker's Thirty Years' War is in my estimation the best account available of the
conflict. The bibliographical essay on pp. 248-72 is both detailed and insightful (Geoffrey Parker, ed.,
The Thirty Years' War, with contributions by Simon Adams, Gerhard Benecke, Richard J. Bonney, John
H. Elliot, R. J. W. Evans, Christopher R. Friedrichs, Bodo Nischan, E. Ladewig Petersen, and Michael
Roberts, 2d ed. [London: Routledge, 1997] [TYW]). For a brief historiographical survey of the war, see
Theodore K. Rabb, ed., The Thirty Years' War, 2d ed. (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America,
1981). For an outline of its causes, see Myron P. Gutmann, "The Origins of the Thirty Years' War,"
Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18, no. 4 (Spring 1988): 749-70. For a discussion of the concept of
the Thirty Years' War, see IConrad Repgen, "Zum Begriff 'DreiBigjahriger Krieg,'" in Von der
Reformation zur Gegenwart: Beitrdge zu Gnmdfragen der neuzeitlichen Geschichte, ed. Klaus Gotto and
Hans Giinter Hockerts (Paderborn: Schoningh, 1988), 25-9.
2There was a similar defenestration of city councillors from the windows of the New Town Hall
during the Hussite revolt in 1419.
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regents and their secretary out the window amid the applause of the angry crowd.3 The delegates
then appointed a provisional government and raised a small army in short order. Bohemia was in
revolt.
The Defenestration was a deliberate challenge to the Habsburgs and to Ferdinand in
particular. As he turned his attention to preparing military action against the rebels, the Bohemian
estates deposed him in August 1619 and elected Frederick V of the Palatinate, a Calvinist and son-
in-law of the King of England, in his stead.4 These actions made any future compromise between
the two sides very difficult. In the end, this was an unfortunate circumstance for Frederick and the
Bohemians, because Ferdinand —as King of Bohemia and (after 1619) Austrian Habsburg ruler and
Emperor — could call upon vast reserves of support from his own hereditary lands, Spain, and the
Empire to defend his interests. As confessional alliances fell into place on each side, the stage was
set for war. Thus the Defenestration, seemingly a local protest of Bohemians against the policies
of their Habsburg ruler, had a wider significance for the Empire and all of Europe. It sparked a much
3Providentialist Catholics believed that divine intervention saved the lives of the two Imperial
regents Slawata and Martinitz and their secretary Fabricius and therefore saw their survival as a sign of
God's support for the Catholic cause. The reason for their survival, however, more likely lies in the fact
that their fall was broken by the refuse that filled the castle moat. The Emperor later bestowed upon
Fabricius the tongue-in-cheek title Freiherr von Hohenfall, i.e., "Baron of the High Fall" (H. G.
Koenigsberger, The Habsburgs and Europe. 1516-1660 [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1971], 222).
For Martinitz's description of the Defenestration, see Mirslav Toegel, ed., Der Beginn des
Dreifiigjahrigen Krieges. Der Kampf tan Bohmen: Ouellen zur Geschichte des bohmischen Krieges
(1618-1621), Documenta Bohemica Bellum Tricennale Illustrantia, vol. 2 (Prague: Academia, 1972;
Vienna: Btihlau, 1972), 42-9; for Siavata's version, see Vilem Slavata, Pameti nejvySSiho kanclere
krdlovstvi ceskeho Vilema hrabete Slavacy: od I. 1608 do 1619, ed. J. Jirecek, Monumcnta historiae
Bohemica, 1 (Prague: Kober, 1866), vol. 2.
4Although the Bohemians would have preferred a Lutheran, John George of Saxony (the obvious
choice) was not interested. He believed his interests would be better served by supporting the Emperor
(Roger Lockyer, Habsburg and Bourbon Europe, 1470-1720 [London: Longman, 1974], 343).
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larger and more complex struggle, which, fueled by religious differences and dynastic rivalry, was
destined to engulf the Holy Roman Empire and spread disease, famine, and desolation in its wake.
The Thirty Years' War was just one episode in a century continuously riddled by warfare.
In fact, the first half of the seventeenth century did not see one full calendar year ofpeace in Europe.5
Geoffrey Parker convincingly argues that the polarization of international politics was responsible
for this widespread belligerence. He points out that before 1580, most wars were waged just
between two powers. After that date, however, wars between rival blocs of allies became
increasingly common because for several reasons European states were more willing than ever to
make firm commitments to allies, particularly those of the same confession.6 Firstly, a number of
dogmatic, militant churches emerged in Europe in the later sixteenth century. These churches
actively encouraged adherent states to form confessional alliances to defend and propagate their
creed and to aid their co-religionists at home and abroad. At the same time closer diplomatic
coordination among friendly states was made possible by improvements in diplomatic organization
and in communications. This conjunction of circumstances insured that more European states,
divided into politically and confessionally hostile camps, would be drawn into war than ever before.
5See Geoffrey Parker, Europe In Crisis. 1598-1648, rev. ed., Fontana History of Europe, ed. John
Plumb (London: Fontana, 1984), 72 fig. 4.
"TTiis coincides with the beginning of Heinz Schilling's third stage of confessional ization, 1580s-
1620s, the apogee of confessionalization (Heinz Schilling, "Confessional ization in the Empire: Religious
and Societal Change in Germany between 1555 and 1620," in Religion. Political Culture and the
Emergence of Early Modern Society: Essays in German and Dutch History [Leiden: Brill, 1992], 226).
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Thus the polarization of international politics goes far in explaining why the hostilities were so
widespread and why making peace was so difficult in the period of the Thirty Years' War.7
Cause and Conflict
The Thirty Years' War was the climax of a lengthy period of religious warfare. By the time of its
outbreak in 1618, the combustible combination of religion and politics, brought to new heights by
the Reformation, already had been responsible for almost one hundred years ofviolence in Europe.
In the Empire, there were the Knights' and Peasants' Revolts (1522 and 1524-6) and the
Schmalkaldic Wars ( 1546-55); in France, the religious wars ( 1560-98); in the Netherlands, the Dutch
Revolt against Spanish rule ( 1568- 1648); and in England, the Pilgrimage of Grace (1 536-7), Wyatt's
Rebellion (1554), and the Revolt of the Northern Earls (1569).
In the Empire specifically, conditions became increasingly unstable during the last quarter
of the sixteenth century. The Religious Peace of Augsburg (1555) had temporarily put an end to
confessional warfare in Germany by instituting the principle of cuius regio, eius religio. This
arrangement allowed each secular territorial ruler to dictate the religion of his subjects — either
Catholicism, as defined by the Decrees of Trent, or Lutheranism, as specified by the Confession of
Augsburg. Although the Peace left the door open for the eventual re-unification of Christianity,
religious divisions instead hardened as the competing creeds defined their positions ever more
explicitly.
7Geoffrey Parker, "The Dutch Revolt and the Polarization of International Politics," chap. in
Spain and the Netherlands. 1559-1659: Ten Studies (Short Hills, N. J.: Enslow, 1979), 65-6. For further
explanations for the longevity of the war, see idem, TYW, 197-200.
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In order to distinguish itself from rival churches, each confession carefully defined its
doctrine as well as its religious practices.* Once adopted, the new policies had to be propagated and
enforced when necessary. For this churches had to rely to some extent on the assistance of secular
authorities, "a help which was granted willingly, but not free ofcharge." Churches sacrificed their
autonomy, in many cases their lands and income as well, to princes who saw the advantages ofsuch
an arrangement:
Early modem state-builders . . . knew very well that joining the process of
"Confessionalization" would provide them with three decisive competitive
advantages: enforcement ofpolitical identity, extension ofa monopoly ofpower, and
disciplining of their subjects. Therefore, it was obvious that a policy of religious
toleration would not pay at that stage ofstate-building. Indeed, tolerant states were
powerless states during the first centuries of modem history!9
As Wolfgang Reinhard points out, a distinct religious identity was particularly important to the
political identity of the states and territories of the Empire, since they lacked a "national" culture to
'Clear delineation of creed was a key element in the process of "confessionalization." This
concept is based upon the idea that "religion and politics, state and church were structurally linked
together, so that under specific conditions of the early modem period the effects that religion and the
church had upon society were not separate parts of a larger phenomenon, but rather affected the entire
social system and formed the central axis of state and society." (Schilling, "Confessionalization in the
Empire," 208). It is interesting that the process of confessionalization was closely paralleled in the
various religious communities, despite their theological differences. For more on confessionalization,
which has been treated at length in recent German historical literature, see: Wolfgang Reinhard,
"Reformation, Counter-Reformation and the Early Modem State: A Reassessment," Catholic History
Review 75 (1989): 383-404; Heinz Schilling, "Confessional Europe," trans. Thomas A. Brady, Jr., in
Handbook ofEuropean History, 1400-1600: Late Middle Ages, Renaissance and Reformation, ed.
Thomas A. Brady, Jr., Heiko A. Oberman, and James D. Tracy, vol. 2, Pistons, Programs and Outcomes,
641-81 (Leiden: Brill, 1995); idem, "Die (Confessional isierung von Kirche, Staat und Gesellschaft—Profil,
Leistung, Defizite und Perspcktiven eines geschichtswissenschaftlichen Paradigm as," in Katholische
Konfessionalisienmg, 1-49; Heinrich Schmidt, Konfesstonalisienmg im 16. Jahrhundert, Enzyklopadie
Deutscher Geschichte, vol. 12 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1992); and the work that started it all, Ernst Walter
Zeeden, Die Entstehung der Konfessionen: Grundlagen und Formen der Konfessionsbildung (Munich:
Oldenbourg, 1965).
9Reinhard, "Reformation," 397-8.
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legitimate their political sovereignty. At times there were not even separate dynasties clearly to
distinguish one state from another, only rival lines of the same ruling house. In this situation, the
individual branches usually embraced different creeds — for instance the Bavarian line of the
Wittelsbachs was Catholic, while the Palatine line was Calvinist.10 The marriage between religion
and politics during this period thus allowed territorial rulers to promote unity in their lands and their
own autonomy in the Empire. However, it had a more destructive consequence as well — the
acceptance of permanent confessional conflict as a way of life.
This situation contributed to the rise of two militant religious groups in the Empire that
eventually destroyed the delicate balance created by the Peace ofAugsburg. The first of these was
the Calvinists, who became increasingly embittered after they were excluded from recognition under
the Religious Peace in 1580. " Heidelberg became the major center ofCalvinism in the Empire, and
the Palatinate under Christian of Anhalt aggressively pursued a confessional foreign policy. This
policy, which was most visible in repeated attempts to form an international Calvinist coalition
uniting opponents of the Habsburgs and Counter-Reformation Catholicism, was driven by the fear
of a Catholic conspiracy that would extirpate Protestantism in the Empire. Its goal was to destroy
10Ibid., 399.
"In 1577, the Lutherans agreed upon the Formula of Concord, a more conservative interpretation
of their confession of faith, the confession of Augsburg. In 1580, the Formula was incorporated into a
new book of Lutheran doctrinal standards, the Book of Concord. The Calvinists could not accept either
the Formula or the Book of Concord, and as a result they could no longer subscribe to the Lutheran
confession. This is an important point, because the Religious Peace only recognized two confessions:
Lutheran (Confession of Augsburg) and Catholic (Decrees of Trent). Thus, as far as the constitution of
the Empire was concerned, the Calvinists were non-entities.
46
the Catholic threat once and for all. 12 The Calvinists' fears were not unfounded, for at about the same
time, an opposing militant group of Catholics was forming in the Empire. They were spurred on by
Jesuits and other radical Catholic reformers who championed an active offensive against the
Protestants as a complement to the renewal otf the Church set out at Trent. Ferdinand of Styria and
Maximilian ofBavaria were ardent supporters of this crusade to reclaim German lands and souls for
the Roman Church. Both rulers took steps to eradicate Protestantism from lands under their rule,
as the Bohemian estates quickly discovered in Ferdinand's case.13 Both ofthese militant groups soon
constructed confessional alliances — the Protestant Union, which included both Lutherans and
Calvinists, was formed under Anhalt's leadership in 1608, while in answer the Catholic League was
created under Maximilian's the following year.14 Each side was encouraged and supported by
foreign co-religionists: the English, Dutch, and Bohemians in the case of the Union, and the Spanish
12Claus-Peter Clasen, The Palatinate in European History. 1559-1660 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1963),
21-2.
l3The Jesuits William Lamormaini and Mttti Contzen, confessors to Ferdinand of Styria (later
Ferdinand II) and Maximilian I respectively, influenced these sovereigns and their policies. Although the
extent of Jesuit influence was not as great as has been previously thought (see chap. 2, p. 68), there was a
contemporary perception that it was, particularly at the Imperial court It was said that Ferdinand
followed Lamormaini's advice as a sheep does the shepherd ("wie das Schaf dem Hirten") (Ludwig
Steinberger, Die Jesuiten und die Friedensfrage in der Zeit vom Prager Frieden bis zum Nurnberger
Friedensexekutionshauptrezefi. 1635-1650, Studien und Darstellungen aus dem Gebiete der Geschichte,
ed. Hermann Grauert, vol. 5, nos. 2-3 [Freiburg ijn Breisgau: Herdersche Verlagshandlung, 1906], 15).
Rumors circulated that "both the lords and councillors were governed by Jesuits who were found with,
beside, and near these men day and night...everything had to pass through their hands; whatever they
organized and advised had to take place...." ('"sovohl die Herren als die Rate von Jesuiten' regiert
warden, 'die sich Tag und Nacht mit, neben und bci diesem Hcrm befanden...es muBte ailes durch ihre
Hand laufen; was sie schafften und was sie riethem, das muQte geschehen....'" [Friedrich von Hurter,
Geschichte Kaiser Ferdinands 11. (Schaffhausem Hurtersche Buchhandlung, 1857-64), vol. 3, 245]).
l4For the events leading up to the formation of the Union and League, including Anhalt's attempts
to form an international Protestant alliance and the Protestant-Catholic confrontation in the Empire over
the Cleves-Julich succession and the Bavarian occupation of Donauworth, see Parker, TYW, 22-8.
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in the case of the League. The confessional blocks in the Empire were ready to face off. With
Imperial political institutions paralyzed by confessional conflict, the only remaining question was
which ember would set the volatile Empire ablaze. 15 [t just so happened that it was the revolt of the
Bohemian Protestants against their Catholic Habsburg king, Ferdinand.
After the Bohemian insurgents had deposed Ferdinand, they needed a new ruler. Wishing
to avoid reconquest and religious repression, on 26 August 1619 they decided to offer the crown to
the Calvinist Elector Palatine, Frederick V. Frederick was one of the best-connected Protestant
princes in Europe, and he was thus capable (so the Bohemians believed) ofmobilizing considerable
confessional support for their cause among his Protestant peers. 16 Frederick hesitated, but was
finally persuaded by the arguments of his militant councillors Anhalt and Ludwig Camerarius that
he had nothing to lose by accepting, as a war to defend Protestant liberties against the Catholic axis
bent on their destruction was inevitable. Therefore Frederick accepted the Bohemians' offer on 28
September, precipitating an important shift in the balance ofpower in the Empire — the Protestants
"Four areas were particularly susceptible to the outbreak of hostilities at this time and had the
potential to ignite a war of European proportions: I ) the Netherlands, where the truce with Spain was due
to expire in 1621; 2) the Empire, where the formation of the confessional alliances and the conflict
between its Catholic Habsburg ruler and his Protestant estates threatened the peace; 3) the Baltic, where
the antagonism between Catholic Poland and Protestant Sweden periodically erupted into hostilities; and
4) various areas of strategic importance (for instance Lorraine, Savoy, and northern Italy, all on the
"Spanish Road"), in the event that dynastic war broke out between France and the Habsburg states.
Contemporaries knew that the outbreak of a European war was only a matter of time given the many
potential trouble spots and the network of international alliances that connected European states (Parker,
Europe, 157).
l6Parker points out that Frederick was in many ways a strange choice. A hostile contemporary
wondered that the Bohemian rebels had elected as their new king "a man who had never seen either a
battle or a corpse,. ..a prince who knew more about gardening than fighting" (M. Toegel, "PfiCiny saskeho
vpadu do Cech v roce 163 1," (jeskosolvensky Casopis historicity 21 (1973): 560 n. 16; quoted in Parker,
TYW, 47).
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instead of the Catholics now held the majority in the Imperial electoral college.17 Ferdinand of
Styria, newly elected as Emperor Ferdinand n," was now forced to take decisive action against
Frederick and the Bohemian rebels, for with Bohemia's electoral vote in Protestant hands, Habsburg
power in the Empire was under dire threat" Initially, the rebellion was quite successful; it spread
to the Austrian crown lands, most notably Upper Austria, and the rebels twice laid siege to Vienna.
17The Golden Bull of 1356 invested the seven Kurfursten, or Imperial electors, with the authority
to elect the Holy Roman Emperor. They were also to hold certain important offices at the Imperial court,
such as chancellor, almoner, cupbearer, and master of the horse. The Bull designated three ecclesiastical
electors (the archbishops of Mainz, Trier, and Cologne) and four lay electors (the Count Palatine of the
Rhine, the Margrave of Brandenburg, the Duke of Saxony, and the King of Bohemia). In 1618, they were
split religiously as fol lows—four Catholic (Bohemia and the three prince archbishoprics) and three
Protestant (Lutheran Saxony and Brandenburg and the Calvin is t Palatinate). Frederick's acceptance of the
Bohemian crown gave him control of two of the coveted electoral votes, tipping the balance in favor of
the Protestants. For approximately 200 years, Habsburgs had been chosen as emperor because they were
the most powerful of the princes of the Empire and defended its eastern frontier against the l urks.
Habsburgs were also routinely elected as King of Bohemia for much the same reasons. With the
deposition of Ferdinand and the election of Frederick as King of Bohemia, this tradition was flouted and
Habsburg power in the Empire was thus threatened. As an interesting sidelight, Ferdinand was elected
emperor shortly before Frederick accepted the Bohemian crown, and the latter had cast his Palatine
electoral vote in Ferdinand's favor.
1"Anhalt, in the hope of dividing the Catholic electors and thus forestalling the election of a
Habsburg as emperor, attempted to persuade Maximilian of Bavaria to stand as a candidate. Anhalt was
unsuccessful, much to his chagrin (he once said that he would rather see a Turk or the Devil elected than
Ferdinand); despite Maximilian's wish to contain Habsburg power, he refused to act as a front for the
Protestants (Parker, TYW, 33).
"The famous Imperial general Albrecht von Wallenstein, a champion of Imperial power,
suggested a more radical solution to the impertinence of Frederick, whose actions endangered Imperial
sovereignty: "The Friedlander openly declared [that] prince electors or other princes were not needed any
longer and [that] they should no longer be treated with consideration [literally, their little "guest hat"
should be removed, i.e., they should no longer be treated as guests]. They should be taught manners and
shown that the Emperor was not dependent upon them, but rather they upon the Emperor." ("Offen
erklarte der Friedlander, man bediirfe keiner Kur- und anderer Fursten mchr und miisse ihnen das
Gasthutel abziehen. Man miisse sie mores lehren und ihnen zeigen, dafi der Kaiser nicht von ihnen,
sondem sie von Kaiser abhingen." [Anton Gindely, Waldstein wdhrend seines ersten Generalats im
Lichte der gleichzeitigen Quellen (Prague: Temsky, 1886), vol. 1, 176; quoted in Gunther Franz, "Glaube
und Recht im politischen Denken Kaiser Ferdinands II," in Der Dreissigj&hrige Krieg: Perspektiven und
Strukturen, ed. Hans Ulrich Rudolf, Wege der Forschung, vol. 451 (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche
Buchgesellschaft, 1977), 426]).
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In the end, however, it was the Emperor who emerged victorious with the financial and military
support ofhis Spanish, Bavarian, and Saxon allies. In November 1620, combined Imperialist troops
crushed Frederick's forces outside of Prague at the Battle of White Mountain.
Frederick's failure to win the Palatinate's traditional allies over to his side contributed
significantly to his undoing. He received negligible support from the very Protestant powers which
the Bohemians were confident would support his claim to the throne, particularly his father-in-law
James I of England and his uncle Maurice ofNassau, Prince of Orange, who refused to support the
"Hurra-Calvinisten" (militant Calvinists) in their Bohemian adventure.20 France remained neutral
and offered only mediation. Frederick, largely isolated in Europe, could only stand by and watch
as his German support also melted away. His only steadfast ally was Bethlen Gabor, the
Transylvanian prince who was attempting to conquer Habsburg Hungary.
After his defeat at White Mountain, Frederick suffered for his insolence. League forces soon
occupied the Upper Palatinate and the eastern portion of the Lower Palatinate, while Spanish armies
took over its western portion. By 1622, Frederick and his family had fled into Dutch exile.
Ferdinand made good on promises to reward Maximilian of Bavaria at Frederick's expense in return
for League support. Frederick was outlawed by the Imperial ban in 1621, and his electorship was
conferred upon Maximilian for life in February 1623. 21
MHeinz Schilling, Aujbruch und Krise: Deutschland 151 7-1648, Siedler Deutsche Geschichte,
vol. 5 (Berlin: Siedler, 1988), 414; Clasen, 25.
21The Imperial Diet had decreed perpetual peace, or ewiger Landfrieden, from 1495, officially
condemning private warfare in the Empire. This provided the legal basis for the censure of rebel princes
that would later take the form of the Imperial ban. (Jean Berenger, A History of the Habsburg Empire,
1273-1700, trans. C.A. Simpson [London: Longman, 1994], 128-9).
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Ferdinand's moves against Frederick were a cause for great concern for German as well! as
foreign princes. Although most believed Frederick deserved to be ejected from Bohemia and
stripped ofhis crown, complete dispossession of his hereditary lands and the transfer ofhis electooral
title to Maximilian was another matter completely. No prince of the Empire could feel '. his
possessions were completely secure after Ferdinand had deprived Frederick of his patrimony aand
then used it to repay a Habsburg ally.22 Also, with the Palatine electorate in Bavarian hands, rthe
Catholics strengthened their majority in the electoral college, which Frederick's acceptance of rthe
Bohemian crown had so recently threatened. Understandably, Protestants feared more than ever : for
their religious freedom. The great powers, for their part, were concerned with the fate of rthe
Palatinate, as it was one of the most important and strategically located principalities in the Empinre.
None of them wanted it to fall into enemy hands; therefore Protestant and anti-Habsburg states odid
not observe the developments of 1621-3 with pleasure. They constantly looked for ways to
undermine Habsburg ascendancy in Europe and the Empire, and, as a part of this program, to restoore
Frederick to his lands and titles. The Palatinate therefore became the connecting link not omly
between the Bohemian conflict and its expansion to Germany, but also between the German confllict
and dynastic power struggles in western Europe.
'^Given the infrequent changes to the electoral college, it is easy to understand the alarm causeed
by the Emperor's alteration of the Imperial constitution to accommodate Maximilian of Bavaria. No
changes had been made in the electoral arrangement of the Empire for almost 300 years when the
Palatine electorate was transferred to Maximilian in 1623 (it was secured for his line in 1628). In 1654.-, an
eighth electorate was created for the Prince Palatine. Afterwards, the only changes that were made untml
the nineteenth century were: 1) the addition of Hannover as a ninth electorate in 1692; and 2) the
amalgamation of the Palatine and Bavarian electorates in 1777 (thus bringing full circle the process wfchich
had begun in 1623), whereupon Hannover became the eighth.
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Christian IV, King of Denmark and prince ofthe Empire, was one of the foreign princes who
was disturbed by the course ofevents in the Empire. In 1625, spurred on by promises ofEnglish and
Dutch aid made at the Hague Convention, he took the lead in defending German Protestantism.23
Wisely or not, he sent his troops into the Empire to fight against Imperialist forces, which consisted
mainly of the seasoned Catholic League army on the one hand and the Emperor's own army newly
raised by Albrecht von Wallenstein on the other. Unfortunately for Christian, his allies did not come
through with much ofthe assistance they had promised him.24 After several inauspicious campaigns,
the Danish army suffered a decisive defeat at the hands of Imperialist forces at Lutter in August
1626. In the following two years, Wallenstein's army pushed up through northern Germany and on
into Jutland. Christian was finally forced to conclude the Peace of Lubeck in May 1629, by which
he was allowed to retain Denmark and Holstein but was obliged to leave his German allies to the
Emperor's revenge. Ferdinand, encouraged by his confessor and the militant Catholic party at the
Imperial court, seized the opportunity to roll back Protestantism in the Empire. In March 1629, he
promulgated the Edict of Restitution, which demanded the restoration of all Church lands seized by
Protestants after 1552 in violation of the Peace ofAugsburg. The Edict and Spanish plans to launch
a fleet in the Baltic were enough to bring Sweden into the fray and make the conflict international.
^Christian held lands in Holstein, which was a state of the Lower Saxon circle of the Empire. In
addition to protecting Protestantism, he was anxious to extend his influence in the circle and to gain
control of the secularized bishoprics of Bremen, Verden, and Osnabriick, which commanded the estuaries
of the Weser and Elbe.
"By the Hague Convention (1625), England and the United Provinces each agreed to pay
144,000 thalers a month to help support Christian's cause. England was particularly negligent in making
payments—Christian only received a fraction of the promised amount (547,000 thalers) over the three
years of fighting, most of it in 1626. The Dutch paid their subsidies more promptly, but also came up
short of the expected sum (Parker, TYW, 69; Ronald G. Asch, The Thirty Years War: The Holy Roman
Empire and Europe. 1618-48 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997], 88).
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Once the longstanding Swedish-Polish conflict in the Baltic was resolved in 1629, the
Swedish King Gustavus Adolphus lost no time in undertaking his long-contemplated invasion of
Germany. In June of the following year he invaded, purportedly to aid the German Protestants but
also to prevent the Habsburgs from establishing firm control over northern Germany and the Baltic.25
The initial dominance of Swedish forces over the Imperial armies was dazzling, but the tide of their
success was ultimately stemmed at the Battle of Lulzcn, where the charismatic Swedish King fell
leading the charge of one of his regiments. With Gustavus's death, the Swedish army lost the
inspirational force behind their impressive sweep across Germany; thereafter, though the
demoralized Swedes kept on fighting, they began to fall back before the advancing Catholic armies.
The decisive blow came in 1634, when the combined Imperialist forces of Ferdinand, King of
Hungary (the future Ferdinand III) and his cousin the Cardinal Infante Ferdinand of Spain
annihilated Swedish forces at Nordlingen.
The Emperor took full advantage of his dominant position to open serious peace talks with
the German Protestants. He was finally prepared to make some religious concessions to them in the
"The confessional aims of Gustavus's policy should not be underestimated, as defense of
Protestantism not only justified his action in Germany, but it was also the principle that legitimized his
rule in Sweden. The Polish King, Sigismund Vasa, had been the King of Sweden before his uncle Charles
(Gustavus's father) deposed him because he was a Catholic. From 1600 both Charles and Gustavus fought
Sigismund (and after 1632 the Iatter's successor Wladislaw) on and off over the Swedish crown and the
Baltic provinces of Estonia and Livonia (Asch, 102-4). Another important consideration for Gustavus in
his decision to intervene in the Empire was the strong Imperial military presence in northern Germany,
which he feared might be employed to aid the Poles against Sweden. For an alternative explanation of
Gustavus's intervention in Germany, see Erik Ringmar, Identity. Interest and Action: A Cultural
Explanation ofSweden's Intervention in the Thirty Years' War, Cambridge Cultural Studies (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1996). For Gustavus's initial war aims, see: Michael Roberts, Gustavus
Adolphus: A History ofSweden, 1611-1632 (London: Longman, 1953-8), vol. 2, 373-5 and 417-25; and
Sigmund Goetze, Die Politik des schwedischen Reichskanzlers Axel Oxenstierna gegenuber Kaiser und
Reich, Beitrage zur Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte, vol. 3 (Kiel: Mtihlau, 1971).
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interests of ridding the Empire of foreign intervention. By the Peace of Prague of 1635 concluded
with Lutheran Saxony, Ferdinand retreated from the strident demands of the Edict ofRestitution in
return for assistance in ousting the foreign invaders. Its terms were subsequently accepted by most
of the Protestant states and cities of the Empire (including many of Sweden's erstwhile allies). The
religious concessions made by Ferdinand assured many German Protestants that the formation of
a united anti-Catholic front was no longer necessary to the preservation of their religious liberty.
War-weary Germans of opposing ideologies were finally working together toward a common goal
— peace. The spirit of secular compromise evidenced in the Peace of Prague marked a turning point
in the Thirty Years' War.
Ultimately, the hope that this German settlement could end the conflict proved too idealistic,
for the Thirty Years' War was no longer a German war, but a European war. Thus a viable peace
would only be achieved at an international congress with the participation of the foreign powers
involved, particularly France and Sweden, into whose hands the opposition to the Habsburgs had
fallen almost entirely after 1635. France, already covertly aiding the Dutch and Swedes against the
Habsburgs, announced its entry into the hostilities in May 1635 with a declaration of war on Spain.
By the following year, the French were at war with the Emperor too. Thus the Thirty Years' War
had degenerated into a conflict between France, Sweden, the United Provinces (in revolt against
Spain), and their allies on the one hand, and the Habsburgs and their allies on the other.26 By
drawing in foreign states, an internal conflict had inadvertently turned the Empire into a theater of
operations for outside powers to increase their influence and prestige.
^Gutmann, 766.
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Peace at Last
By the beginning of 1643, the pressure for peace was mounting. Spain, France, and Sweden were
all experiencing difficulty in maintaining the war effort, and the war-weary Germans were calling
for peace.27 It had finally become apparent to all involved that a military solution to the
confrontation in the Empire was unlikely, and that peace would only be achieved at the bargaining
table. Thus an area was neutralized for an international peace conference in Westphalia, and
delegates began to arrive shortly thereafter. Almost all of the European powers were represented,
with the exception of Russia, the Ottoman Empire, and England. Protestants and Catholics were
organized separately, with the Corpus Evangel icorum meeting at Osnabrflck, and the Corpus
Catholicorum at Minister. In addition to the foreign powers involved in the war, all of the Imperial
estates had been invited to take part in the peace conference as well. This meant that Westphalia was
not only an international conference, but also a meeting of the estates of the Empire capable of
addressing German issues.2*
27The financial situation of all parties involved was deteriorating. Internal dissension in Spain and
France—revolts in Portugal (1640) and Catalonia (1640-52) and the portents of the "Fronde" (1648-
53)—prompted both of these powers to seek an end to the German conflict. The destruction wrought by
years of war in the Empire provided an obvious reason for the Germans' desire for peace.
2*Asch, 134-5. For Imperial policy during the peace negotiations, see Karsten Ruppert, Die
kaiserliche Politikauf dem weslfalischen Friedenskongrefi, 1643-1648, Schriftenreihe der Vereinigung
zur Erforschung derNeueren Geschichte (SVENG), vol. 10 (Munster: Aschendorff, 1979); for Bavarian
policy, see Gerhard Immler, Kurfurst Maximilian I. undder Westf&lische FriedenskongreP: Die
bayerische auswartige Politik von 1644 bis zum Ulmer Waffenstillstand, SVENG, vol. 20 (MQnster:
Aschendorff, 1992).
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Difficulties, however, plagued the negotiations from beginning to end. After the two sides
were finally assembled, negotiations were delayed by incessant disputes over rank and precedence
that broke out among the delegates.29 At Mtinster, for example, arguments erupted over
Who should make the first visit; how far a host should accompany his guest, whether
to the door or to his carriage; how the ambassadors should be seated; what titles
should be employed in addressing the different plenipotentiaries, — these were the
momentous questions upon which the diplomatists spent months of anxious
thought.30
As a result, the first serious business was not transacted until the middle of 1645; but once they
started, "They negotiated as hard as they fought"31 Even after the peace negotiations were well
underway, military operations continued, with the diplomats continually assessing the military
situation in an attempt to exploit a victory or play for time after a defeat. Fighting did not really
cease until the final signatures were affixed to the treaty on 24 October 1648.
The Peace of Westphalia was a settlement of enormous significance for all of western
Europe.32 Its territorial provisions were of great interest to non-German powers as well as German
states. France and Sweden in particular secured significant territorial cessions. France gained
29These hindrances were so tenacious that Francois Ogier, the attendant of the French
plenipotentiary Abel Servien, wrote in frustration: "If they create in the substance of the business delays
proportioned to those hitherto, I do not know that the unborn child Madame Servien is expecting can
hope to see the end of a treaty to which our adversaries create such extraordinary obstacles." (Francois
Ogier, Journal du Congres de Mimsier, cd. Augusts Boppe [Paris: Plon, Nourrit, 1893], 88; quoted in
David Jayne Hill, A History ofDiplomacy in the International Development ofEurope, vol. 2, The
Establishment of Territorial Sovereignty [New York: Fertig, 1967], 594).
"Hill, S95.
31Parker, TYW, 160.
"For an abridged version of the peace terms, see Geoffrey Symcox, ed., War, Diplomaty and
Imperialism. 1 61 8-1 763 (London: Walker, 1974), 39-62.
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control of three Lorraine bishoprics — Metz, Toul, and Verdun — and most of Alsace. Sweden
obtained, most importantly, possession of western Pomerania and the secularized bishoprics of
Bremen and Verden, as well as an indemnity of five million thalers.33 The Swiss Confederation and
the United Provinces won official recognition as sovereign states, though they were already de facto
independent of the Empire in 1618. The boundaries ofthe Empire shrank with the formal admission
that neither they nor the bishoprics ceded to France were any longer Imperial constituents.
The peace settlement was also of fundamental importance, both politically and religiously,
to the internal affairs of the Empire. With the decentralization of Imperial authority, the Habsburgs
lost their political pre-eminence in the Empire, which split into a hodgepodge of independent
principalities. Individual German territorial rulers became essentially sovereign in both
ecclesiastical and political matters; thus, the Westphalian peace settlement can be seen as the
legitimation of territorial absolutism.34 Territorial cessions made to three of the German electors
increased their importance while further eroding that of the Emperor: Bavaria retained the Upper
Palatinate; Saxony kept Lusatia, which it had held as security for backing the Emperor during the
Bohemian phase of the war, and Brandenburg gained the eastern portion of Pomerania and the
secularized bishoprics of Magdeburg, Halberstadt, and Minden. The electoral balance in the Empire
shifted as an eighth (and junior) electorate was created for the Prince Palatine, Charles Louis, who
33Stephen J. Lee, The Thirty Years War (London: Routledge, 1991), 65-8.
MIt should, however, be noted that while the sovereignty of the princes and estates of the Empire
was affirmed by the Peace, and the Emperor was now to seek their consent in major political decisions,
many of his prerogatives were not clearly defined and thus remained open to broader interpretation.
Further, many of the smaller estates, too weak to take advantage of their new privileges, sought the
protection of the Emperor now that some new limitations were imposed on his authority. Therefore, the
peace settlement did not preclude a resurgence of Imperial power (Asch, 144-5).
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was restored to his inheritance in the Lower Palatinate. The original Palatine electoral dignity was
confirmed to Bavaria.35
Perhaps the most portentous problem addressed from the perspective of the Empire was that
of a permanent religious settlement. The agreement reconfirmed the Religious Peace ofAugsburg
and its partition arrangement, with 1624 as the normative date for the resolution of confessional
disputes: "The Edict of Restitution was consigned to the dust heap of history for good."36
Confessional disputes were no longer to be decided by Imperial courts but were to be negotiated in
at Imperial Diet between groups of the Catholic and Protestant estates, the Corpora Catholicorum
and Evangelicorum. And Calvinism was finally recognized as a third religious option.37 Although
the Austrian Habsburgs lost their political dominance in the Empire, they retained untrammeled
sovereign authority in their hereditary lands and in Bohemia, giving them a free hand to complete
the suppression of Protestantism there.
While the religious and political settlement agreed upon at Westphalia was successful at
ending the fighting in the Empire, it failed to bring about a general European peace. War continued
between France and Spain until the latter was defeated and they finally signed the Peace of the
Pyrenees in 1659. The concern then became containing Bourbon rather than Habsburg power, as
the many European wars against Louis XTV's France were to show. Despite its shortcomings,
"The Palatinate, once one of the most prosperous territories in Germany, was desolated; it never
regained its previous preeminence (Lee, 62; Clasen, 30).
^Asch, 145.
"Ibid.
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however, the Peace ofWestphalia was ultimately accepted by most European powers as an inherent,
cardinal component of the post- 1648 European state system.
The Westphalian peace conference and the settlement reached there constituted a watershed
in international relations. It was the first great European peace congress in that it attempted to
address all western European issues at once — a radical departure from previous peace negotiations,
which only sought to deal with issues affecting two or three parties.3* Also, the settlement
recognized that the European international system was comprised of independent sovereign states
acting in their own interests, as opposed to the medieval ideal ofa united Christendom represented
by pope and emperor.39 Although the reality of universal Christendom had been indubitably
destroyed by the onslaught of the Reformation, the ideal was only put to rest when the Westphalian
settlement publicly revealed that political concerns had eclipsed religious ones.
The "Age of Ideology" Ends
Reason of stale is a wonderful beast, for it chases away all other reasons.
von Thumshim. a perceptive witness at Westphalia
Even before 1648, European politics were headed in a more secular direction. This shift was most
apparent in the move away from confessional alliances in favor of those based on dynastic interest.
Religion, of course, continued to be politically important, but it no longer governed international
relations as it had a half-century before. In the end, Europeans had decided that the cost of religious
"Georges Pages, The Thirty Years War, 1618-1648 (London: Black, 1970), 1 1-2.
39HilI, 599.
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warfare was too dear. Although it is difficult to date the waning of confessional politics precisely,
Geoffrey Parker suggests that
As the task ofdefending the Protestant cause fell into the hands of the Lutherans, less
militant and less intransigent than the Calvinists, and as the extent of non-German
participation increased, so 'reasons of state' came to the fore. Naturally the balance
did not swing entirely away from religion . . . [yet] the place of religious issues
relentlessly receded.40
The 1630s reveal the most obvious signs of the decline of the influence of religion on international
politics, for instance the concessions made by the Emperor to the German Protestants in the Peace
ofPrague and, more conspicuously, Catholic France's bankrolling and support ofProtestant Sweden
against their Habsburg co-religionists for the sake of promoting French dynastic interests.
The process was certainly well underway at the time of the Westphalian negotiations,
because modified attitudes toward confessional politics are what made compromise and settlement
viable. This increasingly secular attitude was reflected in the posture of the Catholic delegates in
MQnster toward papal pronouncements on peace negotiations with the Protestants. Initially, there
was papal mediation at the peace conference, but when the pontiff refused to sanction concessions
to Protestants, Catholic powers dispensed with his services. They ignored the nuncio's
remonstrations that the peace settlement legitimized heresy in the Empire, as well as a papal protest
declaring it "perpetually null, vain, invalid, wicked and . . . without force and effect."41 The Catholic
states' dismissal ofpapal objections to the peace exposed the ever-widening gap between the political
^Parker. 7W, 196.
4lHill, 604. For an analysis of the papal politics at Westphalia and the protest, see Konrad
Repgen, Die romische Kurie undder Westfal'tsche Friede: Idee und Wirklichkeit das Papsttums im 16.
und 1 7. Jahrhundert (Tubingen: Niemayer, 1962) and idem, "Der papstliche Protest gegen den
Westfalischen Frieden und die Friedenspolitik Urbans VIII.," in Von der Reformation zur Oegenwart, 30-
52.
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and religious claims of the papacy on the one hand, and the realities of the European political
situation on the other. As the papacy became increasingly irrelevant as a political force in
international relations, so the promotion of the secular interests of individual states took precedence
and became the modus operandi for the peace negotiations. This resulted in the foundation of the
new system of international relations of the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that allowed
for the peaceful coexistence ofconfessions.42 A new basis of European cooperation and discussion
had been established.43
This is not to imply that religious considerations no longer played a role in international
relations after 1648. That would be far too simplistic. The prominent role of confession in the early
modem state-building process and resulting intricate relationship between religion and politics
ensured that the two would never be completely exclusive ofone another in this period.44 Rather the
decisive departure was that
^Schilling, Aufbruch, 438.
4jFor a historiographical discussion of the economic and social impact of the Thirty Years' War,
see Parker, TYW, 186-92, 268-72.
44Johannes Burkhardt convincingly argues that the interests of religion and politics became
indelibly intertwined during the early modem state-building process as states looked to confession for
help with legitimacy and organization. The early modern state came into its own as a confessional state.
The complex, close relationship between religious and political power was obvious in the dynastic
political myth of the pieias Ausrriaca (which dates from the Thirty Years' War period), the close
association of state and church under the Austrian Habsburgs (Johannes Burkhardt, Der DreifiigjShrige
Krieg, Ncue Historische Bibliothek, n.s., vol. 542 [Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1992], 139-43).
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. . . reason of state, as opposed to religious allegiance, was much more openly
acknowledged as the basis ofbigh politics governing European power politics as well
as relations between the Princes of the Empire. . . . [the] ideal of a princely
government inspired primarily by religious and confessional principles, which had
never been entirely realistic even before 1618, was now definitely passe.43
These momentous changes in European political and religious life were well underway when the
Emperor and Charles I exchanged diplomatic missions in the middle years of the 1630s.
4SAsch, 193.
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2
The Foreign polIcy of the Emperor and His AllIes:
The German War, 1618-25
In order to assess effectively Charles I's Habsburg foreign policy in the later 1630s, and more
specifically his diplomatic overtures to the Emperor, it is critical to understand the religious and
political motivations and the relationships of the Emperor and his major allies, Spain and Bavaria.
The next two chapters therefore explore how these issues influenced Imperial foreign policy
decisions in the years leading up to Taylor's mission to the Emperor in 1635. The first deals with
the years from the outbreak of the Thirty Years' War in 16 18 until just before the entry of Christian
IV of Denmark into the fray in 1625. During this first period, the war was mainly fought by
"German" combatants in the broader sense, that is, by states belonging to the Empire. The second
discusses the years from the Danish intervention until the Peace of Prague of 1635. During this stage
the war took on an increasingly international character, with Sweden and France following Denmark
into the fighting in 1630 and 1635 respectively. The Peace of Prague concluded between the
Emperor and Saxony was intended to put an end to hostilities among German states and expel the
foreign intruders from the Empire. This agreement had important consequences for the Palatine
house and by extension for Charles I's foreign policy and English diplomacy. In fact, the King's
main motives for sending Taylor to Vienna was to register his protest against its terms and to
negotiate a more favorable settlement for his nephew.
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The following two chapters will discuss a variety of events and issues impacting Imperial
foreign policy and the English negotiations with the Emperor in these years. They will introduce
many of the important personalities involved, including Ferdinand II and Maximilian of Bavaria as
well as influential councillors and foreign diplomats at the Imperial court. These chapters also look
at policy making and the networks of influence at the Imperial court, the priorities and goals of the
Emperor and his allies, and the relationships among them. They trace the development of the
Palatinate question due to the imposition of the ban on Frederick, the division of the Palatine lands
and dignities among Spain and Bavaria, and the refusal of many European and German states to
countenance it. This problem had great consequences for all involved and had a particularly strong
impact on English foreign policy in the early Stuart period. The events of these years, the issues
under discussion, and the players involved had a significant impact upon the diplomatic negotiations
between England and the Emperor in the later 1630s.
Ferdinand II and the Politics of the Imperial Court
Ferdinand of Styria, later Emperor Ferdinand II, was a friendly, trusting, and generous man.1 He
took his responsibilities as a ruler very seriously, and consequently he diligently spent many hours
each day consulting with bis councillors and poring over government documents.2 Ferdinand's
1Ferdinand II was bom on 9 July 1578 in Graz to Karl II of Inner Austria (son of Emperor
Ferdinand I) and Maria of Bavaria. Ferdinand was married twice: from 1600 to 1616 to his first wife,
Maria Anna, daughter of Duke Albrecht V of Bavaria; and from 1622 until his death to his second wife,
Eleonore, daughter of Duke Vinccnzo I of Mantua. Ferdinand began his personal rule of Inner Austria on
4 December 1596. He was crowned King of Bohemia on 29 June 1617 and King of Hungary on 1 July
1618. He was elected Emperor on 28 August 1619 and crowned on 9 September of the same year.
Ferdinand reigned as emperor until he died on 15 February 1637 in Vienna; he was buried in Graz.
JOn Ferdinand, see Dieter Albrecht, "Ferdinand II., 1619-1637," in Die Kaiser der Neuzeit, 1519-
1918: Heiliges Romisches Reich. Osierreich. Deutschland, ed. Anton Schindling and Walter Ziegler
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dedication to his duties as a sovereign was only surpassed by his religious devotion; indeed, in his
mind the two were inextricably entwined. It was apparent that his belief in Catholicism was his
defining personal characteristic:
on one matter all could agree: the emperor's Catholic convictions amounted to a
consuming passion. He attended Masses at all hours of the day and night; he revered
the Blessed Virgin and the relics of saints; he showed conspicuous favour to the
priesthood and to the institutions of the Church, especially its monasteries; he went
on pilgrimages and endured self-abasement; his private life was a model ofpiety and
familial virtue. This devotion was not merely common knowledge: it was publicly
paraded . . . .3
Ferdinand's strict Catholic upbringing by his Bavarian Wittelsbach mother and his education at the
Jesuit University of Ingolstadt cemented his convictions and convinced him that his highest calling
as a prince was to safeguard and extend the Catholic faith in domains under his control.4 Thus the
defense and advancement of Catholic interests was his primary political goal as Archduke of Styria
and later as Emperor.5 It should be noted, however, that religious and political interests were
inseparable in Ferdinand's mind, as it was in the minds of many European rulers of the time: he
identified the advancement of Catholicism with the advancement ofdynasty and state. His inability
(Munich: Beck, 1990), 125.
3Parker, TYW, 75-6. Further, "Ferdinand carried personal piety to great lengths.... His routine
included meditations and two masses, as well as (cissing the floor five times in memory of Christ's five
wounds. He would follow processions for hours, carrying a taper and bareheaded, even in the pouring
rain." (R. J. W. Evans, The Making of the Habsbicrg Monarchy, 1550-1 700: An Interpretation [Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1979], 72).
'"Ferdinand's education did more than simply reinforce his commitment to Catholicism: in
addition to German, he spoke Italian fluently and Latin quite well, and he could also understand French
and Spanish (Albrecht, "Ferdinand II," 125; Joharan Franzl, Ferdinand II: Kaiser in Zwiespalt der Zeit, 2d
ed. [Graz: Styria, 1989], 230).
'Albrecht, "Ferdinand II," 125; Franz, 415-7. According to Geoffrey Parker, "the ascetic faith lies
at the root of all the emperor's political activity."
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to separate the interests ofChurch and state created a dilemma that continually plagued him, namely
to what extent he could sacrifice religious and moral as well as legal considerations in political
decision-making to the necessity of Staatsraison.6 When push came to shove, in the Empire
Ferdinand preferred political considerations to confessional ones when they came into open conflict
with one another. Whenever possible, however, he tried to harmonize them. Perhaps the most
visible example of this was his promulgation of the Edict of Restitution in 1629, when Imperial
power was at its zenith.
Ferdinand's insistence upon furthering the Counter Reformation and his intolerance where
religion was concerned convinced his opponents that he was a tyrant and bigot. He rarely
relinquished ground in religious matters, even in moments of great adversity which called for
measured compromise with Protestants. As Ronald Asch points out, Ferdinand was able to stand
firm in the face of danger because he possessed
[a]n unshakeable faith in the justness of his own cause coupled with courage, or
perhaps just great insensitivity at moments of danger. . . . Unable to understand the
convictions of his opponents, he was equally incapable of imagining the disasters
which might befall him if he continued to pursue his policy in the face of opposition.
The steadfastness and resolution . . . enabled him to survive even periods of crisis
without giving in to his enemies.7
6Albrecht, "Ferdinand II," 126. His solution, as we will see, was to have his councillors
thoroughly examine his policies for expediency and legality and his spiritual advisors for compatibility
with natural and divine law.
7Asch, 57-8. Ferdinand's inflexibility in the face of danger bordered on foolishness. For instance,
when Bohemian troops were threatening Vienna in 1619, Ferdinand met with a group of irate Lower
Austrian noblemen to discuss their grievances (the Lower Austrian estates had declared their support of
the Bohemian rebels). It was rumored that during the meeting, one of the nobles seized the embattled
Emperor and shouted at him, "Give in Nandl, or you are done for!" However, Ferdinand only responded
to this outburst with indifference (ibid., 57).
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Given Ferdinand's inflexibility, Protestants — particularly those directly ruled by the Habsburgs in
the crown lands, Bohemia, and Hungary* — had justifiable reasons to fear him.
For his part Ferdinand was convinced that Protestant heresy bred disloyalty among his
subjects, and he resolved to extirpate it in the areas under his direct control.9 He therefore instituted
his program of confessional consolidation or "confessional absolutism" in the crown lands, where
Protestantism was well established by the later sixteenth century, particularly among the nobility
who controlled the regional estates.10 He began in Inner Austria while he was Archduke of Styria
by instigating a ruthless campaign against the Protestants there, effectively forcing their conversion
or exile. Ferdinand was quick to recognize the advantages that religious unity brought to Inner
Austria, and particularly that it strengthened his own position as ruler. It comes as no surprise,
therefore, that shortly after his election as King of Bohemia in 1617, he embarked on a similar
"The Habsburgs ruled the Austrian crown lands, or ErblSnde, with direct sovereignty. These
lands consisted of: Further Austria, or the Vorlande, in the west (the Tyrol, some islands of territory along
the middle area of the Rhine, and portions of Alsace); Inner Austria, or Innerdsterreich, in the southeast
(the duchies of Styria, Carinthia, and Camiola); and the core Austrian duchies of Upper and Lower
Austria, Ober- and Niederosterreich. From 1526, the elective kingdoms of Bohemia (which besides
Bohemia proper also included Moravia, Silesia, and Lusatia) and Hungary (in this period a slice along its
northwestern border, as the rest was controlled by either the Ottoman sultan or his vassal the prince of
Transylvania) were also ruled by the Austrian Habsburgs. After the suppression of the Bohemian revolt,
Bohemia also came under direct control of the Habsburgs; thus a case can be made for including it among
the Austrian crown lands after 1627, as it was in the nineteenth-century Dual Monarchy. In the Empire, of
course, the Habsburg emperors enjoyed only limited hegemony. For more details on the areas under
Austrian Habsburg rule, see Evans, Habsburg Monarchy, chaps. 5-8.
9ibid., 68; idem, "The Austrian Habsburgs," in The Courts ofEurope: Politics, Patronage and
Royalty. 1400-1800, ed. A. G. Dickens (London: Thames and Hudson, 1977), 136.
10While Ferdinand made moves towards religious consolidation in the crown lands and later the
Empire, monarchical rule was only a goal for the former (Albrecht, "Ferdinand II," 126; Robert Bireley,
"Religious War," in Krieg und Politik, 102). In his mind, he acted in the interest of his subjects' religious
welfare, according to the law of the land and respecting their rights (idem, Religion and Politics in the
Age of the Counlerreformation: Emperor Ferdinand II. William Lamormaini, S.J., and the Formation of
Imperial Policy [Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1981], 13).
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program there by steadily attacking the religious privileges of the Bohemian Protestants. The
resulting friction between the Protestant estates and Ferdinand's government culminated in the
Bohemian revolt. This conflict spread because Ferdinand, true to form, continued doggedly to
pursue a narrow vision of his princely mission without adequately adjusting the policies that had
been successful in Inner Austria to suit the situation in Bohemia. More importantly, once he became
Emperor he did not adjust them for the Empire, where his authority was more limited than in either
Inner Austria or Bohemia."
Ferdinand's decision to roll back Protestantism in the lands under his rule was influenced by
the Catholic religious, particularly the Jesuits. Given the importance of religion in his public and
private life, it is unsurprising that the clergy multiplied and influenced political decision-making at
his court in Graz and later in Vienna. The most well-known religious figure at the Imperial Court
was Ferdinand's confessor, the Jesuit William Lamormaini.12 Although in theory confessors were
to avoid political machinations, Lamormaini (like many of his peers) was unable to avoid the
temptation to further the cause of the true faith by prevailing upon Ferdinand's tender conscience.
Thus, even though he was not an official councillor of state, Lamormaini came to exercise significant
influence on Imperial policy. Both in the confessional and as one of an official team of spiritual
""In a way he was out of his depth outside his hereditary lands. This explains to some extent why
in the later 1620s he took recourse to the same sort of purely confessional policy in the Empire which he
had previously pursued, ultimately successfully, in his own dominions. But in the Empire this policy was
to lead to disaster." (Asch, 58).
^Lamormaini, who was from Spanish Luxemburg, became acquainted with Ferdinand in Graz,
where the former was first a professor and then rector of the University. Appointed rector of the
University of Vienna in 1621, Ferdinand chose Lamormaini as his confessor when the post fell vacant in
1624. For Lamormaini's influence on Ferdinand's political decision-making, see Robert Bireley's Religion
and Politics, a detailed study of Imperial politics from 1624 to 163S. Bireley argues that religious motives
often outweighed political ones with Ferdinand, and that Lamormaini was partially responsible for this.
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advisors called upon to give its opintion on certain sensitive political/confessional issues,
Lamormaini counseled the Emperor to aocept bis divine mission to restore and protect Catholicism
in all his lands, including the Empire. Ferdinand, as we will see, found these arguments convincing
when Catholic fortunes were ascendant.13
Despite the fact that the Catholic clergy at the Imperial court, and Lamormaini in particular,
had some influence upon the Emperor, care must be taken when attempting to evaluate the actual
effect ofclerical politics on Imperial policymaking. M Firstly, though Lamormaini's counsel certainly
had an impact, it did not dominate Ferdinand's thinking. Secondly, depending upon the
circumstances, the confessor's sway was stronger at some times (in the latter 1620s, with Catholic
victories in the Empire and the declaration of the Edict of Restitution) than others (in the early to
mid-1 630s, with Swedish successes and thic Peace of Prague). Thirdly, since the Emperor's religious
advisors did not always agree on a course of action to be followed, they often undercut each other's
position and offered so many alternatives "compatible with conscience" that he could pick and
choose among them to suit the situation at hand. For example, Lamormaini and the Spanish
Capuchins at the Imperial Court, especially the Queen of Hungary's Spanish confessor Diego de
Quiroga, had a notoriously bad relationshnp with each other. 15 Finally, Ferdinand's closest political
13Ibid., 6-12.
l4The older literature stresses Lamormaini's leverage with the Emperor and the impact of his
influence on politics (for instance, Steinberg..er, Jesuiten, 15). For more recent examples of this viewpoint,
see Robert Birder's work (for instance Religion and Politics). Many recent interpretations, however,
deem this influence exaggerated (for examplie Evans, "Austrian Habsburgs," 136 and Parker, TYW, 77).
l5The Queen of Hungary is perhaps Abetter known as the Infanta Maria, sister of Philip III of
Spain. She was the very Infanta whom James I of England indefatigably pursued as a wife for his son, the
future Charles I. Instead, she married her cousin Ferdinand, King of Hungary, heir of Ferdinand II.
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advisors were his councillors, most of whom were not clergymen at all and supported a militant
Catholic policy only when it was politically expedient to do so. Among the most influential were
Johann Ulrich von Eggenberg and Maximilian von Trauttmansdorff.16
The most important of Ferdinand's political advisors were the Imperial privy councillors.17
The Imperial privy council, or Geheime Rat, was the principal organ of government for both the
Habsburg lands and the Empire. It normally dealt with all important political matters, foreign and
domestic, as well as administrative and judicial problems, though the Emperor could and did
occasionally consult individual ministers instead. " The council was a purely advisory body, without
the power to act on its own initiative. Therefore, the great power it wielded was dependent on its
influence — or the influence ofsome of its members — with the Emperor. " He alone held the ultimate
l6On Eggenberg and Traurtmansdorff, sec below, p. 71.
17The council's membership was international, though it was dominated by the Austrian-
Bohemian nobility, thus reflecting the pre-eminence of the hereditary lands in Ferdinand's
Habsburgpolitik. In addition to the secular council members, a few high churchmen— most noticeably
Anton Wolfradt, Abbot of Kremsmunster and later Prince-Bishop of Vienna, and Franz Cardinal
Dietrichstein— were included. The council's core was made up of the directors of the various
administrative and judicial governmental organs, to which were added assorted others with administrative
or military ability, or family connections to other councillors (Henry Frederick Schwarz, The Imperial
Privy Council in the Seventeenth Century, Harvard Historical Studies, vol. 53 [Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1943], 115-6, 399, 402-3).
"Although the Emperor conferred with advisors outside of the council circle, for instance experts
from other governmental units or theologians, their advice was almost invariably incorporated into
council deliberations on issues of importance.
"Not all attended every meeting; thus a smaller, more active group that attended on a fairly
regular basis took care of most of the day-to-day business. From 1627 to 1637, this group included Franz
Christoph von Khevenhtlller, Wolfgang von Mansfield, Leonhard Helfried von Meggau, Wilhelm Slawata
(quite recovered from his fall), Johann Baptist Verda von Werdenberg, Johann Ernst Fugger, Cardinal
Franz von Dietrichstein (after 1634), Johann Ulrich von Eggenberg (to 1634), Maximilian von
Trauttmansdorff, and Anton Wolfradt, Abbot of Kremsmunster and later Prince-Bishop of Vienna. The
latter three clearly exercised the greatest influence in Imperial counsels (Thomas Fellner and Heinrich
Kretschmayr, Von Maximilian I. bis zur Vereinigung der österreichischen und bdhmischen Hqfkanzlei
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power ofdecision, but he relied heavily upon his councillors for advice and almost always accepted
the opinion of the majority of his council.20
The heterogeneity of the court as well as the council was quite marked due to the varied
backgrounds and political standpoints of its members. With advice coming from so many quarters
with diverse interests, the formation of Imperial foreign policy under Ferdinand II was a complex
business. Councillors, officials, and representatives of every stripe from the Habsburg lands,
Empire, and foreign countries converged on the Imperial court, where they naturally coalesced into
groups intended to defend and promote their particular interests. As might be expected, political
coalitions were not static and often changed along with the circumstances at court and the individual
issues under discussion.
Despite the amorphous nature of these interest groups, three major parties at the Imperial
court can be delineated, each with a basic policy focus. The first of these was the "Spanish party,"
which consisted of supporters of Spanish policy whose main concern was the maintenance of the
traditional dynastic alliance between the two branches of the House of Habsburg. In their eyes,
Spain's enemies were also naturally the Emperor's enemies, particularly the insolent Dutch rebels
and their calculating French allies. Another party was formed by the Catholic militants, who
encouraged the Emperor to launch a general crusade against Protestantism regardless of the
(1749), pt I, Die Osterreichischc Zentralvenvaltimg, Veröffentlichungen der (Commission filr neuere
Geschichte Osterreichs, vols. 5-7 [Vienna: Holzhausen, 1907], vol. 1, 44; Schwarz, 1 16).
20Ibid., Ill, 130-1. Schwarz rightly points out that the conscientious attendance of Ferdinand II
(and later his son) at council meetings served to increase that body's influence. Ferdinand, however,
seldom participated in the debates, instead leaving the weighing of advantages and disadvantages to his
councillors, and almost always made his decisions according to the advice of the majority (ibid., 398;
Franzl, 231).
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consequences. The militants saw the Catholic victories of the 1620s as a sign ofdivine support for
their cause and steadfastly opposed any compromise with the Protestants, even in the early 1630s
when Swedish forces controlled most of the Empire. They rather naively envisioned the
participation of all Catholic powers, including France, in the Emperor's divinely-inspired campaign
to restore the Empire to the true faith. Finally, the third major party at the Imperial court was a
loosely-based group ofmoderates who did not necessarily support either the Spanish or the Catholic
militant program, but instead pragmatically promoted what they saw as the interests ofEmperor and
Empire. In their eyes, the Emperor's main responsibility was to preserve his influence in both the
Habsburg lands and the Empire, which meant restoring peace and preventing foreign interference
in these lands as well as avoiding foreign entanglements himself. The moderates supported a
settlement in the Empire that would consolidate Catholic gains and finally bring peace to its war-tom
population — even if it came at the expense ofconcessions to Protestants.21
Each of these political groups at the Imperial court had representatives among Ferdinand's
most trusted advisors, for instance Lamormaini for the Catholic militant party, Joharm Ulrich von
Eggenberg for the Spanish party, and Maximilian von Trauttmansdorff for the moderate party.
These latter two men were very influential, and their views actively tempered those of the militants.
Although Lamormaini's opinions certainly had an impact upon the Emperor's policy, Eggenberg,
who came with Ferdinand from Graz to the Imperial court, was the Emperor's most trusted and
influential councillor until shortly before his death in 1634. As director of the privy council, he held
2lBireley, Religion and Politics, 23, passim. Although each of these parties at the Imperial court
had its own agenda, a general consensus on issues was often reached because there were those in each
group who would compromise on one issue for the sake of another deemed more important.
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the most important position at court aside from the Emperor.22 Although Eggenberg was a convert
to Catholicism, his policy was mainly determined by political rather than religious considerations.
In the sphere of foreign policy, he constantly aligned himself with Spanish interests, a policy which
he believed would strengthen the Emperor's position in the hereditary lands and Empire as well as
the position of the House of Habsburg as a whole.23
Maximilian von Trauttmansdorff was the most influential of the loose group of moderates
at the Imperial court Politically independent, he did not seek to associate himself with any
particular faction, but instead steered a middle course which he believed would best advance the
interests of the Emperor and the Empire. In the end, this is what brought him together with other
like-minded individuals. Although he was an influential figure since his nomination to the privy
council in 1618, he became indisputably the most important figure at the Imperial court after
Eggenberg's death in 1634. In addition to his privy council duties, Trauttmansdorff was the
Obersthqfineister or Lord Steward to the King of Hungary (later Ferdinand HI) and was one of the
few men who really enjoyed his confidence; therefore, Trauttmansdorff exercised even greater
influence from Ferdinand Ill's accession in 1637 until Trauttmansdorff s own death in 1650. Both
Ferdinand II and Ferdinand III recognized that Trauttmansdorff possessed extraordinary political
talents; as Henry Frederick Schwarz has pointed out, "Trauttmansdo rf owed the great position to
—"All contemporaries agree that he, more than any other man, held the conduct of affairs in his
hands." (Schwarz, 1 14, 1 18). Eggenberg held the directorship until his death in 1634.
23Ibid., U8-9, 226-8; Bireley, Religion and Politics, 18. Anton Wolfradt, Abbot of Kremsmiinster
and later Prince-Bishop of Vienna, another powerful member of the privy council, was one of the group
that formed around Eggenberg and was therefore closely associated with the tatter's pro-Spanish foreign
policy. Wolfradt, who served on the privy council from 1624 until his death in 1639, often substituted as
director in Eggenberg's absence (Schwarz, 119-21, 386-9).
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which he rose at Court entirely to his merit, to his ability, and to the confidence he was able to
inspire."24 His service, above all others, forms a bridge between the reigns of the two emperors. As
we will see, by the time that Taylor and Arundel arrived at the Imperial court in the later 1630s, the
influence of Lamormaini had waned and more pragmatic political advisors like Trauttmansdorff
were ascendant in the Emperor's counsels. In the interests of coming to an accommodation with
England on the Palatinate question, particularly after the accession of Ferdinand III in early 1637,
Trauttmansdorff would use his influence to try to moderate the demands of Bavaria and Spain for
restitution.
In addition to the major representatives of the three political parties at the Imperial court,
Peter Heinrich von Stralendorf was also an influential figure in foreign affairs. Stralendorfs political
affiliation is more difficult to categorize, but at times he supported Maximilian of Bavaria's foreign
policy stance." Stralendorf was vice president of the Imperial aulic council, or Reichshofrat, and
member of the privy council from the early 1620s.26 More significantly, however, he was made
""In the entire seventeenth century, there was perhaps no greater and certainly no more
admirable personality at the Imperial Court than Maximilian, Count Trauttmansdorf....[he was] a man
with a breadth of vision and, for his times, extraordinary tolerance, with the supreme gift of the
statesman—the ability to distinguish the possible from the impossible." (ibid., 127-9). Trauttmansdorff
often served on diplomatic missions and was respected at foreign courts as well as at home for his
integrity and negotiating skill. He was an obvious choice for chief Imperial negotiator at the Westphalian
peace congress.
"Ibid., 361-2; Bireley, Religion and Politics, 18. The Imperial Chancellor ex officio was the
Archbishop of Mainz. On the Imperial chancery and its relationship to the Austrian chancery, see
Schwarz, 19-24, 42, and Gross, Geschichte der Reichshofkanzlei, 326-34.
26The aulic council was the most influential government unit next to the privy council. Although
in the seventeenth century its function was essentially judicial, it was often charged with delivering
opinions on political issues (Schwarz, 16). For more on the aulic council, see Oswald Gschliesser, Der
Reichshofrat: Bedeittung tmd Verfassmg, Schicksal und Besetzung einer obersten Reichsbehörde von
1559 bis 1806, Veroffentlichungen der (Commission fur neuere Geschichte Osterreichs, vol. 33 (Wien,
1942), as well as Schwarz, 16-24, and Fellner, 143-59.
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Imperial acting vice chancellor in 1623 and vice chancellor, or Reichsvizekanzler, in 1627, a post
he held until his death in 1637. As active head of the Imperial chancery, or Reichshojkanzlei,
Stralendorf oversaw Imperial foreign political and diplomatic correspondence and thus was
responsible for distributing and reporting upon the letters and reports he received to the privy
council. This put him in an influential position, as Schwarz noted: "In a word, the office of Imperial
Vice-Chancellor offered to its incumbent not only the broadest possible view of affairs but also an
unparalleled opportunity to influence decisions and events."27 It fell to Strahlendorf,
Trauttmansdorff, and the Emperor's other major councillors, who often had conflicting views about
the best course to pursue in foreign affairs, to attempt to guide theirsovereign during one of the most
difficult, divisive, and destructive periods in European history.
The Bohemian War
Despite the opposition of the various parties at the Imperial court to one another on issues of foreign
policy, there was consensus in Vienna regarding the Bohemian revolt that broke out in 16 18 — it was
necessary that it be crushed. The resolve of Ferdinand and his secular and religious advisors,
buttressed by the Spaniards at court and the leading princes of the Catholic League, was strengthened
further when the Elector Palatine Frederick V accepted the Bohemian crown offered to him by the
rebels. The transfer of the Bohemian electoral vote into Calvinist hands meant that an important
shift had taken place in the balance of power in the Empire —the Protestants instead of the Catholics
27Schwarz, 19.
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now held the majority in the Imperial electoral college.2' Ferdinand n, newly elected as emperor,
now had no choice but to take decisive action against Frederick and the Bohemian rebels, for with
Bohemia's electoral vote in Protestant hands, Habsburg power in the Empire was under dire threat
Furthermore, this insufferable affront to Ferdinand's dignity and power could not go unanswered.
It was absolutely necessary to remove the insolent Frederick from the Bohemian throne, to subjugate
the equally insolent rebels who put him there, and to eradicate the subversive influence of Palatine
Calvinism from Bohemia.
The realization of these goals, however, would be difficult. Ferdinand was woefully
underprepared to wage war, even against Frederick and his motley assortment of supporters. After
the revolt, many of the areas under Ferdinand's rule defected one by one to the Bohemian side, most
notably Lusatia, Moravia, Silesia, and Upper and Lower Austria. The parts of Hungary occupied
by Bethlen Gabor, the Calvinist prince of Transylvania, also supported Frederick. With these
territories in rebellion against him, the embattled Emperor needed outside assistance to defeat his
enemies. Fortunately for him, military and financial aid was indeed on the way from Spain and
Bavaria, the Austrian Habsburgs' traditional allies. Together these powers, determined to thwart the
victory of the Bohemian rebels and subsequent Protestant control ofthe Empire, launched a massive
intervention in Ferdinand's defense.
When the Bohemian war broke out, however, it was unclear how far either Spain or Bavaria
would go in supporting the Emperor. Despite the traditionally close connections between the two
branches of the House of Habsburg, the Spanish monarchy could not necessarily be counted upon
"Frederick's acceptance of the Bohemian crown gave him control of two of the coveted electoral
votes, tipping the delicate balance in favor of the Protestants.
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to support the Emperor completely.29 Under the Duke of Lerma, the favorite of Philip EH, Spain had
followed a quiescent foreign policy in the early part of the century. Years of fighting the English
and especially the Dutch had taken their toll, and Lerma believed that a peaceful policy was
necessary if Spain was to avoid economic and military collapse. Under his leadership, Spain
concluded peace with England in 1604 and the Twelve Years' Truce with the Dutch in 1609. Not
everyone, however, agreed with Lerma's peaceful policy. There were influential Spaniards outside
of the circle of power in Madrid, particularly Spanish diplomats, who opposed this policy because
they believed it damaged Spain's reputation and power abroad. These men, among them the
formidable Don Baltasar de Zuniga, who served as Spanish ambassador in Brussels, Paris, Rome,
and finally Vienna, and Count Ofiate, Zuniga's replacement in Vienna, instead promoted an active
foreign policy that would reassert Spanish power against the enemies of Spain, the House of
Habsburg, and Catholicism before it was too late.30 Zuniga in particular became an outspoken
19Ties of blood had been the basis of Austro-Spanish relations since the time of Charles V, but
reasons of state played an increasingly important role in Spanish policy making in the years leading up to
the Thirty Years' War. Spanish statesmen began to place the needs and goals of the Spanish monarchy
ahead of those of the Casa d'Austria as a whole, instead attempting to maintain its support of Habsburg
authority in Central Europe through financial inducements and symbolic gestures designed to preserve
the monarchy's reputation (Magdalena Sanchez, "Dynasty, State, and Diplomacy in the Spain of Philip
III" [Ph.D. diss., Johns Hopkins University, 1988], iv-v). Dynastic obligation, however, was still a
significant consideration. For a general overview of inter-Habsburg relations in the seventeenth century,
sec Grete Mecenseffy, Habsburger im 1 7. Jakrhundert: Die Beziehungen der Hdfe von Wien und Madrid
wdhrend del Dreifiigjdhrigen Krieges, Archiv fur osterreichische Geschichte, vol. 121, no. 1 (Vienna:
Roherer. 1955).
"J. H. Elliott, "Foreign Policy and Domestic Crisis: Spain, 1598-1659," in Spain and Its World.
1500-1 700: Selected Essays, ed. J. H. Elliott (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 116-8; and
idem, Olivares, 56. For Onate's machinations at the Imperial court, his encouragement of action against
the Bohemian rebels, and his role in securing Spanish assistance against them, see Bohdan Chudoba,
Spain and the Empire, 1519-1643 (New York: Octagon Books, 1969), 210-48.
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advocate for closer relations between Spain and Austria and a more active Spanish role in Central
Europe.
It is questionable whether the appeals for help from Vienna would have met with a favorable
reply from Madrid had Zuniga not returned from the Imperial court in July 1 6 17 to take his seat on
the council of state. His return, as J. H. Elliott has noted, "mark[ed] the transition from the quiescent
Lerma epoch to the new activism that would distinguish Madrid's policies in the 1620s and 1630s."31
Zufliga's voice quickly came to dominate the Council, and he used it to encourage vigorous Spanish
intervention in the Empire, which he knew intimately from his years of long service there. He and
Ofiate were convinced that this intervention was required to save the Emperor from the tide of
rebellion and heresy sweeping his lands and threatening the Empire, because if the rebels were
successful, they would take control of the Empire and undermine Spain's position in the Netherlands.
This was the main reason for Spain's commitment in Germany.32 Also, Spanish military action in
the Empire could secure the military corridors linking Spain's base in Milan to Vienna and Brussels.
These corridors were essential to maintaining the war effort against the Dutch, which was likely to
be renewed upon the expiration of the Twelve Years' Truce in 1621. 33 This show of Spanish might
would not only assist the Emperor, but would also help restore Spanish reputacion on the European
31Elliott, "Foreign Policy," 1 18. The council of state was the highest of all Spanish councils and
was responsible for the making of foreign policy.
32John Lynch, The Hispanic World in Crisis and Change, 1598-1700, A History of Spain, ed.
John Lynch (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), 97.
33EIIiott, Olivares, 56. Many Spaniards were convinced that Catholicism and Habsburg power in
Europe were threatened by an international conspiracy orchestrated by the Dutch. This "siege mentality"
may help explain the successful drive for Spanish intervention in central and northern Europe (J. H.
Elliott, "A Question of Reputation?: Spanish Foreign Policy in the Seventeenth Century," Journal of
Modern History 55, no. 3 [1983]: 482).
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and world stage. Therefore, in the interests of both the Austrian party and Spain, Zufiiga initiated
and guided Spanish intervention in Bohemia and central Europe between 1618 and 162 1.34
When surveying the situation from the Spanish perspective, it becomes apparent that in many
ways Frederick had chosen the worst possible moment for a confrontation with Spain's Austrian
cousin. With the truce due to expire in 162 1 , Spain had already decided to give a higher priority to
Habsburg interests in central Europe in preparation for a renewal of the war in the Netherlands; but
as this war had not yet resumed, Spain still had some resources available to support Ferdinand in
Bohemia and the Empire. Thus, despite a shortage of funds, Spain quickly granted Ferdinand
considerable financial assistance after the outbreak ofthe Bohemian revolt in 16 18 and, after Lerma's
fall in that autumn, substantial military reinforcement as well. Both proved critical to Ferdinand's
political survival in 1619 and 1620."
Spain had already promised generous financial and military support to the Imperial cause to
avert a Bohemian victory and Protestant control of the Empire, which would in turn undermine Spain
MEIliott, "Foreign Policy," 1 18-20. For the reluctant process of Spanish intervention in Germany,
see: Peter Brightwell, "The Spanish Origins of the Thirty Years' War," European Studies Review [ESR] 9
(1979): 409-31; idem, "Spain and Bohemia: The Decision to Intervene, 1619," ESR 12 (1982): 1 17-41;
idem, "Spain, Bohemia and Europe, 1619-21," ESR 12 (1982): 371-99; and Eberhard Straub, Paxet
fmperium: Spaniens Kampf urn seine Friedensordnung in Europa zwischen 1617 und 1635, Rechts- und
Staatswissenschaftliche Veroffentlichungen der Görres-Gesellschaft, ed. Alexander Hollerbach, Hans
Maier, and Paul Mikat, n.s., vol. 31 (Paderbom: Schoningh, 1980), chap. 4.
"Ferdinand had already received the considerable sum of 3.4 million thalers from Spain in July
1619, and in May 1619, 7,000 Spanish or Spanish-paid soldiers were sent from Flanders to Vienna to
help the Emperor. Further reinforcements came from northern Italy, and later other Spanish troops
attacked the Palatinate. In July 1620, Ferdinand had altogether about 12,000 Spanish soldiers at his
disposal in Austria and Bohemia (Parker, TYW, 50; Asch, 20S-6 n. 16; Hildegard Ernst, Madrid und
fVien. 1632-1637: Politik und Finamen in den Beziehungen zwischen Philipp IV. und Ferdinand II.,
Schriftenreihe der Vereinigung zur Erforschung der Neueren Geschichte, ed. Konrad Repgen, vol. 18
[Miinster: Aschendorff, 1991], 18).
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in the Netherlands. Spain, however, had no intention of remaining the Emperor's sole support, and
from the beginning Onate encouraged Ferdinand to seek assistance from German Catholics, most
particularly from his cousin Maximilian ofBavaria and the Catholic League.36 Maximilian, one of
the most adept rulers of his time, had attended Ingolstadt with Ferdinand and in many ways shared
his vision of protecting and advancing the cause of Catholicism in the Empire.37 Although he was
pious, the interests of the Bavarian state and Wittelsbach dynasty determined his policy in the first
line and at critical points took precedence over all other interests, including those of the Church.3*
Maximilian preferred dynastic-territorial considerations when they came into open conflict with
36ForOfiate's successful efforts to reconstitute the Catholic League so it would assist the
Emperor, see Peter Brightwell, "Spain, Bohemia and Europe," 372-6.
37In many ways Maximilian was the opposite of his friendly, trusting, and generous cousin.
(Ferdinand, as the son of Wilhelm V of Bavaria's sister Maria, was Maximilian's first cousin). Their
relationship became even closer, in that scary way for which the seventeenth-century Habsburgs were
renowned: when Maximilian married Ferdinand's daughter in 1635, Ferdinand became not only
Maximilian's father-in-law, but at the same time—as the husband of Maximilian's sister Maria Anna—his
brother-in-law.) By all accounts, Maximilian had a complex and difficult personality: he was humorless,
mistrustful, and easily insulted, and was shrewd, vengeful, and calculating to boot. Maximilian was above
all a dedicated statesman and strong personal ruler. He was strict and frugal, and the soundness of his
finances rendered him more politically maneuverable than Ferdinand. He was little loved and much
feared, but always respected (Dieter Albrecht, "Das konfessionelle Zeitalter, zweiter Teil: Die HerzSge
Wilhelm V. and Maximilian I.," in Handbuch der Bayerischen Geschichle, ed. Max Spindler, 2d rev. ed.
[Munich: Beck, 1977], vol. 2, 365).
'"Albrecht, "Konfessionelle Zeitalter," 366-8. As Albrecht points out, it is telling that
Maximilian's father Wilhelm V built a church, while Maximilian himself built a residence of Imperial
proportions. Maximilian's dearest confessional goals were to ensure Catholicism within his own borders
and to uphold the confessional status quo in the Empire fixed by the Religious Peace— two goals which
most definitely coincided with Bavarian state interests. Beyond these, advances for the Church were
dependent upon opportunities to do so that were not disadvantageous to his political ambitions. Had
Maximilian observed an unequivocal confessional policy, he would have unreservedly supported the
Habsburgs in the Empire. As things were, he held back from intervening too intensively for the Emperor
or for religious motives that might weaken or endanger his own position. Further, he actually sought to
increase Bavarian independence at the expense of the Emperor and Empire (ibid.; idem, "Kriegs- und
Friedensziele," 271).
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confessional ones, but he like Ferdinand tried to harmonize political and religious interests whenever
possible. Many times when it seemed that his policy was motivated by Empire and religion, it was
in reality underpinned by Bavarian dynastic and territorial interests.39 Therefore, despite
Maximilian's commitment to the Catholic cause, confessional motives never obfuscated his game
of power politics.40
Maximilian was a sober, realistic statesman who pursued limited objectives by cautious
methods, but he was also an opportunist who did not hesitate to take advantage of a favorable
situation.41 With great skill, he relentlessly pursued his twin goals — firstly, the aggrandizement of
the Bavarian state, and secondly, the advancement of the Catholic religion. He was aided in the
pursuit of these goals by the large personal fortune he managed to amass, which amounted to
,9Robert Bireley emphasizes the confessional motivation of Maximilian's policy and ascribes a
major role to Jesuit influence. Bireley argues that Maximilian (who like Ferdinand struggled with the
duality of his role as ruler and Christian) reconciled confessional and dynastic-territorial aims with the
help of anti-Machiavellian arguments forwarded by his confessors Adam Contzen (1624-35) and John
Vervaux (1635-51) that religious obligation and political advantage coincided (see Robert Bireley,
Maximilian von Bayern, Adam Contzen S.J. und die Gegenreformation in Deutschland 1624-1635,
Schriftenreihe der Historischen (Commission bei dcr Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, vol. 13
[Gettingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1975]; idem, "Antimachiavellianism, the Baroque, and
Maximilian of Bavaria," Archivum Historicum Societatis Iesu 53, no. 105 (1984): 137-59; and idem,
"Religious War," 85-106; see also his contribution to the discussion of Dieter Albrechf s paper in Krieg
und Politik, 349). Albrecht, however, presents the most convincing picture of the elusive Maximilian. Far
from discounting religion as an important consideration in Maximilian's policy, Albrecht rather takes
confessional influences into account and persuasively argues that many times what appears to be
confessionally or constitutionally motivated policy is in reality predicated by dynastic-territorial interests,
and that the laner prevailed when the two were at odds (see n. 38). He points out, however, that dynastic-
territorial and confessional goals were not exclusive but rather often corresponded with each other. In this
sense, they constituted a whole, the components of which Maximilian pursued as he was presented with
opportunities to do so (Albrecht, Maximilian 1, 1115). For further arguments against the overriding
influence of religious concerns by Albrecht, Kathrin Bierther, and (Conrad Repgen, see the discussion of
Bireleys "Religious War," in Krieg und Politik, 3 19-20.
^Schilling, Aufbruch und Krise, 404.
41Albrecht, Auswdrtige Politik, passim.
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approximately 5 million florins between 1598 and 1618.42 So, as Parker has observed, "[u]nlike
most of his fellow-rulers, he had money to put where his mouth was."43 Thus Maximilian's
combination ofpolitical acumen, religious conviction, and financial security made him a formidable
figure on the European political stage.
Maximilian was indeed persuaded to send the Catholic League army to support the Emperor
in Bohemia, a commitment that was formalized in the Munich agreement of October 1619. The
Emperor, however, was compelled to pay a dear price for his assistance. With Onate's
encouragement, Ferdinand made Maximilian an attractive offer that would be difficult for the
ambitious Bavarian Duke to refuse: in return for League military intervention in Bohemia, in the
written treaty Ferdinand promised to compensate Maximilian for his war costs, ifnecessary through
League occupation of any Austrian territories seized from the Emperor's enemies.44 Ferdinand also
assured Maximilian verbally that after Frederick's defeat the elector would be proscribed under the
ban of the Empire, and that Maximilian would be rewarded with the transfer of the Palatine
electorate to the Bavarian Wittelsbachs as well as any Palatine lands conquered by the League. In
addition, Ofiate promised Maximilian Spanish troops to reinforce the League army and a Spanish
attack on the Lower Palatinate from Flanders.45 To have made such a tempting offer, the Habsburgs
must have known that the level of Bavarian commitment required to win in Bohemia could not be
42About £830,000 (Parker, Europe in Crisis, 84).
43Ibid.
44The treaty is printed in C. W. F. Breyer, Geschichte des Dreyfligjdhrigen Kriegs nach
ungedruckzen Papieren, vol. 4, Geschichte Maximilians I. und seiner Zeit, ed. P. P. Wolf and C. W. F.
Breyer (Munich: Bey Joseph Lindauer, 1811), app. 3.
45Brightwell, "Spain, Bohemia and Europe," 381.
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counted upon from Maximilian without the bait of territorial gains and particularly of the electoral
dignity, which the Bavarian dukes had long coveted.46 In the same fashion as Bavaria, Saxony was
lured to the Imperial side with the promise of territorial rewards.47 Thus Ferdinand incurred
substantial political and financial debts because he lacked the strength to crush the Bohemian
rebellion on his own.
However Ferdinand was not helpless without his allies. In fact, his unanimous election as
Emperor in the summer of 1619, a mere two weeks after he was deposed as King of Bohemia, was
a meaningful victory and immediately strengthened his position:
From the moment he was elected and crowned Ferdinand had an enormous political
capital at his disposal. Even without an army at all, his authority was considerable.
However many battles the Bohemians and the troops of the Elector Palatine might
win, Ferdinand would still be Emperor, whereas a single lost battle could easily spell
doom for his opponents. Without the Emperor's assent, no legitimate political
settlement could ever be reached in Germany. . . . [He] could outlaw his enemies for
breach of the Empire's peace and crimen laesae majestatis (high treason), and by
carefully exploiting and manipulating the existing legal framework he could declare
^Maximilian's desire to obtain the Palatine electorate for the Bavarian line was deeply rooted in
the past. By the Treaty of Pavia of 1329, Emperor Louis IV, who was also the Duke of Bavaria, split the
Wittelsbach lands between the Bavarian (Wilhelminc) and Palatine (Rudolphine) lines of the family. This
agreement stipulated the alternation of the electorate between the two lines, but in 1356 the Golden Bull
granted the electorate to the Palatine line alone. This was enough to cause tension between the two lines,
tension which increased in the sixteenth century when the Palatinate became first Lutheran and then
Calvin ist. The rift widened further when the Protestant Union was formed under Palatine leadership and
the Catholic League under Bavarian (Dieter Albrecht, "Bayem," 461-2). Given this history, it is
understandable that Maximilian coveted the electoral dignity held by his relatives, especially since the
Elector Palatine was considered the chief secular prince of the Holy Roman Empire. Also, in terms of
land, Maximilian was particularly interested in the Upper Palatinate, which bordered northern Bavaria.
Although the rewards offered by the Emperor were indeed great, Ofiatt doubted the League would be
successful enough against the Bohemians to merit them (Parker, TYW, 51; Brightwell, "Spain, Bohemia
and Europe," 381).
47Albrecht, "Kriegs- und Friedensziele," 271; idem, "Ferdinand II," 13 1. In return for John
George's loyalty to the Emperor, the Catholic electors promised by the "MQhlhausen guarantee" that they
would not attempt to recover secularized church lands in the Saxon circles without a legal hearing. In
addition, Ferdinand promised him Lusatia as a pledge if he captured it from the rebels.
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whole principalities forfeited and use these titles and dominions to reward his allies.
Never clearly defined and often fragile, the Emperor's authority was nevertheless a
factor ofconsiderable significance in a political situation as confused as that created
by the Bohemian rebellion.4*
Therefore, in his capacity as emperor, Ferdinand commanded new respect and wielded new powers,
among them the ability to declare Frederick a rebel against his Imperial overlord, charge him with
treason, and deprive him of his lands and titles. Ferdinand's elevation to the Imperial dignity
consequently helped him win allies to his side, and it should not be underestimated as a factor in his
successes in Bohemia and later in the Empire.
With the aid of Spain and particularly Bavaria, the Emperor defeated Frederick just outside
of Prague at the Battle of White Mountain in November 1620 and drove him from Bohemia. The
assumption of the Bohemian rebels that Protestant powers would leap to Frederick's defense proved
ill-founded. The unfortunate "Winter King," as he was deridingly called by his detractors because
he had reigned in Prague only one winter, had received little support from the very powers they had
most counted upon, namely the Netherlands and England. Neither were prepared to assist him. The
Dutch were readying themselves for a renewed Spanish attack upon the expiration of the Twelve
Years' Truce, and Frederick's father-in-law James I (who in any case fancied himselfa peacemaker)
was not willing to support a rebellion against legitimate authority. Only a handful of German
Protestant princes had aided Frederick, including the Margrave of Anspach, the dukes of Saxe-
Weimar, and Christian of Brunswick- Wolfenbilttel. In comparison, the financial and military
"Asch,6I.
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support pledged to the Emperor by his allies was indeed superior and, once it had fully materialized,
was instrumental in a swift Imperial victory.49
As a result of his dependence upon his major political creditors — Bavaria and to a lesser
extent Spain — these powers exerted a strong influence on Imperial policy even after Frederick's
defeat in 1620.50 This development would prove exceedingly important in the formulation of
Imperial foreign policy for the duration of the Thirty Years War, since the Emperor could scarcely
afford to overlook the interests of his powerful allies when making his own policy, much to the
chagrin of the moderate councillors in Vienna who wished to follow a policy benefitting Emperor
and Empire, not Bavaria and Spain. This being said, it should be noted that Imperial foreign policy
was never completely subordinate to that ofBavaria and Spain, particularly under Ferdinand III, who
reigned as Emperor beginning in 1637.
The Genesis of the Palatinate Question and the Spread of the War to the Empire
In spite of Frederick's crushing defeat and his expulsion from Bohemia, the war did not end on the
plains of Prague as the Imperialists had hoped, but instead spread to the Empire. The extension of
the conflict out of the Bohemian phase of the war and the inception of the Palatinate question is
attributable to four related developments: first, and most importantly, Frederick's proscription under
the ban of the Empire in 162 1 ; second, the subsequent occupation of the Palatinate by Bavaria and
Spain; third, the punishment and re-Catholicization which was carried out in Bohemia and Upper
4*In addition to the help he received from Spain and Bavaria, the Emperor was also aided by
several Italian princes including the Pope, who sent subsidies to both Emperor and League (Parker, TYW,
52-3).
50Asch, 58-9.
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Austria by the Emperor and in the Palatinate by Bavaria and Spain; and last, the transfer of the
Palatine electorate to Bavaria in 1623. Together these factors provoked enough consternation to
persuade certain powers inside and outside the Empire to lend moral support to Frederick's cause,
and in some cases financial and military support as well. This assistance allowed him to continue
to resist the Emperor, this time in the fight to the recover his hereditary lands and titles, and ensured
the spread of the war to the Empire.51
After White Mountain, the Emperor — urged on by Maximilian — lost little time in punishing
the unfortunate Frederick for his treacherous behavior. In January 1621, he proscribed Frederick
under the ban of the Empire. The ban was the strictest penalty that the Emperor could impose: it
deprived the offender of every legal protection for his person and his property and threatened his
allies with the same fate, thus isolating him politically, socially, and economically from the rest of
the community of the Empire. It also left him open to the confiscation of his lands and titles and
ultimately the death penalty. Since Frederick had taken up arms against the Emperor, it seems that
the latter was justified in invoking the ban against Frederick. This may be the case, but there were
those inside and outside the Empire who, far from compliantly accepting Frederick's proscription,
hotly contested it on account of the manner in which it was achieved.
The usual procedure for outlawing an Imperial offender under the ban was for an official trial
to be held either before the Imperial Chamber Court (Reichskammergericht) in Speyer or the
Imperial Aulic Council (Reichshofrat) in Vienna. At a minimum, the estates of the Empire
assembled in the Imperial Diet {Reichstag) or the electors should approve the Emperor's declaration
"Albrecht, "Ferdinand II," 132-3.
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against the offender before it was published and carried out. Despite this custom, Ferdinand
accepted his lawyers' argument that he need not work through the usual channels because Frederick
was deemed a "notorious rebel" who was subject to the ban without due process of law because he
had broken the perpetual peace of the Empire by taking up arms against the Emperor. Ferdinand
therefore pressed ahead and outlawed Frederick by Imperial declaration.52 Once the ban was
imposed, Ferdinand was free to confiscate Frederick's lands, titles, and dignities, and use them to
satisfy the political and financial claims of his allies if he so chose.
Unfortunately, the legal issue was not as clear-cut as the Emperor might have liked, and his
declaration against Frederick did not go uncontested. Although the majority of German princes
accepted the Emperor's right to outlaw notorious rebels without due process of law, the assent of the
electors was still considered essential, and some believed that the declaration against Frederick was
made without suitable consultation with the Protestant electors.53 In addition, Frederick's supporters
challenged the basis of the Emperor's claim by insisting that all offenders must be legally tried before
the ban could be applied. Beginning in 1620, the Emperor's opponents launched a pamphlet
campaign against what they considered his dubious legal position. After Frederick's proscription
early the following year, the question of the ban and particularly its application to the Palatine House
"Christoph Kampmann, Reichsrebellion unti kaiserliche Acht: Politische Strajjustiz im
DreiJSigjdhrigen Krieg und das Verfahren gegen Wallenstein 1634, Schriftenreihe der Vereinigung zur
Erforschung derNeueren Geschichte, ed. Konrad Repgen, vol. 21 (Munster: Aschendorff, 1992).
"The lawyers of the Reichshofrat did advise consultation with the electors before the publication
of the ban against Frederick. However, as Frederick had clearly ignored a 1620 mandate approved by the
electors (except Frederick's Union ally Brandenburg) to clear out of Bohemia, the lawyers considered all
legal obstacles to a public pronouncement and execution of the ban removed. Although the Catholic
electors agreed with this reasoning, the problem remained that Protestant Saxony refused to consent to the
ban though it had approved the mandate (ibid., 55-70).
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became one of the major themes of the public opinion wars in the Empire during the Thirty Years'
War.54
The second development that contributed to the extension of the war to Germany was the
occupation of the Palatinate by Catholic armies in the course of 1 621 . In spite of the controversy
surrounding the declaration of the ban against Frederick, the Emperor and his allies lost no time in
occupying the hapless prince's territories. In 1620, Spanish forces from the Low Countries under
the command of Ambrosio Spinola had launched a diversionary attack on the Lower Palatinate in
order to relieve the military pressure on Vienna, which had been besieged by Transylvanian and
confederate forces since early in the year." The Spaniards soon occupied the Palatine lands on the
west bank of the Rhine, which comprised the bulk of the Lower Palatinate, and gained full control
of the Rhine valley. As foreseen by Zufiiga, Spain thus secured this pivotal and previously hostile
54The Emperor's opponents argued that it was illegal for Ferdinand to adjudicate his own affairs,
and that the offender should be summoned before a court of law to answer for his crimes. They also
contended that Frederick's conflict was with Ferdinand as King ofBohemia rather than as Emperor, in
which case it was wrong for the latter to use Imperial punishments. From 163 1, pro-Swedish
pamphleteers even made the argument that the Emperor himself could be viewed as a notorious criminal
for breaking the perpetual peace by attacking peaceful estates of the Empire. The Emperor's defenders, on
the other hand, argued that his actions were legal since he was allowed to take any measures necessary to
restore peace in the Empire; and in cases of uncommon danger, particularly in the case of an attack on his
hereditary lands that could lead to the collapse of the Imperial order, he could impose the ban on the
notorious rebels involved without further legal formalities.
In 1636, Maximilian of Bavaria, who fully supported the Emperor's position (and in fact had
pressured him to impose the ban on Frederick), technically resolved the ban controversy in the Emperor's
favor. Maximilian achieved this by introducing a clause in Ferdinand Ill's election capitulation
(Wahlkapitulation) confirming the Emperor's right, with the assent of the electors, to proceed against
notorious criminals without trial. However, despite the technical resolution of the conflict, it continued
until a political solution to the ban cases—particularly the Pfalzfrage—was agreed upon at the Peace of
Westphalia in 1648. Other notorious rebels outlawed in the course of the war include the military
entrepreneurs Ernst von Mansfeld and Albrecht von Wallenstein as well as the dukes of Mecklenburg-
Schwerin and -Giistrow (ibid., 220-6).
"For a detailed look at Spain's decision to invade the Lower Palatinate from Flanders, see
Brightwell, "Spain, Bohemia and Europe," 386-95.
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stretch of the Spanish Road, its main line of military communications between Italy and the Low
Countries.56 While Spain was busy securing its military corridor, Maximilian's Catholic League
forces moved into the Upper Palatinate, which conveniently bordered Bavaria, as well as into the
bit of the Lower Palatinate left by the Spaniards, which lay east of the Rhine. By the end of the year,
ali of the Palatine lands were under Catholic control save the fortress of Frankenthal (which the
English held until 1623), the Protestant Union was dissolved, and Frederick and his family had fled
into exile in the Netherlands.
The Catholic take-over of the Palatinate is closely related to the third factor that encouraged
the continuation of war, namely the systematic re-Catholicization that was carried out in the lands
occupied by the Imperialists. In addition to Frederick and his family, many others, particularly the
Protestants in his lands, suffered on account ofhis defeat. The unfortunate situation of the Bohemian
Protestants was apparent to Sir Edward Conway, an English ambassador to Germany, immediately
after the battle of White Mountain:
the Imperials ... as it seems, hold Bohemia now by conquest, and all immunities
[and] privileges [are now] void, and if a new establishment by petition shall be
obtained, it will be only the law of the Conqueror, who doth already finely call those
of the [Protestant] Religion to account for what they have, and put it into safe
keeping, so that they taste already their condition to come.57
56Parker, Army of Flanders, 53-5; Koenigsberger, 230. It was apparent to all that Spain's
occupation of the Rhine Palatinate strategically coincided with its refusal to renew the truce with the
Dutch, which was due to expire in April 1621. For more on the Spanish occupation of the Lower
Palatinate, see Anna Egler, Die Spanier in der linksrheinischen Pfalz, 1620-32: Invasion, Verwaltung,
Rekatholisiervng, Quellen und Abhandlungen zur Mittelrheinische Kirchengeschichte, vol. 13 (Mainz:
Selbstverlag der Gesellschaft fur Mittelrheinische Kirchengeschichte, 1971).
"Quoted in Hubert G. R. Reade, Sidelights on the Thirty Years War (London: Kegan Paul,
Trench, Trubner & Co., 1924), vol. 1, 388.
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Conway's prognostication was correct, for the Emperor came to interpret his victories over the
Bohemian Protestants as a divine summons to root out Protestantism and restore Catholicism to the
areas under his control. This providentialist outlook was championed by the Catholic militants at
the Imperial court, particularly Lamormaini, who saw the Emperor's victories as an opportunity to
regain some of the Church's lost influence and territories in the Habsburg lands and the Empire.5*
Determined to punish the rebels and their supporters and restore Catholicism in the Habsburg lands,
Ferdinand began a renewed and more thorough assault on the Protestants in Bohemia and Upper
Austria. Most of Frederick's supporters there, if they did not lose their lives, lost their lands and
titles and were forced to flee.59 Spain and Bavaria followed a similar policy of re-Catholicization
in the occupied Palatine territories.60 The occupation ofthe Palatinate by the triumphant Imperialists
and their moves to re-Catholicize lands that were formerly predominantly Protestant substantially
complicated the Emperor's relationship with the German princes and with outside powers,
particularly with Protestant ones. It was understandable that they wondered who would be next on
his list.
"Bireley, Religion and Politics, 15. Lamormaini trumpeted his hopes to the Vatican: "great
things can be accomplished by this emperor.. .Perhaps even all Germany [may] be led back to the old
faith, provided. ..[pope and emperor together] take up the matter vigorously and see it through with
persistence." (quoted in ibid., 21).
wMore than 1,500 Bohemian landowners were tried for supporting the rebellion, and nearly half
of their estates were confiscated (Parker, TYW, 80).
60Albrecht, "Ferdinand II," 132. For re-Catholicization in the Palatine lands, see Egler, Spanier,
and W. Gegenfurtner, "Jesuiten in der Oberpfalz: Ihr Wirkung und ihr Beitrag zur Rekatholisierung in
den oberpfalzischen Landen, 162 1-50," Beitrdge zur Geschichte des Bistums Regensburg 11(1 977): 71-
220. Of course the process of re-Catholicization was not instantaneous; it took place gradually over a
period of years and had long-lasting effects. Catholic churches and schools were opened, Protestant
pastors and schoolteachers expelled, secularized Church lands recovered, and finally Protestants were
given the choice to convert or leave.
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Despite the reduction of Frederick and the Bohemians, the Emperor still could not afford to
relax his military vigilance since Palatine supporters continued to oppose him Ernest of Mansfeld,
the Protestant military enterpriser who had fought with the confederates, had taken over command
of the troops of the now-defunct Protestant Union and continued to fight in the Empire supported
by Christian of Brunswick and the Margrave of Baden-Durlach. In addition to Mansfeld's activity
in the west, Bethlen Gabor remained at large in the east and repeatedly attempted to expel Ferdinand
from Hungary, often with the protection and support of the Turks. With these foes still active
against him, Ferdinand remained reliant on his allies, particularly Maximilian and the League, to
help him defend his position in the Empire.
In view of the continued military pressure in the Empire, Ferdinand was clearly in no position
to renege on the verbal promises he had made to Maximilian of Bavaria at Munich, namely the
transfer of a portion of the Palatine lands and the electorate to the Bavarian Wittelsbachs.
Maximilian had in any case earned his reward when he led League forces to an almost single-handed
victory over Frederick at White Mountain. Thus, in 1621, Ferdinand agreed that League forces
should continue to occupy the Upper Palatinate and Upper Austria as security that his military
expenses from the Bohemian war would be paid.61 Maximilian, however, was importunate about
the reward he coveted most, that is, the transfer of the Palatine electorate to the Bavarian line.62 This
was a prize the Emperor could not grant unilaterally, as it required the approval of the Imperial
estates.
61In 1620 Maximilian occupied Upper Austria, which had endorsed Frederick's cause, after he put
down a rebellion of the Upper Austrian estates led by the Calvinist Georg Erasmus Tschernembl.
"Albrecht, "Konfessionelle Zeitalter," 429.
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The Emperor consequently called a Deputationstag at Regensburg in 1623 to sanction tlie
transfer of the electorate to Bavaria.63 However, it was not effected as easily as he hoped. The
claims to the electorate of Frederick's children, his younger brother the Duke of Simmern, and his
close relative the Duke of Pfalz-Neuburg, who had recently converted to Catholicism, were raised
against Maximilian's. Most of the influential princes of the Empire — with the exception of
Maximilian's brother, the elector of Cologne — were against the hereditary transfer of the electorate
to the Bavarian Wittelsbachs on constitutional and/or religious grounds. The opposition of Saxony
and Brandenburg was particularly strenuous.64
Spain also opposed the transfer of the electorate to Maximilian, and though it was an outside
power, Philip Ill's desires as an ally and head of the senior Habsburg branch carried weight with the
Emperor. Once again, Spain's objection was predicated on its primary foreign policy objective,
namely to bring the war in the Netherlands to a favorable conclusion (see below, p. 98). The
Spaniards realized that the transfer would prolong the war in the Empire and therefore prevent
German troops from assisting Spain in the Netherlands. In addition, Spain wished to remain on good
terms with England because English neutrality was an important ingredient in Spain's recipe for
victory against the Dutch. It hoped to achieve this by opposing the electoral transfer as a gesture of
A Deputationstag was the meeting of the committee of the Imperial Diet that was called by the
emperor in the absence of a full-fledged Reichstag to confer upon and present decisions on certain
matters touching the Empire. The committee consisted of the electors as well as representatives of the
colleges of the princes and the cities. In contrast, a Kurfurstentag, or electoral meeting, was simply a
meeting of the electors called to advise the emperor on Imperial matters.
"Albrccht, Maximilian /, 567-9.
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support for Frederick.65 Further, Philip regarded Maximilian with suspicion because ofbis jealousy
of Habsburg power in the Empire, opposition to German intervention in the Netherlands, and his
friendly relations with France. The latter in particular made Maximilian a security risk in the King
of Spain's eyes. For all of these reasons, Spain wished to contain Bavaria's influence by obstructing
the transfer of the electorate.66
In the end, after contentious debate on the subject, the electorate was indeed granted to
Maximilian, but with restrictions.67 First, it was granted only for his lifetime rather than permanently
to his line. Second, the Emperor should continue attempts to reach an agreement with England about
the Count Palatine; in the case of successful negotiations or their ultimate failure, he and the electors
should decide whether the electorate should be turned over to one ofFrederick's children or relatives
or if it should remain in the Bavarian line. Maximilian was forced to submit to this decision and face
"Roderigo Rodenas Vilar, La politico europea de Espaha durante la Guerra de los Treinta Anas.
1624-30 (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Fnvestigaciones Cienti'ficas, Escuelade Historia Modem*, 1967),
37; Elliott, Olivares, 83, 205; Ernst, 27. England might combine with the Dutch if hopes for Frederick's
restoration through the good offices of Spain were dashed. From this standpoint, the snubbing of
Bavarian demands for the electoral dignity and lands was an immediate requirement of Spanish policy.
However, continued Spanish possession of the Lower Palatinate to ensure the supply lines to the
Netherlands was also of strategic importance in securing a favorable outcome against the Dutch. Thus,
while Spain represented itself to England as a supporter of Frederick's restoration, it is debatable how
serious its efforts actually were. Because the restoration of Palatine lands and/or titles was in the
Emperor's purview, Spain could afford to pose as a friend to Frederick; if decisions were made regarding
the Palatinate that were unfavorable to Frederick's cause, Spain could defend itself to England by
retreating behind the excuse that it was not within its power to prevent such decisions (Albrecht,
Auswartige Politik, 59-61). On Spanish opposition, cf. Straub, 161-2, 188.
"Lynch, 108; Mecenseffy, 23.
67With the significant exceptions of Saxony and Brandenburg, all the estates present accepted this
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the possibility that he might have to relinquish the electorate in the future.6* The new elector, who
was of a vengeful nature and carefully delineated his friends from his enemies, wrould not forget
Spain's opposition to the electoral transfer nor its propensity to deal with the English on the question
of the restoration of the Palatinate.
Although this compromise settled the question of the Palatine electorate for the time being,
its long-term future and that of the Palatine lands still remained unresolved: therein lies the origin
ofthe Palatinate question, or Pfalzfrage. As long as the possibility for the restoration! of the Palatine
lands and dignities to Frederick and his family still existed, the matter continued too be debated at
courts across Europe. An acceptable solution to the Palatinate question was a necesssary ingredient
for peace. No permanent settlement of the war was possible without prior settlememt of this thorny
question.69
Everyone had his own opinion on how this difficult matter should be settle; d, particularly
those who were directly involved. Maximilian, ofcourse, intended for the electoral dignity and the
Upper Palatinate to remain with himself and his heirs. The focal point of his policy from this point
6*Albrecht, Maximilian /, 569. For the text of the Belehmmgsbrief, dated 25 February 1623, see
Bernd Roeck, Gegenreformation and Drei/Sigjahriger Krieg. 1555-1648, vol. 4, Deutsche- Geschichte in
Quellen und Darstellung, ed. Rainer A. Miiller (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1996), 245-50. As carliy as September
1621, in a secret document Ferdinand assured Maximilian of the electorate for himself an»d his heirs.
Maximilian was only personally invested in February 1623, but at that time Ferdinand secretly renewed
his promise that the dignity would become hereditary (Albrecht, Maximilian I, 570-1; idem, "Ferdinand
II," 259-60).
^Albrecht points out that—though since the mid- 1620s its resolution alone could mo longer bring
peace to Germany—it remained an integral element of a lasting peace settlement. FredericUc's supporters,
however, continued to argue that his restoration would quickly affect peace (Albrecht, "Btayern," 462-3).
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forward, therefore, was to tighten his grip on both.70 He knew that Frederick would never voluntarily
give up his inheritance and that he would always have to reckon with the enmity ofEngland because
of the dynastic ties between the Stuart and Palatine houses. Spain's stance was more complicated,
and vacillated along with the European political situation. On the one hand, Spain wanted to
maintain its control over the Lower Palatinate; but on the other, it was ready to negotiate with
England for the return of the Lower Palatinate to Frederick if the rewards for doing so were great
enough. Further, what was considered great enough fluctuated with the fortunes of war. Frederick,
for his part, campaigned constantly to build a grand alliance of all anti-Habsburg states to force his
restoration. Defeated and dispossessed, he had nothing to lose by continuing to resist the
Habsburgs.71
The Palatinate question was destined to become a problem of European proportions.
Frederick was able to keep his cause alive because most of the German and European powers,
particularly the Protestant ones, were not prepared to accept Frederick's proscription, the occupation
and re-Catholicization of his lands, and the transferof the electorate to Maximilian (even ifonly for
life). Although the general consensus was that Frederick deserved to be ousted from Bohemia and
TOOne of the ways Maximilian tightened his grip on the Upper Palatinate was to enforce a
program of re-Catholicization there.
71The Palatine court-in-exile at the Hague crusaded tirelessly for the formation of an anti-
Habsburg alliance in the 1620s and 1630s, with the ultimate goal of full restoration for the Palatine
family. It served as an important point of contact for militant Protestants from all over Europe. F. H.
Schubert has convincingly argued that the Palatine exiles rather than the Dutch were the driving force in
the polarization of European politics in the 1620s in "Die pfalzische Exilregierung in DreiBigjahrigen
Kricg: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des politischen Protestantismus," Zeitschrifi fur Geschichte des
Oberrheins 63 (1954): 575-680.
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stripped of his crown, it was another matter entirely that the Emperor dispossessed him of his
hereditary lands and titles and parceled them out to Imperial, Catholic allies.
The Emperor's willingness to strike at Frederick's patrimony and alter existing power
relationships in the Empire in favor of the Catholics caused princes both inside and outside the
Empire to cast a wary eye upon him and his allies. Protestants were understandably disturbed by the
occupation and forced re-Catholicization of formerly Protestant areas by Catholic powers, and, in
the case of Spain, a foreign power. Even worse, however, was the transfer of one of the precious,
Protestant-controlled electorates to a Catholic prince, which resulted in a decisive shift in the balance
of power in the Empire in favor of the Catholics, who now held a solid majority in the electoral
college. The Protestant princes (rightly so) began to fear for their religious freedom. The rest of
Protestant Europe also felt threatened by the occupation of the Palatinate by Spain and Bavaria,
which it saw as yet another manifestation of the operation ofa militant Catholic axis linking Madrid,
Brussels, Vienna, Munich, and Rome.
The Palatinate question was raised from a German to a European problem early on because
of the interest of foreign powers.72 None of the European powers, Protestant or Catholic, could
afford to ignore the occupation of the Palatinate by the Habsburgs and their allies because of its geo-
strategic and political importance. It was one of the major principalities of the Empire, and its heart
— the Lower Palatinate and capitol at Heidelberg — straddled the sensitive area of the Rhine that was
a major crossroads ofEuropean communication. Spain's control of this key area gave the Habsburg
cause in the Empire and the Netherlands, where war resumed in 162 1 , an important advantage. The
"Albrecht, "Bayern," 463.
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Habsburgs and their allies could transport their own men and supplies more quickly while
obstructing or at least delaying those of their foes, particularly the United Provinces and France.73
Therefore, the Dutch and French as well as German and European Protestants perceived the
occupation of the Palatinate transfer of the electorate as a serious threat to their security or religious
freedom, or both. With resistance building to the moves of the Emperor and his allies in the
Palatinate, anti-Habsburg opposition groups began to coalesce with the aim to crush, or at least
weaken, Habsburg power in Europe. Frederick therefore managed to rally more support for his
restoration to his hereditary lands and titles than he had for his Bohemian escapade, and the fight for
his cause in the Empire continued well after his defeat at White Mountain.
Still, the full extent ofthis support did not materialize immediately after his defeat, and initial
campaigns on his behalf — by the allied army under Mansfeld and Christian of Brunswick, now
employed by the Dutch, and Bethlen — did not meet with much success. Brunswick was summarily
defeated at Stadtlohn by League forces led by Jean 't Serclaes, Count Tilly, in August 1623.
Mansfeld managed to escape the same fate, but was forced to disband his army in early 1624 when
his financial resources were exhausted. Bethlen, abandoned by his allies, was forced to sue for peace
with the Emperor. None of Frederick's supporters could stand up to League armies, and,
unfortunately for the Palatine cause — no international alliance capable of combating the Emperor
and his supporters formed until 1625. But form it would, because anti-Habsburg European powers
and Frederick's Protestant allies could not stand back and watch as the Palatinate fell to Habsburg
and Bavarian imperialism. Neither could England for dynastic reasons; from this time, the
73The former a Calvinist mercantile republic fighting to break away from Catholic Spanish rule,
the latter a powerful Catholic monarchy threatened by Habsburg encirclement.
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restoration of the Palatinate was a constant goal of English foreign policy. The Palatinate therefore
became the connecting link between not only the Bohemian conflict and its spread to the Empire,
but also between strife in the Empire and power struggles in western Europe.
Spain and Bavaria
The spread of hostilities to the Empire was an unfortunate circumstance for Ferdinand, for it meant
that he must maintain a strong Catholic military presence there and continue to rely upon Spain and
Bavaria for military and financial support. In return, each of his powerful allies expected to exercise
influence on Imperial policy in matters that affected its interests. This created a particularly difficult
situation for the Emperor, because his own ambitions were not necessarily congruent with those of
his allies, and even worse, Spanish ambitions were seldom compatible with those of Bavaria.
Spain's view was European (and where its overseas Empire was concerned, global), and it was
constantly exerting pressure on Ferdinand to follow a policy that was favorable to its operations
outside the Empire. Bavaria's view, on the other hand, was essentially German. Maximilian, whose
first priority was the Empire and promoting Bavarian interests within it, resented Spanish
interference in German affairs. The conflicting ambitions of Spain and Bavaria and those of their
partisans at the Imperial court created a tense political situation in Vienna that was to last the
duration of the war.
Spain's involvement in Germany was dictated by the drive to reassert its power in northern
and western Europe, a policy guided first by Zuniga and then, for the twenty years after his death
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in 1622, tenaciously followed by his nephew the Count-Duke ofOlivares.74 The foremost objective
of this policy was to conclude a respectable peace settlement with the Dutch, who had been in
rebellion against Spain since the 1560s and were now a European power in their own right. Despite
the fact that Zufiiga and many other Spanish councillors realized that it was highly unlikely that they
could forcibly re-impose their religion or their rule on the Dutch, they still opposed the renewal of
the truce due to expire in 1621 and instead supported the resumption of war." At this point, the
Spaniards no longer hoped to emerge victorious, but rather to apply enough military and economic
pressure to the Dutch to force them to negotiate a new settlement acceptable to Madrid.76 In order
to accomplish this goal Spain required two assets — allies and a secure route to supply its troops in
Flanders. German assistance could prove crucial in both categories.
74Don Gaspar de Guzman, Count-Duke of Olivares, became a member of the Spanish council of
state in 1622, and soon came to dominate it just as his uncle had. Like Zufiiga, Olivares's main concern
was to preserve Spain's status as a world power, and his plan to reassert Spanish power in northern and
western Europe was an important aspect of this policy. For more on the life and political career of one of
Spain's greatest statesmen, see J. H. Elliott's outstanding biography, Olivares.
7SThis decision was based on several considerations, but economic ones were of the greatest
importance. Dutch commerce was profiting from peace in Europe while it continued to penetrate the
Spanish and especially the Portuguese overseas empires. Also, the Spaniards believed that the Dutch were
exploiting the lull in hostilities to aid the enemies of the Habsburgs and recover their own strength for the
next bout with Spain. Finally, because the terms of the Twelve Years' Truce of 1609 were so humiliating
to Spain, these councillors opposed renewing it in order to preserve Spain's reputation as a great power.
The terms of the 1609 truce that the Spanish found so objectionable included the virtual recognition of
Dutch independence, the closure of the river Scheldt to traffic in and out of Antwerp, and the acceptance
of Dutch commercial and maritime operations in the Spanish and Portuguese colonial empires.
"Jonathan I. Israel, The Dutch Republic and the Spanish World, I606-1661 (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1982), 66-85; Geoffrey Parker. The Dutch Revolt (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1977),
264-6; idem, TYW, 93; Elliott, "Foreign Policy," 121-2. For a detailed look at the long debate whether to
renew the truce or not, see Israel, 66-85, and Peter Brightwell, "The Spanish System and the Twelve
Years' Truce," EHR 89 (1974): 270-92.
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In return for Spain's assistance against the Bohemian rebels, Olivarcs was counting on
support from the Emperor, and hopefully from the League as well, to drive the Dutch rebels to the
bargaining table. In fact, Olivarcs considered close Spanish-Imperial collaboration to be the key to
lasting stability in the Empire and to the favorable resolution of the Netherlands problem, that is, to
reestablishing a European order acceptable to Spain.77 In his magisterial biography ofOlivares, J. H.
Elliott points out the importance of close collaboration between the two branches of the Habsburgs
in the Spanish statesman's mind: "His foreign policy, like that of Zuftiga, remained resolutely
'Austrian', and its central axiom was that 'not for anything must these two houses [the Austrian and
the Spanish branches of the Habsburgs] let themselves be divided.'"7*
For Spain to secure Imperial assistance, however, it was necessary for peace and stability first
to be restored to Germany. Olivares thus worked tirelessly to end the insidious conflict in the
Empire. He constantly urged peace — even at the cost of compromise with the Protestants — so that
Imperial and League troops would be free to aid Spain against the Dutch. Maximilian and his
League allies, however, strenuously opposed any proposal that would involve the Emperor or League
in Spain's war with the Dutch. They avoided entanglement in what they viewed as a costly war
77Straub, passim; Elliott, "Question of Reputation," 479. Olivares promoted close cooperation
between the Austrian and Spanish Habsburgs as a way to involve the Emperor in the war against the
Dutch. From late 1624, he pursued a "Habsburg league," a formal offensive and defensive alliance
between Vienna and Madrid, seeing it as the most effective way to secure peace in the Netherlands and
the Empire. He even (unsuccessfully) sought to involve Maximilian and the League. Olivares's quest to
construct this league, which was a major element in his foreign policy strategy, was long and
disappointing. The negotiations between the two branches of the House of Habsburg are chronicled in H.
Gunter, Die Habsburger-Liga. 1625-1635: Briefe undAkten aus dem General-Archiv zu Simancas,
Historische Studien, vol. 62 (Berlin: Ebering, 1908; reprint, Vaduz: Kraus Reprint, 1965), which includes
a long introduction and collection of Spanish documents on the subject.
n10 Nov. 1630, Olivares to council of state; quoted in Elliott, "Foreign Policy," 123.
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waged for Habsburg benefit that would subordinate German Catholic interests to Spanish ones and
jeopardize the gains they had already made in the Empire.79
More importantly, Spain needed to secure reliable supply routes between Spain and Flanders
if it hoped to drive the Dutch to the bargaining table. These routes ran either by sea through the
English Channel (the "English Road") or by land through a network ofmilitary corridors from Milan
to Brussels (the "Spanish Road"). The preferred corridor of the Spanish Road closely paralleled
France's eastern frontier and ran mainly through Habsburg territory or that of its allies — from Genoa
to Milan, up through Savoy, the Franche Comte, and Lorraine to Flanders. After 160 1, however, the
passage of Spanish troops through Savoy became much more difficult, and when Charles Emmanuel
defected from the Habsburgs in 1622 the route through Savoy was closed to them completely.10
Fortunately for Spain, an alternative corridor existed. It also ran from Genoa to Milan, but then
veered up through the Alpine passes of the Valtelline to the Tyrol and passed along the northern
shore of Lake Constance and the north bank of the Rhine. From here, Flanders could be reached in
one of two ways. The first and fastest route was to proceed by ship down the Rhine. This was
dangerous, however, because of the Prince Palatine's enmity towards the Habsburgs. Even after
Spain's invasion and occupation of the Palatinate in 1620, it remained so — though to a lesser degree
— because the lands ruled by less consequential princes unfriendly to the Habsburgs still abutted this
route. The second, much safer route for Spanish troops passed through Habsburg and Habsburg-
'9Albrecht, Auswdrtige Potitik, 159-62.
*°When Savoy gave up territory to the French in the Treaty of Lyon (1601), this connection
became tenuous at best for Spain, as it was reliant upon keeping open these narrow corridors of friendly
territory to avoid transgressing upon French soil. In one area, it was confined to a single bridge across the
River Rhone, which the anti-Habsburg French often obstructed to prevent Spanish reinforcements from
nothem Italy from reaching Flanders (Parker, Europe in Crisis, 124).
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friendly lands, via Alsace and Lorraine." This land route, along with the sea route, served as Spain's
principal military corridors during the Thirty Years' War.*2
The security of the sea route, which ran from Spanish ports up through the English Channel
to Flanders, also fluctuated, as it was largely dependent upon the friendship or at least benevolent
neutrality of England. Any time hostilities arose between Spain and England, the sea route became
unsafe for Spanish ships. An example of this was in the latter half of the sixteenth century, when
Elizabethan England financially and militarily supported the Dutch rebels and then was itselfat war
with Spain. After James I's accession to the throne and the conclusion ofpeace with Spain in 1604,
conversely, Spanish troop ships sailing through the Channel to Flanders could depend upon English
protection; they were also allowed to shelter in English ports if they came under attack from the
Dutch.*3 The Dutch Republic was a great maritime power in the seventeenth century, and the
security England could provide in the Channel was therefore ofgreat advantage to Spain, particularly
when its overland military routes became hazardous.
Spanish policy fluctuated as to the best way to ensure that at least one of these supply routes
remained open, whether by land or sea. On the one hand, Spain curried England's favor to protect
"As the land route took two months to negotiate, the sea route was often more attractive, though
it had its problems as well (Taylor, "Trade," 243).
KParker, Army ofFlanders, 53-5. For representations of the different routes, see Parker, TYW,
map 2, and Parker, Army ofFlanders, figs. 6, 8-10. In the event of war with the Habsburgs, French
security was reliant upon cutting Spain's lines of communication. In the words of J. H. Elliott, "This
lifeline of the Spanish Monarchy in Europe looked like a noose to the French. But, as the Spaniards and
French were well aware, it was a lifeline or noose that might be cut with reasonable ease at a number of
critical points—the French border with Savoy, the Swiss valley of the Valtelline, or along the northern
reaches of the Rhine...." (Elliott, Olrvares, 56).
"Parker, Army ofFlanders, 77.
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the sea route. Beginning in 16 14, Philip III dangled the prospect ofa marriage between his daughter,
the Infanta Maria, and Prince Charles before James. Then, after Frederick's proscription and exile
in 162 1 , Spain also promised to effect his restoration to his lands and dignities through Spain's good
offices with the Emperor. The settlement of the Palatinate question, therefore, was an attractive
avenue for Spain not only to win English friendship but also to contribute to peace in the Empire that
was necessary to gain German support in the Netherlands. On the other hand, though the sea route
was important, Spain also needed to protect the land route. From this perspective, it was not in
Spanish interests to support Frederick's restoration because continued Spanish occupation of the
Lower Palatinate secured a pivotal leg of the land route and at the same time kept French ambitions
in the region in check. Sir Henry Wotton, the English ambassador to Venice, pointed out that it did
not bode well for England's ambition to restore the Prince Palatine that the Spaniards were "now able
to walk (while they keep a foot in the Lower Palatinat) from Milan to Dunkercke upon their own
inheritances and purchases, a connexion of terrible moment in my opinion."*4 Although these
conflicting interests seemingly put Spain into an impossible situation, Olivares was able to turn it
to his advantage. Because Frederick's restoration to the Palatine lands and titles did not lie in Spain's
power but rather the Emperor's, and the Emperor and Maximilian at this point opposed it, Olivares
could afford to express Spanish support for Frederick's cause and readiness to return the Spanish-
occupied Palatinate knowing full well that it was unlikely that Spain would ever have to countenance
actually doing so.*s
"Logan Pearsall Smith, The Life and Letters ofSir Henry Wotton (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1907), vol. 2,221: 18 Dec. 1621, Wotton to Sir Walter Aston.
"Albrecht, Auswdrtige Politik, 58-60.
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Olivares was correct in assuming that Maximilian, who had no intention of relinquishing his
hard-won rewards, would resist any move to restore Frederick to his patrimony. However, he could
not count on Bavarian support to further Spain's agenda in Germany. Maximilian and his League
allies — and the rest of the German princes for that matter — opposed continued Spanish occupation
of the Lower Palatinate, which they viewed as a foreign intrusion on German soil that would
certainly result in the erosion of German liberties. In addition, Maximilian feared that the Spanish
presence on the Rhine might provoke France to intervene in the Empire, a move that would expand
the conflict and thus endanger Bavaria's recent acquisitions.*6 His objections to the Spanish
occupation of the Lower Palatinate, as well as to German intervention in the Netherlands, and his
friendly relations with France all created a climate of distrust and antagonism between Spain and
Bavaria.
Given these conflicts of interest, the Emperor found it increasingly difficult to please both
of these allies, each ofwhich had representatives and supporters at the Imperial court As each side
maneuvered to further its agenda, a tense political situation developed in Vienna. The consensus that
had existed among the various parties at the Imperial court during the Bohemian phase of the war
evaporated. After White Mountain, dissension surfaced in the Imperialist camp over issues that
proved much more difficult to reconcile than how to go after the traitorous Bohemian rebels and
their opportunistic leader.
"Ibid., 159-60.
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3
the foreign policy of the emperor and his allies:
The European War, 1625-35
All the wars that are on foot in Europe have been fused together, and have become a
single war.
Gustavus Adolphus to Axel Oxenstiema
The Danish Phase and Habsburg Ascendancy
Unfortunately for the Palatine cause, no international alliance capable of challenging the
preponderance of the Emperor and the Catholic princes in the Empire coalesced until 1625. From
this time onwards, however, various anti-Habsburg combinations led by foreign powers formed to
defend their interests and those of the German Protestant princes against what they perceived as the
imperialism of the House of Austria. They justified their intervention in terms of the defense of
German liberties, the Protestant cause, or both. These guiding principles were inextricably bound
up with the Palatinate question and were ones from which the Prince Palatine could profit in his
crusade for restoration. As foreign states — anti- and pro-Habsburg alike — became increasingly
vested in the outcome of the conflict, so the character of what had been an essentially German war
became increasingly international.
In the few years following Frederick's deprivation, his diplomats worked feverishly at courts
around Europe to bring about the formation ofan anti-Habsburg alliance committed to restoring his
lands and titles. They concentrated their efforts upon leading Protestant powers such as England,
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the Dutch Republic, Denmark, and Sweden, but they also attempted to convince Catholic France to
support their cause. 1 While these powers were certainly disturbed by the fate of the Palatinate, they
hesitated to spring immediately to Frederick's defense. Several events in 1624 and 1625, however,
caused them to form an anti-Habsburg coalition in 1 625 that was committed to limiting Habsburg
power in Europe. These powers saw restoring Frederick to his lands and titles as a means to this end,
which caused them to galvanize their support for his cause as well. In 1624, Cardinal Richelieu
assumed direction of the French government and without delay firmly set its foreign policy in an
anti-Habsburg track; that same year, France joined England and the Dutch Republic in a defensive
alliance. England, for its part, had turned against Spain soon after the Spanish Match fell through
and Prince Charles married the Princess Henrietta Maria of France, in 1625 ? The marriage sealed
the intention of the two powers to cooperate against Habsburgs, but neither they nor their Dutch
allies were ready as yet to take active measures against the Emperor in Germany.
Instead of taking action themselves, the allies — egged on by Palatine leaders — proceeded to
encourage Danish intervention in the Empire on Frederick's behalf. It was not long before Christian
IV was persuaded by their arguments, which played upon his religious convictions and dynastic
ambitions, to take up arms against the Emperor.3 Christian, however, imprudently made this
1For more about the Palatine exiles and their diplomacy, see F. H. Schubert, "Die pfalzische
Exilregierung," and idem, Ludwig Camerarius, 1573-1651: erne Biographie (Kallmunz: Lassleben,
1955).
2Charles had been spumed by the Infanta, and Buckingham by the Spanish government during
their ill-fated jaunt to Spain in 1623. Both prince and favorite returned to England convinced that it must
follow an anti-Habsburg foreign policy; they turned their considerable influence toward mustering
support in Parliament for war against Spain, despite the resistance of the peace-loving James I.
3They exploited Christian's ambitions to extend his own influence in northern Germany and
check that of his rival Sweden by letting him know that if he was not willing to lead an army into the
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commitment before he had secured any binding promises of support from the allies. The impressive
personal fortune Christian had managed to accumulate made unilateral Danish intervention in
Germany possible, even over the objections of his council.4 So, wisely or not, he sent Danish troops
into the Empire to confront Imperial forces: the seasoned Catholic League army commanded by
Tilly on the one hand, and, unbeknownst to Christian, the Emperor's own army newly raised by
Albrecht von Walienstein on the other.5
The Imperial military establishment turned out to be more than Christian had bargained for,
and he desperately needed help. At first it appeared some assistance was on the way from the anti-
Habsburg coalition. In December 162S, Denmark, England, and the United Provinces concluded
the Treaty of the Hague, which was directed against the Emperor and Catholic League as well as
Spain.6 The signatories pledged to work together to fight for the rights and liberties of the German
Empire in defense of the Protestant and Palatine causes, his foe Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden would. As
Duke of Holstein, Christian exercised considerable authority in the Lower Saxon Circle of the Empire,
and he was eager to extend it to the secularized bishoprics of Bremen, Verden, and Osnabriick, thus
giving him control over the mouths of the Weser and Elbe rivers and undercutting Sweden's influence in
the Baltic (Parker, TYW, 65-7). For more on Denmark during the Thirty Years' War, see Paul D.
Lockhart, Denmark in the Thirty Years' War. 1618-1648: King Christian IV and the Decline of the
Oldenburg State (Cranbury, N.J.: Associated University Presses, 1996).
4By 1625, his assets totaled close to 1.5 million thalers, plus he had access to the huge fortune of
his mother, Queen Sophia; ironically, the only other prince who approached his solvency was Maximilian
of Bavaria, who had four million thalers in cash at his disposal in 1618 (Parker, TYW, 65).
sAlbrecht von Walienstein (or Waldstein) was from a noble yet impoverished Bohemian
Protestant family. After converting to Catholicism, Walienstein attached himself to Ferdinand while the
latter was still Archduke of Styria; by 1623, Walienstein was in the position to profit handsomely from
the Bohemian confiscations following the Imperial victory at White Mountain. In 1625, WalIenstein was
entrusted with the command of a new Imperial army responsible to the Emperor rather than Maximilian
and the League. Walienstein rose quickly through the social ranks: he was created Duke of Friedland in
162S and, controversially, Duke of Mecklenburg in 1628.
6France's involvement against Spain in the Valtelline inhibited it from making a commitment to
Christian in the Empire. On the strategic importance of the Valtelline, see Geoffrey Parker, Army of
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princes and to contain Habsburg power, in a supplementary secret treaty, they also promised to
struggle for the restitution of the Palatinate.7 In addition, both England and the United Provinces
pledged financial support for the Danish military effort in the Empire.
Although these assurances of a network of support for the Danish war effort were
encouraging, unfortunately for Christian it never fully materialized. His allies —particularly England
— did not come through with much of the promised assistance.* Charles, now King of England,
instead turned the precious subsidies voted to him by Parliament towards his war against Spain,
which had been initiated by the disastrous English attempt to attack the Spanish port of Cadiz in
November 1625. Nor did the anti-Habsburg powers remain united, and Christian's support melted
away as they began to squabble amongst themselves. The Anglo-French alliance collapsed first, and
then in 1626 Richelieu refused officially to join the anti-Habsburg alliance because the English and
Dutch had declined to help him crush the revolt of their Huguenot co-religionists. Even worse, the
following year France and Spain made a short-lived alliance against England, which quickly
retaliated by sending an ill-fated expedition under the Duke ofBuckingham to assist in the defense
of the Huguenot stronghold of La Rochelle. At this crucial juncture for the Danes, neither England
nor France had the time or the money to become involved in Imperial affairs. Therefore, though
Flanders, chaps. 2-3. The passes were theoretically controlled by the Swiss Protestant Graubunden, or
Grey Leagues, but they were alternately occupied by Spanish, Austrian, French, and papal troops.
7Steiner, 110.
sBy the Hague Convention (1625), England and the United Provinces each agreed to pay 144,000
thalers a month to help support Christian's cause. Also, English levies under the command of Count
Mansfeld were to be integrated into Christian's forces. Christian only received a fraction of the promised
amount (547,000 thalers) over the three years of fighting, most of it in 1626. England was particularly
negligent in making payments; the Dutch paid their subsidies more promptly, but also came up short of
the expected sum (Parker, TYW, 69; Asch, 88).
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England, the Dutch, and France (the latter for much of the time anyway) continued to follow an anti-
Habsburg foreign policy, it was largely aimed at combating Spain rather than assisting the Danes
against the Emperor.
Without the promised help, Christian's war effort in the Empire faltered. After several
inauspicious campaigns, half of his forces were wiped out at Lutter in 1626 by the League army
under Tilly.9 In the meantime, his allies Mansfeld and Bethlen fared no better. Mansfeld died in
1626, and Bethlen was forced to make peace with Ferdinand in December of the same year because
the Turks, who had just suffered a severe defeat at the hands of the Persians, could no longer support
his conquest of Habsburg Hungary. Christian's forces were driven back into Denmark, and by late
1627, Imperialist troops occupied Holstein, Schleswig, and Jutland. He was finally forced to
conclude the Peace of Lubeck in May 1629, by which he was allowed to retain his lands but was
obliged to leave his German allies to Ferdinand's revenge. The dukes ofMecklenburg, for instance,
were summarily deprived of their lands and titles, which were then transferred to Wallenstein as
payment for his military expenses.10 Because the Emperor's enemies were defeated or occupied
elsewhere, he emerged from this latest contest stronger than ever. Catholic predominance was once
again restored, and there was no longer an army to defend the Protestant cause in the Empire.
Despite his strong position, Ferdinand knew that the Palatinate question must be addressed
for there to be lasting peace in the Empire. Too many dissatisfied elements in the Imperial
community and among foreign powers refused to accept the disposition of the Palatine lands and
9Lockyer, Habsburg and Bourbon Europe, 350.
l0For the confiscation of the possessions the dukes of Mecklenburg, see Kampmann, 90-8.
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titles. As long as this remained the case, Frederick and his heirs would continue to find support to
fight for their cause. Therefore, prodded by his council, Ferdinand began to pursue a peaceful
solution to this lingering problem. However, he was careful not to push his ally Maximilian too hard
to make unwanted concessions to Frederick. Ferdinand still could not afford to estrange himself
from Maximilian, who continued to hold Upper Austria as security for repayment of his war debts.
Nor did the counter-reforming Emperor particularly wish to reinstate fully the militant Calvinist
Frederick to his preeminent position as an elector of the Empire. Ifa compromise on the Palatinate
was indeed to be achieved, Frederick — who was even more inflexible than Maximilian on the subject
of acceptable terms for his restoration — would have to make some real concessions to the Emperor,
Maximilian, and the Catholic party in the Empire.
Almost immediately after Frederick's proscription and particularly after the Palatine
electorate was transferred to Maximilian for life, various proposals for the settlement of the
Palatinate question were advanced. All, of course, called for some sort of restoration of the deprived
Palatines. Each of these plans, however, ran into difficulties just as quickly as it was presented. The
electorate was the most controversial subject. At first, Maximilian insisted that the electorate be
made hereditary in the WUhelmine (Bavarian) line, and refused to countenance any plan that called
for compromise where it was concerned. For instance, he summarily rejected a plan forwarded by
Spain to restore the electorate to Frederick's heir if he were raised a Catholic." In addition to his
inflexibility on the subject of the electorate, Maximilian also refused to give up any part of the
Palatine lands he occupied. In his mind, maintaining the lands and particularly the electorate in
"Steiner, 113.
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Bavarian hands was essential to the cause of the Empire, the Habsburgs, Catholicism, and most
importantly Bavarian aggrandizement. And Frederick, despite his disadvantageous position,
continued to insist on the full restoration of the Palatine lands and titles. With both sides taking a
hard line, the prospects for an agreement were not good.
Still, in early 1627, Imperial and Palatine representatives held secret negotiations at Colmar
to try and hammer out a solution. Ferdinand's proposals, however, were completely unacceptable
to Frederick. In return for the restoration ofa portion ofhis lands, Frederick would be required not
only to submit humbly to the Emperor and renounce his claims to Bohemia, but also to renounce the
electorate, allow Catholicism in any restored areas of the Palatinate, and reimburse the Emperor for
his war costs. Frederick's proposals were no less exacting than Ferdinand's. In return for renouncing
his claim to the Bohemian throne, Frederick expected that his lands would be fully restored and that
he and Maximilian would share the electoral title until Maximilian's death, whereupon it would
revert to the Palatine line. Also, Frederick was not prepared to accept Catholicism in the Palatinate.
Since neither side was ready to make any substantive concessions, the talks at Colmar failed.12
The Palatines now hoped that the electors would offer a workable solution at the electoral
convention of Muhlnausen, which met in the autumn of 1627 to look for ways to establish permanent
peace in the Empire. This meant that the Palatinate question was sure to be on the agenda, as it was
recognized that its settlement was essential to a stable peace. From the beginning, however, things
did not bode well for Frederick and his family: Palatine, English, and Danish representatives were
unable to get a grant of safe passage to attend the convention. With no representation on hand from
12Ibid., 114; Bireley, Religion and Politics, 50-1 .
Ill
the Palatine side, the electors gave Ferdinand their official opinion on the terms of Palatine
restoration, which amounted to much the same offer as that made by the Emperor earlier in the
year.13 The Catholic electors, however, gave their true opinion in a separate, secret memorandum
to Ferdinand: the electorate should be made hereditary in the Bavarian line (and only ifthis line died
out could it revert to the Palatine line); and Catholicism should be retained in any lands restored to
the Palatine house. The electors referred a final decision to the Emperor, who with his victories in
the Empire against the Danes had for the time being lost interest in negotiating with the Palatine
party.14
With the Catholic electors' opinion regarding the Palatinate question, the way was open for
Ferdinand to fulfill the secret promise he had made to Maximilian in 1623. Trauttrnansdorff, in his
diplomatic debut, negotiated the Treaty of Munich ofFebruary 1628. By this agreement, Ferdinand
went a step beyond the compromise made at Regensburg five years before and made the electorate
hereditary in the Bavarian line. Also, he and Maximilian reached a final agreement on the question
of the mortgaged Austrian lands and his debt to Bavaria: Ferdinand finally recovered Upper Austria
by granting Maximilian the Palatine lands he occupied for thirty years as compensation for his war
costs. Thus Maximilian essentially purchased the Upper Palatinate and the Lower Palatinate east
13Saxony and Brandenburg did, however, withhold judgment on the fate of the electorate and
lands after the death of Maximilian and Frederick.
14Steiner, 1 16-7; Bireley, Religion and Politics, 57; idem, Maximilian von Bayern, 86-7.
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of the Rhine (the lands he occupied) for the sum of 13 million florins (his war costs).15 The
Palatinate west of the Rhine remained in Spanish hands.
The treaty proved expedient for its signatories and the Catholic cause in the Empire. Once
again, Maximilian profited the most. Ever since his occupation of the Upper Palatinate and more
particularly the electoral transfer in 1623 , he sought to strengthen his hold on these gains. As he had
planned, the Munich agreement brought the Palatine electorate and lands even more firmly under
Bavarian control. At this point, Maximilian was more determined than ever to hang onto the
electorate or the Upper Palatinate; however, he would consider parting with the Bavarian-occupied
Lower Palatinate if it were necessary to consolidate his hold on his other gains.16 Ferdinand
benefitted from the settlement as well. For him, it was an opportunity to fulfill his promise to
Maximilian and to regain Upper Austria. Given the state of Imperial finances, it would have been
an impossible task for him to raise the money to repay Maximilian otherwise. Also, the Emperor
conveniently ensured a Catholic majority in the electoral college at the same time he was hoping to
secure the election of his son Ferdinand as King of the Romans (Emperor-elect). The Treaty of
Munich undoubtedly dealt a harsh blow to the Palatine cause. It meant the loss of the first temporal
electorate and a definitive alteration of the Golden Bull of 1356 (the constitution of the Empire),
which bound the electorate to the principality of the Lower Palatinate. With the Imperialists at the
15Brie/e und Akten zur Geschicfue des Dreissigjdhrigen Krieges in den Zeiten des vorwaltenden
Einflusses der Witlelsbacher [BA], n.s., Die Politik Maximilians von Bayern und seiner Verbundeten,
1618-1651, pt. 2, vol. 4, 1628-Juni 1629, ed. Walter Goetz (Munich: Beck, 1948), 28-3 1 : 22 Feb. 1628,
Treaty of Munich; Steincr, 117-8, 201-2; Albrecht, "Konfessionelle Zeitalter," 387; idem, "Kriegs- und
Friedensziele," 260. The sum equalled approximately 8,666,667 thalers.
16Albrecht, "Bayem," 461.
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zenith of their power, Frederick would have to wait for the intervention of Gustavus Adolphus of
Sweden before serious negotiations on the Palatinate question could be reopened."
Even while the Emperor was still making his half-hearted attempts to reconcile with the
Prince Palatine in 1627, he was already discussing plans for Catholic restoration in the Empire with
his councillors and the Catholic electors. Prodded on by Lamormaini and the militants, he resolved
to capitalize on his recent military successes and promote the interests of the Catholic Church in the
Empire as he had in the Habsburg lands. At the electoral convention at Muhlhausen in 1627,
Ferdinand had officially revealed to the Catholic electors his intention to recover church lands for
Catholicism that had been illegally alienated according to the Catholics' interpretation of the
Religious Peace of Augsburg. His plan was received favorably, particularly by Maximilian of
Bavaria and the Archbishop of Mainz, who emerged as the major proponents among the electors for
Catholic restoration.
Although the Catholic electors and militants pushed for action on this initiative, some of the
most influential Imperial councillors, including Trauttmansdorff, Stralendorf, and the Abbot of
Kxemsmunster (later the Prince-Bishop ofVienna) urged caution. They counseled Ferdinand against
the aggressive restitution of church lands and instead recommended a more conciliatory approach
that would be less likely to provoke the Protestant states of Saxony and Brandenburg into war. They
reminded him that his top priority in the Empire should be the election of his son as King of the
"Steiner, 1 18-9.
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Romans, and that achieving this objective would become much more difficult ifhe alienated the two
Protestant electors."
At the same time that discussions about Catholic restoration were underway in the Imperial
camp, Catholic unity in the Empire began to crumble. One cause of discord was the Emperor's
general Wallenstein. The electors, and Maximilian in particular, disliked the enormous power
Wallenstein wielded and the large size of his army, which outstripped that ofthe League. Even more
irksome to them was the fact that the more success Wallenstein's new Imperial army enjoyed, the
less reliant the Emperor was on their forces and the more the general's power increased. The fact
that Wallenstein's army supported itself in large part by coercing contributions from the populace
of the principalities where it was quartered did not make him popular with German rulers no matter
what their confessional bent. It caused destruction and depopulation wherever it was stationed. As
early as 1627, the electors had demanded that Wallenstein reduce the size of his army and bring it
under civilian financial control." In addition, they and other German princes suspected that
Wallenstein had ambitions to suppress their liberties in order to augment Imperial power as well as
his own authority and wealth.20
The other important i ssue dividing Catho lies both at the Imperial court and in the Empire was
the conflict that broke out in 1628 between France and Spain over the succession to Mantua and
Montferrat in northern Italy, territories that were strategically located on the land route to the
l'Bireley, Religion and Politics, 51-2, 58-9.
"Parker, TYW, 90-1.
^Albrecht, "Ferdinand □," 134.
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Netherlands.21 The struggle immediately threatened to draw in the Emperor, for two reasons.
Firstly, these territories were Imperial fiefs, and it was therefore the Emperor's prerogative to invest
the new duke. And secondly, Olivares in his perennial search for allies once again called upon the
Austrian Habsburgs for assistance.
In Vienna, the Imperial court was divided over the issue of active Imperial involvement in
northern Italy. On the one hand, the Spanish party led by Eggenberg and Collalto predictably
supported Imperial military intervention on Spain's behalf. On the other hand, the moderates and
militants joined in opposition to it, instead encouraging the Emperor to avoid needless foreign
entanglements and seek a peaceful solution to the Mantuan dispute. Then he could concentrate his
attention on the Empire, where the moderates hoped he would promote peace, the militants Catholic
restoration.22 The Catholic electors, especially Maximilian, also opposed Imperial involvement in
Italy because it would distract Ferdinand from his program of Catholic restoration in the Empire.
Also, they regarded his support ofhis Spanish cousins as purely dynastic and detrimental to German
interests.23 The Catholic electors were afraid that active Imperial support ofSpain in northern Italy
21After the Duke of Mantua died in 1628, the French-backed Duke ofNevers (the strongest
claimant) took over the government, whereupon Spain laid siege to the fortress of Casale in Montferrat
Unfortunately for Spain, the surrender of La Rochelle in October 1628 freed a French army to march into
northern Italy. Although the conflict over Mantua was a relatively contained affair, both Spain and France
prepared for what both sides saw as the inevitable confrontation to come. Each mobilized their resources
and searched for allies; as a result, they both hurried to make peace with England—France in April 1629
and Spain in November 1630. For the background and a more detailed account of the Mantuan succession
dispute, see Parker, TYW, 36-7, 95-6.
22Bireley, Religion and Politics, 67, 72-3, 94; Straub, 338.
23Bireley, Religion and Politics, 67; Albrecht, "Ferdinand II," 136.
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would result in the same in the Netherlands, thus prolonging the war indefinitely and drawing them
in on Spain's side as well.
Maximilian had every right to fear being drawn into a costly war for Habsburg profit, for it
had always been an essential element of Olivares's foreign policy strategy to secure Imperial and
League assistance against the Dutch, if possible through a formal league of alliance with Spain.24
Spain needed to drive the Dutch rebels to the bargaining table as quickly as possible, and Olivares
regarded an offensive and defensive military alliance between Spain and the Emperor —a "Habsburg
league" — as the best way to do it.25 He forwarded his first proposals for such an alliance as early as
1624. Constructing the league he envisioned, however, proved as difficult for Olivares as forming
an anti-Habsburg alliance had for the Palatines, not only because ofMaximilian's resistance, but also
because the Emperor and his German allies were occupied with their own war in the Empire and
could see no immediate benefit from involving themselves in a war with the Dutch too.26
Despite Ferdinand's reluctance to commit himself to a formal league of alliance with Spain
or to intervene actively against its enemies, Olivares continued to press for a firmer Imperial
commitment to Spain. To show Madrid's dedication to working in close partnership with Vienna,
Olivares arranged a marriage in 1629 between the Emperor's son Ferdinand, King ofHungary, and
^Elliott, "Foreign Policy," 128.
"For more on the Habsburg league, see Giinter, Habsburger-Liga.
2S"The presumed identity of interests between Madrid and Vienna, and the overriding necessity of
preserving unity between the two branches of the family, were central to all [Olivares's] thinking about
Spain's international position. All too often his hopes were defrauded: Vienna's priorities were not those
of Madrid, and even on those occasions when the emperor had the will, he rarely had the
wherewithal. ..and the German princes were unwilling to concur in a policy that threatened them." (Elliott,
Olivares, 369). For Maximilian's attitude toward Spain's plans for a league in 1624-6, see Albrecht,
Auswartige Politik, chap. 8.
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Philip IV's sister, the Infanta Maria (who had previously been betrothed to Charles I).27 His
persistence finally paid off. In 1629, with relative peace in the Empire after Christian's defeat and
the Imperial cause ascendant, Ferdinand finally agreed to send Imperial troops to support Spain in
Mantua, despite the strong objections of the electors and many of his councillors. He only took
action, however, after the Duke of Nevers (the French-backed candidate) repeatedly refused to
recognize the Emperor's jurisdiction in Mantua and Montferrat, and a large French army, made
available by the capitulation ofLa Rochelle, marched into northern Italy to his aid.2* While Olivares
succeeded in securing Imperial support in Italy, however, the much-desired Habsburg league still
remained elusive. The reluctance on the part of the Emperor and his major councillors to commit
to this design foreshadows the political and diplomatic split between the two branches of the House
of Habsburg that would widen as time went on. It would manifest itself most conspicuously in the
separate peace made by the Emperor with France at Westphalia.
At the same time that Olivares was promoting a Habsburg league, he advanced another,
more specific plan for Spanish-Imperial cooperation that was aimed against the Dutch, namely the
great "Baltic design."29 He realized that the basis of Dutch power was economic, and that the best
way to wage war against the Dutch Republic was to destroy its prosperity and therefore its war chest
by attacking its maritime trade.30 Thus in the later 1620s when Imperial armies occupied several
"Elliott, Olivares, 369, 397.
2sMore than 30,000 Imperial troops under the commanders Collalto, Gal las, and Piccolomini
were sent to northern Italy to fight for Spain in 1629-30 (Parker, Europe in Crisis, 203).
^For a detailed look at Spanish naval strategy in the Baltic, see: Alcala-Zamora, 229-48, 267-76;
Rodenas Vilar, 73-13 1; and Straub, 288-3 14.
"Elliott, Olivares, 360.
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important harbors in northern Germany, Olivares promoted a plan for a joint Spanish-Imperial trade
war against the Dutch. It entailed building up a formidable Habsburg fleet in the Baltic and
establishing a Habsburg trading company to destroy Dutch control of the lucrative Baltic trade. If
the Dutch were cut off from this source of grain, timber, and naval stores, their economy would be
so impaired that they would be forced to make peace on terms favorable to Spain.31 Although
Ferdinand assented to the plan, in the end it came to nothing. Several problems — not least
Wallenstein's failure to capture the key Baltic harbor of Stralsund and the resistance ofthe Hanseatic
cities — had doomed the Baltic design to failure by 1629.32
While Spain tried to persuade the Emperor to commit to a Habsburg league and Catholic
unity was deteriorating over the problems of Wallenstein and Mantua, in March 1629 Ferdinand
promulgated his long-awaited declaration regarding the restoration of Catholic lands in the Empire
— the Edict ofRestitution.33 The Edict was the high-water mark of the Emperor's power in Germany.
Even though he claimed that it was only designed to enforce existing Imperial law by compelling
Protestants to return Catholic lands that, under the terms of the Religious Peace of Augsburg, had
been illegally poached, the Edict actually demanded far more for the Catholic Church than the Peace
had originally accorded:
31Parker, Europe in Crisis, 213-4; Elliott, Olivares, 332.
32lbid., 36 1; Parker, TYW, 95.
33A selection from the Edict is printed in Roeck, 267-76. For detailed studies of the Edict, see:
Heike StrtSle-BGhler, Das Restitutionsedikl von 1629 im Spannungsfeld zwischen Augsburger
Religionsfrieden IS55 unddem Westf&lischen Frieden 1648, Theorie und Forschung, vol. 159
(Regensburg: Roderer, 199 1); and Michael Frisch, Das Restituiionsedikt Kaiser Ferdinands II. vom 6.
Man 1629: erne rechtsgeschichtliche Untersuchung, Jus ecclesiasticum, vol. 44 (Tubingen: Mohr, 1993).
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The opening sections of the draft Edict seemed to confirm [the Emperor's claim]:
all church lands seized since 1552 (the 'normative date' in the Augsburg peace) were
to be restored. But the Edict also declared that ecclesiastical princes had the same
right to enforce religious conformity on their subjects as secular rulers. This went
far beyond the settlement of 1555 . . . Yet even this was not enough for the Catholic
prelates: they proceeded to demand the inclusion in the Edict of a new prohibition
of Calvinism, and the application of its terms to Imperial Free Cities, too. ... the
emperor and his advisors finally decided to include the ban on all Protestant sects
other than Lutheranism, but to leave the cities out.34
Thus the terms imposed by the Edict, especially the extension of the principle of cuius regio, eius
religio to territories ruled by ecclesiastical princes and the prohibition of Calvinism in the Empire,
were far more advantageous to German Catholics (and therefore disadvantageous to German
Protestants) than those of the Religious Peace had been.
Lamormaini and the militants as well as the Catholic electors and ecclesiastical princes, who
provided the momentum for the Edict, naturally supported the Emperor's statement on Catholic
restoration. However not everyone in Vienna was as pleased with it. Actually, Lamormaini was the
only key figure at the Imperial court who wholeheartedly supported it. Indeed, many of the
Emperor's councillors, particularly those identified with the moderate and pro-Spanish groups, had
warned him against issuing the Edict. They thought that his militant Catholic policy would drive
the Protestant electors and princes who had earlier supported the Emperor or remained neutral to
armed resistance, thus igniting an all-out religious war in Germany. Trauttmansdorff and the
moderates, though they did not actively oppose the Edict, had serious reservations about it because
they believed that the Emperor and Empire were best served by peace. Eggenberg and the Spanish
MParker, TYW, 88.
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faction actively opposed it because religious war in the Empire would distract the Emperor from his
commitment in Italy.35
These councillors had good reason to think that the Edict might force into armed resistance
Saxony, Brandenburg, and the other German Protestant princes who before had supported the
Emperor, or who had remained neutral. Initially, all the Protestants' fears about the Edict seemed
justified:
Within eighteen months, six bishoprics and their lands were back in clerical hands,
as were 100 convents (with more than 80 more in the process of restitution), while
countless parishes, both rural and urban, were reclaimed for a Catholic incumbent.
No distinction was made between rebellious (usually Calvinist) and loyal (mostly
Lutheran) Protestant states and it was clear that the edict was but one of a series of
intended measures aimed at extirpating Protestantism.36
While it seemed that church lands in Saxony and Brandenburg, which had been secularized long
before 1552, were for the time being protected from reclamation under the Edict, the Protestant
electors still had ample reason for discomfort. Firstly, on the strength of the Edict, Catholics had
reclaimed some lands that had been secularized before the normative date. Secondly, soon after the
publication of the Edict, the Jesuit Paul Laymann's influential tract Parts Compositio forwarded the
argument that Protestants should return any land to which they could not produce valid title. And
finally, the Emperor used Imperial troops to enforce the Edict, many of which were stationed close
to the borders of Saxony and Brandenburg.37
"Bireley, Religion and Politics, 78-9.
MParker, Europe in Crisis, 216.
"Parker, TYW, 88-9. In the end, however, little was done to enforce the Edict outside of the
rebellious Lower Saxon Circle, and nothing was ever done in either Brandenburg or Saxony.
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The Edict had been issued by the Emperor with the support of the militants and the Catholic
electors, but there were many at the Imperial court who opposed it or simply did not support it.
These councillors instead supported more pragmatic and/or dynastic policies. This conflict was also
apparent in the opposition of the moderates to the Emperor's intervention on the side of Spain in
Mantua. This is important to note, because the voices of these men would grow stronger and more
influential as time went on. Under the influence of the moderates, the Emperor did make some
moves to find a solution to the Palatinate question. These efforts, however, were stopped dead by
the refusal of either Frederick or Maximilian to consider any type of compromise. Bavarian, and
particularly Palatine, inflexibility would remain a difficult obstacle to a settlement of the Palatinate
question in the years ahead.
The Intervention of Sweden and Habsburg Decline
With the defeat of Christian IV and his Protestant allies and the promulgation of the Edict of
Restitution, the position ofthe Habsburgs in the Empire seemed secure in 1629. But this appearance
was deceptive. As the Emperor's moderate councillors had feared, the Edict had alienated German
Protestants who had earlier supported the Emperor, or at least not opposed him. Also, despite the
apparent Catholic unity generated by the Edict, the rift between the Emperor and his German
Catholic allies continued to grow because ofdifferences over Wallenstein and Imperial intervention
in Mantua. Even worse, the strong Habsburg military presence along the Baltic provoked yet
another foreign invasion of the Empire: on 6 July 1630, Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden entered the
German war. He declared his intention to defend the liberties of German Protestants, including
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Frederick, whose restitution was specifically named as one of the Swedish war aims.3* He also
meant to prevent the Habsburgs from establishing firm control over northern Germany and the
Baltic.39 So, despite the Emperor's apparently strong position in the Empire as the 1630s opened,
factors already existed that would contribute to the rapid and dramatic collapse ofthe Habsburg and
Catholic position in Germany in the years ahead.
In the summer of 1630 Ferdinand called an electoral meeting at Regensburg in order to deal
with the various problems confronting the Empire and, as always, to consider options for a
permanent peace settlement-40 The Habsburgs hoped to secure the approval and support of the
electors for several concrete objectives: first and foremost, the election of his son as King of the
Romans; second, military assistance for the Habsburgs in northern Italy and the Netherlands; and
finally, after Gustavus's landing mere weeks after the opening of the meeting, the same to combat
'"However, there was no talk of restoring Frederick to Bohemia (Steiner, 121).
"Parker, TYW, 109-10. Gustavus also bore a grudge against the Emperor for sending military aid
in 1629 to the King of Poland, who was fighting a war against Sweden. The two sides concluded peace
the same year, thus freeing Gustavus to undertake his long-contemplated invasion of Germany. For more
on Gustavus's initial war aims, see chap. 1, n. 25.
^For events at the Regensburg electoral meeting, see: BA, n.s., pt. 2, vol. 5, Juli 1629-Dezember
1630, ed. Dieter Albrecht (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1964); idem, Auswartige Politik, chap. 13; idem, "Der
Regensburger Kurfurstentag und die Entlassung Wallensteins," in RegensburgStadt der Reichstage:
Vom Mittelalter zwr Neuzeit, ed. Dieter Albrecht, rev. and enl. ed., 88-108, Schriftenreihe der Universitat
Regensburg, vol. 21 (Regensburg: UniversitStsverlag Regensburg, 1994; Bireley, Religion and Politics,
chap. 6; and Otto Heyne, Der Kurfurstentag zu Regensburg von 1630 (Berlin: Guttentag, 1866). The long
list of dignitaries and representatives who attended the meeting attests to the importance of the
problems— at both the Imperial and European levels—that would be addressed there. The Emperor,
Catholic electors, and papal nuncio all attended personally. Saxony and Brandenburg made their
opposition to the Edict known by sending only representatives. Many of the major European
states— including France, Spain, Venice, Tuscany, and England—sent envoys. Sir Robert Anstruther
represented the interests of England in the Palatinate. He was accompanied by Johann Joachim von
Rusdorf, the Palatine envoy (Albrecht, Auswartige Politik, 264-6). Over 2,000 participants and observers
attended (idem, "Regensburger Kurfurstentag," 88).
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the Swedes in the Empire. Maximilian and the other electors, however, were not in a conciliatory
mood. They had their own concerns that they wanted the Emperor to address, particularly the
dismissal of Wallenstein and the reorganization of the Imperial army. After much wrangling, the
Emperor agreed to Wallenstein's dismissal (and his replacement by Tilly, the League's general) as
well as the reduction and reformation of the Imperial army.4 1 However, Ferdinand gained little from
these concessions. The electors still refused to pledge their support to the Habsburg wars either in
Italy or the Netherlands and instead urged the Emperor to find a peaceful solution to the Mantuan
war as quickly as possible. They also declined to recognize young Ferdinand as King of the
Romans.42 This was a significant setback for Imperial policy. The one request to which they
acceded was to help defend the Empire against the advancing Swedes. A further matter upon which
the Emperor and Catholic electors agreed, despite the pressures to conciliate the German Protestants
now that Swedish troops were on German soil, was the preservation of the Edict in its original
form.43
41Albrecht, Auswartige Politik, 267-71 ' see also idem, "Regens burger Kurfurstentag."
42Albrecht, Auswartige Politik, 266.
43ln addition to the issues officially on the slate to be considered at Regensburg, the Catholics
discussed the Edict of Restitution informally among themselves. With Swedish troops in the Empire,
Maximilian and some of the Catholic princes decided that some relaxation of the Edict's provisions was
advisable as a conciliatory gesture to the Protestants. The Spaniards, who still hoped for assistance from
the Emperor and League, urged Ferdinand to moderate the Edict as well (Glinter, 262-4: 23 July 1630,
Philip IV to the Duke of Tursi, Spanish representative at Regensburg). However, the
confessors—particularly Lamormaini and Contzen— successfully persuaded the Emperor and the Catholic
electors that concessions to Protestants were "unacceptable to conscience and that God would give the
Catholics complete vicrory if only they persevered in confidence." (Bireley, Religion and Politics, 125;
see also "Discurs uber des Reichs statum," in which Maximilian explains this interchange, printed in
Albrecht, Auswartige Politik, 379-8 1). They thus decided to preserve the Edict in its original form and
rejected compromise in favor of Catholic restoration, even though compromise might have enabled the
Emperor to maintain the allegiance of the Protestant states and repulse the Swedish invasion. Robert
Bireley argues that this choice of Catholic restoration over reason of state reveals most clearly the
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In addition to these issues, the Palatinate question was discussed at Regensburg. The
Spaniards were particularly eager that the problem be considered at the electoral meeting, for it was
an opportunity for them to foster the Anglo-Spanish peace negotiations that had been underway since
1629. Olivares was desperate to end the hostilities with England as soon as possible so Spain could
concentrate on fighting the French in northern Italy. The negotiations, however, had constantly run
aground over the issue of the Palatinate. Charles exploited the opportunity to recover at least part
of the Palatinate for his brother-in-law Frederick: as a condition of peace, he insisted that the
Spaniards include their promise to restore the Spanish-occupied Lower Palatinate in the written
terms of the treaty. The idea was that once Frederick was in possession of a portion ofhis lands, he
could use them as a springboard to recover the rest ofhis patrimony. But the Spaniards, who did not
wish to relinquish the Lower Palatinate because of its strategic situation and value as a bargaining
chip with England, repeatedly sidestepped the English demands.44
Olivares finally succeeded in convincing the English that the question ofPalatine restitution
must be referred for resolution to the electoral meeting at Regensburg, where both the Emperor and
Maximilian would be present. Their participation was necessary for a viable settlement, he argued,
because the removal of the ban — a prerequisite to the restoration of any of the Palatine lands and
titles, including the Spanish-held portion of the Lower Palatinate — was the Emperor's prerogative,
ideological nature of German war (Bireley, Religion and Politics, 123; idem, "Religious War," 97).
"Even during these negotiations, Spain was pursuing a contradictory foreign policy, as it was
also pursuing the league with the Emperor and Maximilian that would all but preclude the settlement of
the Palatinate question in favor of England (Albrecht, Auswartige Politik, 232-6). From the Spanish
perspective, whichever would join them against the Dutch would become the more influential.
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and Maximilian was in possession of the rest of the Palatine lands and the electorate. Olivares
promised England would have Spain's full support in championing Palatine interests at the meeting.45
Despite these assurances, Olivares likely had no intention of Spain forfeiting the Lower
Palatinate. Although supporting Palatine restoration and maintaining Spain's hold on the Lower
Palatine lands were apparently contradictory aims, Olivares could pursue them both because any
concessions to the Palatine family were contingent upon the approval of the Emperor and
Maximilian. When they refused, as Olivares was almost sure they would, Spain could then
conveniently place the blame at their door for the breakdown in negotiations and continue to hold
the lands they occupied in the Lower Palatinate as well. Therefore, Olivares could support the
Palatine cause as he had promised to seal the peace with England while minimizing the danger that
Spain would actually have to forfeit the Lower Palatinate.46 That Charles I allowed the referral of
the Palatinate question to Regensburg at a time he had such leverage was a great mistake, as time
would tell. Since he did not actually engage in war with the Habsburgs again in the course of the
Thirty Years' War, it was unlikely he would have as much bargaining power later on as he had at this
time.
OHvares's successful referral of the Palatinate question from Madrid to Regensburg increased
the enmity that already existed between Spain and Bavaria. Maximilian's primary goal was still the
45Ibid., 297-8. Both sides desired peace, so after further negotiations they signed the Treaty of
Madrid in November 1630 without any mention of the Palatinate in its terms. Thus, as Olivares had
hoped, in the end peace between Spain and England was not hindered by the Palatinate question. For a
contemporary printing of the articles of the treaty, see Articles, entercourse, and commerce concluded in
the names of the most high and mighty kings. Charles by the grace ofGod King ofGreat Britame...and
Philip the Fourth King ofSpaine...in a treaty at Madrit, the fift day ofNovember after the old stile in the
yeere ofour Lord God M. DC 'JOCK (London: Robert Barker by the assignes of lohn Bill, 1630).
'"Albrecht, Auswdrtige Politik, 298.
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consolidation and full recognition ofhis position in the Palatinate, and he had always suspected that
Spain might undermine this goal by coming to a separate agreement with England that would be
detrimental to Bavarian interests and then persuading the Emperor to uphold it. Therefore, he
grasped every opportunity to minimis Spanish influence on the settlement of the Palatinate
question, or cut it out altogether if possible. Maximilian, for all his political acumen, did not
understand that Spain was only slightly more willing than he was to give up its Palatine acquisitions.
This did not mean, however, that Maximilian was against referral of the question to
Regensburg, as one might think. On the contrary, he supported it At the electoral meeting, he could
influence the outcome of the negotiations, rather than leaving Spain to make a bilateral agreement
with England that would prove disadvantageous to Bavaria. It was characteristic for Maximilian to
favor negotiations at venues where he believed he could influence the outcome and make measured
concessions, all with the aim of cementing his hold on the Upper Palatinate and electoral dignity for
his line. Special negotiations with England, the Emperor, and Spain in the later 1630s would bear
out.
In the end, Olivares's gamble paid off. As predicted, Maximilian resisted any kind of
concession to the Palatines. And even though the other Catholic electors favored Frederick's
reconciliation so that a viable peace could be made in the Empire, they could not accept the English
and Palatine envoys' insistence on full restitution.47 The most they were prepared to offer was the
removal of the ban and restoration of a portion of the Palatine lands (with the appropriate protections
for Catholicism in those lands), in return for Frederick's humble submission to the Emperor and his
"They were willing to restore some territory to Frederick; the Archbishop of Mainz was willing
to do so without any restrictions on religion.
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renunciation of the Bohemian crown, his hereditary lands and dignities, and all alliances. The
electorate was not on the bargaining table at all.4' Once again, Frederick's insistence on full
restoration rendered the negotiations futile. It was therefore safe for the Duke ofTursi, the Spanish
representative, to support the demands of the English and Palatine envoys at Regensburg. As
Olivares had hoped, Charles was assuaged by Spain's actions and continued to see negotiation with
the Habsburgs as the best hope for Palatine restitution.49 Maximilian, conversely, was convinced
that Spain was an enemy to be resisted.50
Alongside the discussion of German issues, the Emperor carried on negotiations with a
French delegation sent to Regensburg to find an acceptable solution to the Mantuan problem. From
the moment that Imperial troops had been sent to support Spain in northern Italy, Maximilian and
his League allies had protested Ferdinand's dynastic foreign policy. They pressured him to conclude
peace with France and turn his attention back to the Empire. At Regensburg, they were determined
to press their agenda on this issue and stepped up the pressure for a Franco-Imperial settlement on
Mantua.51 Between this and Gustavus's invasion, Ferdinand was inclined towards peace with the
French so that he could turn the large Imperial army in northern Italy towards repulsing the Swedes.
When news reached Regensburg in mid-July that the Imperialist army had taken the city ofMantua,
the French representatives saw the necessity ofconcluding a quick settlement before their position
"Steiner, 120; Albrccht, Auswartige Politik, 299; Bireley, Religion and Politics, 119-20.
"Spain repeatedly used this disingenuous subterfuge to its advantage in its dealings with
England, with greater and lesser success, up until the matter of the Palatinate was settled at Westphalia.
"Albrecht, Aitswdrtige Politik, 299; Bireley, Religion and Politics, 1 19-20.
"For a detailed account of the negotiations leading up to the treaty, and particularly Maximilian's
role in them, see Albrecht, Auswartige Politik, 284-97.
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deteriorated even further. Therefore, in October 1630, they signed the Treaty of Regensburg with
the Emperor, which stipulated the joint evacuation ofFrench and Imperial troops from northern Italy,
the withdrawal of French support from Imperial foes, and the investiture of the Duke ofNevers as
ruler of Mantua and Montferrat.52
In the end, Ferdinand had decided for the interests ofthe Austrian branch in the Empire rather
than for the dynastic interests of the House of Habsburg as a whole. The Spanish Habsburgs, who
had no hand in the treaty and had received nothing in return for the ten million ducats they had
invested in the war, understandably felt sold out by their Austrian cousins.53 Olivares considered
the Treaty of Regensburg to be "an Imperial betrayal of Spain's interests — 'the most discreditable
peace we have ever had.'"54 Thus the Mantuan war, rather than bringing Madrid and Vienna closer
together through a coordinated effort against the French as Olivares had hoped, instead "dangerously
soured" their relationship and revealed that the two branches of the House of Habsburg did not
necessarily share the same priorities.55 This was an uncomfortable situation for Olivares, because
by this time he was convinced that France and Spain were set on a collision course. Although
confrontation was not yet imminent, it was only a matter of time before war erupted, and Spain
"Parker, TYW, 102-3. Louis XIII, angered by the concessions made by the French representatives
(who in any case did not have the powers to conclude the settlement), refused to ratify the treaty. He
particularly objected to the renunciation of French support for allies or potential allies. Richelieu's
authority was so undermined by this incident that he was nearly removed from power by the militant
Catholic devot party ("The Day of the Dupes," 1 1 November 1630). Because Louis had repudiated the
treaty, a final agreement was not reached until the Peace of Cherasco was concluded the following spring;
the terms of this agreement were more to his liking.
"Elliott, Olivares, 401.
54 10 Nov. 1630, Olivares to council of state; quoted in Parker, TYW, 98.
"Ibid., 97-8.
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needed the Emperor's help to bring the war in the Netherlands to a satisfactory conclusion before it
was obliged to fight France.
The electoral meeting at Regensburg did not solve the problems confronting the Emperor,
but rather made them worse. The rivalry between Ferdinand's two most important allies, Spain and
Bavaria, intensified. Bavaria had successfully opposed Spain at almost every turn at the meeting:
League support was withheld from the Habsburgs in Italy and the Netherlands; the Edict of
Restitution was upheld in its pristine form; the Palatinate question remained unresolved; and peace
was concluded between the Emperor and France in northern Italy.5* The mistrust between the
Emperor's allies only made it more difficult for him to coordinate Imperial policy at a time when,
thanks to the Swedish invasion of Germany, he was under intense pressure to do so. He also
contributed to the erosion of his own position, as Bodo Nischan has accurately observed, when he
bowed to the electors' wishes and dismissed Wallenstein and when he obstinately refused to
renounce or alter the Edict:
By sacrificing Wallenstein, Ferdinand lost the one man whose ability and power
might conceivably have enabled him to consolidate his recent gains and unite a weak
and divided Germany under a strong Habsburg monarchy. By retaining the Edict of
Restitution, the emperor and the League princes further alienated the north German
Electors, thereby exacerbating existing Protestant-Catholic divisions. The events at
Regensburg had, in effect, created a power vacuum. No one was now in control of
the Empire.57
The stage was set for the collapse ofHabsburg and Catholic dominance in Germany and the dramatic
upswing in Protestant fortunes driven by the military successes ofGustavus Adolphus of Sweden.
56Albrecht, Auswtirtige Palitik, 297.
"Parker, TYW, 101-2.
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While the Emperor tried to deal with the problems that had surfaced at Regensburg, several
threats to Maximilian's hold on his newly acquired Palatine lands and titles — the erosion of Imperial
dominance, Frederick's restoration as a Swedish war aim, and Spain's support of the Palatine cause
to court England — convinced him that he needed outside help to protect them. He turned to France,
the arch-rival of the House of Habsburg, for this assistance.5* After the Mantuan conflict, Richelieu
like Olivares believed it was only a matter of time before war broke out between France and Spain.
The Cardinal therefore cagily exploited Maximilian's insecurity regarding his acquisitions in the
hope of concluding a Franco-Bavarian alliance that would separate the League from the Emperor
and thus weaken Habsburg support. It worked. The two sides undertook secret negotiations for an
alliance, finally reaching an agreement in May 163 1, but only after Richelieu promised to recognize
the hereditary right of the Bavarian Wittelsbachs to the Palatine electoral title.59 By the secret Treaty
of Fontainebleau, each side agreed not to attack or aid the enemies of the other.60
As Maximilian negotiated an alliance with France in an attempt to guarantee his acquisitions,
Gustavus was doing the same to try and rustle up some support for his war in the Empire. In January
1631, France and Sweden signed the Treaty of Barwalde, by which France promised generous
5*Albrecht, Auswdrtige Politik, 212-30; Bireley, Religion and Politics, 96. Despite the outcome at
Regensburg, his fears regarding Palatine restitution through the agency of Spain were not completely
unfounded. Sir Francis Cottington had concluded a secret treaty with Madrid that included Spain's
promisc—albeit vague—to take steps to restore the Palatinate if England pressed the Dutch to make peace
with Spain.
wIn addition to the reasons given above, the fact that both Pope Urban VIII and Maximilian's
Jesuit confessor Adam Contzen favored an alliance with France played a role in Maximilian's decision to
negotiate. Urban promoted this alliance as a Catholic counterweight to Habsburg power. He particularly
wished to halt Habsburg expansion in northern Italy. Contzen supported the alliance in the hopes of
further advancing the Catholic cause in the Empire (Bireley, Religion and Politics, 128).
"Albrecht, Auswdrtige Politik, 253-7, 303-4, 378-9; Parker, TYW, 106-8.
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financial support for the Swedish war effort in the Empire.61 Despite the fact that Gustavus had
ostensibly intervened to defend German Protestantism, he at first received little open support for his
effort from the very princes whose liberties he professed to defend, particularly Saxony and
Brandenburg which had the most to lose by breaking with Ferdinand. These states did attempt,
however, to create a "neutral third force" in the Empire to function as a buffer between the
increasingly impotent Emperor and the foreign invaders. In April 163 1 , an assembly of Protestant
princes called together in Leipzig created a Protestant defensive alliance supported by an
independent army, the Leipziger Bund. The Protestants once again had an army to counter that of
the League and assist Sweden if they chose. In the end the Protestant princes, most notably
Brandenburg and Saxony, were compelled to join with the Swedes.62
The Swedes, backed by French money and new allies, were poised for victory. When the
Imperialists under Tilly moved on Leipzig, Swedish forces crushed them at Breitenfeld in September
163 1 in one of the most resounding triumphs of the Thirty Years' War. Two-thirds of the formerly
undefeated Imperialist army was lost.63 With his own lands out of danger, John George of Saxony
61Convinced of the inevitability of war with Spain, Richelieu was determined to check Habsburg
expansion in Germany, and he was happy to subsidize someone else to do it. By the Treaty of Barwalde
of 23 January 163 1, France agreed to pay generous subsidies to Sweden (the equivalent of £83,000
annually) for five years in order to help Gustavus Adolphus campaign against the Habsburgs in Germany.
In return, Gustavus agreed to respect Bavarian territory and tolerate Catholicism in the areas he occupied.
The treaty amounted to open French support of the Protestant cause as well as an indirect declaration of
war on the Emperor (Parker, Europe in Crisis, 208, 219).
"George William of Brandenburg, under duress by the Swedish military presence on his soil,
signed an alliance with Sweden in June 163 1, after the sack of Magdeburg by Catholic forces. In
September, John George had no choice but to join Sweden when Imperial forces threatened to invade
Saxony.
"Parker, TYW, 113.
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immediately occupied Prague. The Protestants rejoiced — Breitenfeld was their first major victory
in the field since the beginning of the war. The tide now turned in favor of the Swedes and their
Protestant allies and the Imperial and Catholic advance in the Empire was finally stemmed. As
Gustavus triumphantly marched though Germany, more supporters flocked to his banner (some more
willingly than others).
After establishing their dominance in northern Germany, the Swedes turned their attention
to the strategic areas of the Rhineland and southwestern Germany. They occupied Mainz as their
headquarters and drove its Prince Archbishop into exile in Cologne. In the midst of the fray,
Gustavus did not forget the Palatinate. He sent Bernard of Saxe-Weimar, a steadfast military
supporter of the Protestant cause, to re-take the Lower Palatinate from the Imperialists.64 Soon
thereafter, Frederick joined Gustavus in the Rhineland to press his cause. Alsace, the hinge of
Spain's overland military routes to Flanders, also fell into Swedish hands. The loss of the Palatinate
and particularly Alsace dealt a damaging blow to Spain's efforts to keep these routes open.
After securing critical points in the Rhineland, Gustavus moved into southeastern Germany.
In April 1632, he invaded Bavaria and routed the League army at Rain, where Tilly was mortally
wounded in the fighting. Maximilian's precious duchy was plundered as Gustavus, accompanied by
Frederick, marched triumphantly into Munich. Frederick's revenge seemed complete:
"Bernard had fought with Protestant armies both in Germany and the Netherlands before joining
the Swedish service. He was the joint commander of the Swedish army after 1632. When France joined
the war in 1635, he and his army joined the French service. The dukes of Saxe- Weimar had supported
both Frederick V and Christian IV against the Emperor, and they were dispossessed for doing so (Duke
John Ernest [d. 1626] had been a military commander for the Palatines and then the Danes). They were
implacable enemies of the Habsburgs and the Elector of Saxony because the Emperor Charles V had
deprived their branch of the family (the Ernestine branch) of the electoral title and most of their lands in
1S47 and granted them to the branch from which John George had descended (the Albertine branch)
(Parker, TYW, 222 n. 17).
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Gustavus and Frederick V held a triumphal entry into Munich on 1 7 May, reviewed
their victorious troops, played tennis together on the ducal courts, surveyed the ducal
art collection, and plundered it as thoroughly as the Bavarians had plundered
Heidelberg ten years before. They also captured over 100 pieces of artillery, much
of it belonging to Frederick and his allies. Maximilian was unable to return to his
capital for three full years.65
Maximilian and what remained of his League army were set to ignominious flight. The situation
looked grim for the Catholics. Their fortunes in the war had reached a nadir. It seemed that
Gustavus was unstoppable.
With Sweden's successes in the Empire and the Palatinate once again in Protestant hands, it
seemed that there was a good possibility of effecting the restoration of the Palatine family.
However, Frederick's hopes for restitution were once again raised — and dashed. If Frederick
believed that Gustavus would simply hand the Palatinate back to him without any stipulations, he
was sorely disappointed. Even before Gustavus had marched into the Palatinate, it was apparent to
the English ambassador Sir Henry Vane, whom Charles had sent to negotiate an alliance with the
Swedish King, that Gustavus would only relinquish it to Frederick for a price: "If this king gets the
Palatinate, it will be hard fetching it out of his hands without satisfaction."6* Vane's prognostication
was proved correct. At first, Gustavus made Frederick's restoration contingent upon England
providing troops and a monetary contribution to the Swedish war effort.67 Then, in September 1632,
the Swedish King raised his demands, insisting that England not only join the land war, but also
provide naval protection in the Baltic. In addition, Gustavus asked for the military support of the
"Ibid., 116.
"PRO, SP 8 1, German States: 12 Nov. 163 1," Vane to Viscount Dorchester, quoted in Gardiner,
vol. 7, 189.
"Gardiner, vol. 7, 189; Steiner, 122.
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restored Prince Palatine and the equality of the Lutheran and Calvinist confessions in his lands.
Charles realized that he would have to summon Parliament to finance these efforts; he thus rejected
these demands.6* Frederick, who continued to insist upon unconditional restoration to his lands and
titles, also rejected the offer. He was as unwilling to accept the Swedish terms for his restoration as
the Imperial terms, despite the fact that his expectations were unreasonable. When both Gustavus
and Frederick died in late 1632, the fate of the Palatinate was left undecided. Swedish Chancellor
Axel Oxenstierna named Frederick's brother Ludwig Philipp von Simmem administrator of the
Palatinate, but only after he agreed to the limitations imposed by the Swedish occupiers.69 For the
time being, the Palatinate had become the pawn of Oxenstierna and Bernard of Saxe-Weimar.70
As the Swedes marched across the Empire in the months after the meeting at Regensburg,
where Bavaria had appeared to be so strong, Spain's influence rose dramatically at the Imperial court
at Bavaria's expense. This development was primarily motivated by two occurrences. The first was
the Spaniards' discovery and exposure of the secret Franco-Bavarian treaty in the spring of 1631,
which they exploited to turn the Emperor against Maximilian and increase his reliance on Spain.
The disclosure of Maximilian's machinations with France behind the back of his Habsburg allies
aroused suspicion against him in Vienna and estranged him from the Emperor.71 It also confirmed
"Gardiner, vol. 7, 196.
"Ibid., 202.
70Ibid., 123.
71Albrecht, Auswartige Politik, 257-62. While Maximilian viewed the treaty as a way to protect
his gains and Bavaria from Swedish attack, to the Habsburgs it seemed like a betrayal. Ferdinand feared
Bavaria would make a secret arrangement with France and Sweden against the Habsburgs, while
Maximilian suspected the Emperor might cut a deal with Saxony at the expense of Bavaria and Catholic
interests, as Spain advocated (Bireley, Religion and Politics, 170).
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Spain's view that Maximilian was a tool of France, which meant to stir up trouble in the Empire and
weaken the Habsburg position.72 The second factor that augmented Spanish influence with the
Emperor was Sweden's success in the Empire. Ferdinand could no longer rely on Bavaria for
support, as it was itself beleaguered by the Swedes, who shattered the League army and left the
duchy in ashes. He therefore needed Spanish help more than ever to fend oft" his enemies.73
Olivares, as always, hoped to exploit this development to secure a firm Imperial commitment
against Spain's primary enemies, the Dutch and French. The chances for realizing the coveted
Habsburg league increased as Gustavus continued his advance; in their desperation, the Emperor's
ministers began to talk again about forming an alliance between the Emperor, Spain, and any
German princes willing to participate.74 But Olivares realized that the war in the Empire had to be
brought to a successful conclusion before the Emperor and German princes could come to the aid
of Spain. In order to achieve this, he supported a peaceful policy of accommodation with the
Protestants, particularly Saxony, and the recall ofWallenstein to lead the Imperial army against the
Swedes.75 Even Wallenstein's old adversary Maximilian did not resist this move. Indeed he too
"For the view of Madrid, see: Giinter, 276-83: 22 Apr. 163 1, Philip rv to Guastalla, Spanish
envoy in Vienna; ibid., 285-6: 28 May 1631, same to Cadereyta, Spanish envoy in Vienna; ibid., 286-7:
19 June 1631, same to Ferdinand II; ibid., 287-8: 19 June 1631, same to Guastalla.
At the same time that Spanish influence was recovering at the Imperial court, that of
Lamormaini and the militants waned. The Protestant successes quickly turned public opinion against
those were identified with the policy of "no compromise" on the Edict. Leading members of the Imperial
privy council, including Eggenberg, Stralendorf, Trauttmansdorff, and the Abbot of KremsmOnster (now
Prince- Bishop of Vienna), continued to support the peaceful policy of accommodation with the
Protestants that was advocated by Spain (Bireley, Religion and Politics, 157, 171).
74Gunter, 97-105.
"For an example of Olivares's advice to the Emperor to suspend the Edict and ally with Saxony,
see Gardiner, vol. 7, 180-1 n. 2: 28 May 1631, Philip IV to Cadereyta.
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called for Wallenstein's reinstatement, as he recognized that Wallenstein was the only general
capable of turning back the Swedish advance. Just one year after signing the Treaty of
Fontainebleau, the panic-stricken Duke begged the Emperor to save Bavaria and renewed his
commitment to an Imperial alliance.76
Wallenstein, after securing from the desperate Emperor significant concessions that bordered
on military and diplomatic independence, quickly raised a new Imperial army and went on the
offensive against the Swedes and their allies. First, he drove the Saxons out ofBohemia and Silesia,
and then he invaded Saxony itself in order to draw the Swedes out of Bavaria. In November 1632,
Wallenstein finally confronted the Swedes at Liltzen. Although the battle itselfwas indecisive, the
death of Gustavus Adolphus in the fighting was a victory for the Imperialist cause. Protestant spirits
in the Empire and throughout Europe flagged at the loss of their charismatic leader, while Catholic
enthusiasm was revived.
At Lutzen, the tide of Protestant success was finally stemmed, and the two sides were placed
once more on equal footing. This situation prompted them to scramble for the foreign support that
might tip the balance in their favor, with "the hopes of Sweden pinned ever more firmly on France,
those of the emperor fixed increasingly on Spain."77 Under the influence of Spain, the Imperialists
fought on after Lutzen not to restore the hegemony they had enjoyed in the 1620s but to improve
"When the Pope realized that the preservation of Catholicism in the Empire depended upon
Bavarian-Imperial cooperation, he ceased to encourage Richelieu's attempts to separate them. Still,
Urban's financial support to the Imperial cause remained paltry (Albrecht, Auswdrtige Politik, 339-40).
77Parker, TYW, 118.
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their military position to the point that they would be able to secure reasonable conditions for peace
with German Protestants.7*
After Gustavus's untimely death, Chancellor Axel Oxenstiernatook over the reigns ofpower
in Sweden and ruled in the name of the young Queen Christina. Sweden was exhausted by the many
years of war in Poland and now Germany, and Oxenstierna realized that if the Swedish war effort
in the Empire was to continue, it required more active support from allies in addition to subsidies.
Oxenstierna thus took the lead in forming a united alliance of its Protestant supporters in west and
south of the Empire, the Heilbronn League, in April 163 3. 79 The Heilbronn confederates pledged
to continue fighting until three goals were obtained: the preservation of German liberties, the
restoration of Protestant estates, and appropriate compensation for Swedish involvement in
Germany.*0 In September, France joined the Heilbronn League, thus openly supporting the
Protestant side and repudiating its secret alliance with Bavaria." Saxony and Brandenburg did not
join, but they threw in their lot with Sweden for another campaign.
While the Imperialists were pinned down fighting the Swedes in the Empire, Richelieu
exploited the confusion by establishing French bridgeheads in the Rhineland. By 1633, Swedish and
French advances in Germany completely blocked the military corridors that allowed Spain to
provision its army in Flanders from its bases in Italy. After Gustavus's victory at Breitenfeld and
7*Bireley, Religion and Politics, 189.
"The coalition joined the Franconian, Swabian, and Upper and Lower Rhenish circles.
""Parker, TYW, 12 1. As for appropriate compensation, territory on the south Baltic coast (namely
Pomerania) sprung to Swedish minds, much to the chagrin of the elector George William of
Brandenburg, who had a legitimate claim on the area.
*1Steiner, 123.
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invasion of the Rheinland in 163 1, both the Palatinate and Alsace fell into Swedish hands. The loss
of Alsace, the hinge of the corridors, was particularly damaging. Although the pivotal bridgehead
of Breisach was saved, it became very difficult for Spain to move its recruits to Flanders.*2 The loss
of Alsace was serious, but the French invasion of Lorraine in 1633 cut all Spain's major military
routes at once, because all depended on right of passage through the duchy.*3 Olivares lamented
Spain's dire situation:
The King of France has entirely closed the Italy-Flanders route. France lies between
Spain and Flanders, so that no help from Germany can reach either Flanders or Italy;
none from Italy can reach Flanders; and none can reach Spain from Flanders or
Flanders from Spain except by way of the Channel, bordered by French ports on one
side and English ports on the other, and swarming with Dutch.*4
Spain was left to rely upon the sea route, and therefore the pleasure of England, to transport its
troops and supplies through the Channel to Flanders.
Despite their advances and the new commitment made at Heilbronn, tensions grew between
Sweden and her German allies. With the encouragement of the Emperor, Wallenstein exploited this
rift by opening negotiations with the German Protestants, particularly Saxony and Brandenburg, in
an attempt to detach them from Sweden and promote a settlement with the Emperor. At this time,
Vienna was hoping for an agreement between Catholic and Protestant states that would serve as the
basis for an eventual alliance to expel foreigners from the Empire and bring any renegade German
*2Parker, Army ofFlanders, 55. 58, 73.
^Ibid., 76. The French invaded Lorraine, occupying Nancy and other major strongholds, and
forced Duke Charles into exile for aiding critics of the French government, including Gaston of Orleans
(the French heir presumptive), and for allowing the Habsburgs to raise troops and occupy two key
fortresses in Lorraine. The exiled Duke became a Habsburg general. A strong French military presence in
Lorraine was essential to Richelieu's anti-Habsburg strategy (Elliott, Olivares, 464; Parker, TYW, 130-1).
"Elliott, Olivares, 464.
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states back into line.*5 Spain supported this move, hoping that a settlement between the Emperor
and the Protestant princes would result in German aid for Spain against the Dutch and French.
Hopes ofpeace through Wallenstein's diplomatic endeavors, however, came to an abrupt end.
The Emperor had become increasingly suspicious of his conduct of the secret negotiations .*6 The
last straw was the General's attempt to render himself untouchable by requiring his officers to swear
an oath of loyalty to his person at Pilsen in January 1634. The Emperor regarded this move as
treasonous and decided that it was necessary to remove his overmighty subject.*7 By Imperial order,
a group of Wallenstein's own officers assassinated him at his home in Eger on 25 February 1634.
The Emperor's son, Ferdinand, King ofHungary, assumed supreme command of the Imperial army.
Habsburg Recovery and the Peace of Prague
The Habsburgs could not accept the altered situation in Germany with equanimity. They were
determined to clear southern Germany of Protestant troops and to re-open the land route to
Flanders." The situation became all the more pressing when Archduchess Isabella, who had ruled
''Bireley, Religion and Politics, 198. Lamormaini and the militants predictably opposed
reconciliation because it would mean concessions to Protestants.
"Some of these negotiations were authorized (e.g., with Saxony) and some were not (e.g., with
France).
"Albrecht, "Ferdinand II," 138. The Emperor declared Wallenstein a "notorious rebel" before he
sent out his assassins. For a detailed look at the Emperor's proceedings against Wallenstein, see
Kampmann, 101-72. Wallenstein had made many enemies. For a summary of the arguments of his critics
and reasons for his dismissal by assassination, see Parker, TYW, 123-5. A contemporary account reported
that the group of his own officers who killed him "drew him out by the heels, his head knocking upon
every stair, all bloody, and threw him into a coach and carried him to the castle where the rest [of the
dead] lay naked, close together.. .and there he had the superior place of them, being the right hand file,
which they could not do less, being so great a general." (quoted in Lockyer, Habsburg and Bourbon
Europe, 360).
"Elliott, Olivares, 465.
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the southern Netherlands since the death in 1621 of her husband, Archduke Albert, herself died in
December 1633. The Cardinal Infante Ferdinand, brother ofPhilip IV and the new governor of the
Netherlands, had to find a way to break through Germany and get up to Flanders." In this time of
difficulty, a closer collaboration emerged between Madrid and Vienna, much to Olivares's delight.
The Habsburgs developed a plan for the Imperial army under Ferdinand, King of Hungary, and
Spanish forces under the Cardinal Infante to join together in Germany. If all went well, this grand
Habsburg army would expel the Protestants from south and southwest Germany and restore Spain's
overland communications.90 As planned, in September 1634 Imperial and Spanish armies met
outside of the free Imperial city ofNdrdlingen in Bavaria. There the combined Habsburg forces led
by the two Ferdinands met and inflicted a catastrophic defeat upon the Swedes and their Heilbronn
allies under the joint command of Gustav Horn and Bernard of Saxe- Weimar."
The success of the Habsburg cooperation at Nordlingen precipitated a breakthrough for
Olivares's plans for a Habsburg League. Count Ofiate, who was still serving as Spanish ambassador
to Vienna, finally persuaded the Emperor to sign the long-discussed league of alliance with Spain,
"The Archduke Albert, son of Emperor Maximilian n, served as viceroy of Portugal and advisor
to Philip II before he was named governor of the Netherlands in 1596. Soon thereafter, he became joint
sovereign ruler with his cousin, the Infanta Isabella (daughter of Philip II), whom he married in 1599.
The Archdukes ruled the south Netherlands together from 1598 until Albert's death in 1621. Isabella
continued to rule as governor-general until her own death in 1633.
"Parker, Army ofFlanders, 259.
91At Ndrdlingen the Habsburg army, 33,000 men strong, substantially outnumbered the
Protestants, at 25,000 men. Almost half of the Protestants were killed on the field and around 4,000 more
taken prisoner, among them Hom himself. Olivares dubbed the Habsburg triumph at Ndrdlingen "the
greatest victory of our times." (Parker, TYW, 126).
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the secret League of Ebersdorf, in October 1634." Under the terms of the treaty, the Emperor
promised to assist Spain in its waragainst the Dutch and to allow it to maintain an army in Germany
at its own expense. He also agreed not to settle the question of the Palatinate without prior
consultation with Spain.
With the signing of this league, however, Spanish expectations were for the most part
disappointed. Olivares hoped that the Emperor would assist Spain against both of its arch-enemies,
the Dutch Republic and France. However, the Emperor would not commit to war with France, and
at this point, it rather than the Dutch Republic was Spain's greater worry 93 Imperial help against the
French would have been particularly welcome, as they continued to control strategic areas in Alsace
and along the Rhine, thus blocking Spain's overland military routes to Flanders.*4 Also, the Emperor
still would not engage in war with the Dutch, let alone the French, until he had secured a favorable
peace in the Empire.
The successful cooperation at NSrdlingen, which Olivares had sought to exploit for Spam's
profit, dealt a devastating blow to the Swedes and their Protestant allies. In fact, Nordlingen was as
disastrous for the Swedes as Breitenfeld had been for the Imperialists. The Swedes lost southern
Germany, and the military advantage swung back in favor of the Emperor and League. Many of
Sweden's allies saw Nordlingen as a portent and deserted the alliance soon thereafter. Sweden itself
withdrew from the Heilbronn League in December 1634.
"GQnter, 184; Mecenseffy, 29. The text of the secret League of Ebersdorf of 31 October 1634 is
printed in Gunter, 425.6.
"ibid., 173, 184-5.
^Elliott, Olivares, 482.
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Perhaps the most damaging outcome of NOrdlingen for the Protestant cause, however, was
the defection of Saxony and its subsequent negotiations with the Imperialists. The Emperor, who
was once again negotiating from a position of strength, decided the time was right to bring the
German states together under his banner, drive the foreigners out, and restore peace to the Empire.
And at this point, John George of Saxony was prepared to listen. Ten weeks after the battle, the
negotiations between Saxony and the Emperor —those originally initiated by Wallenstein —yielded
a tentative agreement, the Preliminaries ofPima. Its terms were advantageous for both parties. The
signatories recognized Saxony's right to Lusatia (which John George had held since 1620 as security
for the repayment ofhis Bohemian war expenses) and Magdeburg, and the permanent transfer of the
Upper Palatinate and electorate to Bavaria.95 They agreed to form one army composed of Saxon,
Bavarian, and Imperial troops to combat foreign forces in the Empire, and the Emperor promised
to grant amnesty to secular rulers who had taken up arms against him. The normative date was set
at November 1627 for the restitution of church lands and the exercise ofpermitted faiths, effectively
suspending the Edict for the next forty years. This was a significant compromise that permitted
Catholics to preserve their gains in southern Germany, but protected secularized lands in the north.96
When news of the terms of the preliminary agreement with Saxony reached Vienna, there
was an immediate confrontation at the Imperial court between those who supported concessions to
Saxony and the other Protestant states and those who did not. Lamormaini and the militants
predictably continued to uphold the cause of Catholic restoration by advising the Emperor against
9SBA, n.s., pt 2, vol. 10, Der Prager Frieden von 1635, ed. Kathrin Bierther (Munich:
Oldenbourg, 1997), 1545-85: Preliminaries of Pima.
"Bireley, "Religious War," 100; Parker, TYW, 127.
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concessions, particularly the backpedaling on the Edict.97 Ranged against him were the moderates
—the influential councillors Stralendorf, Trauttmansdorff, the Prince-Bishop ofVienna, and Cardinal
Dietrichstein (who had replaced Eggenberg as director of the privy council). They were joined by
many prominent clerics, notably Cardinal Pazmany of Esztergom and the court Capuchins. These
men supported a policy of compromise and peace with Saxony and the other Protestant states that
would enable the Emperor to oust the foreign invaders from the Empire and deal with any German
states that continued to oppose him. This meant some modification of the Edict9*
Although the majority of Ferdinand's councillors favored peace, their arguments alone were
not sufficient to persuade him to complete the peace process. He needed reassurance that his
preliminary peace proposals were acceptable to God . In February 163 5 , Ferdinand therefore put the
proposals before a panel of his theologians, among them Lamormaini.99 During the panel's
deliberations, the confessor strongly voiced his interpretation of the Imperial victory at Nordlingen
as yet another sign of God's support for the policy of Catholic restoration in the Empire. He
consequently called on Ferdinand to reject all compromise with the Protestants and to abandon the
agreement with Saxony. However, most of the other panel members viewed Nordlingen as a
propitious victory that would not necessarily be repeated, and they accordingly advised Ferdinand
"Instead he promoted the rather unlikely scheme of a rapprochement with France and a united
Catholic front against the Protestants.
"Bireley, Religion and Politics, 208.
"The Emperor, like many other princes of the day, called panels like this one on an ad hoc basis
to consider certain questions of moment. Its membership was not fixed, nor did its decisions carry any
weight beyond what the Emperor chose to assign to them.
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to make peace with the Protestants before they regained the upper hand on the field of battle.100 Not
only did most Imperial privy councillors and theologians support conciliation with the Protestants
and peace in the Empire, but so did Ferdinand's allies. Spain urged it in the hope that once internal
squabbles were settled, the Emperor and German states would back Spain in its unavoidable war
against France. Even Maximilian of Bavaria and the Elector of Mainz preferred the agreement to
continued war.101 This showed how these interest groups, Bavaria and Spain among them, were
willing to compromise in favor of pragmatic goals, even at the cost of the Catholic cause in the
Empire.
Ferdinand, his conscience soothed, took their advice. On 30 May 1635, he signed the final
peace agreement with Saxony at Prague. Its terms were essentially those of the preliminary
agreement with a few alterations, most notably the enforcement of the Edict in a few additional areas
and the rejection of amnesty for certain princes of the Empire, including the Palatines.102 All
German states not specifically excluded by the amnesty were invited to submit to the Emperor by
accepting the terms of the agreement and joining forces with him to expel the foreigners from the
Empire and restore peace. By this time, most of them found the interference of foreign armies in
Germany more menacing than the threat posed by the Emperor.103 Tired of the destruction of war
l00Parker, TYW, 128; Bireley, Religion and Politics, 214-9.
""Ibid., 219; idem, Maximilian von Bayern, 213-20.
W2BA, n.s., pt 2, vol. 10, 1606-3 1 : Peace of Prague.
103Throughout the 1620s and early 1630s, many German princes—particularly the
Protestants—feared the unbridled extension of Imperial influence that was so blatantly exhibited in the
deprivation of various princes and redistribution of their lands, the electoral transfer, and the
promulgation of the Edict (which was single-handedly issued without consultation with most of the
princes of the Empire or the approval of a Diet). These princes felt their liberties were under attack by the
145
and influenced by a rising wave of German patriotism, they accepted the Emperor's offer.104 The
Empire, for the most part, had made peace with itself.
Germany's destiny, unfortunately, was no longer in its own hands. A mere eleven days after
the signing of the Peace of Prague, the long-anticipated war between France and Spain became a
reality. Louis XIII declared war on Spain citing Spanish occupation of strategic points in Trier,
which had been under French protection since 1632, and the arrest of its elector.105 The Spanish
actions in Trier, however, were a mere pretext for the French declaration ofwar. The real reason was
that the anti-Habsburg cause in the Empire was incapable of mounting effective opposition to the
Habsburgs after the annihilation of the Swedish army at Nordlingen and subsequent collapse of the
Heilbronn League. French intervention, therefore, was necessary to prevent Swedish capitulation
and keep the war against the Habsburgs in the Empire alive. France's support of the Swedish war
effort and the continuation of war in the Empire would prevent Spain from turning its full fury on
France and its Dutch allies. It would also put additional stress on the Spanish system, which was
Emperor, and some even suspected that he was attempting to establish an absolute Habsburg monarchy in
the Empire. Although Ferdinand did see the war as an opportunity to extend his influence, he had no
plans to transform the Empire into an absolute monarchy (Haan, Regensburger Kurfurstentag, 18-21;
idem, "Kaiser Ferdinand H. und das Problem des Reichsabsolutismus: Die Prager Heeresrcform von
1635," in Der Dreissigj&hrige Krieg: Perspektiven und Strukturen, 260-64; Burkhardt, 96-9; Asch, 36-7;
Michael Hughes, Early Modern Germany, 1477-1806 [Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
1992], 88-9, 91; cf. Wandntszka, Reichspatriotismus, and Franz, "Glaube und Recht").
l04For the revival of patriotism in Germany, see Wandniszka, Reichspatriotismus.
10SPhilip Christopher von Sotern. He remained imprisoned for ten years. Since 1632, France had
slowly but surely established a military presence in the area between the French border and the Rhine by
acting as protector to cities and principalities that wished to avoid Spanish or Swedish occupation. The
French gained strategic footholds on the right bank of the Rhine, including the fortresses of Coblenz,
Ehrenbreitstein, and Philippsburg when the Elector of Trier asked for French protection. They also
established themselves in Heidelberg. The French presence along the Rhine made conflict with the
Habsburgs a certainty.
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already brittle from years ofwar. Richelieu hoped to engineer its final collapse. France's open entry
into the war infused the anti-Habsburg cause in the Empire with the critical strength it needed to
carry on, as it provided fresh troops and a large war chest. At this point a breach between the
Emperor and France was unavoidable, but it was not until March 1636 that Ferdinand made his
formal declaration of war.
The confrontation that Olivares had long predicted had finally arrived, and he once again
looked to Vienna for support. He hoped that the conclusion of the Peace of Prague would enable
the Emperor to destroy bis remaining foreign enemies and deploy his resources against the Dutch
Republic and hopefully France as well.106 Despite all the support Madrid had provided to the
Imperial cause in the Empire and the promises Ferdinand made when he agreed to the secret league
with Spain the previous year, meaningful Imperial support for Spain's efforts against either the Dutch
or French failed to materialize. Ferdinand was no longer interested in the league after Saxony and
most of the other German states had joined with him at Prague. Ironically, the reconciliation that
Spain had helped to effect between the Emperor and his domestic foes contributed significantly to
the final collapse of Spanish plans for a Habsburg league.107
In many ways Ferdinand's reluctance to come to the aid of his Spanish cousins is
understandable, as the Peace of Prague failed to bring peace to Germany. Despite the apparent
resurgence of German patriotism that permeated the peace process, the Peace did not unite the
German states and the Emperor to the extent necessary to end inter-German strife, let alone drive the
'Parker, TYW, 129.
'Gunter, 178, 198.
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foreigners from the Empire.10* Although most German princes — including all the electors — joined
the Imperial side, some — particularly the northern princes — did so only halfheartedly and resisted
making contributions to the unified Imperial army established in the Peace.109 Others remained
outside the alliance, either because they rejected the amnesty or were excluded from it."0 Among
them were Bernard ofSaxe-Weimar (who placed his army in the French service), William ofHessc-
Kassel, and the new Count Palatine Charles Louis.1" The Peace dealt a particular blow to the
Palatine cause, because it not only excluded Charles Louis from amnesty, but also confirmed the
transfer ofbis title and dominions on the right bank of the Rhine to Maximilian ofBavaria.1 12 Given
the close ties between Charles Louis and his uncle Charles I, this decision was bound to have a
serious effect on Anglo-Habsburg relations, which despite the disappointment of Regensburg had
been relatively harmonious since the Peace of Madrid of 1630. 113
l0*For the decline of confessional opposition and corresponding revival of patriotism in Germany,
see Wandruszka, Reichspatriotismus. German public opinion denounced the presence of foreign armies
on German soil as the source of all its misery.
""For the military settlement at Prague and its implications, see Haan, "Kaiser Ferdinand 11,"
208-64.
110An important clause of the Peace of Prague stipulated that only those princes who had taken up
arms against the Emperor after Sweden's invasion of Germany in 1630 were to receive an automatic
pardon for their rebellion. All others must negotiate with the Emperor for a pardon. A number of them
were excluded from the Peace altogether: this applied to many of the Calvinists, the Elector of
Brandenburg being one of the very few exceptions.
"1William of Hesse-Kassel, who supported both Sweden and France, was driven from his lands
and died in exile in 1637. The Emperor also excluded Kassel, Wumemberg, Baden-Durlach, and exiles
from Bohemia and Upper Austria from the amnesty (Steiner, 125).
"^Maximilian, however, no longer controlled the portion of the Lower Palatinate he formerly
occupied, because French troops had invaded it in the winter of 1634-5.
113For England's reaction, see chap. 8.
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The Empire was not adequately united to drive out the foreign invaders, and those most
deeply involved in the war in Germany, namely France and Sweden, had no intention of leaving.
Ifanything, the Peace ofPrague encouraged more committed foreign participation. On the one hand,
the defection ofSweden's German allies to the Emperor was one of the main reasons France became
openly involved in the war. On the other, the fact that the Peace failed to address the interests of
foreign states made them even more determined to continue fighting against the Habsburgs. France
and Sweden in particular already had too much invested in the struggle in Germany to simply desert
it. Oxenstierna was determined to obtain territorial satisfaction for Sweden's military efforts in the
Empire, and Richelieu refused to abandon the struggle until the Habsburgs were finally defeated.
By the Treaty ofCompiegne ofApril 1635, these powers agreed to fight on until their demands were
satisfied. The Peace of Prague therefore did not promote peace in the Empire as the Habsburgs had
hoped, but instead encouraged a Habsburg-Bourbon war for European hegemony that would be
fought mainly on German soil for the next thirteen years, with the Habsburg states aligned against
France, Sweden, and the Dutch.1 14 Habsburg hopes that the Peace of Prague would bring permanent
peace to Germany were shattered. In the end, a German peace was inadequate to resolve what had
become a European war."5
"'"Haan, Regensburger Kurfurstentag, 20-5.
1"The Peace therefore changed the character of the war and the complexion of the group
dedicated to opposing the Habsburgs in the Empire. With the defection of many of Sweden's former allies
to the Imperialist side, the anti-Habsburg cause fell almost entirely into foreign hands. Without a sizable
contingent of German allies to consider, the attitude of the interventionists changed accordingly.
Although they continued to pay lip service to upholding German liberties and (in the case of Sweden) the
Protestant cause, both Richelieu and Oxenstierna saw the war as an opportunity to increase the advantage
and prestige of their countries (Parker, TYW, 138).
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For all its failings, the Peace did mark a significant turning-point in the Thirty Years' War
in that it brought about a notable scaling-down in the religious aspect of the struggle and paved the
way for a lasting peace settlement."6 It showed that German Protestants and Catholics were no
longer uncompromisingly ranged against each other in monolithic blocs, and that they were finally
willing to work together to achieve a common goal. In particular, the peace agreement defused
(though did not eliminate) confessional tensions between the Emperor and the Protestant German
princes, which in turn fostered a relaxation in the political power struggle between them. When
making political decisions, they now tended to give greater weight to political and dynastic rather
than religious interests."7 These developments indelibly altered the character of the war and gave
real hope that a lasting peace settlement between Protestants and Catholics could be achieved. The
most aggressive phase of the Counter Reformation in the Empire was at an end.
With the rejection of the militant policy at Prague, there was a decided shift to moderate
policies in Vienna and an atmosphere of anticipation of the peace that eventually would come at
Westphalia.1" The political influence of Lamormaini and the militants on Imperial policy waned.
The Emperor, supported by Maximilian and the other Catholic electors, had publicly repudiated his
conviction that the cause of Catholic restoration in the Empire was guaranteed divine support and
"4Haan, Regensbarger Kurfurstentag, 15-8.
1"There were times, of course, that religious and dynastic interests coincided and could not be
easily delineated from one another.
1"Bireley sees two major tendencies toward secularization of Imperial politics that result from
the Peace of Prague: the rejection of revelation as a source of policy and "demise of the crusading spirit"
that heralded the end of holy war, and the declining role of the papacy in Imperial politics. Both of these
trends were confirmed by the Peace of Westphalia (Bireley, "Religious War," 102-3).
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that concessions to Protestants were unacceptable to God."9 This is not to say, however, that they
neglected the Catholic cause after this point, only that they accepted the argument of the moderates
that religious concessions could be of greater benefit to Church and Empire than war.120 With the
triumph of their policy of peace with the German Protestants at Prague, the pragmatic, moderate
councillors—among them Stralendorf, Trauttmansdorff, the Prince-BishopofVienna, and Cardinals
Dietrichstein and Pazmany — gained the upper hand at the Imperial court. They would not relinquish
control of Imperial policymaking until after the war had come to an end.121
In conclusion, the years between the outbreak of the Thirty Years' War and the Peace of
Prague saw events and developments that would have a great impact upon Anglo- Imperial relations
in the later 1630s. The first was Frederick's acceptance of the Bohemian crown, his subsequent
defeat and proscription, and the dispersal of his lands and dignities. The Emperor's reliance on the
assistance of Bavaria and Spain to combat Frederick and his supporters ensured that Imperial allies
would have some influence on Imperial policy making, though how much fluctuated with time and
circumstance. This created a difficult situation at the Imperial court, because the goals of Spain and
Bavaria did not necessarily coincide with one another, nor with those of the Emperor.
1"Bireley, Religion and Politics, 224. Bireley shows that the militant policy championed by
Lamormaini became increasingly difficult to maintain after 1630, with the Swedish advance in the
Empire and the growing threat of French intervention. As his influence diminished, that of the moderate
and Spanish parties, which supported conciliation and accord with the Protestants, increased. The Peace
of Prague in March 1635 marked the decisive rejection of his plans for the restoration of Catholicism in
Germany.
l^Many of these men had long advised Ferdinand that achievement of the militant program of
Catholic restoration in the Empire was impossible, and that he should make peace with the German
Protestants so he could consolidate his own position in the Habsburg territories.
mBireley, Religion and Politics, 227-9; idem, "Religious War," 103.
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Dining the Habsburg ascendancy of the latter 1620s, the Emperor was able to forward his
Catholic agenda in the Empire and did not have much incentive to make concessions to the Palatine
House, though he did take some small steps in that direction. The collapse ofthe Habsburg position
soon after the entry of Sweden into the war, however, put him in a more conciliatory mood- His
position in the 1630s was much less secure, particularly after the entry of France into the war, and
he became more concerned with promoting his own interests by securing the election of his son as
King of the Romans and putting an end to the war in the Empire. The Emperor's pragmatic,
moderate councillors, who had gained the upper hand in his counsels by the mid- 1 630s, encouraged
him to promote his own interests before those of his allies. To achieve his goal of lasting peace in
the Empire, the Palatinate question had to be addressed. The thorny legal issues involved and the
refusal of many European powers to accept the fate of the Palatinate ensured that the Emperor would
encounter constant resistance. In the years to come, he would intensify his efforts find a compromise
solution to this problem that both England and his allies could accept.
The conflicting interests of the allies showed that the Catholic side was not a monolith. The
Emperor's pursuit of his own interests, readily discernible in the Treaty of Regensburg and the
collapse of the Habsburg league, highlighted the divergence of interests between the two branches
of the House of Habsburg. The Spaniards constantly complained about the fickleness of their
Austrian cousins. The ambitions of Spain and Bavaria were even more discordant, and the Palatinate
question became a major point of friction between them. Maximilian, for his part, was concerned
with consolidating his hold on his newly acquired Palatine gains, particularly the Upper Palatinate
and electorate. His inflexibility on the subject of Palatine restoration was eclipsed only by that of
Frederick, whose unrealistic expectations were an even greater barrier to compromise than
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Maximilian's opposition. The electorate was and continued to be the most controversial point.
Maximilian would modify his demands as time went on, but the Palatines remained obdurate. The
war against the Dutch, on the other hand, was Spain's main foreign policy objective. The
maintenance of secure supply routes between Spain and Flanders was cardinal to this effort. After
Swedish and French advances blocked Spain's overland military corridors in 1633, the sea route
became crucial to the Spanish war effort in the Netherlands. Spain was thus reliant on the friendship,
or at least the neutrality, of England to move much-needed supplies of men and money to Flanders.
Its wish to retain its share of the Lower Palatinate and at the same time curry England's favor led to
a fundamental conflict of interest. Spain therefore needed to be convinced that whatever England
would offer in return for Palatine restoration would be more valuable in its war with the Dutch and
later the French than keeping the Palatinate. In the years leading up to Taylor's embassy, Spain
seemed more accommodating to England than Bavaria, but in the later 1630s Maximilian would
show himself increasingly more amenable to compromise. The tensions caused by the conflicting
aims ofthe Imperialists could be exploited to England's advantage in negotiations on the restoration
of the Palatinate.
Finally, the Peace of Prague proved to be a turning point in Anglo-Imperial relations. As
noted above, the Peace failed in its aims but heralded a notable scaling back of the religious aspect
of the struggle. The implicit rejection of the militant religious agenda and a shift to moderate
policies in Vienna boded well for English negotiations on the Palatinate. While the Emperor and
Maximilian continued to advance the cause of Catholicism in the Empire where they could, when
push came to shove, considerations of state came first; this was particularly apparent in the period
after the Peace of Prague when both had reasons to come to some accommodation with England.
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At the same time, however, the Peace struck a decisive blow against the Palatine cause, as it
confirmed the transfer of the Upper Palatinate and electorate to Bavaria and rejected amnesty for the
Prince Palatine. These setbacks were to have a major effect on English foreign policy, precipitating
a burst of diplomatic activity.
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4
The Foreign Policy of England, 1618-35
In order to assess the effectiveness of Charles I's Habsburg foreign policy in the later 1630s, and
more specifically his diplomatic overtures to the Emperor, it is critical to understand English foreign
policy of the preceding years. This chapter therefore introduces the events, personalities, and issues
that shaped English foreign policy from the outbreak of the Thirty Years' War in 1618 until the
Peace of Prague in 1635. It explores the networks of influence at the English court, the priorities and
goals of the King and Parliament, and the volatile relationship between the two. The events of these
years, the issues under discussion, and the players involved would have a significant impact upon
the diplomatic missions exchanged between England and the Emperor in the later years of the
personal rule, which marked the last really serious effort in a long string of attempts to resolve the
Palatinate question by diplomacy.
The Palatinate question had a particularly strong impact on English foreign policy in the early
Stuart period. During these years, foreign policy was guided primarily by the King's desire to effect
the Prince Palatine's restoration to his lands and dignities. In pursuit of this goal, the early Stuart
monarchs, James I and Charles I, tried a variety of foreign policy approaches, ranging from active
intervention in the war to diplomatic pressure. Three major phases of foreign policy can be
delineated for the period under discussion. The first was the pro-Habsburg peace policy of James
I from the outbreak ofwar in 16 18 until his death in 1625 . The second period was the anti-Habsburg
war policy of Charles I and the Duke of Buckingham from the new King's accession in 1625 until
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the start of his personal rule in 1629. The last phase was Charles's return to a pro-Habsburg peace
policy in 1629, which continued with intermittent breaks until 1637, when the failure of the Earl of
Arundel's embassy provoked England to rum instead to a French alliance.
The Foreign Policy of James 1, 1618-25
When news of the Defenestration of Prague reached England, James I was disgusted by this display
ofdefiance to established authority in the name of religious freedom. At the time, however, he was
unaware how closely it would come to touch him: the action of the Bohemian rebels initiated a
series of events that would result in the proscription and dispossession of his son-in-law, the Prince
Palatine. The issue of the restoration of the Palatinate — the Palatinate question — was destined to
become the main focus of English foreign policy for the next twenty years.
As a staunch defender of monarchical authority and a self-declared peacemaker, James had
no wish to involve himself in the Bohemian revolt. Although the Bohemian rebels were co
religionists ostensibly advancing Protestant interests, he could not support rebellion against a
legitimate monarch. Aside from his belief in the legitimacy of Ferdinand's claim, James refused to
aid the rebels because he disliked warfare of all kinds, and particularly confessional warfare. He
viewed religious tensions as the greatest threat to peace and considered religious war "a disaster to
be avoided at all costs.'"
Although England was widely viewed as the natural leader of the Protestant cause in Europe,
James did all he could to ensure that his country would not become involved in the violent and costly
religious strife on the Continent, a policy that was not appreciated by many of his subjects with
1Adams, "Spain or the Netherlands?," 87.
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Puritan sympathies. In 1610, for instance, he had declined the presidency of the Protestant Union,
which had recently been formed in the Empire under Palatine leadership.2 Instead of contributing
to the tense situation by becoming the leader of a confessional bloc, the King wished to act as a
mediator between the two sides, styling himself as Europe's Rex Pacificus? In his view, this was
the highest function of Christian kingship, and it had been a constant theme of his foreign policy
since his accession to the English throne in 1603. However, to those who supported the cause of
international Protestantism, James's refusal to take on the role ofProtestant defender and his attempts
to mediate a peace with the Catholic enemy represented the abandonment of Elizabeth I's Protestant
foreign policy.4 They ardently wished for him to return to the anti-Spanish policy reminiscent of
England's Elizabethan greatness.
In an effort to cast himself in the role of the peacemaker who was capable of negotiating a
better understanding between rival confessional camps, James strove to increase his influence with
both sides through a policy of dynastic marriages. He first arranged for a union between his
daughter, the Princess Elizabeth, and the Calvinist Elector Frederick V of the Palatinate, the leading
Protestant prince of the Empire. This marriage, which took place in 1613, elevated the King to new
'However he did sign a treaty of alliance with the Union in 1612. For more on the confessional
tensions in the Empire in the years leading up to the Thirty Years' War and the formation of the Protestant
Union and Catholic League, see chap. 1, p. 45.
3James was encouraged in this endeavor, for example, by his success in mediating the second
Cleves-JOIich succession dispute together with France and Spain. His attempts to restore peace in Europe
through diplomacy earned him the title of "the wisest fool in Europe." For more on the King's pacific
bent, see W. B. Patterson, James Viand I and the Reunion of Christendom (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1997).
4As J. R. Jones has pointed out, James exhibited an attitude of religious moderation rare among
his Protestant contemporaries, and he was at least "trying to escape from the sterile position of regarding
all Catholic states as axiomatic enemies." (Jones, 17).
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stature in Protestant circles on the Continent and provided him with an ideal platform from which
to promote bis agenda ofpeace. To balance Elizabeth's Protestant marriage and elevate bis standing
with the Catholic states, James sought to marry his son, Prince Charles, to a Catholic princess.
Beginning in 1614, he doggedly pursued a match between Charles and the Infanta Maria, the
daughter of Philip III of Spain. On the basis of this alliance, James intended for Spain and England
to work together to preserve peace in Europe. He was encouraged in this hope by the Spaniards, who
wished to keep England from allying with their longtime enemies, the Dutch. The Spanish
ambassador in England, the Count of Gondomar, fostered the King's belief that an Anglo-Spanish
compact to maintain peace in Europe in the face of religious extremism was a real possibility.5
Given his pacific bent and respect for monarchical authority, James did not aid the Bohemian
rebels but instead attempted to mediate the dispute. In the spring of 1619, he sent James Hay,
Viscount Doucaster, to open negotiations with both the Imperialists and the rebels. Respecting
Ferdinand as the legitimate ruler of Bohemia, James instructed Doncaster to support Ferdinand's
claim to the title. In return for the rebels' submission, James thought that Ferdinand might guarantee
them religious freedom and general amnesty, though certainly nothing more. In spite of the King's
support for Ferdinand's authority, the Imperialists did not take his mediation attempt seriously. After
such great military expenditure, they had no intention ofrelinquishing the advantages that they had
'Simon Adams, "Foreign Policy and the Parliaments of 1621 and 1624," in Faction and
Parliament: Essays on Early Stuart History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), 149. Thomas Cogswell
neatly summed up James's intentions with this dual marriage policy when he wrote: "with prominent
relatives in both confessional camps, the Stuart dynasty would stand as a potent safeguard against the
revival of the religious wars which had wracked the Continent in the preceding century. In other words, a
Spanish match coming on the heels of the Palatine alliance would provide a solid foundation to James'
claim to be Rex Pacificus, the King of Peace." (Thomas Cogswell, "England and the Spanish Match," in
Conflict in Early Stuart England: Studies in Religion and Politics. 1603-1642, ed. Richard Cust and Ann
Hughes [London: Longman, 1989], 1 1 1).
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won thus far against the rebels. Doncaster returned to England soon thereafter, without having
achieved the object of his mission.6
Soon after the breakdown of James's mediation attempt, the Stuarts became more
immediately involved in the Bohemian quagmire when the rebels offered the Bohemian crown to
his son-in-law Frederick, the Prince Palatine. The Bohemians believed that Frederick, as one of the
best-connected Protestant princes in Europe, would be able to mobilize substantial support for their
cause among his Protestant peers. Unsure of which course to take, Frederick hesitated. James, who
disliked rebellion of all sorts, advised his son-in-law against accepting the rebels' offer. However,
the offer was too tempting for the young and ambitious Frederick. Under pressure from his militant
advisors Christian of Anhalt and Ludwig Camerarius, he ignored his father-in-law's counsel and
accepted the Bohemian crown on 28 September 1619.
The rebels' assumption that the Protestant powers would leap to Frederick's side proved
decidedly ill-founded. He received little support from the very states they had most counted upon,
particularly the Netherlands and England. Neither were prepared to assist him. The Dutch were
busy readying themselves for the renewed Spanish attack that would come when the Twelve Years'
Truce expired in 162 1 . England also hung back, despite the support for Frederick's cause in English
Protestant circles. James, who was appalled that Frederick had embarked on this Bohemian
adventure, declined to support his son-in-law's defiance of Ferdinand's legitimate authority. The
King not only refused to collect money for the Bohemian cause, but he also encouraged the
6Edward McCabe, "England's Foreign Policy in 1619: Lord Doncaster's Embassy to the Princes
of Germany," Mitteilungen des Osterreichischen Institute fur Geschicktsforschung 58 (1950): 47 1; Robert
Zaller, "'Interest of State': James I and the Palatinate," Albion 6, no. 1 (Spring 1974): 145.
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Protestant Union to hold itself aloof from the fray.7 Disavowing both the rebels and Frederick,
James pressed instead for a cease fire and return to the antebellum status quo.* The most he was
prepared to do to help his son-in-law was to allow the levy of 4,000 volunteers to defend the
Palatinate, to be placed under the command of Sir Horace Vere; under no circumstances were they
to involve themselves in the Bohemian war.9 As it turned out, only a handful ofGerman Protestant
princes came to Frederick's aid, and the superior financial and military support offered to the
Emperor by his allies, Spain and Bavaria, ensured a swift Imperial victory.10 While most of
Protestant Europe looked on, Imperialist forces handily defeated Frederick at the Battle of White
Mountain in November 1620 and drove him from Bohemia.
Soon after Frederick's defeat in Bohemia, the Emperor and his allies deprived the unfortunate
prince of his hereditary lands and titles and forced him to flee into exile in the Netherlands. In
January 162 1 , the Emperor proscribed Frederick under the ban of the Empire, thus leaving his lands
'Parker, TYW, 53.
'James sent Sir Henry Wotton, who was on his way to take up the post of ambassador at Venice,
to Vienna at the beginning of 1620 to ask the Emperor for peace negotiations and a cease fire. Ferdinand
was willing to grant the first request, but he dragged his feet on the second, claiming that his reputation
was at stake. Wotton's embassy was overtaken by military events: Frederick's defeat at White Mountain
insured its failure (Elmar WeiB, Die Unlersiaizung Friedrichs V. von der Pfalz durch Jakob I. und Karl I.
von England im Dreifiigjdhrigen Krieg (1618-1632), Veroffentlichungen der (Commission fur
geschichtliche Landeskunde in Baden- Wurttemberg, ser. B, Forschungen, vol. 37 [Stuttgart:
Kohlhammer, 1966], 28-9).
9Ibid., 25. Only 2,250 men were eventually raised, but they were augmented by Dutch troops.
l0In addition to the help he received from Spain and Bavaria, the Emperor also received financial
aid from several Italian princes, including the Pope (Parker, TYW, 52-3). A Jesuit play performed in
Antwerp satirized the paltry support of Frederick's allies, including England: "[the play] contained a
scene in which a courier announced to the Elector Palatine that 100,000 herrings had just arrived from
Denmark, 100,000 cheeses from Holland, and 100,000 ambassadors from England." (idem, Europe in
Crisis, 166).
160
and titles open to seizure. Spain and Bavaria, for their part, lost no time in occupying the Palatine
lands. Spanish troops quickly moved into the Lower Palatinate west of the Rhine, while
Maximilian's League forces occupied both the Upper Palatinate and what remained of the Lower
Palatinate. By the end of the year, all of Frederick's lands were under Catholic control except for
the fortress of Frankenthal, which Vere's garrison continued to hold. In 1623, Frederick's
dispossession was completed when the Imperial Diet agreed to transfer the electorate to Maximilian
for his lifetime and Vere finally surrendered Frankenthal.11
With the genesis ofthe Palatinate question, the restoration of the Palatinate became the major
goal of English foreign policy.12 While James had refused to assist Frederick in Bohemia, the
Palatinate was another matter entirely. The fact that the Emperor had deprived him ofhis hereditary
lands and titles and doled them out to Imperial allies struck directly at Stuart dynastic interests.13
This assault finally motivated the King to intervene on his son-in-law's behalf, and he was supported
in this, to a greater or lesser degree, by Parliamentary interests. Although the King and Parliament
were united in their determination that something must be done for the Palatine family, there were
stark differences of opinion between them as to how and when this should be achieved.
"Gardiner, vol. 4, 405; ibid., vol. 5, 74.
l2For more about the origins of the Palatinate question and its impact on European politics, see
chap. 2, p. 84.
13James's policy, therefore, was dynastically motivated; however, he may not be classified as a
strict dynastic ambitionist, as he had refused to support Frederick in Bohemia (Weifi, 125).
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The King, true to his pacific nature, hoped to accomplish the restoration of the Palatinate
through largely peaceful methods. 14 While he was concerned to uphold Stuart dynastic interests, he
carefully avoided English entry into the Thirty Years' War. In spite of his standing in Protestant
circles and the importance that European Protestants had attached to the Palatine marriage, James
refused to be drawn into a confessional war. 15 In addition, James did not want to incur the high costs
that military involvement in a war would bring. His relationship with Parliament had been turbulent,
and he wished to avoid a war that would require him to rely heavily upon Parliamentary subsidies.
Thus, given his pacific inclinations and problematic political and financial situation, he intended to
honor his commitment to Frederick by diplomacy rather than war.16
Under these circumstances, the King's solution was to incorporate Frederick's restoration into
the Anglo-Spanish marriage negotiations, which had been underway in earnest for some time. From
162 1 until the breakdown of the negotiations in 1623 , James attempted to effect a general settlement
of the Palatinate question, and thereby the Continental conflict, within the framework of the Spanish
match. The Spaniards, for their part, were more than willing to lend an ear to these overtures and
promised to support his mediation attempts in Germany, which he took as a sign of their good
intentions.17 They could not afford to alienate England at this crucial juncture in their war with the
"However, it should be noted that James's support to the Prince Palatine was also financial and
military: his financial support totaled £800,000, and his military support came to 15,000 men, excluding
6,000 that were in the Dutch service in 1624 (ibid., 126).
1SG. M. D. Howat, Stuart and Cromwellian Foreign Policy, Modern British Foreign Policy, ed.
Malcolm Robinson (London: Adam & Charles Black, 1974), 2.
16Adams, "Spain or the Netherlands?," 88.
"Ibid., 89; Alcala Zamora, 180-1, 21 7-8.
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Dutch, which was underway again after the expiration of the truce. The reduction of the Dutch
rebels was the main objective of their foreign policy, and the attitude of England could be decisive
in this endeavor since it effectively controlled traffic in the Channel." The Bohemian war and
Frederick's dispossession thus turned the Spanish match into a diplomatic means of settling the
Continental conflict and relieving the pressure for England to intervene militarily on Frederick's
behalf.
However, Spain had to weigh its willingness to accommodate England in the Palatinate
against the interests of its allies. Archduchess Isabella, who ruled the Spanish Netherlands, wished
to retain control of the Lower Palatinate to help keep the land route open to Flanders. The Emperor
had proscribed Frederick and was the only one with the authority to restore him. In addition,
Maximilian, who had been promised the Upper Palatinate and electorate in return for his support of
the Imperial cause, vigorously opposed any attempt to restore them to Frederick." Caught in this
bind, the Spaniards continued to encourage the King's hope that the Palatinate question could be
settled within the context of the Spanish marriage negotiations — even once they had realized that
it would likely not be possible — with the aim of placating James and keeping England neutral.20
James's attempts to reach a diplomatic agreement on the Palatinate question with the
Habsburgs fueled conflict with his subjects. Although they concurred that Frederick should be
"See chap. 2, p. 101.
"Straub, 173, 178; Egler, 76. James was aware that the Spaniards did not support the transfer of
the electorate to the Duke of Bavaria, which encouraged his hopes recovering the Palatinate through their
agency (Adams, "Spain or the Netherlands?," 97).
^Roger Lockyer, The Early Stuarts: A Political History of England, 1603-1642 (London:
Longman, 1989), 20.
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restored to his lands and titles, they and the King could neither agree on the basis of this policy nor
on the means to achieve it. For James, his foreign policy was motivated by dynastic loyalty and
secular interest. He could not stand idly by while the Habsburgs and their allies summarily deprived
his daughter and son-in-law of their lands and titles and drove them into exile, thus dealing a harsh
blow to Stuart dynastic power. However, many of his subjects, particularly those with Puritan
leanings, believed that English foreign policy should be conducted in defense of Continental
Protestantism rather than dynastic interests.21 Rather than negotiating with the Habsburgs for
Frederick's restoration, they supported England joining a general Protestant alliance including the
Dutch, who they saw as natural political and religious allies, to support the recovery of not only the
Palatinate, but also Bohemia.22 In theirminds, Spain should be the target ofEnglish arms ratherthan
overtures, as C. V. Wedgwood has observed: "The Puritan-Protestant tradition ofElizabethan policy
imprinted in English minds the idea that Spain was the natural enemy and that the rightful place of
England in foreign affairs was among the supporters of the Protestant Cause."23 James did not share
this view, particularly when it came to the Dutch — he was jealous of their commercial success and
found the idea of a republican state repugnant.24 With neither a common basis (dynastic or religious)
for English foreign policy, nor an agreed mode of delivery (diplomatic or military), tensions flared
2lTheir fears of a Catholic revival in Europe were not unjustified: in 1590, Protestantism was the
official religion of approximately half of Europe; by 1650, the resurgence of Catholicism had reduced its
share to a mere fifth (Parker, Europe in Crisis, 50).
22Adams, "Spain or the Netherlands?," 87.
23C. V. Wedgwood, "King Charles I and the Protestant Cause," Proceedings ofthe Huguenot
Society of London 19, no. 2 (1954): 22.
24Lockyer, Early Stuarts, 22.
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between the King and Parliament. The strain generated by foreign policy issues was a constant
theme throughout the early Stuart period, and it would continue to factor heavily into the King's
decision making process when he considered how to support the Palatine cause best.
Early 162 1 , however, seemed to be one of the few times that King and Parliament basically
agreed on a course of action. In the wake of the Frederick's loss of Bohemia and proscription,
Parliament met for a scheduled session. Recognizing the danger to his hereditary lands, the King
and Commons agreed that England should take diplomatic measures to defend the Palatinate from
encroachment by the victorious Habsburgs. If diplomacy proved unsuccessful, then military
measures would be necessary. The Commons indicated their support of this plan in their declaration
of June 1621 and voted the King two subsidies to show their earnestness.25
The King, who ardently hoped for a peaceful solution, did not restrict his diplomatic
overtures to Spain. He also opened a dialogue with the Emperor about Frederick's restitution. In
June 1621, soon after the Palatine cause had suffered several serious blows, James sent Sir John
Digby, later Earl of Bristol, to the Imperial court to demand the full restoration of Frederick to his
lands and titles.26 If the Emperor agreed to this demand, Digby was to promise that Frederick would
unconditionally renounce the Bohemian crown and submit to the Emperor. However, ifhe refused,
Digby was to inform him that England would be forced to recover the Palatinate by other, more
bellicose means." In the case that the Emperor would not accept a reasonable solution, James was
^Adams, "Foreign Policy," 161; Weifi, 35-7.
26At this point, the Spaniards had invaded parts of the Lower Palatinate, the Emperor had
proscribed Frederick, and rumors began to circulate that the electorate would be transferred to
Maximilian in return for his military service.
27Zaller, 159-60.
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counting on the Spaniards to support England's position as they had promised. Digby's embassy was
the first in a series ofAnglo-Imperial diplomatic negotiations to reach a settlement on the Palatinate
question, which would culminate in the missions ofTaylor, Arundel, and Radolt in the later 1630s.
Digby arrived in Vienna in July 162 1 and, as instructed, immediately asked that the Emperor
lift the ban against Frederick and fully restore him to his lands and titles in return for Frederick's
unconditional surrender of his Bohemian claims. Otherwise, the King would be forced to take
action. However, Ferdinand, who was reliant on continued Bavarian assistance in the Empire and
already owed Maximilian a considerable sum for his services in Bohemia, was in no position to grant
this request without the Duke's consent.2* Thus the Emperor, while assuring Digby of his desire to
grant the King satisfaction, moved to consult his nettlesome ally about what concessions might be
made to England and warn him of the dangers that might ensue ifDigbys mission failed. Ferdinand
assured Digby that the matter of the electorate would be regulated at the upcoming Diet; however,
he had already secretly decided to transfer it to Maximilian.29 The Emperor, while he complained
to Digby about Frederick's continuing military actions, also promised to extend the truce that he had
established in April in the Lower Palatinate if Maximilian and Count Mansfeld, who continued to
fight on Frederick's behalf, would do the same in the Upper Palatinate. Several occurrences
conspired to undermine Digby's negotiating position. Maximilian flatly rejected the idea ofa cease
fire as well as that of the full restitution of the Palatinate. The ambassador's position was further
eroded when Vere decided to quarter his troops in territory belonging to the Bishop of Speyer.
"See chap. 2, p. 90.
2,WeiB, 39.
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Frederick, for his part, further complicated matters by loudly announcing that he was unwilling to
submit to the Emperor or to renounce his Bohemian pretensions unconditionally. The intercession
of the Spaniards, upon which James had so depended, and that of influential Imperial ministers who
advocated peace with their master did not significantly improve the situation.30 Under these
circumstances, Digby's mission produced no tangible results; he left Vienna in the middle of
September. Several ofthe obstacles he encountered in his negotiations, particularly the intransigence
ofMaximilian and Frederick and the Emperor's need to consult with his allies about restoration, were
to be constant features of future Anglo-Imperial negotiations.
Upon his return to England, Digby informed James of what he considered the best tactics to
regain the Palatinate. His words were lent greater weight by Frederick's declining fortunes — by the
time Digby arrived home, League troops bad already occupied not only the Upper Palatinate but also
the east bank of the Lower Palatinate. The ambassador strongly advised the King to support the
small contingent of troops under Vere that still held strongholds in the Lower Palatinate. In addition,
he counseled the King that it would be necessary to check Frederick's unrealistic demands and
require him to yield to his father-in-law's direction if the Palatinate were to be regained.31 Digby's
assessment was not off the mark. Frederick's high expectations and refusal to compromise would
pose a formidable impediment to the settlement of the Palatinate question in the coming years.
Elizabeth and to a lesser extent his heir, Charles Louis, perpetuated Frederick's stubborn attitude
after his death in 1632.
"Ibid., 40.
3lZaller, 160-71.
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Given Digby's experience at the Imperial court and the further deterioration of Palatine
fortunes, it was apparent to the King that he must take some action in support of the Palatine family.
He decided that the threat of English military intervention on the Continent — conveyed via a
truculent Parliament — would be the most effective way to bring about a diplomatic restoration of
the Palatinate. In November 1621, he called Parliament back into session, and Digby related the
events of his embassy before both houses. But the MPs did not require much convincing, as most
of them had already agreed that measures should be taken to defend the Palatinate from further
encroachment by Spain ifdiplomacy failed. On top of this, Spain's renewed war against the Dutch
intensified their fears that the Habsburgs intended to restore Catholicism throughout Europe. The
Commons therefore overwhelmingly agreed to support a military solution to Frederick's woes and
at the same time strike a blow for the Protestant cause.
In spite of this promising start, relations between the King and Parliament rapidly
disintegrated when Parliament began to debate matters of foreign policy, which he regarded as his
privilege. To be fair, the Commons likely believed that the government was soliciting their views
when Sir George Goring, one of Buckingham's clients, initiated a discussion on the Spanish match.
Once asked, they certainly let the King know their mind — they not only rejected the match outright,
but also petitioned him to wage war on Spain for the defense of Protestantism and marry Charles to
a Protestant princess instead. In doing so, James felt that they had not only rejected bis policies but
encroached upon his prerogative, and he refused their petition outright The Commons responded
with a protestation reiterating their privilege of free speech. Needless to say, the King rejected their
protestation as well. These actions resulted in political deadlock and ultimately in the dissolution
of Parliament, before James had obtained the necessary financial support for military intervention
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on the Continent32 The events of the Parliament of 162 1 illustrate the endemic problems that faced
English intervention in Frederick's fawor. The tensions between the King and Parliament raised by
foreign policy issues only grew as tinne passed. The result was that James became increasingly
unwilling to undertake a foreign polncy that would require the financial backing of Parliament,
because be feared that popular pressurre might force him into a foreign policy he did not support33
Given the domestic difficulties associated with active intervention on Frederick's behalf, the
King continued to rely on a diplomattic solution to the Palatinate question, and the Emperor was
willing to continue the dialogue. Soon after the breakdown of Digby's negotiations, Ferdinand
decided to send Count Schwarzenbeqg as his ambassador to England to discuss the cease fire that
Digby had requested and impress the [Emperor's peaceful intentions upon the King. In April 1622,
Schwarzenberg arrived in London, wHiere he was warmly received. After preliminary discussions
about the cease fire, the two sides agreed to continue the negotiations at a conference at Brussels.
However, due to disagreements amo«ng the various parties represented there — the Palatine, the
English King, the Archduchess Isabelila, and the Emperor — the conference broke up in September
without having accomplished anythin g of import.34
By the spring of 1623, Frederick's position had worsened perceptibly. The Imperial Diet had
transferred the electorate to Maximillian for his lifetime, and Spanish and Bavarian troops had
"Cogswell, "Spanish Match," 1114-5; Adams, "Foreign Policy," 164; Zaller, 173-4.
33Adams, "Spain or the Netherlamds?," 82. As Simon Adams has observed, "The need to reach
agreement with members of parliament — and in consequence to permit discussion of policy—made
reliance on parliamentary subsidy for mi litary finance an unattractive prospect [for the King]." (ibid., 81 ).
MWeiB, 47-8. England was reprersented by Lord Treasurer Weston.
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completed their conquest of the Palatinate.35 After his defeat at Stadtlohn, Frederick finally gave up
his military ambitions and surrendered his cause to his father-in-law's mediation. Because of his
troubles securing Parliamentary funding on terms he could accept, James continued to move closer
to Spain in the hope of achieving Frederick's restoration diplomatically, through an alliance with
Spain based upon the Spanish match. In 1623, however, a series of unwelcome discoveries by
Charles and Buckingham made it readily apparent that this tactic would not prove successful. Eager
for the Spanish marriage finally to take place, the two had decided to undertake the journey to Spain
so that the young Prince could personally woo his prospective bride, the Infanta Maria. Arriving at
the Spanish court unannounced, they demanded a speedy conclusion to both the marriage treaty and
the restoration ofthe Palatinate. The response they received was both unexpected and objectionable.
Charles was treated to a rude awakening from his dreams of a tender reception from the Infanta:
The Infanta . . . went into hysterics, shrieked, and fell on the ground, when Charles,
thinking to approach her as a lover, jumped over a wall into a garden where she was
walking. Her confessor had reminded her how comfortable it would be to think of
him who should lie by her side and be the father of her children as "certain to go to
hell!"36
No less disagreeable was the exposure of Spanish expectations that Charles convert to Catholicism
and promise English Catholics toleration as conditions of the marriage. When he made clear that he
had no intention ofagreeing to either of these stipulations, the Spaniards' already lukewarm interest
in the match became even cooler. Moreover, during Buckingham's discussions with the Spanish
ministers, he discovered that they had no real intention of restoring the Palatinate, which served as
"Gardiner, vol. 4, 405; ibid., vol. 5, 74.
36Hill, S6S-6.
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an important link on their supply route between the Netherlands and Italy.37 Buckingham, now
convinced that Habsburg religious and dynastic ambitions posed a significant threat to all non-
Habsburg states, saw the construction of a grand anti-Habsburg alliance as the only means to curb
their pretensions, preserve English independence, and recover the Palatinate.3' The French and
Dutch, both of whom were concerned with warding off "encirclement" by the Habsburgs, would be
natural allies in this endeavor.39
Spumed by the Infanta and the Spanish government, Charles and Buckingham returned home
determined to redeem their personal and national honor by leading England into war against Spain.40
"The Spaniards were considering a scheme for the Lower and Upper Palatinate to be returned
(the latter upon payment of six million gulden, or four million thalers), for the electorate to revert to the
Palatine line after the death of Maximilian (they also considered creating an eighth to satisfy Maximilian's
claims, which the Duke rejected), and for Charles Louis to be brought up a Catholic at the Imperial court
and married to the Emperor's daughter. Maximilian was fearful that the Anglo-Spanish marriage
negotiations might actually result in Frederick's restoration. He was right to worry, because Olivares was
indeed willing to make concessions to England in the Palatinate, if England helped bring the Dutch to the
bargaining table. Maximilian thus sought support from France to secure his gains and also attempted to
cut the Spaniards out of the picture by sending Francesco Rota (the Capuchin Alexander von Hales) to
persuade James to deal directly with him on the Palatinate question, with the mediation of the curia.
James at first rejected this idea, preferring to deal with Spain, but he lent an ear to these overtures after
the breakdown of the marriage negotiations. It was during these unofficial discussions that James first put
forward the idea of an eighth electorate. Maximilian considered this option, so long as he kept the first
temporal electorate, and Frederick was invested with the new one. However, these discussions stuck on
the condition that Charles Louis be brought up Catholic (Albrecht, Auswartige Politik, 106-17; idem,
"Kriegs- und Friedensziele," 265; WeiB, 61-6; Steiner, 101).
3tLockyer, Early Stuarts, 2 1.
3,WeiB, 125.
"Charles was utterly "disgusted with the conduct of his intended bride and the exactions of the
Spanish court" (Hill, 566). The following statement made by Charles to Henry Rich, who was negotiating
the terms of the Prince's marriage treaty to Henrietta Maria, made it clear that Charles attempted to woo
the French not because he esteemed them, but rather to get back at the Spaniards: "The Monsieurs have
played you so scurvy a trick, that if it were not for the respect I have for the person of Madame, I would
not care a fart for their friendship. I mistrust them wholly; and if they insist upon these new grounds, let
them go hang themselves." (CSP, vol. 1, app., x; quoted in Adams, "Spain or the Netherlands?," 89-90).
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In spite of the resistance of the peace-loving James, they turned their considerable influence toward
mustering support for their plans in Parliament, which was eager to comply. In concert with the
humiliated prince and favorite, the Commons clamored for war against Spain, making it a
precondition of their vote of adequate subsidies for military intervention on the Continent. In the
end, they voted funds meant to support the Protestant cause through rearmament and military
assistance to the Dutch.41
James agreed to break off the treaties with Spain, but he would not go along with their
demands to wage a more generalized, confessional war against the Habsburgs. He was only
interested in recovering the Palatinate and thus would only commit to a limited military action to
restore Frederick to his hereditary lands and titles. He had still not given up on a diplomatic solution
to the Palatinate question, and though he had no plans to wage a larger war, he did hope that the
threat of one might bring pressure to bear on Spain to restore the Palatinate peacefully. With this
idea in mind, James actually invited Parliament to discuss foreign policy in the hope this move
would persuade the Commons to vote him subsidies.42
Buckingham wasted no time in constructing his anti-Habsburg edifice. In 1624, with his
prompting, negotiations for a French marriage alliance for Charles got underway in earnest. In
addition, England and France concluded a defensive alliance with the Dutch and discussed financing
4lAdams, "Foreign Policy," 165.
42Lockyer, Early Stuarts, 210. Until his death the following year, James continued to hope for a
more satisfactory offer from Spain. He even engaged in secret negotiations with Maximilian, mediated by
the curia (see above, n. 37).
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a joint expeditionary force under Mansfeld to recover the Lower Palatinate.4'1 Even without a firm
commitment from France, James authorized Mansfeld to raise 12,000 troops to be supported at
English cost. The King, not wishing Mansfeld's force to provoke hostilities with other states, gave
the general strict orders not to engage in military action outside of the Palatinate. He need not have
worried, because the expedition was plagued, both literally and figuratively, with difficulties from
the outset, and Mansfeld's army saw httle action outside of its training field. Two thousand men
deserted before the force even left England. Soon after landing in the Netherlands in February 1625,
it was reduced to an ineffective rump by disease, starvation, and desertion. Short of funds, the
commander repeatedly petitioned the King for payment so he could compensate and supply his
troops. James, however, was in no position to respond — he had died soon after Mansfeld left
England.**
The Early Foreign Policy of Charles 1, 1625-9
After his accession in 1625, Charles and Buckingham were free to pursue the aggressive anti-
Habsburg foreign policy previously hampered by the pacific James. In doing so, the new King's
main concern was for the reestablishment ofhis sister and her family in the Palatinate. This dynastic
motive was the consistent thread in the foreign policy ofhis reign. Buckingham, however, had more
ambitious plans. He had expanded his objective to include not only the recovery of the Palatinate,
but also the containment of Habsburg power through a secular alliance of Protestant and Catholic
43Albrecht, AuswOrtige Politik, 144. In 1625, Richelieu withdrew his support from the expedition.
He had hoped to use Mansfeld's troops against Spain in the Valtelline rather than in the Palatinate, as
James had planned.
44WeiB, 77-9.
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anti-Habsburg powers, and he convinced the King to pursue this course.45 The dynastic and secular
nature of early Stuart foreign policy was preserved in the transition from rather to son.
Parliament, which would be called upon to finance these military undertakings, objected to
the secular nature of the new King's foreign policy, just as it had to his father's:
. . . the English gentlemen who made up the political nation and dominated the House
of Commons, which alone could provide the financial underpinning for English
participation in the Thirty Years War, never understood — and insofar as they did
understand, deeply disapproved of — a secular foreign policy. They were the
prisoners of the Elizabethan legend, and wanted Charles to do what they believed his
older brother, Prince Henry, would have done — namely, place himself at the head of
a protestant crusade against the powers ofdarkness represented by the Pope and the
King of Spain.46
Even after England declared war on Spain in 1625 and France in 1627, Parliament refused to
adequately supply the King. Thus he was unable to play a meaningful role in the Continental war
and meet his obligations to his allies.47 In any case, waging a simultaneous war against powerful
states like France and Spain was a ridiculous idea, as would become painfully apparent.
Even before James's death, Buckingham had set to work building a grand alliance against the
Habsburgs that would be capable of regaining the Palatinate by force. To advance this scheme, he
arranged for a marriage alliance between Charles and Henrietta Maria, the sister of Louis XHI of
France. He also promoted the Treaty of the Hague, which was concluded between England,
Denmark, and the United Provinces in December 1625. The signatories pledged to work together
45Lockyer, Early Stuarts, 32.
"Ibid., 32-3.
47For the King's failure to fulfill his commitment to his his uncle Christian IV, see chap. 3, p. 107.
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to contain Habsburg power and restore the Palatinate to Frederick.4* In addition, both the English
and the Dutch pledged financial support for Christian IV's military effort against the Habsburgs in
the Empire.49 Much to Buckingham's chagrin, France could not be persuaded to join the league, in
spite of the marriage alliance.50 To make matters worse, Richelieu made peace with Spain in the
Valtelline the following year.
Eager to show England's military might, Charles and Buckingham embarked without delay
on a string of ventures on the Continent. All proved to be fiascos. Mansfeld's expedition had failed
miserably in 1625: in spite of German reinforcements, his army continued to dwindle because he
had no money to pay his men. By the summer of 1625, it was apparent that he was in no position
to advance the Palatine cause by force of arms.51 Later that same year, Buckingham attempted a
diversionary attack on the Spanish treasure fleet at Cadiz, which resulted in nothing but the initiation
of war between England and Spain. The combined Dutch and English fleet charged with this task
not only missed the treasure fleet entirely but also failed to inflict any notable damage on Spanish
shipping or settlements. It limped home, having lost a third of its ships and many of its men."
Finally, in 1628 Buckingham attempted to relieve the Huguenots, who were besieged by French
4*Steiner, 110.
49By the Hague Convention (1625), England and the United Provinces each agreed to pay
144,000 thalers a month to support Christian's cause. Also, Mansfeld's levies were to be integrated into
Christian's forces (Parker, TYW, 69).
'0Richelieu had good reasons for this. First, his primary goal was not to win the struggle in the
Empire, but rather that with Spain in the Valtelline. Second, he needed to concentrate his energies on
quelling the French Huguenot revolt that broke out in January 1625 (Mbrecht,Auswdrtige Politik, 144).
51WeiB, 84-5.
"Parker, TYW, 69.
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forces at La Rochelie, by landing English troops on the nearby Isle ofRhe\ This mission also proved
a debacle, and the starving Huguenots were left at Richelieu's mercy.53
Due in part to these ignominious military setbacks and other issues delated to foreign policy,
relations between the King and Parliament deteriorated rapidly. The war hoc and Buckingham were
waging was quite different from the one Parliament had agreed to fund in I6:<24. Parliament was also
reluctant to continue financing the King's wars because it objected to the inetfficient manner in which
Buckingham was conducting them and blamed him for the military defeats. Parliament thus made
several deliberate attempts to remove the favorite from power. In 1626, the Commons made supply
contingent upon his impeachment. This attempt backfired, for in order to save Buckingham, the
King was compelled to dissolve Parliament before it had voted any smpport for his military
undertakings. The lack of financial support, and the low yield and slow receipt of subsidies more
generally, forced him to turn to extra-Parliamentary sources of revenue to rmaintain his war effort54
The most visible of these was the forced loan, which was extremely unpopular with his subjects and
the source of many Parliamentary grievances. The King, however, blamed! his humiliating defeats
"Buckingham's policy toward the Huguenots was actually quite callous, as he hoped to use La
Rochelie as a bargaining chip to persuade Richelieu to help restore the Prince Palatine. The support
England lent the Huguenots was actually a cruel deception, since Buckingham vuvas negotiating with
Richelieu the entire time, promising to withdraw England's support if France woould declare in favor of
Frederick. His efforts were in vain because Richelieu forced the surrender of La Rochelie in 1628, shortly
after the favorite's assassination (Parker, Europe in Crisis, 201). For the backgroound to the crisis at La
Rochelie and its effect on the relationship between the King, Buckingham, and FParliament, see: Thomas
Cogswell, "Foreign Policy and Parliament: The Case of La Rochelie, 1625-1626i," EHR 99, no. 391 (Apr.
1984): 241-67; idem, "Prelude to Re: The Anglo-French Struggle over La Rocheslle, 1624-1627," History
71 (1986): 1-21.
54Sharpe, Personal Rule, 13.
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on Parliament's failure to provide adequate supply, and he therefore felt fully justified in collecting
this money.
Parliament's persistent attacks on Buckingham for the Mansfeld and Cadiz disasters, and
posthumously for La Rochelle as well, coupled with the King's willingness to turn to extralegal
sources of revenue to finance his wars, did nothing to improve his relations with Parliament.55 In
1628, Parliament condemned the forced loan in the Petition of Right. Even after Buckingham's
assassination in 1628, the situation continued to worsen. The following year, the Commons again
raised grievances over extra-Parliamentary taxation, among other issues, and enshrined them in the
Three Resolutions, which were read out while members of the opposition held the speaker down in
his chair. The King, incensed by their audacity, immediately retaliated by dissolving Parliament.
The Foreign Policy of the Personal Rule to 1635
With inadequate funding, an increasingly hostile Parliament, and a string of disastrous military
interventions and the elimination of the favorite who supported them, war was no longer an attractive
prospect for the King. Given his unpleasant experience with Parliament in the first four years of his
reign, he had determined to rule without it and its subsidies as long as he could. Thus, he finally
bowed to financial and domestic pressures, made peace with his enemies, and withdrew from the
war. From 1629 to 1640, Charles would rule England without resort to Parliament. Inconsequence,
he could not easily afford an active foreign policy. Thus Buckingham's death and the King's
decision to rule alone marked the effectual end of England's military involvement in the Thirty
"In violation of the Subsidy Act, which stipulated that the Parliamentary funds voted in 1624
should be used for rearmament and to aid the Dutch, Buckingham had siphoned off £62,000 for
Mansfeld's expedition (Adams, "Spain or the Netherlands?," 99).
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Years' War. From this time forward, the King would seek a diplomatic solution to the Palatinate
question.
Peace was the first priority ofCharles's personal rule. He first came to terms with the French,
who were eager to end the hostilities with England so they would be free to protect their interests
in northern Italy against the Habsburgs.56 In April 1629, the two sides quickly concluded the Peace
of Susa. Peace with Spain, however, took more time because the negotiations constantly ran
aground over the issue of the Palatinate. The King, who had prosecuted the war against Spain with
the aim of recovering the Palatinate, hoped to incorporate its restitution into the peace. Sir Francis
Cottington, the English negotiator, insisted that Spain's promises to return the Spanish-occupied
Palatinate be included in the written terms of the treaty. Olivares, though desperate to end the
hostilities with England so he could concentrate on fighting the French, repeatedly sidestepped this
demand because he did not wish to relinquish this strategically situated territory.57
The wily Spanish statesman, however, finally managed to persuade the English to drop their
insistence on the restoration of the Palatinate as a prerequisite to the peace by convincing them that
it was necessary to refer this question to the electoral meeting at Regensburg, where the other
affected parties (the Emperor and Maximilian) would be present." Philip pledged his full support
to English endeavors for Frederick at the meeting, and his immediate reinstatement in the Spanish-
~In 1628, a conflict broke out between France and Spain over the succession to Mantua and
Montferrat, territories that were strategically located on the land route to the Netherlands. For more on the
Mantuan succession dispute and the effect it had on the relationship between the Emperor and his allies,
see chap. 3, pp. 1 14, 127.
"Albrecht, AuswSrtige Politik, 232-6.
"For the aims of the Spaniards and the events of the electoral meeting, see chap. 3, p. 124.
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occupied Palatinate once the Emperor had removed the ban. With these reassurances, Charles
acquiesced and the Treaty of Madrid was finally signed on 15 November 1630. It included no
reference to England's claims for the restoration of the Palatinate; the best Charles would get was
Philip's written assurance ofhis best efforts to promote the Palatine cause.59 That the King allowed
the Palatinate question to be referred to Regensburg when he had such bargaining power proved to
be a great mistake. Since he never again engaged the Spaniards in hostilities, this was his best
opportunity to persuade them to relinquish their portion of the Palatinate.
Two years after Buckingham's death, England was once again at peace. This did not mean,
however, that the King had given up on the idea of recovering the Palatinate. On the contrary, it
continued to be the primary objective of his foreign policy throughout the 1630s. The main
difference is that he was now obliged to seek a diplomatic rather than a military solution to the
Palatinate question. After the challenging war years that launched his reign, his policy in the years
of the personal rule necessarily became more pragmatic and was shaped by his dynastic concerns,
economic interests, financial limitations, and understanding of the changing nature of European
politics.
From 1630 until 1635, Lord Treasurer Weston, who came the closest to replacing
Buckingham as the King's chief advisor, and others who favored a policy of peace and cooperation
with Spain exercised considerable influence upon the King in foreign affairs. With their
encouragement, in these years the King focused his hopes for Palatine restoration mainly on a
negotiated settlement with the Habsburgs, who were in the best position to restore the Palatine lands
"Gardiner, vol. 7, 173-4, 176.
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and dignities. Much to the chagrin of those who supported a Protestant foreign policy, Charles
abandoned whatever commitments he still had to bis Protestant allies and sought the restoration of
the Palatinate elsewhere. He had few qualms about doing so because he considered the Protestant
cause to be "a political force no different from any other and not the cause of true religion.''60 In any
case, he recognized that European politics were becoming increasingly secular and that the warring
sides could not claim to break cleanly on religious lines.
The debate over foreign policy was associated with the rivalry of factions at court, all of
which had influential spokesmen who attempted to sway the King to their views. The religious
sympathies of their adherents were often related to their attitudes on foreign policy. Those who
supported intervention in the Continental war, for religious reasons or otherwise, wrestled with those
who favored peace. Weston (later Earl of Portland), the earls of Bristol and Arundel, Cottington,
and Windebank were the main figures affiliated with the Spanish or peace party. This group
preferred peace and cooperation with Spain as opposed to collaboration with the anti-Habsburg side,
which would certainly involve England in war, and tended to include those who were sympathetic
to Catholicism.61 It should be noted that the peace party supported a policy of pro-Habsburg
neutrality rather than active intervention on the Habsburg side. Its opponents, the war lobby,
promoted decisive military action on behalfofthe Palatine family in alliance with the French, Dutch,
and/or Swedes. It was made up of two basic groups. The first was the Protestant party, which aimed
"Adams, "Spain or the Netherlands?," 90.
61Albert J. Loomie, "The Spanish Faction at the Court of Charles f, 1630-8," Bulletin of the
Institute ofHistorical Research 59 (May 1986): 48. Archbishop Laud and Sir Thomas Wentworth, two of
the King's most influential councillors, also supported a policy of peace, but they are less clearly
identified with this party.
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not only for the active promotion of the Palatine cause, but also that of the Protestant cause in
Europe more generally. Its adherents preferred to accomplish this in alliance with the Dutch and
Swedes, but some were also willing to consider an alliance with France as a powerful confederate
of these Protestant states. Supporters of a Protestant policy included the earls of Essex,
Southampton, Pembroke, and Bedford, as well as Sir Thomas Roe and Secretary Coke. The second
group was the French party, spearheaded by Queen Henrietta Maria, the Marquis of Hamilton, and
the earls of Holland and Carlisle, who promoted an alliance with France. Unlike the others, this
party was not united by religion; it included those with Protestant as well as Catholic sympathies.
The peace party tended to rally around the King; the war party, around the Queen.62
Given the divisive nature of court politics and the substantial opposition to his Habsburg
diplomacy, the King decided to make and conduct his most sensitive foreign policy in secret This
led to a system whereby prominent members of the peace party — Weston, Cottington, and
particularly Windebank — helped Charles make and implement bis secret foreign policy. They
established direct lines of communication with the diplomats who carried it out on the ground, at
times bypassing the official reporting channels. These secret negotiations were hidden from the view
of most courtiers, diplomats, and members of the foreign committee of the privy council (which was
charged with advising the King in matters of foreign policy), including Secretary Coke. From the
King's perspective, this stratagem alleviated some of the criticism of his policies coming from the
war lobby and allowed them time to bear fruit.
62Adams, "Spain or the Netherlands?," 91 .
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However, the secrecy the King maintained about his negotiations with the Habsburgs was
obstructive to the ultimate success of his foreign policy. His diplomats, who were often unaware or
ill-informed of secret negotiations regarding the Palatinate at various European courts, were
disadvantaged in their own negotiations. An example of this is the English ambassador Sir Robert
Anstruther's ignorance of the secret Habsburg negotiations simultaneously carried out by John
Taylor at Regensburg and Vienna.63 If this were not bad enough, Charles kept these diplomatic
dealings secret not only from most of his councillors and diplomats, but also from the very envoys
conducting them. The King's strategy, therefore, undermined rather than strengthened his chances
for diplomatic success.
In January 1631, immediately after the Treaty of Madrid failed to settle the Palatinate
question, Cottington and Olivares arrived at a secret agreement that would provide a basis for all
further Anglo-Habsburg negotiations (secret or otherwise), despite the fact it was never ratified by
Charles.64 By the secret Cottington Treaty, Spain would take steps to restore the Palatinate if
England in turn pressed the Dutch to make peace with Spain. The two countries would join in an
offensive and defensive alliance against the Dutch, and if they could not be brought to peace, their
territories would be subject to partition.65 This agreement would come into force only once it was
"See below, p. 183.
Weston had convinced the King that he would be able to wring concessions from Spain in the
Palatinate on the basis of the peace and accompanying assurances of Philip, without ratifying the secret
treaty. Weston's error would become apparent at Regensburg (L. J. Reeve, "Quiroga's Paper of 163 1: A
Missing Link in Anglo-Spanish Diplomacy during the Thirty Years' War," EHR 101 [1986]: 921).
"CSP, vol. I, 35: 2 Jan. 163 1, Secret Cottington Treaty; Gardiner, vol. 7, 176-7; Albert J.
Loomie, "Olivares, the English Catholics and the Peace of 1630," Revue Beige de Philologie et Histoire
47, no. 4 (1969): 1 154-66. In addition to the treaty itself, there was a paper that had passed between
Olivares and Cottington proposing the restoration of the Palatinate was contingent upon England bringing
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ratified by their monarchs. Before he left Spain, Cottington also worked out a mutually beneficial
arrangement with Olivares whereby Spanish bullion would be brought to England, a portion of
which was to be minted at the Tower of London, and then safely convoyed to Flanders in English
ships. This arrangement was advantageous to English merchants and royal revenues.66
There was no consensus, however, between England and Spain as to how the terms of the
secret treaty should be interpreted. Each did so to their own advantage. To Charles and the peace
party, the terms of the treaty suggested that the full restoration of the Palatinate would be possible
ifhe would mediate a peace between Spain and the Dutch. They were optimistic that Spain would
give up its own share of the Palatinate and bring pressure to bear on Bavaria and the Emperor to
relinquish the rest of the lands and electoral dignity. Although there were questions as to whether
Spain would be willing or able to affect this, the King believed negotiations with the Habsburgs, who
were in the position to restore the Palatine lands and titles, were the best hope for a diplomatic
restoration.67 The Spaniards, on the other hand, held to a more extreme interpretation of the secret
treaty. For them, the price of restoration was an active English alliance against the Dutch, which
they claimed had been promised in a paper given by Cottington to Olivares; otherwise, a few words
on the behalf of the Palatine cause at the Imperial court should suffice.6* These conflicting
interpretations were characteristic of Anglo-Spanish relations across the board — each side
the Dutch to satisfactory terms. The Spaniards came to regard this paper as a kind of codicil to the
Cottington Treaty (Gardiner, vol. 7, 187; Reeve, "Quiroga's Paper," 919).
"Loomie, "Spanish Faction," 38; Elliott, "Three Ambassadors," 167.
"Sharpe, Personal Rule, 93.
"Adams, "Spain or the Netherlands?," 100.
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continually overestimating the advantages it could gain in return for the minimal concessions it was
willing to make. As would become painfully apparent, their mutually gauging approach would lead
to many conflicts in future attempts to settle the Palatinate question through diplomatic negotiation.
The dispute arose repeatedly whether Spain should initiate the alliance by restoring the Palatinate,
or whether England should by making war on the Dutch. Because ofSpain's necessary involvement
in any Anglo-Imperial negotiations with the Emperor about the Palatinate, this dispute was also an
impediment to their success.
With Spam's assurances ofsupport, the King had also opened negotiations with the Emperor
for the restoration ofthe Palatinate at the electoral meeting at Regensburg. In the summer of 1630,
he sent Sir Robert Anstruther, a client of the war party, as his ambassador, first at the electoral
meeting at Regensburg and then afterward at the Imperial court in Vienna. On the basis of the peace
with Spain, Anstruther was to demand that the Emperor lift the ban and restore at least the Lower
Palatinate to Frederick. However, the Spaniards only payed lip service to supporting Frederick's
cause at Regensburg. Since he had surrendered much of his leverage with them when he made
peace, they had little motivation to press their allies seriously to give the King satisfaction — that is,
unless he activated the secret treaty and intervened with the Dutch. As the 1630s would bear out,
Spain would not support England's ambitions for the restoration of the Palatinate in more than a
superficial way without a corresponding English commitment to bring the Dutch to satisfactory
terms, by diplomacy or, if necessary, military force.69 IfEngland would make this commitment, the
Spaniards were prepared to give up their share of the Lower Palatinate and intercede with its allies
69Gardiner, vol. 7, 187; Reeve, "Quiroga's Paper," 918.
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for the rest. The King, however, was in no position to pressure the Dutch to anything so long as he
refused to call Parliament. Only once he built up the ship money fleet, and France declared war on
Spain and blocked the Spaniards' land route to Flanders, would he recover some ofthis leverage with
the Habsburgs.
In October, John Taylor, who had been sent to Regensburg in an unofficial capacity to gather
information for Weston and the peace lobby, joined Anstruther there. Alongside the ambassador's
official negotiations, Taylor met with Imperial and Spanish ministers to promote the peaceful
settlement of the Palatinate question. This is an example of the typical end-run maneuver the peace
party employed to bypass the war lobby: Taylor was aware of Spain's expectations for the
restoration of the Lower Palatinate — that is, England's mediation of an acceptable peace between
Spain and the Dutch, and ifthis effort failed, England's active assistance against the Dutch — and he
did not share them with Anstruther. In fact, the ambassador finally learned of the Spanish demands
through the Queen of Hungary's confessor, Quiroga. Thus not only the Spaniards, but the English
peace party and the King himself withheld vital information about Spain's conception of the basis
of its negotiations with England from those associated with the war lobby, even those whose
negotiations were directly affected by it.70 Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that
Anstruther was unable to reach an agreement with the Emperor on the Palatinate question.
Frustrated by the Habsburgs' intransigence and Taylor's meddling, he finally departed Vienna in the
autumn of 1632.71
70Ibid., 921-2.
71PRO, SP 80/7, f. 220: [1630?], Taylor to [Weston]; ibid., SP 80/8, f. 86: 2 1 Oct. 163 1,'
Anstruther to [Weston?]. Taylor had departed in August (PRO, SP 80/8, f. 217: 20 Aug. 1632, Taylor to
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Even though the Habsburg option seemed the most promising to the King and some of his
closest advisors, they saw the wisdom of keeping their diplomatic options open. If he could obtain
the restoration of the Palatinate on better terms, it was immaterial to him ifhe did so "by the aid of
France or Spain, ofProtestant or Catholic."72 At the very least, continuing negotiations with the anti-
Habsburg powers would put pressure on the Habsburgs to come to a satisfactory settlement on the
Palatinate question. Charles's willingness to negotiate with whichever power was in the best position
to help restore the Palatinate was not unethical for the time; other nations used similar tactics.
However, his multiple negotiations necessarily resulted in the vacillating foreign policy condemned
so vigorously by Gardiner.
In addition to his negotiations with the Habsburgs, the King continued discussions with the
anti-Habsburg powers as well, which offered an alternative route to the restitution of the Palatinate
and negotiation with the Habsburgs. In 1631, Charles allowed Hamilton to levy volunteers for
Sweden. Like Mansfeld, Hamilton finally assembled a force whose "numbers were more imposing
than the quality."73 In July, he left for the Baltic with 7,000 men, but his forces soon eroded away
as Mansfeld's had seven years earlier.74 Given the unsatisfactory outlook for Anstruther's
negotiations with the Emperor in Vienna, in May Charles decided to send Sir Henry Vane to
Germany to negotiate an alliance for the restoration of the Palatinate with Gustavus Adolphus. After
the Swedes and their allies had swept through Germany in 1631 and 1632, regaining control of the
Weston).
^Gardiner, vol. 7, 97.
73Ibid., 183.
74Ibid., 191.
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Palatinate in the process, Vane's negotiations took on new importance because the Palatinate could
no longer be recovered through a negotiated settlement with the Habsburgs." With the Palatinate
once more in Protestant hands, the possibilities for effecting the restoration of the Palatine family
seemed promising. However, it soon became apparent to Vane that the Swedes would only
relinquish the Palatinate for a high price. At first, Gustavus made Frederick's restoration contingent
upon England providing troops and a monetary contribution the Swedish war effort.76 Then, in
September 1632, the Swedish King raised his demands, insisting that England not only join the land
war, but also provide naval protection in the Baltic. In addition, he asked for the military support
of the restored Prince Palatine and the equality of the Lutheran and Calvinist confessions in his
lands. Charles realized that he would have to summon Parliament to finance these efforts; he thus
rejected these demands.77
Historians continue to debate the sagacity of the King's decision. According to the traditional
view, an alliance with Gustavus offered the best chance for the restitution of the Palatinate, and
Charles was a fool to turn it down.7' Revisionist historians, on the other side, contend that the King
"For Gustavus's victories and the recapture of the Palatinate, see chap. 3, p. 131. The Habsburgs
would not be in the position to restore the Palatinate again until after their victory at N5rdlingen in 1634.
^Sterner, 122; Gardiner, vol. 7, 189.
^Ibid., 196. Frederick, who continued to insist upon unconditional restitution, also rejected the
offer. After the death of both Gustavus and Frederick in late 1632, Oxenstiema installed Frederick's
brother Ludwig Philipp von Simmern as the administrator of the Palatinate, but only after he agreed to the
limitations imposed by the Swedish occupiers (Steiner, 202).
"Reeve, Charles /, 238-79, passim; idem, "The Politics of War Finance in an Age of
Confessional Strife: A Comparative Anglo-European View," Parergon 14, no. 1 (July 1996): 102, 105;
Gardiner, vol. 7, 205-6, 352-3.
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was right to reject Gustavus's harsh terms — English military intervention on land and sea.79
However, the King's wisdom in steering clear of war is more convincingly argued by Michael
Young, who calls attention to the great risks involved in waging the all-out war Gustavus demanded
He points out that the necessity of calling Parliament to finance this war would have likely put the
King in the same confrontational domestic situation in which he found himself in the late 1620s.
In addition, Gustavus's death in 1632 would have left him in an unenviable position, heavily engaged
in the military deadlock that followed the loss of the inspirational leader."
Possible alliances with France and the United Provinces also fell through. The French made
overtures to England for a league, particularly after Gustavus's death forced them to become more
involved in the war to prevent the collapse of the anti-Habsburg opposition. As war between Spain
and France drew closer, their efforts intensified. Although French ambitions in Germany were
suspect, Charles continued to negotiate with Richelieu to keep his options open and at the same time
apply pressure to his negotiations with Spain." The Dutch also courted an English alliance, but
Charles regarded them as republicans and economic competitors rather than natural allies. He
differed in this view from many of his subjects who "preferred the company of the godly to that of
the adherents of antichrist."*2 The traditional view that Charles made a great mistake in declining
alliances with the Dutch and French, as he had the Swedes, also has recently been challenged by
"Sharpe, Personal Rule, 78-82.
*°Michael B. Young, Charles I , British History in Perspective (New York: St Martin's Press,
1997), 89.
"Sharpe, Personal Rule, 82-6.
cAdams, "Spain or the Netherlands?," 101.
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historians who believe that he actually showed political foresight in his recognition of the up-and-
coming Dutch and French rivalry with England.*3
In the meantime, Charles continued to treat with Spain for the restoration of the Palatinate.
In 1634, Windebank and Cottington negotiated a secret maritime treaty with the Spanish resident
Necolalde. The King offered to equip a fleet of twenty ships to protect the sea route to Flanders if
Spain would subsidize the cost. In return for this favor, he expected the restitution of the Palatinate
— the removal of the ban and return of the Lower Palatinate and an arrangement for the recovery of
the Upper Palatinate and electorate in the future. Spain, however, had no plans to finance the fleet
unless it would be used openly against the Dutch. Although the drawn-out negotiations resulted in
a draft treaty, it was never concluded, leaving the King to support his newly strengthened fleet at his
own expense.*4
In 163 5, the conjunction ofseveral events helped England to recover some of the negotiating
power it had lost when it signed the Treaty ofMadrid. Firstly, relations between England and Spain
became estranged when they failed to conclude the maritime treaty and the news of the Peace of
Prague and its unfavorable terms for the Prince Palatine reached England.*5 Under the
"Ibid.; Shaipe, Personal Rule, 75-8, 89-90.
"Gardiner, vol. 7, 351; Alcala Zamora, 350; Haskell, 309-13; Loomie, "Spanish Faction," 40-2.
The King, disillusioned with Necolalde's conduct of the treaty negotiations, sent Taylor to Spain in 1634
to request the Spanish resident's recall and expedite the negotiations in tandem with the English resident,
Sir Arthur Hopton (see chap. 5, p. 21 2).
'5This treaty, which confirmed Maximilian in his Palatine acquisitions, coupled with his recent
marriage to his niece, which presented the prospect of a permanent Bavarian succession, were thus both
serious setbacks to Charles l's policy of achieving the restoration of his nephew by peaceful means. After
all of the Spaniards' promises, the King and his peace party supporters felt betrayed. For more on the
Peace of Prague and its reception in England, see chap. 3, p. 142, and chap. 8, p. 305.
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circumstances, Olivares could no longer safely assume England's benevolent neutrality. Secondly,
the newly strengthened ship money fleet, in Gardiner's words "the most magnificent in size and
numbers that had ever left English shores," enhanced England's desirability as an ally in the eyes of
other European powers.*6 From this point on, Charles attempted to use this bargaining counter to
his best advantage in diplomacy, playing one would-be ally off against the other. Lastly, France's
declaration ofwar upon Spain further aided in the restoration ofEngland's bargaining position with
these powers. In a state of war, their communications in the Channel became even more critical than
previously, and England's friendship consequently became more desirable to them, particularly in
view of the large, modem fleet it commanded. Both France and Spain rushed to curry England's
favor, since its aid could be decisive to either. Because of his new-found leverage, whicrh would
further increase when France blocked Spain's land route to Flanders, the King had more foreign
policy options in the later 1630s than historians have commonly assumed.
It remained to be seen, however, how effectively Charles would use his improved bargaining
position. The Peace of Prague, which confirmed Maximilian in his Palatine acquisitions, coupled
with his recent marriage to his niece, which presented the prospect of a permanent Bavarian
succession, were thus both serious setbacks to Charles I's policy of achieving the restoration of his
nephew by peaceful means. The English realized that it was crucial that they take some action in
support of Charles Louis's claims. With diplomatic advances being made by both France and the
"Gardiner, vol. 8, 154. Edward Nicholas believed this to be the case because "writs have been
sent to the sheriffs of every county in England, to levy money to defray the charge of a fleet for n«xt year
of double the strength of that employed this year [1635]." He continued, "This seconding soe powerfully
the former honourable expedicion will... make the world see that his Majesties amity is more considerable
than it hath bene rendred by some neighbors malevolent to this crown." (HMC, Sixth Report, vol. 1, 279:
20 Oct. 1635?, Edward Nicholas to Lord Feilding. English ambassador in Venice).
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Habsburgs, debate raged at court over the best means to pursue the Palatine interest
Characteristically, Charles avoided coming down decisively on one side or the other and instead
chose to keep his options open. He still believed that he could regain the Palatinate for his nephew
by treaty rather than arms, and he decided to take advantage of the hostilities between France and
Spain by making overtures to both sides and seeing which held better prospects for success.*7 He
therefore continued to consider the alliance with France offered by Senecterre while at the same time
sounding out the Habsburgs on the restoration of the Palatinate. Seeking to gain from the situation,
Charles began to conduct a more active foreign policy, soon dispatching three embassies — one to
the Emperor, one to Spain, and one to France — to reassert the claims of his nephew.
With the complete dispossession of the Palatine family in 1623, the restoration of the
Palatinate became the primary objective of English foreign policy for the next twenty years.
Disagreements over how to achieve this and England's role in the Continental war more generally
sparked conflict between the King and his subjects. The Protestant party, which had a strong
following in Parliament, urged James I and then his son Charles I to intervene militarily in support
of the Prince Palatine, thus striking a blow for the Protestant cause. The Stuart kings, however,
viewed the restoration of the Palatinate as largely a dynastic question and not a confessional crusade.
In this charged environment, the King and Parliament clashed repeatedly over foreign policy issues.
Parliament voted James subsidies for war, but he favored negotiations with the Catholic Habsburgs.
When Charles took up arms against the Habsburgs in response to the failure of the Spanish match,
the way he and Buckingham conducted and financed the war so disgusted the Commons that they
"BL, Egerton 1820, f. 518: 3 Aug. 1635, Windebank to Hopton.
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were unwilling to vote adequate subsidies. The resulting political deadlock finally convinced
Charles that it was preferable to rule without recourse to Parliament. Over the next eleven years, he
consequently relied upon diplomacy to achieve the reinstatement of his nephew in the Palatinate,
focusing his energies mainly on the Habsburgs. Given the opposition that still existed to this course,
the King made and conducted his most sensitive foreign policy secretly, with the help of a few
trusted councillors and a stable of diplomats abroad. Among the diplomats involved in these secret
Habsburg negotiations was John Taylor, who had served at Habsburg courts in Brussels and Madrid.
In September 1635, in the wake of the Peace of Prague, he embarked upon his most important post
to date when he was sent to discuss the Palatinate question with the Emperor Ferdinand II.
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PartII: Three Portraits
The background and life experiences of the three major envoys involved in Anglo-Imperial
negotiations of the later 1630s — Taylor, Arundel, and Radolt — invariably influenced their conduct
of the negotiations. An understanding of their family ties, social background, religious leanings
(particularly Taylor and Arundel as English Catholics), education, and political and diplomatic
career both before and after their employment in the 1630s provides important insights into the
reasons they were chosen for their missions and the ways they perceived and dealt with their
diplomatic responsibilities.
John Taylor, who was from a minor gentry family in Yorkshire, was brought up as a Catholic
and educated on the Continent After deciding against a religious vocation, he spent most of his
career in the English diplomatic service at Habsburg courts in Brussels, Madrid, and Vienna. He was
positively inclined towards the Habsburgs, and even in the face of adversity he remained a strong
proponent ofa pro-Habsburg foreign policy for England. The Earl of Arundel, on other hand, came
from what was arguably one of the most powerful noble houses in England. He was raised a
Catholic, and though he publicly converted to Protestantism to take his place at court, privately his
true religious inclination toward Catholicism continued. He was exceedingly loyal to his sovereign
and was a man of the highest character. Like Taylor, Arundel supported a peaceful policy with the
Habsburgs, and as such was identified with the pro-Habsburg element at court. However given
adequate reason, he did not hesitate to reevaluate his stance. Unlike Taylor and Arundel, Clement
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Radolt's Catholicism was a non-issue. Radolt belonged to a bourgeois, bureaucratic family in
Vienna. After receiving his doctorate in canon and civil law, he joined the Imperial service. His
steady rise in social rank and long and successful career attest to the trust the Emperor placed in him.
This combined with his legal training, which would be useful for explaining the justice of the
Emperor's actions against Frederick V, were likely criteria for his selection as envoy to the English
court.
These men are of very different backgrounds and took divergent career paths. They did,
however, all share the same religion. And for a few short years in the later 1630s, they treated with
the same aim in mind — a peaceful accommodation between their crowns on the question of the
Palatinate.
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John Taylor (1597-1655)
Background
The first English diplomat sent to negotiate with the Emperor in the aftermath ofthe Peace of Prague
was John Taylor "the diplomatist,"1 who served as resident agent at the Imperial court in Vienna
from 1635 to 1639. Taylor was bom in 1597 in Yorkshire as the eldest of five children (three sons
and two daughters) of Stephen Taylor of Bickerton and his wife Dowsabell, daughter of William
Grimston ofNewport, Isle ofWight.2 The Taylors were a minor gentry family resident at Bickerton
Hall in the parish ofBilton in Ainsty (the county of the city of York). They had a tradition of service
1So dubbed by a later commentator to distinguish him from his contemporary John Taylor, The
Water Poet. Because of the prevalence of certain Christian names in the Taylor family, keeping the
individual family members straight in one's mind can be a difficult task. Fig. I is a useful aid in this
respect. Also, the descriptive tags "senior" and "junior" are applied as needed in this section to
differentiate John Taylor the diplomatist from his grandfather and uncle respectively. Please note that A.
F. Pollard's article on John the diplomatist in the Dictionary ofNational Biography contains fundamental
errors (Leslie Stephen and Sidney Lee, eds., The Dictionary ofNational Biography: From the Earliest
Times to 1900 [London: Oxford University Press, 1885-1901] [DNS], vol. 19, 438. This will be rectified
by my replacement article forthcoming in the New DNB.
2William Dugdale, The Visitation of the County ofYorke, begun in.. .1665 and jinished in...1666,
Surtees Society Publications, no. 36 (Durham: Surtees Society, 1859), 214. The union of Stephen Taylor
and Dowsabell Grimston is but one example of the intermarriage and other close connections common
among the officers' families; Dowsabell's brother was William Grimston, gentleman, the Earl of
Cumberland's receiver in Cumberland (Richard T. Spence, "A Royal Progress in the North: James I at
Carlisle Castle and the Feast of Brougham, August 1617," Northern History [NH] 27 [1991]: 55; idem,
The Privateering Earl, [FarThrupp, Stroud, Gloucs.: Sutton, 1995], 38).
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to the Clifford earls ofCumberland, one ofthe great magnate houses of the North.3 Like most gentry
families, they were entitled to bear arms.4
John Taylor senior's sons Stephen and John junior (the father and uncle of John Taylor the
diplomatist respectively) were both senior estate and household officers in the service of the earls
of Cumberland.5 The Taylors were among the gentry families which provided tlie Cliffords with
successive generations of officers, "parallel dynasties almost," who dealt with the multitude of
activities necessary to manage the affairs of a great noble house.6 For a time, the Taylors were the
Clifford earls' most trusted officers, playing an important role in the management of their financial
and legal affairs as well as their residences and vast estates in Cumberland, Westmorland, and
Yorkshire. Stephen Taylor was the steward of Skipton Castle (the heart of the Clifford inheritance)
and the family estates in Bickerton as well as receiver-general in Craven under the 3rd and 4th earls.
In addition to these duties, he participated in the day-to-day decision making and management of
3Male members of the family were often designated by the ordinary style of gentleman, at times
as esquire. For a good general overview of the gentry in this period, see Felicity Heal and Clive Holmes,
The Gentry in England and Wales, 1500-1700 (Basingstoke, Hamps.: MacMillan, 1994).
4On 12 April 1635, John Taylor junior received a confirmation of arms to himself as well as to
his father, his brothers Stephen, Thomas, and Robert, and all their descendants. These arms appear on
John Taylor the diplomatist's seal (College of Arms, Miscellaneous Grants 7.29; M. R. Trappes-Lomax,
"Who Was John Taylor the Diplomatist7," Recusant History [RH] 7, no. 1 [1963]: 45). The Taylor arms
are described as argent on a pale sable three lions passant of the field, the crest as an ounce passant
proper resting the dexter paw on a shield of the arms (Dugdale, 214).
'Although Albert Loomie lists John Taylor senior as a steward to the 4th Earl, this is impossible
because the former died in 1605, before the 4th Earl inherited (Albert J. Loomie, "Canon Henry Taylor,
Spanish Habsburg Diplomat," RH 17, no. 3 [1985]: 234).
6Spence, Privateering Earl, 39.
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Clifford affairs along with his brother John Taylor junior.7 John junior was the Clifford earls' "man
of affairs," and as such had a wide range of responsibility.* He was most deeply involved in their
financial and legal affairs; for instance, he dealt with the 3rd Earl's multitude of creditors and acted
as the executor of his will.9 Under the 4th Earl, John Taylor junior represented his master at court,
was involved in negotiating the claims made by Lady Anne Clifford, the 3rd Earl's niece, on the
Clifford inheritance, and arranged for the lavish entertainments for James l's 1617 visit.10 There is
7RJcbard T. Spence, The Pacification of the Cumberland Borders, 1593-1628," NH 13 (1977):
141; idem, "Royal Progress," 62.
*fn an earlier publication, Loomie also mentions that John Taylor junior was a steward of the Earl
of Cumberland's estates and a Catholic; however, there is no evidence in the sources he gives to
substantiate these claims (Loomie, ed., Spain and the Jacobean Catholics, CRS Publications, vol. 64
[[London]: CRS, 1973], vol. 1, 9 n. 9).
9CSPD 1603-1610, 402: 7/17 Feb. 1608, Release for John Taylor and other executors of the late
Earl of Cumberland. For the swashbuckling and extravagant life of George Clifford, 3rd Earl of
Cumberland, see Spence, Privateering Earl. His 1605 will is printed in J. W. Clay, "The Clifford
Family," Yorkshire Archaeological Journal 18 (1905), 387-91.
10Complete with hiring beards, hair, and other guises for the actors and procuring gifts for the
King. For a interesting and detailed description of James l's visits to the royal castle of Carlisle (under the
governorship of the Earl of Cumberland) and to Brougham Castle in Westmorland in August 1617, and
John Taylor's junior's role in making arrangements for them, see Spence, "Royal Progress." For his
general duties, see: idem, Privateering Earl; Thomas D. Whitaker, 77ie History and Antiquities of the
Deanery of Craven in the County of York, ed. A. W. Morant, 3d ed. (Leeds: Dodgson, 1878), 361-3;
HMC, Report on Manuscripts in Various Collections [London, HMSO, 1901-14], vol. 7 \Var. Coll. VTI\,
293: 9/19 Nov. 1634, John Taylor to Sir Gervasc Clifton; ibid., Calendar of the Manuscripts of the
Marquess ofSalisbury (Cecil Mss.J [London: HMSO, 1883-1976], vol. 15 [Salisbury (Cecil) XV], 37:
7/17 Apr. 1603, Tobie [Matthew], Bishop of Durham, to the Earl of Cumberland and Sir Robert Cecil;
ibid., Salisbury (Cecil) XVI, 291 : [after Aug. 1604], Earl of Cumberland to Viscount Cranbome. For the
inheritance dispute between Lady Anne Clifford and Francis Clifford, 4th Earl of Cumberland, as well as
John Taylor's role in the negotiations, see Richard T. Spence, Lady Anne Clifford: Countess ofPembroke,
Dorset and Montgomery (1590-1676) ([Phoenix Mill, GIoucs.]: Sutton, 1997).
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evidence to indicate that another of John Taylor senior's sons, Thomas Taylor, also was a senior
officer in the Cliffords' service."
It is apparent that the Taylors, while trusted servants, were on a more personal footing with
the Cliffords. Not only was John Taylor junior the executor of the 3rd Earl's will, but he also was
remembered in it.12 He was chosen to accompany Henry Lord Clifford, later 5th Earl of
Cumberland, as an esquire on the occasion of his being made a Knight of the Bath in June 1610. 13
The relaxed demeanor between the two men is apparent in their correspondence.14 Henry Clifford
was also on good terms with John's brother Stephen Taylor and his family. He stood as godfather
to Stephen Taylor's eldest daughter, Dowsabell. 15 She later became one ofgentlewomen ofCountess
Grissell, Clifford's mother.16
11Thomas Taylor was a steward to the 3rd Eari, but also performed other official duties for him
(Edward Peacock, ed., A List ofRoman Catholics in the County of York in 1604 [London: Hotten, 1872],
61; HMC, Salisbury (Cecil) XV, 260: 16/26 Oct- 1603. Earl of Cumberland to Lord Cecil; ibid., Salisbury
(Cecil) XVT, 428: [between 20/30 Aug. and 5/15 May 1605], the same to Viscount Cranbome).
I2"I appoints the said righte honorable friend, Robart, Earle of Salisburye, Edward, Lord Wotton,
and my well beloved brother, Sir Francis Clifford, knighte, and my servante, John Taylor, who 1 have for
many yeares paste employed in all my businesses, and bred him upp in my service, and have ever founde
him faithful I and honeste, assuringe myselfe he will soe continue to my house, my executors.... To my
trustie servant, John Taylor, the lease of the new parte for twentye yeares, payinge twentye nobles
yearlie." (Clay, 390).
1"Trappes-Lomax, 45.
I4A 161 1 letter from John Taylor junior to Henry Lord Clifford in France gives a sampling of the
important duties entrusted to Taylor and conveys the relaxed relationship between them (Whitaker, 361-
2: June 1611, Taylor to Clifford).
15BI, Parish Registers, Bilton in Ainsty, County York. Dowsabell ("Dowse") was baptized on
16/26 September 1599.
16Dowsabell numbered among the Countess's gentlewomen in 1610 (I am grateful to Dr. Richard
T. Spence for this information).
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Religion
The Cliffords were unconcerned about employing Catholics in their service, a fortunate circumstance
for the Taylors, for many of them were Catholics — whether recusants, church papists, or somewhere
in between.17 The Cliffords' lax attitude may be due in part to the fact that recusancy was not
unusual among Yorkshire gentry families in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.1* Hugh
Aveling notes that "[t]he community ofhereditary Catholics in the West Riding [including Ainsty]
counted as one of the largest, most productive of martyrs and vocations, and wealthiest in
England."" He estimates that until the end of the seventeenth century, approximately a quarter of
"The earls of Cumberland often stayed at Bickerton, and the Taylors' Catholicism did not worry
them. They generally maintained amicable relationships with many Catholic relatives, gentry, and estate
officers (Spence, Privateering Earl, 37-8). In the seventeenth century a recusant was one, particularly a
Catholic, who refused to attend the services of the Church of England; recusancy was a statutory offense.
A church papist (or to Catholics a schismatic), on the other hand, was a Catholic who conformed
outwardly to the established church. There are, of course, many shades between the two. Many English
Catholics conformed only sporadically and were therefore periodically in trouble with church authorities
for recusancy (see also n. 20).
"For an insightful and thorough discussion of the Catholic gentry in Yorkshire, see J. T. Ciiffe,
The Yorkshire Gentry: From the Reformation to the Civil War, University of London Historical Studies,
vol. 25 (London: Athlone Press, 1969), chaps. 8-10. Just as the Catholicism of Stephen Taylor's family
did not prejudice their relationship with the Cliffords, neither did it seem to affect negatively their status
in the parish of Bilton. The parish registers show that Dowsabell stood as godmother to two children, and
eleven more were named after her-and these numbers are limited to those children baptized in the
established church.
"Hugh Aveling, "The Catholic Recusants of the West Riding of Yorkshire, 1558-1790,"
Proceedings of the Leeds Philosophical and Literary Society, Literary and Historical Section 10, no. 6
(1963): 191.
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the nobility and landed gentry in the West Riding was recusant 20 Stephen Taylor's family, including
his son John the diplomatist, was among them.
During a time when persecution was driving many Catholics to conformity,2 1 John Taylor
the diplomatist was brought up in a firmly Catholic household. His parents Stephen and Dowsabell
were both Catholic. Despite Anglican baptisms for most of their children, they were repeatedly
called before Yorkshire ecclesiastical courts to answer charges ofrecusancy and noncoromunicancy,
though it appears they never complied.22 At one point Stephen was cited for neglecting to send his
servants and children to be catechized, and later Dowsabell was expelled from the established church
for "standing excommunicate for seven yeares or thereabouts."23 In January 1606, the Bishop of
London complained to the Earl of Salisbury that Stephen Taylor and one of his sons, among others,
^Ibid. By 1604, recusancy was largely restricted to the gentry and those associated with them;
even then, however, few gentry families were purely recusant (ibid., 228). Many times the head of the
family was a church papist in order to retain his offices and lands and to avoid fines and/or imprisonment.
Also, children raised in recusant households did not always remain Catholic. This is unsurprising given
the censures against Catholics during this time, even if they were not carried out to the letter of the law.
21C I i ffe calls attention to the marked decrease in Catholicism among the Yorkshire gentry
between the Northern Rebellion and the Civil War with the following figures: in 1570, 368 o>f S67 total
Yorkshire gentry families were Catholic; in 1604, 254 of 641; and in 1642, 163 of 679 (Cliffe, 186).
These numbers work out to 65%, 40%, and 24% of the total respectively. However, while the percentage
of Catholics declined, those who remained true to the faith became more firmly recusant: in 1604, 1 12 of
the 254 Catholic families were at least partly recusant; in 1642, 138ofl63 (ibid., 189). This equals 44%
and 85% respectively.
22BI, AVCB 1604, f. 26; ibid., 1615, f. 32; ibid., 1619, ff. 23-4; ibid., 1623, f. 20; ibid., 1627, f.
3 1 . It is possible that some of the latter citations for Dowsabell may actually refer to John Taylor's sister
rather than his mother. For a list of recusants in the West Riding of Yorkshire to 1780, arranged by
parish, see Hugh Aveling's "Catholic Recusants," app. I.
uBl, AVCB 1619, f. 24.
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were harbored at the Spanish ambassador's house and reportedly attended mass there.** Their
Catholic upbringing made a deep impression upon Stephen and DowsabeU's children. John the
diplomatist's younger brothers Stephen junior, a medical doctor in York City since 1627,25 and
Francis, a priest, court chaplain to Emperor Ferdinand III, and almoner to Emperor Leopold I26 were
M"We are informed that there is harboured in the Spanish Ambassador's house one Dr. Taylcr
and his brother, his servant and one of his brother's sons,. ..with many other English people that resort to
the house and are generally reported to hear mass." (HMC, Salisbury (Cecil) XVIII, 23: 17/27 Jan. 1606,
Bishop of London to Salisbury). Dr. Robert Taylor was Stephen's brother and Secretary of English
Letters at the Spanish embassy in London from 1603 to 1609. Stephen was his only brother who had
more than one son (see fig. I).
^Stephen was bom in 1607 rather than earlier, as surmised by Albert Loomie (BI, Parish
Registers, Bilton in Ainsty, County York). Stephen, described as "a definitely recusant doctor," set up his
practice in St. Martin's, Coney Street in York city. Over the years, he and his family were repeatedly cited
for recusancy (Hugh Aveling, Catholic Recusancy in the City of York, 1558-1791 [London: Catholic
Record Society [CRS], 1970], 240, 242 n. 15, 243, 248, 250-2). During the Interregnum, the York
committee sequestered the property of well-off Catholics in the city, of which it found only four worthy
of its attention, among them Dr. Stephen Taylor, however, it appears he eluded the fines (ibid., 85, 89;
Calendar of the Proceedings of the Committee for Compounding & C. 1643-1660 [London: HMSO,
1889-92; reprint, Nendeln, Licch.: Kraus Reprint, 1967], vol. 3, 113: 23 Apr73 May 1648, Rob. Homer,
mayor, and the Committee for the City and County of York to the Committee for Compounding). For a
list of recusants of York city similar to that for the West Riding, see Aveling, Catholic Recusancy, app. I.
"John Thurloe, A collection of the Slate Papers ofJohn Thurloe...Containing authentic
memorials of the English affairs from the year 1638 to the restoration ofKing Charles II., ed. Thomas
Birch (London: Printed for the executor of F. Gyles, 1742), vol.4, 169: l7Nov. 1655, a letter of
intelligence from [H. Manning in Cologne] to [J. Thurloe]; Dugdale, 214; Loomie, "Henry Taylor," 235.
Francis Taylor studied at St. Gregory's College, Seville from ca. 1636 to 1638. He took minor orders in
1636, and was sent as a priest to England in the summer of 1638, but was apprehended upon his arrival
there (Martin Murphy, St. Gregory's College. Seville. 1592-1767, CRS Publications, Records Series, vol.
73 [London: CRS, 1992]). It is known that he carried letters to England for William Johnson, a Jesuit
residing in Spain (JCSPD 1625-49, 576-7: 2/12 May 1638, Johnson to Dr. John Wilson; Martin Murphy,
"The Cadiz Utters of William Johnson vere Pumell S. J. (1597-1642)," RH2\, no. I [1992]: 4). By
1641, Francis Taylor had entered the service of tiie Emperor Ferdinand III as a court chaplain (HKA,
HZAB 87 [1641]). At this time his brother John the diplomatist was already well-known to the Imperial
court as Charles I's resident agent from 1635 to 1639. After John's death in Vienna in 1655, where he was
representing Charles II in exile, Francis stepped in to keep Secretary Nicholas informed of the latest news
from the Imperial court (BL, Egerton 2536, f. 80: 2/12 Apr. 1656, Francis Taylor to Secretary Nicholas).
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both decided Catholics, as was his sister Dowsabell.27 Although the religious leanings of his other
sister, Elizabeth, are not as clear cut, it is very likely she was a Catholic for at least part ofher life.2'
Given the religious affiliation of most ifnot all of his nuclear family, it comes as no surprise that
John Taylor the diplomatist was a steadfast Catholic.
John Taylor's own testimony upon entrance to the English College at Rome in October 1619
confirms not only the Catholicism of most of his immediate family, but his own as well. Each
entering scholar was asked to write an account of his life up until the time of his entry into the
College. These statements, known as the Response Scholarum, incorporate valuable information
about a scholar's family, upbringing, education, health, religious background, and intended vocation.
In his statement, John Taylor affirms that he comes from Yorkshire, that his parents are Catholic,
that he has two brothers and two sisters (one of whom is non-Catholic), and that he has always been
a Catholic himself.29 Thus S. R. Gardiner's oft-quoted statement about him was only half true:
Taylor was decidedly a Roman Catholic, though not actually "half a Spaniard by birth" as Gardiner
claimed..10
"Dowsabell may have been cited for recusancy on several occasions (BL, AVCB 1619, f. 23;
ibid., 1623, f. 20; ibid., 1627, f. 3 1); however, one or more of these citations may refer to her mother. In
any event, her Catholicism is confirmed by her brother John's statement upon his entrance to the English
College, Rome.
"Elizabeth was the sister that John designated as a non-Catholic in his statement. However, it is
unlikely she remained so throughout her life—she married Robert Trappes of Nidd, who was of a known
Yorkshire recusant family and a recusant himself (Dugdale, 214; Bill Williams, Billon through the Ages
[York: Published by the author, 1985]). Additionally, an Elizabeth Taylor was cited for recusancy in the
parish of Bilton in 1623 and 1627 (BI, AVCB 1623, f. 20; ibid., 1627, f. 31).
^For the text of the statement, see Anthony Kenny, ed., 77«r Responsa Scholarum of the English
College, Rome, pt. 1, 1598-1621, CRS Publications, Records Series, vol. 54 ([London]: CRS, 1962), 327.
^Gardiner, vol. 8, 101. Gardiner may have been misled by a letter of Edward Hyde, Earl of
Clarendon, in which he wrote that Taylor bore the delays of the Imperial Diet "like a man bred in the
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When surveying the religious leanings of the members of the extended Taylor family (those
descended from John Taylor senior) through two generations, the unmistakable picture of a
predominantly Catholic family emerges.3 1 The number of family members who were priests and/or
held prominent positions in the Catholic community at home and abroad is quite overwhelming.
Among them was Dr. Robert Taylor, John the diplomatist's uncle, who married Mary Fowler (very
likely the daughter of John Fowler, a distinguished printer of early recusant literature).32 Dr. Taylor
himself was a professor of civil law at Douai and later secretary of English letters for the Spanish
ambassadors in England from 1603 until 1609.33 He was known to shelter priests, including the
Court of Spain." (CCSP, vol. 2, 327: 27 Mar. 1654," Hyde to Bellings). It is also possible that John Taylor
had an accent: his command of spoken English may have suffered during his years of educational exile
and diplomatic service on the Continent
3lSee fig. 1. It is interesting that John Taylor says that his kinfolk are mainly "heretical,'' i.e., noo-
Catholics, in his Responsa statement. Perhaps this seemed true in comparison to the steadfast Catholicism
of his own nuclear family.
32Albert J. Loomie, "Francis Fowler II, English Secretary of the Spanish Embassy, 1609-1619,"
RH 12 (1973): 70. As a widow, Mary Fowler Taylor was paid a pension by the Spanish ambassador
Diego Sarmiento de Acufia, later Count of Gondomar (idem, "Sir Robert Cecil and the Spanish
Embassy," Bulletin of the Institute ofHistorical Research 42 [1969]: 36 n. 4). After her husband's death,
her brother Francis Fowler took over the English secretaryship of the Spanish embassy, serving from
1609 to 1619 (idem, "Fowler").
3,He left England for the Continent early in Elizabeth's reign. He lectured at Douai from the early
1570s, where he earned the degree of Doctor Utriusque Juris in 1602. For more on Dr. Robert Taylor and
his involvement in the most sensitive Anglo-Spanish negotiations of the day, see: Loomie, "Sir Robert
Cecil;" idem, The Spanish Elizabethans: The English Exiles at the Court of Philip //(New York:
Fordham University Press, 1963); idem, "Toleration and Diplomacy: The Religious Issue in Anglo-
Spanish Relations, 1603-1605," Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, n.s. 53, pt. 6 (1963);
idem, Spain and the Jacobean Catholics, vol. 1; and L. Hicks, "The Embassy of Sir Anthony Standen in
1603: Part I," RHS (1959-60). For his involvement in the trial of Father Henry Garnet in 1606, see
Loomie, "Sir Robert Cecil," 36. For his part in procuring Garnefs ear, deemed a relic by Catholics, for
the Spanish ambassador Don Baltazar de Ziifiiga, see Henry Foley, ed., Records of the English Province
of the Society ofJesus: Historic Facts Illustrative of the Labours and Sufferings of Its Members in the
Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries (London: Burns and Oats, 1875-83; reprint, New York: Johnson
Reprint, [1966]), vol. 4, 127-8. And for the strange story of Garnet's ear in general, with contemporary
accounts and illustrations of the ear, see ibid., 120-34, and Philip Caraman, Henry Garnet, 1555-1606,
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infamous Father John Gerard in the aftermath of the Gunpowder Plot in 1605; in April 1606, the
Taylors were imprisoned for hiding yet another priest.34 The children ofDr. Robert and Mary Taylor
(thus first cousins of John Taylor the diplomatist) were raised strictly Catholic in exile in Flanders.
All three of their sons went on, or intended to go on, to careers in the Church: Anthony, who studied
at St. Omers and the English colleges in Madrid and Valladolid, died before he could realize his
goal; Thomas, who studied at St. Omers and the English College at Rome, was ordained in 1628 and
sent on mission to England, where he subsequently died; and perhaps the most illustrious, Henry,
who after study at St. Omers and the English College at Rome went on to become a resident agent
and the Gunpowder Plot (New York: Farrar, Straus, 1964), app. D.
The story of Garnet's ear unfolded more or less as follows. On one of the husks of an ear of straw
stained with Garnet's blood, Catholics discerned the image of a face resembling Garnet's own. Then, two
afflicted women were reported to have been cured by an application of it. As the ear's fame grew, both
Catholics and Protestants flocked to see it. Fearing its subversive influence, English authorities (in
particular the Richard Bancroft, Archbishop of Canterbury) sought to gain possession of the ear. Several
witnesses were examined, but none could (or would) say where it could be found. Through Dr. Robert
Taylor's efforts, Zurtiga had the ear in his possession for a time and showed it to others. Both men were
therefore questioned as to its whereabouts by the Earl of Salisbury, and both denied they knew where it
was. Zuniga told Salisbury: "From curiosity I have seen the said straw of which several before have
spoken to me but I have never been such an enemy to my money as to give it for straws as you have been
told. After having seen it 1 kept it for two or three days. ..and since then have returned it." (HMC,
Salisbury (Cecil) XVIII, 357: 8/18 Dec. 1606, Zuniga to Salisbury).
"Michael Hodgetts, "A Topographical Index of Hiding Places," RH 16, no. 2 (1982): 176. Dr.
Taylor had associations with the plotters. According to notes of meetings related to the "gunpowder
treason," he was in attendance at the Thursday "sennett" which gathered at the Mitre tavern in Broad
Street for dinner in the days before 5/15 November 1605. Plotter Robert Catesby was also present.
However, it is not likely the Plot itself was discussed. Taylor was overheard telling the group that "all
princes' ambassadors were but honorable spies." A telling statement coming from one who worked
closely with the Spanish ambassador (HMC, Salisbury (Cecil) XVII, 522: [Nov. 1605], Gunpowder Plot;
Alan Haynes, The Gunpowder Plot: Faith in Rebellion [Phoenix Mill, Gloucs.: Sutton, 1994], 74).
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for the Spanish Habsburgs in London, priest, court chaplain in Brussels, and eventually Dean of
Antwerp Cathedral.35
In addition to Dr. Robert's family, other Taylor relatives remained faithful to the Roman
Church. John Taylor's only paternal aunt, Anne, married John Fowler, who was most probably the
son of the Catholic printer of the same name and brother ofMary Fowler Taylor and Francis Fowler,
who succeeded Dr. Robert Taylor as Secretary of English letters for the Spanish embassy. Anne
Taylor Fowler became a well-known Catholic bookseller out of her home near the Inns of Court36
John the diplomatist's cousin Thomas Taylor, son of his uncle Thomas Taylor and Mary Ann
Neville, though raised a "heretic," was removed to Flanders by his uncle Dr. Robert Taylor. Young
Thomas attended St. Omers and the English College at Rome, and eventually returned to England
as a priest.37 Finally, many of the Taylors of Tadcaster, which is located only a few miles from
"Geoffrey Holt, St. Omers and Bruges College. 1593-1773: A Biographical Dictionary, CRS
Publications, Records Series, vol. 69 ([London]: CRS, 1979), 258; Foley, vol. 6, 300, 510; Godfrey
Anstruther, The Seminary Priests: A Dictionary of the Secular Clergy ofEngland and Wales, 1558-1850,
vol. 2, Early Stuarts 1603-1659 (Great Wakering: Mayhew-McCrimmon, 1975), 314-5; Loomie, "Henry
Taylor." Henry and Thomas Taylor's statements upon entering the English College, Rome are printed in
Kenny, vol. 1, 333-4, and vol. 2, 367, respectively. Interestingly, Henry states that he has no plans to
become an ecclesiastic, while Thomas knew that he himself had a vocation. Henry Taylor was later a
candidate for the Bishopric of Chalcedon (England) and an executor of the will of Sir Tobie Matthew (Sir
Edward Nicholas, The Nicholas Papers: Correspondence ofSir Edward Nicholas, Secretary ofState, ed.
George F. Warner, Camden New Series, vols. 40, 50, 57, Camden Third Series, vol. 3 1 [London: Printed
for the Camden Society, 1886-1920; reprint, New York: Johnson Reprint, 1965], vol. 2, 272: 3 May
1655," Marmaduke Langdale to Nicholas; Anstruther, 314-5). For an excellent study of the whole of
Henry Taylor's career, see Loomie, "Henry Taylor." For his diplomatic duties in England, see CSPD
1629-1631, 528, 534, and ibid., 1633-1634, 333, 529, 532, 539. Many of his dispatches are in the
registers of the Archdukes Albert and Isabella (HHStA, Belgien, Rep. PC 1 1, Fasz. 64-5).
"Loomie, "Fowler," 75.
"Kenny, vol. 1, 326; Foley, vol. 6, 290, 510; Holt, 258. Although young Thomas records in his
Responsa statement that his parents and three sisters are heretics, it is questionable that his parents
consistently conformed, since a "Thomas Taylor gentleman, steward to ye Earle of Cumberland ... & his
wief ' were cited for recusancy in the parish of Bilton (Peacock, 61).
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Bickerton, were also recusant Catholics; they are possibly cousins further removed of the Taylors
of Bickerton Hall.3*
Education
John Taylor the diplomatist's parents saw to it that he was brought up and educated in the Catholic
faith. It is likely that he was taught the fundamentals by either his parents or a private tutor (often
an itinerant priest) or perhaps in clandestine Catholic schools, which were actually quite widespread
in the North of England.39 In 16 12 at age fifteen, he was enrolled in the Jesuit-run St. Omers College
in Flanders, the leading English Catholic preparatory school on the Continent, where he studied for
the next seven years.40 It may have been at this time that he took the alias John Grimston. St. Omers
was a place for English Catholic boys to perfect their learning; some educational background,
including instruction in Latin, was assumed. Like most Jesuit preparatory schools, St. Omers offered
a humanities course in five forms, or levels: rudiments, grammar, syntax, poetry, and rhetoric. This
course ensured students a solid grounding in the classics and enabled them to proceed on to higher
3*Bl, AVCB, for instance 1636, ft 44-S, and Cause Papers, H 463; Aveling, "Catholic
Recusants," app. I. The Taylors of Tadcaster had held the place of postmaster there since the late I S70s.
The place was lost after Thomas Taylor was executed by the Parliamentary commander Lord Fairfax for
carrying an express to Prince Rupert to hasten the relief of York (PRO, State Papers Domestic, Charles II,
vol. 6, f. 180: June? 1660, Petition of Thomas Taylor to Secretaries Nicholas and Morice; BL, Add. Mss.
28566, n.f.: "Iter Boreale, Anno Salutis 1639": John Aston's Diary, CSPD 1637, 331: 27 July/6 Aug.
1637, Warrant to pay for posts).
3,A. C. F. Beales, Education under Penalty: English Catholic Education from the Reformation to
the Fall ofJames n. 1547-1689 ([London]: Athlone Press, 1963), ix, 56-7, 74-5, 81, 83; Cliffe, 194-5.
Although it was illegal for a Catholic to employ a tutor for his children, for a school to be opened without
permission, or for children to be sent to Continental seminaries, most escaped prosecution because these
laws were laxly enforced (ibid., 1 84).
4°Holt, 258.
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education.41 The main emphasis was on the mastery of Latin composition and conversation (the
boys were required to speak Latin at all times, except during recreation), which was taught "not for
the manufactured reasons of a later age but as a practical instrument of culture;"42 however, the
students learned the basics of Greek as well. The majority of students at St. Omers were lay, that
is, without a vocation.'"
John Taylor decided he might have a vocation, because in 16 19, after finishing his classical
studies at St. Omers, he was admitted as a convictor at the English College in Rome. The English
College was the place through which "all currents of English Catholic life flowed ... by virtue of
scholastics arriving, priests leaving and visitors great and small."44 Upon his entry into the English
College, he gave his statement included in the Responsa Scholarum. In addition to the information
he recorded about himself, his family, and their religion discussed above, he indicated that he had
reached rhetoric, the fifth form of his preparatory training, but had not yet decided upon his
vocation.45 The seven-year course of study at the English College was comprised of three years of
philosophy and four of theology. Therefore, Taylor's background in Latin was undoubtedly
41Beales, 132-3, 159.
^Ibid., 163. Cliffe rightly observes that "[a]t a time when Latin was still extensively used in
works of literature and official and legal purposes, no one could afford to regard himself as an educated
man unless he had a good working knowledge of the language." (Cliffe, 72).
43The proportion was roughly four to one (Beales, 169). Such an education was not
inexpensive—fees amounted to at least £25 a year and had to be paid six months in advance (ibid., 160).
The fact that the Taylors were willing to pay such a sum and risk persecution for themselves and their
eldest son in order for him to receive a Catholic education underlines their strong religious commitment
"Ibid., 121.
45Kenny, pt- 1, 327. Beales notes that because St Omers was at times desperate for boys wishing
to continue on to Rome, the English College was obliged to admit students who were not prepared to the
usual standard or unsure of their vocation (Beales, 130).
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sufficient to enter philosophy at this time. The art ofdisputation was cultivated, and all conversation
was to be in either Latin or Italian.46 Therefore we can assume that he further honed his linguistic
and debating skills during his tenure at the English College.
Taylor apparently decided to forgo a religious career, because he left the English College in
the late spring of 162 1 , after less than two years of study. His whereabouts and activities during the
following seven years are unclear, though it may be during this time he married Jane Gibbs, by
whom he had three children by 1639.47
Career
Though all our Recusants be the King of England's subjects, yet too many of them be
the King of Spaines Servants.
R. Johnson, Kingdom and Commonwealth
John Taylor settled instead upon a career in government service. By 1628, he had secured his first
government employment, and by 1630 he had begun his long career as a diplomatic agent at foreign
courts, particularly those of the Habsburgs in Vienna, Brussels, and Madrid.4* Taylor secured his
"Ibid., 121-2.
47PRO, State Papers Domestic, Charles I [SP 16], vol. 433, f. 102: 25 Novys Dec. 1639, Taylor
to Windebank; ibid., SP 16/470, f. 164: [Oct?] 1640, Petition of Jane Taylor to Charles I.
4*"But where as he hath bene employd these seaven yeeres in his Majesties servise, having on
many long and dangerous ioumys and lived in the dearest Courtes with very small allowance where by he
hath bene forced both in this last voiage as in divers others to disburse sundry summes of his owne by
which he is much emparcd in his estate as allso by neglecting all other occasions where in he might have
benefitted him selfe...." (PRO, SP 16/189, f. 145: 29 May 1635,' "The Accomptof John Taylor sent into
Spaine for his Majesties affaires, 13 July 1634"). In letters to Secretary Windebank in July 1638, Taylor
asks for recompense to his wife and children for his continual absences and in consideration of his ten
years' service (Bodl. Lib., Clar. Mss. 14, f. 1 13: 5/15 July 1638, Taylor to Windebank; ibid., ff. 1 19-21:
1 1/2 1 July 1638, same to same). In another from the Tower of the winter of 1639, Taylor states that he
has served the King continually for eleven years (PRO, SP 16/433, f. 102: 25 Novys Dec. 1639, same to
same). A diplomatic servant of the Crown pleading for reimbursement for his expenses is a recurring
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government employment on the strength ofhis aptitude for languages and, in all likelihood, contacts
made through the earls ofCumberland.49 He would have been well known not only to the Cliffords
but also to Thomas Wentworth (later Earl of Strafford), the diplomat Sir Edward Wotton, and other
notables who journeyed with them, all ofwhom were in the position to help Taylor to a government
post In fact, it is apparent Taylor and Wentworth were well acquainted in 1633, when Taylor was
assisting him with a scheme to promote trade between Ireland and Spain. At this time Wentworth
gave his encouragement and affirmed his friendship to Taylor, writing "and this not for a start and
away, but reposedly and constantly . . . [being] one of those . . . that shall be the latest and loathest
in the world to lose the respects I am enabled to do my friends through mutability and change."50
In his dealings abroad during the Thirty Years' War, Taylor served the interests of the party
that supported peace with the Austrian and Spanish Habsburgs as opposed to the party that supported
intervention on the anti-Habsburg side (Sweden, the Dutch Republic, France, or a combination
thereof).51 The differences of opinion over early Stuart foreign policy contributed to an English
government and foreign service divided roughly along the lines of the peace and war lobbies.
Competing lines of diplomatic communication developed, with Secretary Dorchester and his
theme.
49According to Nicholas Kendall, a jealous rival, John Taylor had "nothing but languadge to help
himself." Kendall believed that he deserved preferment in the King's service rather than Taylor (PRO, SP
16/273, f. 151: 24 Aug /3 Sept. 1634, Kendall to Windebank).
MDavid Masson, The Life of John Milton: Narrated in Connection with the Political,
Ecclesiastical and Literary History of His Time, new and rev. ed. (New York: P. Smith, 1946), vol. 1,
695.
This was often a difficult task, for, as previously noted, the Emperor had deprived Charles I's
brother-in-law, Frederick V of the Palatinate, of his hereditary lands and titles and parceled them out to
Spain and Bavaria.
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protegees representing the war party, and Secretary Windebank and his agents the peace party.52
Most of Taylor's foreign assignments were to the various Habsburg courts, and he accordingly
corresponded primarily with those associated with Charles I's secret Habsburg negotiations, namely
Sir Richard Weston, Earl of Portland (until his death in 1635), Sir Francis Cottington, and
windebank. Indeed, Taylor and other diplomats sent to Habsburg courts were specifically instructed
by Windebank to conduct the meaningful part of their negotiations through him alone and to only
send general news to Secretary Coke (Dorchester's replacement). Therefore knowledge ofTaylor's
activities were often limited to Weston, Cottington, Windebank, and the King while many of his
privy councillors, including those on the committee for foreign affairs, were kept in ignorance.
Likewise, Taylor was privy to information about secret negotiations with the Habsburgs that was
kept from these councillors and many other diplomats, particularly those who advocated intervention
on the Protestant side."
On his first known assignment, Taylor gathered news for Weston in Brussels, where he was
present in April 1630.54 He was soon sent to the Empire in an unofficial capacity to gather
information for the peace lobby, first at the electoral meeting at Regensburg in October and
November 1630, and then afterwards at the Imperial court in Vienna." Alongside the official
52As previously discussed, Charles encouraged this fragmented system by enabling his leading
pro-peace ministers, Weston (later Earl of Portland), Cottington, and Windebank, to conduct secret
negotiations with the Habsburgs that were kept from the war lobby, and by extension from most members
of the privy council and foreign affairs committee, whatever their affiliation.
"For more on Taylor's secret negotiations, see chaps. 8 and 1 1.
*PRO, SP 77/19, f. 335: 18 Apr. 1630, Taylor to [Weston].
5SHis correspondence, mostly directed to Weston, is found in PRO, SP 80/7-,8 and HMC,
Denbigh V. Taylor indeed acted as Weston's agent in Imperial political circles but not as a Spanish agent
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negotiations ofSir Robert Anstruther, the accredited English ambassador to the Emperor and client
of the war party, Taylor met with Imperial and Spanish ministers to promote the peaceful settlement
ofthe Palatinate question. This provides an example of the typical end-run maneuver the peace party
employed to get around the war advocates: although Taylor was aware of Spain's real terms for the
restoration of the Lower Palatinate (the implementation of the secret Cottington Treaty), he kept
them from Anstruther.56 Therefore in both England and the Empire, the Spaniards and those
Englishmen who favored a peaceful settlement, including the King, withheld Spain's conception of
the basis of its negotiations with England from those associated with the English war lobby.57 Since
the two English envoys in Vienna were not working from the same script, it is not surprising that the
parties did not reach an agreement, and Taylor departed Vienna in August 1632."
Taylor returned to Brussels in October and resumed his news-gathering activities there for
a time.59 However, he soon returned to England, where he was investigating the scheme to promote
trade between Ireland and Spain for Wentworth in the summer of 1633. Both Wentworthand Taylor
in England as L. J. Reeve asserts (Reeve, "Quiroga's Paper," 921 ). Reeve has confused John with his
cousin Henry.
56Anstruther let Weston and Taylor know that he found Taylor's presence in Vienna inconvenient
to his negotiations (PRO, SP 80/7, f. 220: [1630?], Taylor to [Weston]). Later, Anstruther's frustrations
are clear when he complains that the Imperialists talk more freely with Taylor than him and that Taylor
will inform the reader of what he has discovered (PRO, SP 80/8, f. 86: 21 Oct. 163 1," Anstruther to
[Weston?]).
57Reeve, "Quiroga's Paper," 92 1-2. For a more general discussion of Anstruther's negotiations,
see chap. 4, p. 183.
5*PRO, SP 80/8, f. 217: 20 Aug. 1632, Abstract of letter from Taylor to Weston.
"PRO, SP 77/22. Taylor remained in Brussels at least until December (ibid., f. 306: 7 Dec. 1632,
Taylor to [Weston]).
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were in contact with the Spanish resident agent in London, Juan Necolalde, to whom Wentworth
looked to support this business.60
Taylor quickly became more involved in Spanish affairs. FromJuly 1634 through May 1635,
he was employed on a diplomatic mission to Madrid to expedite negotiations for an Anglo-Spanish
maritime treaty already underway in England.61 Initially Taylor's charge was to complain about the
behavior of Necolalde, who was blamed for the slow progress of the negotiations, and to secure his
recall. Taylor accomplished this with dispatch, and by August Philip IV had nominated the Count
of Humanes as Necolalde's replacement.62 Once this was achieved, Taylor was ordered to remain
in Spain until news of the conclusion of the treaty came from England. During this time he and the
"Strafford, vol. 1, 95-6: 1/1 1 Aug. 1633, Taylor to Wentworth; ibid., 104: 22 Augil Sept. 1633,
same to same. At this time Taylor's cousin Henry was serving as Necolalde's secretary; it is highly likely
that he, not John, is the interpreter (Mr. Taylor) to whom Wentworth and Necolalde refer (ibid., 112, 118-
9; Loomie, "Canon Henry Taylor," 227).
61Taylor's correspondence while in Spain is in PRO, SP 94/37, and CSP, vol. I. He arrived in
Madrid on 5 August 1634 (PRO, SP 94/37, f. 97: 14 Aug. 1634, Taylor to Portland). Taylor was to be
paid 10 shillings a day (Gary M. Bell, A Handlist of English Diplomatic Representatives, 1509-1688,
Royal Historical Society Guides and Handbooks, Main Series, vol. 16 [London: Royal Historical Society,
1990], 260). For Taylor's financial account for his service in Spain, see PRO, SP 16/289, f. 145, and ibid.,
SP 94/37, f. 181. At the time this account was drawn up, shortly after his return to England, he had
actually already been paid £200 of the £368 he claimed in ordinary and extraordinary expenses, and
requested the remainder due.
aCSP. vol. 1, 126: 22 Aug. 1634, Sir Arthur Hopton to Windebank; CSPV 1632-36, 29 1: 27 Oct.
1634, Anzolo Correr, Venetian Ambassador in England, to the Doge and Senate [D&S]. Humanes's
departure was repeatedly delayed, so long in fact that he died, in September 1635, before he could make
it to England (.CSP, vol. 1, 329: 29 Sept. 1635, Hopton to Windebank; CSPV 1632-6, 471 : 2 Nov. 1635,
Correr to D&S). It is interesting to note that Necolalde and Taylor's cousin Henry had disagreements over
the intentions of the English ministers they dealt with in the secret negotiations for a naval alliance
(namely Weston, Windebank, and Cottington). Necolalde, who believed that Henry Taylor was too partial
to the English position, essentially asked for the tatter's recall in 1634. This is not the first time Henry
Taylor had been suspected of English partisanship; in 163 1 he reported rumors that "I am too much an
Englishman and that I was raised among the Jesuits." (Loomie, "Canon Henry Taylor," 226). John Taylor
encountered similar suspicions throughout his career, but in reverse: Englishmen who supported the
Protestant cause considered him a partisan of the Habsburgs.
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English resident agent Sir Arthur Hopton kept Windebank and Cottington, Charles's main
negotiators of the maritime treaty in England, abreast ofdevelopments at the Spanish court. Back
in England, Charles became weary of Necolalde's intransigence, and he sent Hopton powers in
February 1635 to conclude the treaty in Spain. Before leaving, Taylor had several discussions about
important issues (among them the Palatinate) with Olivares, to whom he was particularly directed.63
The Spanish minister was favorably inclined towards Taylor, though this may have stemmed more
from the hitter's pro-Habsburg stance than his skill in negotiation." Still, in Hopton's estimation,
Taylor was "a very honest and careful man" who performed his diplomatic duties in Spain quite
satisfactorily."
Soon after his return to England, Taylor secured an important post as resident agent to the
Imperial court in Vienna, where he remained from November 1635 until early 1629. 66 This embassy
was the most important of his career, as he was entrusted with negotiations on a sensitive matter of
great importance to both sides (England and the dispossessed Palatines on the one hand, and the
Austrian Habsburgs and their Spanish and Bavarian allies on the other) and to the peace of Europe:
the Palatinate question. The negotiations that took place in the years from 1635 to 1639 between
"PRO, SP 94/37, f. 128: 18 Oct 1634, Taylor to Olivares; ibid., f. 130: 18 Oct. 1634, Philip IV to
Taylor, CSP, vol. I, 150: 160ct. 1634, Taylor to Windebank; ibid., 236: 24 Feb. 1635, same to same;
ibid., 262: 25 Apr. 1635, Hopton to same.
wlbid., 268: 22 Apr. 1635, Olivares to Cottington.
"Bodl. Lib., Clar. Mss. 5, f. 324: 13 Aug. 1634,' Hopton to Windebank.
"Taylors instructions are in PRO, SP 80/9, fT. 34-47. The bulk of his correspondence is in: PRO,
SP 80/9- 10; Bodl. Lib., Clar. Mss.; HMC, Denbigh V; and CSP, vol. 1. He was paid 40 shillings a day for
his labors, fourfold what he was paid in Spain.
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England and the Austrian Habsburgs form the centerpiece of this dissertation and are discussed in
more detail in chapters eight through ten below. John Taylor figured prominently in them.
Despite an auspicious beginning to his negotiations with the Emperor, John Taylor's fortunes
took a turn for the worse. Periodically during his tenure at the Imperial court he was reprimanded
by Windebank for "indiscretions" in his conduct of the negotiations. In early 1639 he was recalled
from Vienna. In April he reached England and was soon called to account for promoting a
conference with the Habsburgs at Brussels without the commission to do so.67 The real cause ofhis
disgrace, however, was not his undertakings with the Habsburgs — which were covertly encouraged
by the Crown — but rather that their exposure prejudiced English negotiations underway for a French
treaty at Hamburg.6*
Taylor was committed to the Tower in September 1639, where he remained for at least seven
months.69 He was miserable in his confinement. Not only had he purportedly offended his sovereign
"For specifics, see chap. 1 1.
"This tactic was not new, though the repercussions were. When Taylor was negotiating in
Vienna in 1636, in England "they have never even been willing to admit that Taylor has powers to engage
in any particular negotiations. ..and declare that if he has gone beyond his instructions he has done so of
his own caprice and not by order of the court. However they do not go so far as to blame him or to say
that they will punish him if he has gone beyond the limits of his instructions. This makes it probable that
they propose to adopt this method to attribute to the imprudence of the minister all the unpleasant results
which they will gather from the negotiations at the Imperial court." (CSPV 1632-6, 529: 14 Mar. 1636,
Correr to D&S).
69A. F. Pollard's old DNB article on John Taylor the diplomatist claims that Taylor's books and
papers were seized from the Inner Temple around the time of his arrest. However, as M. R. Trappes-
Lomax suspected, these items were not the property of our John Taylor but another man of the same
name (Trappes-Lomax, 45). Secretary Windebank did indeed order his secretary Robert Reade to seize
the books and papers of a "Mr. Taylor of the Inner Temple, gent." shortly before our Taylor was sent to
the Tower. However, this was a mere coincidence. These things almost surely belonged to the John
Taylor who soon after the seizure argued that the Secretaries of State have no place in the House of Lords
(unless they were lords or were called by writ). Reade was told of this argument by an informant of the
Inner Temple; thus it came to Windebank's ears (PRO, SP 16/429, f. 49: 26 Sept./6 Oct. 1639,
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and been imprisoned under embarrassing circumstances, but he was in dire financial straights. In
debt due to financial obligations incurred during bis diplomatic service and unable to earn money
to support his family, Taylor repeatedly petitioned Windebank to intercede with the King on his
behalf, ifnot for his own contrition and misery then for the sake ofhis family.10 Taylor's wife Jane
also petitioned the king, pleading for her husband's liberty. According to her account, Taylor was
so melancholy that she feared for his life, the loss of which would result in the "utter ruyne" of
herself and her children. Windebank, who had helped Taylor in the past and felt guilty about his
disgrace, did intercede with the King; he sent Jane Taylor's petition under cover of his own letter
advising Taylor's release.71
The difficult financial situation in which Taylor found himself was compounded by the loss
ofhis inheritance. In November 1639, he lamented to Windebank: "I know not now by what means
possibly to help or relieve my self for amongst other great crosses having lost my Uncle and not only
the hope which I had in him, but have been hardly dealt with all and wronged in my Father's
estate."72 There is no indication that either John the diplomatist, as the eldest son, or his brothers
Francis or Stephen came into their father's estate. After their father Stephen's death in 1618, it is
possible that the inheritance passed instead to their uncle John Taylor junior, perhaps because of the
Windebank to Reade; ibid., SP 16/446, f. 52: 25 Feb-/6 Mar. 1640, Allan Boteler to same).
TOPRO, SP 16/43 1, f. 52: 16/26 Oct. 1639, Taylor to Windebank; ibid., SP 16/433, f. 102: 25
NovVS Dec. 1639, same to same; ibid., SP 16/448, f. 1 12: 21/3 1 Mar. 1640, same to same.
71PRO, SP 16/470, ff. 164-5: [Oct?] 1640, Petition of Jane Taylor to Charles I.
"PRO, SP 16/433, f. 102: 25 Nov75 Dec. 1639, Taylor to Windebank.
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threat of fines or sequestration of the estate under the penal laws against Catholics.73 These laws,
though often laxly enforced, provided that parents like Stephen and Dowsabell who sent their
children to Continental seminaries were liable to forfeit their lands and goods; the same penalty
applied to children who refused to conform, like their three sons.74
All indications point to this conclusion. John Taylor junior was still resident in Bickerton
and a relatively wealthy man in October 1639, when he made his will being "sick ofbody but sound
of mind." He left the great bulk of his estate to Matthias, a distant cousin. Among other bequests,
he left the sum of £50 to his nephew John Taylor the diplomatist and his children, as well as some
money to the children of his brother Dr. Robert Taylor." Thus if Stephen's estate indeed did pass
to John junior, it would fall to Matthias upon the latter's death. From John the diplomatist's own
words, it seems highly likely that he still nurtured the hope of regaining his father's estate from bis
uncle. Surely then, he had every right to be very upset when he received the news in November
nl have no direct proof that John Taylor junior was a Catholic, nor does his name appear in the
Bilton parish registers as a party to an Anglican baptism, marriage, or burial. It should be noted, however,
that in 1604 a John Taylor in the Parish of Bilton and two of his servants, one of them named Jane
Spinck, were cited for noncommunicancy at Easter last (Peacock, 61). Further, in the Bilton parish
registers, a simple, undated list at the end indicates that a Mr. Taylor engaged three servants: William
Taylor, Alice Spinck, and Jane Spinck (no date given). The fact that said Mr. Taylor had three servants in
his pay indicates that he was a man of some means. Therefore, Mr. Taylor could possibly be either John
Taylor senior or junior, who were both active at this time; or he could be someone else entirely.
74Cliffe, 194, 198.
7SIn the early 1630s, John Taylor junior had enough money to be fined for failing to take the
order of knighthood at the coronation of Charles I (one of the King's underhanded tricks to supplement
his revenues during the personal rule). Taylor compounded at £12, while the average Yorkshire
compounder paid only £10 (W. Paley Baildon, "Compositions for Not Taking Knighthood at the
Coronation of Charles I," in Miscellanea, Yorkshire Archaeological Society Record Series, vol. 61
[[Leeds]: Yorkshire Archaeological Society, 1920], 87, 99). In his 1639 will, he bequeathed all freehold
lands, tenements and hereditaments to his cousin Matthias; his wife Mary and her heirs were to receive
the remainder of his goods, chattels, debts, credits, and "other estate" (PRO, Probate Registers 1 1, vol.
182, ff. 206-7; BI, Original Wilis, Dec. 1639).
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1639 that his ailing uncle had instead left his estates to a distant cousin and attempted to settle John
the diplomatist's claim with a disappointing £50. Locked away in the Tower, however, there was
little he could do against it, and by December 1639 his uncle was dead. Regardless of the actual
mechanics of his dispossession, we do know the outcome, namely that John the diplomatist felt
cheated of his inheritance and that his father's legacy in Bickerton was lost76
John Taylor was finally granted his release from the Tower, probably sometime before the
outbreak of the English Civil War. Despite his bad treatment, he remained a staunch royalist, and
at some point he left England for the Continent, eventually returning to Vienna where his brother
Francis was serving as chaplain to the Emperor Ferdinand In.77 Although he was lightly esteemed
by Sir Edward Hyde, one of Charles II's leading ministers and acting secretary of state, Taylor was
employed during the Interregnum on the strength of his loyalty and good reputation with the
Emperor to muster support for the King's cause with the Emperor and some of the Catholic princes.7*
"Even if the estate did not pass from Stephen to John junior, it went to someone other than
Stephen's sons. The parish registers to the end of the seventeenth century provide no further clues about
what happened to the Taylors of Bickerton Hall. It is ominous that they are not mentioned in the 1 642
will of Henry Clifford, 5th Earl of Cumberland (printed in Clay, 397-9). One would think he might leave
something to the Taylors (if any of them were still in his service), before the Clifford inheritance passed
to his cousin Anne.
77Francis Taylor was in the service of the Emperor Ferdinand III in 164 1 and was still serving
him ten years later (HKA, HZAB 87 [1641]; ibid., HZAB 97 [1651], f. 204).
7*It is unclear exactly when Taylor resumed his diplomatic duties in Vienna. He may have served
as the English agent to the Emperor for some weeks in the autumn of 1649. Niccolo Sagredo, the
Venetian ambassador in Germany, wrote to the Doge and Senate that a "gentleman sent by the king of
England, who gives himself the title of ambassador, although as a matter of fact he is not recognized as
such by the Court," visited the Imperial court in the fall of 1649 to try and secure aid for the royalist
cause (CSPV 1647-52, 1 16: 1 1 Sept. 1649, Sagredo to D&S; ibid., 118-9: 25 Sept, 1649, same to same;
ibid., 120: 2 Oct 1649, same to same). The year 165 1 is the earliest I can pinpoint Taylor with any
certainty in Vienna. At this time, the Imperialists considered him to be the English resident agent; they
were also defraying his costs (HKA, HZAB 97 [1651], ff. 334, 472). I have found no independent
evidence to indicate that Taylor was actual ly accredited by Charles II in 1 65 1 ; however, Hyde was in
218
In 1652, Hyde made it no secret in his correspondence with Sir Edward Nicholas that he did not hold
Taylor in high regard.79 Still, it is apparent that Hyde considered Taylor's services useful, as he was
seriously considering sending Taylor to ply Charles II's cause at the Imperial court in Vienna and
the upcoming Diet in Regensburg. Hyde turned to Nicholas for advice, writing
I have often forgot to ask your opinion of Taylor, whom I know not at all, but it
seems he was Agent in the last King's time with the Emperor, and many and amongst
those the Lord ofNorwich, have very much commended him to me; ifhe were to be
judged by his letters I should believe him a fool, yet they say he hath great and real
reputation with the Emperor, and all men confess he is very honest and passionate
for the King's interest, so that I believe it necessary to him which is resolved.*0
Hyde and the King decided that Taylor's loyalty, previous diplomatic experience, and connections
at the Imperial court would make him an effective instrument to solicit support from Catholic rulers,
because in September 1652 Taylor was accredited as resident agent to the Emperor Ferdinand HI and
the electors of Cologne and Mainz."
touch with Taylor in Vienna in June 1652, before the latter was accredited to that court (CCSP, vol. 2,
138: 22 June 1652," Hyde to Taylor).
"Hyde deprecated Taylor to others as well, including Sir Richard Browne, who served Charles II
as an agent in Paris ( Evelyn, vol. 4, 256-7: 3 1 July 1652,' Hyde to Browne).
UCSP, vol. 3, 96: 13 Sept. 1652," Hyde to Nicholas. Nicholas obviously did not know Taylor well
either, because he confused Taylor with his brother Francis when he encouraged Hyde to send William
Curtius, the Protestant resident agent in Frankfurt, to the Protestant princes at Regensburg rather than
Taylor. Nicholas's objection was predicated on the fact that he considered Taylor "a factious papist, [who]
hath not so much reputation with the princes of the Religion Reformed. ...[and] tho well affected, is but a
busy, weak man." However, Nicholas agreed that "he may be fit (as you say) to intimate so much to the
Emperor (with whom he is a domestic) and some Catholic princes." However, Nicholas was thinking of
Francis Taylor, the Emperor's chaplain, rather than his brother John Taylor when he made this statement
(Nicholas, vol. 1, 307-8: 5 Sept. 1652, Nicholas to Hyde; cf. CSP, vol. 3, 103: 4 Oct. 1652," Hyde to
Nicholas).
"Ibid.; CCSP, vol. 2, 148: 6 Sept. 1652,' Charles II to Ferdinand III; ibid., 149: 13 Sept. 1652,'
same to the electors of Cologne and Mainz. For Taylor's credentials and Hyde's side of the
correspondence see Bodl. Lib., Clar. Mss., and CCSP, vol. 2. For his memorials to the Emperor, see
HHStA, StA England, Kart. 1. For his letters to Prince Rupert, see BL, Add. Mss. 18827, ff. 15-6. Later
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Taylor's final mission at the Imperial court was fraught with difficulties. His relations with
Hyde were strained. In fact, shortly after Taylor's appointment, the two had a falling out over what
Hyde perceived as Taylor's blatant promotion of a friend, Sir John Henderson, for diplomatic
employment. Hyde wrote Taylor a letter of rebuke and was incensed even further by the latter's
purported indiscretion in showing Henderson the letter.*2 Taylor was so disgusted by the whole
affair that for a time he dropped all correspondence with Hyde. Hyde, equally disgusted, wrote to
Nicholas that he was glad that Henry Wilmot, Lord Rochester, would be sent as ambassador to the
Emperor and Diet, because he was "sure a wise man is wanting there; for Taylor is the most absolute
fool I ever heard of."u While complaining acidly of Taylor's indiscretion and his long silences,
Hyde apparently still recognized the value ofhis loyal service; he wrote to Rochester that Taylor has
"much affection, zeal and integrity to the cause, . . . [which] is recompense for many infinnities,
which it may be he can no more mend, than he can the color of his eyes or hair."*4
Hyde explained Taylor's effectiveness in this role to William Curtius: "Mr. Taylor's credit may be great
with Catholic princes, but his temper is not so proper to deal with those of our religion. In intercourse
with Catholic princes, the style current in their courts must be used, seasonably and secretly, in
mentioning the Pope." (CCSP, vol. 2, 174: 7 Feb. 1653," Hyde to Curtius). The Emperor continued to
defray Taylor's costs by 600 florins (400 thalers, or « £82) a year during the time he was accredited as
resident agent (HKA, HZAB 99 [1653], f. 378; ibid., HZAB 100 [1654], f. 394; ibid., HZAB 101 [1655],
f. 327).
*2Taylor apparently claimed that Henderson was drunk when he saw the letter (CCSP, vol. 2,
214: 13 June 1653," Hyde to B. Belling, Secretary to Lord Rochester, English ambassador to the German
Princes and Imperial Diet).
"CSP, vol. 3, 12 1: 30 Nov. 1652," Hyde to Nicholas. This though he was not fond of Rochester
and initially opposed his appointment (CCSP, vol. 2, 156: 22 Nov. 1652," Hyde to Nicholas; ibid., 162: 10
Oct. 1653," same to same; ibid., 262: 10 Oct. 1653," same to same). At this point Rochester was still Lord
Wi Imot, but soon thereafter—before he left for the Diet—he was created Earl of Rochester (CCSP, vol. 2,
163: [21 Dec.] 1652," Preamble of the patent creating Wilmot Earl of Rochester).
MBodl. Lib., Clar. Mss. 45, f. 192: 28 Mar. 1653," Hyde to Rochester.
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Rochester was sent as ambassador to the Emperor, German princes, and Imperial Diet in late
1652 to persuade them to support Charles H's cause both morally and financially. He was to consult
with both Taylor and Sir William Curtius, the resident agent at Frarikfurt.*5 Taylor soon met
Rochester in Regensburg, where the Diet convened in 1653 and 1654, but he delayed presenting his
credentials, perhaps because of his feud with Hyde and the King's failure to pay for his expenses.*6
Taylor, however, did work with Rochester to convince the Emperor and princes to contribute to the
King's relief. With the assistance of the elector of Mainz, they succeeded in securing promises of
financial assistance for his cause — a sum voted by the Diet plus a donation of 1 00,000 thalers by the
Emperor." However, this contribution was dependent upon the actual collection of the four
subsidies (Romermonate) that had been promised.
This difficult task was divided among the King's agents in Germany — Rochester, Colonel
William Gunn, Sir Henry dc Vic, Curtius, and Taylor — with each assigned a collection quota.
Taylor was charged with collecting the promised money in the Austrian and Bavarian circle,
KCCSP, vol. 2, 162: 2 1 Dec. 1652,' Rochester's commission as envoy to the German princes and
Diet; ibid., 163: 21 Dec. 1652," Rochester to Ferdinand III; ibid., 166: [Dec.] 1652, Instructions for
Rochester. It was rumored that after a few drinks, Rochester was not above publicly protesting against the
House of Austria's carriage towards Charles I. On one such occasion, Taylor purportedly attempted to
"divert the discourse, but the other [Rochester] took his advertisement so ill that they were like to have
fallen by the ears yester." (Nicholas, vol. 2, 6: 5 Mar. 1653,' Extract of a letter from Vren). Rochester,
however, denied such behavior (CCSP, vol. 2, 190: 4 Apr. 1653," Hyde to Nicholas; ibid., 248: 5 Sept.
1653," same to Rochester, ibid., 261-2: 10 Oct. 1653,' same to Nicholas).
"CCSP, vol. 2, 158: 30 Nov. 1652," Hyde to Taylor, ibid., 164: 24 Dec. 1652," Charles II to
same; ibid., 169: 4 Jan. 1653," Hyde to same; ibid., 174: 7 Feb. 1653," same to same.
"Ibid., 341: 24 Apr. 1654," Hyde to Richard Clement (alias of Hyde's correspondent at Rome);
ibid., 349: 5 May 1654," Official notification for Rochester, ibid., 354: 18 May 1654, Ferdinand m to
Rochester.
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including the Emperor's 100,000 thalers.** Apparently Taylor had doubts that the Emperor would
pay, and he suggested to Hyde that he instead go to Rome to convince the Pope to support Charles's
cause. However Hyde disagreed: "[I] cannot believe mat when the Emperor sent his Great Seal for
the payment of 100,000 rix-dollars to the King, he intended that he should have nothing for it but
the wax."*9 He ordered Taylor to remain in Vienna lest the Emperor might believe himselfabsolved
from his promise.*0 According to Clarendon, neither the Emperor nor even princes such as the
Elector Palatine or the Landgrave ofHesse-Kassel paid their share. In all, the sum the King received
amounted to less than £10,000, and most of this was spent on Rochester's negotiations."
John Taylor therefore continued in his discouraging task.92 He carried out his diplomatic
duties at the Imperial court, the last ofhis career, up until his death in late 16S5.93 We can only hope
that his brother Francis provided him with solace in his last days.94
Thurloe, vol. 2, 469: 28 July 1654, Henderson to Richard Bradshaw, English resident at
Hamburg; CCSP, vol. 2, 441: [1654], Papers relating to the German Diet
"Ibid., 381: 8 July 1654," Hyde to Taylor.
9°Hyde also pointed out that any negotiation undertaken at Rome would have to be conducted
secretly, and certainly not by a known agent like Taylor (ibid.).
"Clarendon, vol. 2, 349-50.
9Jln December 1654, six months after his departure from Regensburg, he wrote to Prince Rupert
"As for our business, I get nothing (as yet) but empty promises for the King being put on the Romer
months, your Highness will know the uncertainty of them, especially as there are such factions amongst
the German Princes." (BL, Add. Mss. 18827, f. 15: 16 Dec. 1654, Taylor to Prince Rupert).
93In October or more likely November (Thurloe, vol. 4, 103: 2 Nov. 1655, [Manning] to
[Thurloe]; ibid., 169: 17 Nov. 1655, same to same).
"Prince Rupert was sent to negotiate with the Emperor in Taylor's place, and Francis Taylor
continued to correspond with the English court-in-exile (ibid.; BL, Egerton 2536, f. 80: 12 Apr. 1656,
Francis Taylor to Nicholas).
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As we will see, Taylor's background and experiences influenced his conduct of the
negotiations with the Emperor in the 1630s. He was convinced that the best route to the restoration
of the Palatinate was via Vienna and Madrid, and throughout most of his diplomatic career, he
remained a strong proponent of a pro-Habsburg foreign policy. The connections of his family
members with Habsburg courts and diplomacy surely reinforced the desirability in his mind of close
cooperation between England and the Habsburg states. Also, bis Catholicism and education in
Flanders likely supported his positive inclination towards the Habsburgs. Taylor so ardently wished
that some accommodation may be found between the Habsburgs and England on the Palatinate
question that he was willing to minimize the obstacles and exaggerate the possibilities for an
agreement, both in his own mind and in his dispatches home. For all these reasons, Taylor was
suspect to many Protestants. Despite his optimism, however, Taylor conducted his negotiations in
what he considered to be the best interests of crown and country.
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Thomas Howard, 2nd Earl of Arundel (1585—1646)
Background and Education
Charles I's ambassador extraordinary to the Emperor in 1636, Thomas Howard, 2nd Earl ofArundel,
came from one of the most influential noble houses in Tudor England.1 The Dukedom of Norfolk
had been hereditary in the Howard family since 1483, when King Richard III bestowed it upon Lord
John Howard, an ardent supporter of the House of York. From this time, the Howard dukes filled
various important political posts, among them the offices of Lord Chancellor, Lord Treasurer, and
Earl Marshal. The latter post, in fact, practically became hereditary in the Howard family over the
course of the sixteenth century.
Howard fortunes rose and fell with surprising regularity during the Tudor period. While rich
and powerful (or perhaps because they were), they proved an ill-fated bunch. In the first half of the
century, several members of the family ended their lives on Henry VTE's scaffold, including his
wives Anne Boleyn and Katherine Howard as well as the "Poet" Earl ofSurrey, renaissance man and
heir of the 3rd Duke ofNorfolk. The first three Dukes and the Poet Earl were all attainted.2 Despite
1See fig. 2.
2John Howard, 1st Duke of Norfolk, was killed fighting on the side of Richard III at the Battle of
Bosworth (14SS). Henry VII attainted both the 1st Duke (posthumously) and his heir Thomas Howard,
2nd Duke of Norfolk. However, shortly before his death in 1509, Henry restored him in property. The
new king, Henry VIII, restored the 2nd Duke in title after he led the English to a glorious victory against
the Scots at the Battle of Flodden (1513). According to legend, the "Flodden" Duke personally slew King
James IV of Scotland in combat. Thomas Howard, 3rd Duke of Norfolk, was the scheming uncle of the
duo of beheaded queens Anne Boleyn and Katherine Howard; he was also instrumental in the downfall of
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these periodic falls from grace, however, the negative effects of Che attainders were reversed time
and again by the loyal service the Howard family rendered to the crown.
In spite ofthe fall ofhis father the Poet Earl ofSurrey, Thomas Howard, 4th Duke ofNorfolk
held a pre-eminent position at court. When he assumed his titles Ln 1554, he was the sole duke and
greatest magnate in England. However, he ensured his own downfall when he attempted to court
Mary Queen of Scots, Queen Elizabeth's Catholic rival. Through bus association with Mary, he was
soon implicated in the Ridolfi Plot, an international Catholic scheme to dethrone Elizabeth and
replace her with Mary, thus restoring England to the papal fold. The 4th Duke, though his
involvement in the plot was obscure and he was likely framed by his political enemies, was found
guilty of treason, attainted, and finally executed in 1572:3
[in] Courting her [Mary's] love, he lost his Mistress Queert Elizabeth, who spilt that
bloud then called amorous, rather than traiterous, that he intended to make Royal,
and to prevent a Marriage between hira and the Queen of Scots, divorced his Head
from his Body, making him contented to lie in his Ancestors cold Grave, for aspiring
to a Queens warm Bed.4
The 4th Duke's punishment marks the beginning of the most severe and long-lasting of the
Howard falls from grace, which was completed by his son, Philip Howard, 1st Earl of Arundel of
Henry VIU's favorites Cardinal Wolsey and Thomas Cromwell. The 3rd Duke was himself imprisoned
and attainted in 1547 after his conservative faction lost the power struggle over the protectorship of the
young Edward VI to the Protestant faction. Only saved from execution. by Henry's death, he remained in
the Tower during Edward's reign, only to have his attainder reversed by Mary I in 1553. The 3rd Duke's
heir, the Poet Earl of Surrey (so called because he introduced the sonnet to England), was condemned on
the charge of quartering royal arms.
3Walker, 63-6; John Martin Robinson, The Dukes ofNorfolk: A Quincentennial History (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1982), 63-6.
'Lloyd, 284.
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the new line.' Although the latter began his public life as a charmingly wanton courtier and favorite
of Queen Elizabeth and he had been brought up a Protestant,6 he was reformed under the influence
of the Jesuit Edmund Campion into a pious Catholic. Because of his new-found interest in
Catholicism, Arundel began to drift toward the cause of Mary Queen of Scots, the one person he
should have avoided in light of his father's experience. In any case, his timing could not have been
more unfortunate: Elizabeth was moving into the most active phase of her war on Catholicism as
she had become convinced that the old faith posed the greatest threat to the religious settlement upon
which her rule was founded. The mere rumor, therefore, of Arundel's association with the
Throckmorton Plot — another of the numerous Catholic plots to replace Elizabeth with Mary — was
all the reason she needed to place him under house arrest. Arundel, who decided that the freedom
to practice his religion was dearer to him than his country, attempted to flee from England by boat
but was caught offshore and subsequently committed to the Tower in 1585. During his
imprisonment, he was accused ofpraying for the victory of the Spanish Armada. For this treasonous
offense he was attainted and condemned to death. Although the death sentence was never carried
out, Arundel died a martyr to his faith in the Tower in 1595 ? With his own attainder, he lost all the
5His mother Lady Mary FitzAlan was the heiress of Henry, the last earl of the FitzAlan line (see
fig. 2).
6A godson of Philip II, Philip Howard was brought up as a Protestant with John Foxe as his tutor.
After the 4th Duke's execution, Lord Burgh ley became his guardian.
7Robinson, 72-7. Philip Howard and his relatives played a significant rote in the first stage of the
English Counter Reformation. He was canonized in 1970 by Pope Paul VI as one of the Forty Martyrs of
England and Wales, only seven of whom were lay Catholics (Encyclopaedia Britannica Online, "Forty
Martyrs of England and Wales," http://www.eb.com: 180, accessed 12 Sept. 2000). Philip Howard's
remains lie in Arundel Cathedral, Arundel, Sussex.
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lands, titles, and incomes that he had been allowed to retain after his father's attainder, namely those
of his maternal grandfather, the last FitzAlan earl of Arundel. Howard fortunes had hit their nadir.
Philip Howard never saw his son Thomas, who was born in 1585 at the parsonage of
Finchingfield in Essex, shortly after his father's incarceration in the Tower. When young Thomas
made his appearance in this world, his future prospects looked anything but promising: his
grandfather had been executed for treason, his father was imprisoned in the Tower, his family estates
and possessions were confiscated, and all of their titles were in abeyance save the courtesy title of
Lord Maltravers. Thomas's early years were therefore quite grim. He was brought up in the latter
years ofElizabeth's reign in relative poverty and obscurity by his austere and pious Catholic mother,
Anne Dacre, the eldest daughter of Lord Dacre of Gillesland. She educated her son at home to the
"strictest observances of Catholic orthodoxy,"* though once he was older, he may have taken
daytime instruction at the Westminster School.9
After he had received adequate preparatory training, Thomas, like so many of the sons ofthe
English nobility and gentry during this time, may have enrolled in university. He was admitted to
the degree of Master of Arts in 1605 at Cambridge, but it is more likely that it was conferred as an
honorary degree rather than earned.10 The questionable Lloyd places him at Trinity College, but
*Anne Dacre was a zealous protector of the Jesuits in England but was without political motives.
She was also the founder of the Jesuit College in Ghent (Hervey, 10, 15).
9Lloyd, who is a dubious source at best, claims that Thomas attended the Westminster School and
St. Omers. Whether he actually attended either is highly questionable. There is no list preserved for the
former institution before 1763 (Hervey, 15), and I have found no indication that he did attend that cannot
be traced back to Lloyd. Also, his name is not among the student lists of St. Omers.
10John Venn and J. A. Venn, comps., The Book ofMatriculations and Degrees: A Catalogue of
Those Who Have Been Matriculated or Been Admitted to Any Degree in the University of Cambridge
from 1544 to 1659 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1913), 363; idem, Alumni Cantabrigienses:
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Arundel is not recorded in its register." Given his penchant for family tradition, Arundel would
have most likely attended St. John's, the Howard college ofchoice. However it was improbable that
he was enrolled there, since in bis own words he wished that his Cambridge-bound son "should be
of St. John's College, where my father and uncles were scholars," omitting to mention himself.12
Further, there is no evidence that he had previously taken a Bachelor ofArts. However, ifhe indeed
did earn his master's degree, he would have been very proficient in Latin and classical studies and
schooled in the art ofdisputation, since the Elizabethan statutes at Cambridge provided for the study
of all the arts and the three philosophies by the end of the master's course.13
Whether he was Cambridge-educated or not, Arundel's language skills were well-honed, for
a contemporary who knew Arundel well noted that he "understood the Latin tongue very well, and
A Biographical List ofAll Known Students, Graduates, and Holders ofOffice at the University of
Cambridge, from the Earliest Times to 1900 (Cambridge: University Press, 1922-54), pt. 1, vol. 2, 416.
"These lists, however, are by no means complete.
12David Howarth, Lord Arundel and His Circle (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), 122.
Arundel's father and two of his paternal uncles (Thomas, Earl of Suffolk, and Lord William Howard of
Naworth Castle), his two surviving sons (Henry Frederick, Lord Maltravers, and William, Viscount
Stafford), and three of his five grandsons (Henry Frederick's three eldest sons Thomas, the 5th Duke,
Henry, the 6th Duke, and Philip, Cardinal Norfolk) received degrees from St. John's (Venn, Alumni
Cantabrigienses, 415-7; Lawrence Stone, The Crisis of the Aristocracy, 1558-1641 [Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1965], 689).
"in the four years leading up to the bachelor's degree, an undergraduate would study rhetoric in
his Fust year, logic in his second and third year, and philosophy in his fourth year, if a Trinity student, he
studied grammar as well. In addition to the completion of his course of lectures, he was required to
complete a course of academic disputations and pass an oral examination by the proctors and regent
masters of the arts before he would be admitted to the degree of bachelor of arts. After the bachelor's
degree, an additional three years of study would be required to attain a master's. During this time, the
bachelor would continue with his disputation exercises and his study of philosophy (conceivably
progressing from moral philosophy on to natural philosophy and metaphysics), and added the disciplines
of astronomy, drawing, and Greek (Mark H. Curtis, Oxford and Cambridge in Transition, 1558-1642: An
Essay on Changing Relations between the English Universities and English Society [Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1959], 87-92).
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was master of the Italian."14 Therefore, in addition to the Latin training he would have received at
Cambridge and most certainly received in his earlier education, Arundel acquired a thorough
command of Italian. Whether his training in Italian was formal or informal is not known.1' He
certainly had the opportunity to hone his skills during his many trips to the Italian peninsula over
the years, the first being in 16 12. The education of his youth and his trips to Italy almost surely laid
the foundation for his later interest in art and classical scholarship, and thus for his marked favor of
such scholars and antiquaries as Sir Robert Cotton, Sir Henry Spelman, and John Selden and artists
as Anthony Van Dyck, Wenceslaus Hollar, and Francois Dieussart. All of these skills and interests
indicate that he was well prepared to discuss a variety ofacademic and artistic subjects with educated
peers, a great advantage in practicing the art of diplomacy. Before turning to a discussion of
Arundel's religious tendencies and political career, it is useful to first assess his character, which
influenced both the public and private aspects of his life, including his conduct of the negotiations
with the Emperor.
Character
[H]e was of a stately Presence and Gate, so that any Man that saw him. though in never
so ordinary Habit, could not but conclude him to be a great Person, his Garb and
Fashion drawing more Observation than did the rich Apparel of others; so that it was
a common Saying of the late Earl of Carlisle, Here comes the Earl ofArundel in his
plain Stuff and trunk Hose, and his Beard in his Teeth, that looks more like a Noble
Man than any of us.
Sir Edward Walker, Historical Discourses
14Walker, 221.
"Italian was among the the extra-statutory modem languages offered at Cambridge in the early
seventeenth century (Curtis, 139-41).
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Once grown, Arundel was widely considered to be a man of strong character and solid virtues:
honor, loyalty, and pride were his most evident qualities. Authors who dedicated books to him
stressed his solid virtues in contrast to the apparent frivolity of the early Stuart court. His
contemporary, Sir Edward Walker, praised his honesty and integrity, promotion of the traditional
values oforder and sobriety in public life, and unwavering support of the interests of the crown and
ruling elite. M. A. Tiemey, quoting Walker, describes him and his many positive qualities:
The zealous "assertor of the splendour and greatness of the crown," as well as of "the
ancient honour of the nobility and gentry," he was . . . not less respectful in his
carriage towards the sovereign, than rigid in his demands of deference from his
inferiors. In council he was bold, honest, and uncompromising; in action he was
firm, dignified, and prudent. Unconnected with party of any kind, his merits were
his only passport to his various employments ... his kindness and hospitality were
universal; his friendships were few but sincere.16
Arundel was preoccupied with order and formality and displayed a gravity of bearing; he was a
personification the classical virtues of dignitas and gravitas (see fig. 3). 17 Even Edward Hyde, later
Earl of Clarendon, who was a personal and political enemy ofArundel, could not completely ignore
the noble aura he exuded:"
l6Tiemey, vol. 3, 485-6.
"Kevin Sharpe, "The Earl of Arundel, His Circle and the Opposition to the Duke of Buckingham,
1618-1 628," chap. in Politics and Ideas in Early Stuart England: Essays and Studies (London: Pinter,
1989), 204-5; Robinson, 108.
"There are several reasons Clarendon had a strong prejudice against Arundel. Clarendon, whose
uncle Sir Nicholas Hyde was Buckingham's lawyer, disliked Arundel because of the tatter's opposition to
the Duke. Also, as Earl Marshal, Arundel won a power struggle with Clarendon's uncle in a jurisdictional
dispute between Earl Marshal's court and the King's bench. Clarendon obviously did not forget this loss,
for during the Short Parliament of 1640 he led the attack on the jurisdiction of the Earl Marshal's court
(Esther S. Cope and Willson H. Coates, eds., Proceedings of the Short Parliament of 1640, Camden
Fourth Series, vol. 19 [London: Royal Historical Society, 1977], 260-2; Sir Thomas Aston, 77ie Short
Parliament Diary ofSir Thomas Aston, ed. Judith D. Maltby, Camden Fourth Series, vol. 35 [London:
Royal Historical Society, 1988], 12). When he later wrote his history of the rebellion, "he still
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3 Thomas Howard, 2nd Earl of Arundel (1629/30), Engraving after Peter Paul
Rubens
While he was in England negotiating the preliminaries for peace between Spain and England,
Rubens drew studies that resulted in a stunning three-quarter length portrait of Arundel, after
which this engraving is patterned. The painting, which shows Arundel standing in front of a
wine-colored curtain dressed in glowing armor, successfully conveys the romantic image of a
great noble. Today it hangs in the Isabella Stewart Gardner Museum in Boston.
From Birch, Portraits ofIllustrious Personages, vol. 3 (London, s.d.).
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It cannot be denied that he had in his person, in his aspect, and countenance, the
appearance ofa great man, which he preserved in his gait and motion. He wore and
affected a habit very different from that of the time, such as men had only beheld in
the pictures of the most considerable men; all which drew the eyes of most, and the
reverence of many, towards him, as the image and representative of the primitive
nobility, and native gravity of the nobles, when they had been most venerable."
Although Arundel was dedicated to upholding the interests of the old aristocracy, a sense of fair play
was inherent in his character.20 He also possessed a keen sense ofantiquity and history, particularly
as related to his own family background. The first was expressed in his interest in antiquities,
particularly classical, and in his patronage of classical scholars. The second is clearly seen in his
remembered with feeling the days when as Mr. Edward Hyde he was at cross purposes with this Earl of
ancient lineage." (D. N. Smith, Characters from the Histories and Memoirs of the Seventeenth Century
[Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1920]; quoted in Sharpe, "Earl of Arundel," 183). A final explanation for
Clarendon's hostility is that he suspected the Earl of being an atheist (Richard Ollard, Clarendon and His
Friends [London: Hamish Hamilton, 1987], 329).
"Edward Hyde, Earl of Clarendon, The History of the Rebellion and Civil Wars in England, ed.
W. Dunn Macray (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888; reprint, London: Oxford University Press, 1958), vol.
I, 70. A bevy of likenesses of Arundel exist because he was a avid patron of the arts. A sampling
includes: individual likenesses such as portraits by Rubens (Isabella Stewart Gardner Museum, Boston
[see fig. 3]; the National Gallery and the National Portrait Gallery, London; Ashmolean Museum,
Oxford), and by Mytens (Arundel Castle, Sussex), a bust by Franfois Dieussart (Ashmolean), and
etchings by Wenceslaus Hollar (Ashmolean; the Fitzwilliam Museum, Cambridge); and likenesses with
others such as portraits with his grandson Thomas, later 5th Duke ofNorfolk, and with his wife Alethea
Talbot by Van Dyck (Arundel Castle; J. Paul Getty Museum, Malibu), and a portrait with his wife,
grandchildren, and a dwarf by Philip Fruytiers (Arundel Castle).
MHis regard for justice extended to his inferiors as well as his peers, as evidenced in his letter to
Sir Edward Dering respecting the continued imprisonment of Francis Jenifer at Canterbury, whom he had
ordered to be set at liberty: "Sir Edward Deering. At your last being here you may remember that upon
complaint made of the imprisonment of Francis Jenifer at Canterbury you were ordered to take some
course for his speedy enlargment, which was promised should accordingly be done. But being informed
that the poore man rcmaincs yet in durance, and the cause of his comittment being so slender as was
represented, (onely for killing hauks meate) I cannot but once more require you to set the man forthwith
at libertie, or to send me some reason for this his detention thus long, contrary to your owne promise. I
shall expect to heare your instant answere." (BL, Stowe Manuscripts 743, ff. 118-9: 23 MarJl Apr. 1635,
Arundel to Dering).
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interest in family history. He was instrumental in developing the Howard "cult of the past" that has
been strongly characteristic of his family ever since.21
Clarendon's unflattering assessment ofArundel is considered by many modern historians to
be to be spiteful and unfair.22 Clarendon dismisses him, for all things, as a collector.23 There was,
however, some basis in truth for his criticisms. Arundel had a reserved and retiring nature that was
at times misinterpreted as arrogance. Clarendon scathingly wrote:
He was a man supercilious and proud, who lived always within himself, and to
himself, conversing little with any who were in common conversation .... He
resorted sometimes to the Court, because there was only a greater man than himself;
and went thither the seldomer, because there was a greater man than himself. He
lived toward all favourites and great officers without any kind of condescension; and
rather suffered himself to be ill treated by their power and authority . . . than to
descend in making any application to them.2.1
Of course it must be remembered that Arundel and Clarendon were not on good terms, and Arundel
was only one of many who fell prey to Clarendon's acid pen.
More disturbing than Arundel's aloofness was his penchant to take immediate offense at any
perceived slight to his honor or that of his family. In one incident, he took an oversight by the Lord
Mayor of Chester as a personal affront:
2lRobinson, 79. A provision in his will shows how important family history was to him: "I desire
great care to bee had for Collecting all the Materialls for an History to bee written of my Noble
Auncestors whereby their good memory may bee preserved, and those that shall succecde may bee
invited to bee virtuous, or at least ashamed to bee vitious." (Hervey, 46 1).
—R. W. Harris, Clarendon and the English Revolution (London: Chatto & Windus; Hogarth
Press, 1983), 27.
"Clarendon, vol. I, 69-70.
24Ibid., 69.
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In 1634, the Earl ofArundel, Earl Marshal, came to Chester, and not finding ... the
mayor ... in attendance, sent for him by warrant The mayor attended with all the
insignia of office, when the Earl said, "Mr. Mayor, I sent for you to tell you your
offence you have committed, in not giving your attendance as you ought, and now
do you come with your authority." The Earl then plucked the rodfrom the mayor's
hand, and put it in the window, saying, " I will teach you to know yourself, and attend
peers of the realm. Though I care not for your observances, yet, because you want
manners, I shall teach you some, and you shall further hear from me: I would have
you know, I have power to commit you, to teach you to know yourself and me, and
give better attendance.15
In another instance, he refused a barony and absented himself from court because he was mortified
at a rumor that he had bought a barony, even though, as the center of royal patronage, it was the only
place to rebuild his family fortunes:
The fear which he had to be thought to buy a barony has been the special cause why
he has this long absented [himself] from Court, it may be he stands on too nice [a]
point of reputation Though he knows that to strive for precedency has ever been
thought a womanish ambition, yet doubting lest the ghosts of the Dukes ofNorfolk,
from who he is descended, and of King Edward the Fourth's Queen, his great
grandmother (whom he knows the King himself would somewhat respect) might
chide him for giving place to such as can hardly prove themselves gentlemen, he
thought fit so far to urge their right as to crave either a convenient place, or no
barony.26
Even worse than an insult to Arundel's own reputation was one to that ofhis family. These
he was particularly keen to avenge. This is clear in a verbal altercation he had with Lord Spencer
in 1621 that resulted in Arundel's commitment to the Tower, when the Lords were discussing
whether Sir Henry Yelverton should be given a hearing after his speech in the Commons against
3SCorporation Book of Chester, quoted in Tierney, vol. 3, 442.
26HMC, Salisbury (Cecil) XV, 190-1 : 14/24 July 1603, Arundel to Robert, Lord Cecil. In 1495 the
3rd Duke, Arundel's great-great grandfather, married Anne Plantagenet, daughter of Edward IV and
Elizabeth Woodville and sister of Henry Vll's Queen, Elizabeth of York. Their issue, however, died in
infancy. Arundel is descended from Henry Howard, Earl of Surrey, who was the son of the 3rd Duke and
his second wife, Lady Elizabeth Stafford (see fig. 2).
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Buckingham's promotion of monopolies. At this time an ally of the Duke, Arundel strongly
supported Yelverton's censure by the Lords without a hearing. Lord Spencer pointed out to Arundel
that some of the latter's own ancestors had been condemned as traitors without a hearing, Arundel
vehemently flung back that his ancestors had -suffered "and it may be for doinge the Kings and
country good service, and in such times as perhapps the Lord's auncestors that spake last kept
sheep."27 Arundel was asked three times to apologize to Spencer for the affront, which the former
adamantly refused and thus was sent to the Tower, where he was "very much visited and courted,
by the Lord of Buckingam and all the Grandes of that side."2* His hasty temper in matters of family
honor did not serve to boost his popularity at court.
Family pride also motivated Arundel's overriding ambition to re-establish the position of the
senior branch of the Howard family through a fvall restoration of the titles, possessions, and standing
that his ancestors had enjoyed:
His ambition developed out of his ancestor worship and family pride. His ancestors
had been distinguished for their role in the affairs of the State and in their patronage
of scholarship and the arts. He intended to renew that pattern in his own life; he was
therefore consciously following family "tradition in almost everything he did.29
If successful in his program of restoration, the senior Howard line would occupy a place second in
wealth and status only to the royal family. Arundel pursued this goal relentlessly throughout his life,
and despite periodic setbacks, he was surprising Jy successful. As we will see, he managed to regain
27Robinson, 102.
"Chamberlain, vol. 2, 374-5: 19 May 162 L John Chamberlain to Sir Dudley Carleton; Wallace
Notestein, Frances Helen Relf, and Hartley Simpson, eds., Commons Debates, 162 I (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1935), vol. 5, 204, 380, vol. 6, 39-5, 403-4.
"Robinson, 99.
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many of the lost estates and titles, play an important role in English political and diplomatic affairs,
and make a name for himself as the foremost patron of the arts in England. In the end, only the
restoration of the dukedom ofNorfolk eluded him
Early Career under James I
At the first opportunity Arundel launched a crusade to re-establish his political position as the head
of the Howard family. After the death of Queen Elizabeth, he was quick to present himself at the
court of the new king, James I. However, ifArundel hoped for immediate benefits as compensation
for his family's loyalty to Mary Queen of Scots, the King's mother, he was sorely disappointed.
Raising the specter of his mother was the last thing that James wanted to do in the early years ofhis
reign, when he was attempting to gain the confidence of his English subjects. Arundel did indeed
benefit from renewed royal favor, but it was slow in coming.
Perhaps Arundel's prospects would have improved more quickly if members of the cadet
branches of the Howard family had been less eager to profit from their younger relative's
misfortunes. They were just as quick to present themselves to the new king, and — led by Arundel's
cousin Lord Howard of Effingham, his uncle the Earl of Suffolk, and his great uncle the Earl of
Northampton — they advanced rapidly at court. The Howards were so successful in their quest for
royal favor that they virtually monopolized court posts and royal patronage after the death of the Earl
of Salisbury: the early part of James's reign is known for the revival of the Howard role in English
political affairs. Once they were ensconced, they "lighted on his [Arundel's] estates to pick the
carcass of any flesh and leave only the bony remains of the ancestral castle at Arundel."30 It was
MHowarth, Lord Arundel, 9.
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hard enough that the 4th Duke's estates, which would have come to Arundel, were divided after his
attainder between the Queen, Arundel's father Philip, and the latter"s half-brother Suffolk, but his
father Philip's estates again had been divided between the Queen and Arundel. When James restored
the bulk of the estates seized by the crown to the family, he did not necessarily return them to
Arundel as the rightful heir, but instead parceled most of them out to his powerful, grasping
relatives.31 Thus the recovery of these properties understandably became one ofhis primary goals.32
He was eventually successful in his crusade to regain them, but only at great expense to himself.
Northampton willed much of his share to Arundel, but he was compelled to purchase that ofSuffolk
and Effingham. The cost was so great that in 1608, Arundel grumbled that he would have been
among the buyers at an art sale "if the Admirall [Lord Howard of Effingham] were not damned for
makinge me pay foure thousand pounde for [Arundel] house."33 Arundel, however, was not entirely
forgotten during the general resurgence of Howard fortunes — in 1604, he regained Arundel Castle
and other lands in Sussex along with the title of earl of Arundel and Surrey.34
In 1606, Arundel strengthened his position immeasurably when he married Alethea Talbot,
daughter and co-heiress of the Earl of Shrewsbury, thus uniting "the two families ofclassic English
3lStone,413.
32Hervey,21-3.
33Lodge, Illustrations, vol. 3, 33 1: 17/27 Nov. 1608, Arundel to the Earl of Shrewsbury. Arundel
House was regranted to Arundel in January 1608.
34See Act of Parliament, 21 Jac. I, 1604. The letters patent restoring him to the titles and
precedence enjoyed by his father, who had been attainted on 14/24 April IS 89, the earldom of Surrey, the
baronies his grandfather had lost by attainder, and various manors and estates were not issued until 1608
(ACA, Thomas [Howard], Earl of Arundel [1585-1646] G 1/87: 22 Nov72 Dec. 1608, Letters patenr,
there is a full-length portrait of James I in the initial letter, and about three-fourths of the Great Seal
remains).
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nobility — Howard and Talbot — in which Catholicism was most prevalent"35 The Talbot family was
no less distinguished than the Howards and enormously wealthy to boot, which was surely not
unattractive to Arundel given his ambitions. It was certainly a match of great advantage for him, as
his wife's inheritance transformed his financial situation making possible the recovery of lands and
position as well as the building ofart collections, a passion the couple shared.36 Although at times
they led lives quite independent ofone another, a sincere bond of affection developed between them
as is evidenced in the proliferation of letters from Arundel to his "deerest harte." The couple had six
35John Bossy, The English Catholic Community, 1570-1850 (London: Darton, Longman & Todd,
1975), ISO.
36Arundel is considered to be the greatest early modern English art collector and patron. He was a
connoisseur of international stature, having collected hundreds of pictures, drawings, prints, books,
manuscripts, antique marbles, and gems. His picture collection had reached nearly 800 pieces by the eve
of the Civil War (Stone, 719). He amassed "the largest and choicest treasure of Greek and Roman
antiquities that was ever possessed by an English subject." His collection of Holbeins was the greatest
ever assembled. Around him he gathered a circle of scholars, heralds, genealogists, painters, engravers,
and sculptors. He was a patron of artists such as Van Dyck, Rubens, Dieussart, and Hollar. For more on
Arundel's activities as a collector and patron, see: David Howarth's thorough study, Lord Arundel and His
Circle, as well as idem, "Lord Arundel as an Entrepreneur of the Arts," Burlington Magazine 122 (Oct.
1980): 690-2. A recent issue of the international art magazine Apollo (Aug. 1996) is devoted entirely to
Arundel and his collections. A beautifully illustrated volume by Christopher White, Anthony van Dyck:
Thomas Howard. The Earl ofArundel, Getty Museum Studies on Art (Malibu: Getty Museum, 199S)
focuses on the relationship between Arundel and Van Dyck. For specific aspects of Arundel's collecting,
see: Denys Haynes, "The Arundel Marbles: The Formation and Dispersal of the First Great Collection of
Classical Sculpture in England," Archeology 21 (Apr. 1968): 85-91, 206-1 1; Graham Parry, "Thomas
Howard, Earl of Arundel," chap. in 77re Golden Age Restor'd: The Culture ofthe Stuart Court. 1603-42
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981); John Peacock, "Inigo Jones and the Arundel Marbles," Journal of
Medieval and Renaissance Studies 16, no. 1 (1986): 75-90; Dcnys Sutton, "Thomas Howard, Earl of
Arundel and Surrey as a Collector of Drawings," Burlington Magazine 89 (Jan.-Mar. 1947): 2-9, 32-4,
75-7; Francis Taylor, "The Father of Virtu in England," chap. in Taste ofAngels: A History ofArt
Collecting from Rameses to Napoleon (Boston: Little, Brown, 1948); Patronage and Collecting in the
Seventeenth Century: Thomas Howard. Earl ofArundel, The Ashmolean Museum Nov. 1985-Jan. 1986
(Oxford: Ashmolean Museum, 1985). BL, Add. Mss. 15970 includes many letters from Arundel to the
Reverend William Petty, his art agent; a list of them is printed in Springell, app. II.
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children, ofwhom only two — Henry Frederick, Lord Maltravers, who succeeded his father as Lord
Arundel, and William, Lord Stafford — survived their parents.
Throughout James' reign, Arundel made gradual progress towards attaining what he
considered to be his rightful place in public life. He and his wife took an active role in court life,
participating in masques and jousts. They also had a good relationship with the royal family.
During these early years, Arundel became an intimate friend of Henry Frederick, Prince of Wales,
with whom he shared a passion for art, books, and collecting.37 In 1607, the King stood as godfather
to the Arundels' eldest son, his namesake James.3* As a further mark of royal favor Arundel was
created a Knight of the Garter in 16 1 1 .3* By the following year he had improved his position to the
point that the Venetian ambassador reported:
[Arundel is] the premier Earl of this Kingdom, in which there are no Dukes save the
King's sons . . . nor Marquises save Winchester who does not come to Court.
Arundel will be, through his wife, . . . heir to sixty thousand crowns a year, he is
nephew of Northampton who has no children and is very powerful in the
government.40
Arundel used his position as premier earl of the realm to become ever more involved in
public life, but in 16 12, threatened by consumption, he was obliged to leave court to take the waters.
During his travels, he visited the Low Countries, France, and Italy. Much to his grief, Prince Henry
died tragically during his absence. The death ofhis royal friend did not, however, impede his rise.
37Arundel's son Henry Frederick was named after the Prince of Wales.
"James, Lord Maltravers, died in 1624 of smallpox at Ghent; Henry Frederick then became
Arundel's heir.
"Chamberlain, vol. I, 245-6: 20/30 July 1607, Chamberlain to Carleton.
40CSPy 1610-3, 438: 26 Oct. 1612, Antonio Foscarini to D&S.
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Alter his return to England in 1613, be carried the sword of state at the wedding of the Princess
Elizabeth and Frederick V, and he and his wife were among the principal members of the retinue
chosen to escort her to her new home in Heidelberg. After fulfilling his duties there, he proceeded
on to Italy, where he traveled extensively with Inigo Jones. Arundel further cultivated his taste for
the arts during his Italian sojourn, and then returned to England in 1614.41
In Arundel's political career, 1616 was an auspicious year. In July, his public position was
confirmed with his appointment to the privy council. Then, six months later, he publicly conformed
to the Anglican Church by taking communion in the King's Chapel on Christmas Day.42 This act
removed the final barrier standing in the way ofhis continued advancement. By the following year,
Arundel was well enough established in the King's counsels for figures such as Sir Dudley Carleton
and Sir Horace Vere to seek his patronage.43
In the final years ofJames's reign, Arundel continued to make progress toward the restoration
of the position of power his ancestors had enjoyed. In 1618, when Suffolk was deprived of his
offices in the wake of the Overbury murder, Arundel was not implicated and was able to continue
his political and social advance unaffected. In this case, the coolness between the senior and cadet
branches of the family actually worked to his advantage.44 In 1621, Arundel was permanently
4lFor Arundel's Italian jaunt, see David Howarth, "Setting a Style of Patronage: Lord Arundel and
Inigo Jones in Italy," Country Life 157 (24 Apr.-l May 1975): 1052-4, 1 138-40.
42Chamberlain, vol. 2, 18: 20 July 1616," Chamberlain to Carleton; ibid., 47: 4 Jan. 1617,' same
to same.
43ACA AL 1617-32, no. 224: 3 Nov. 1617," Carleton to Arundel; ibid., no. 231: 7 July 1618,"
Vere to same.
"Robinson, 101.
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appointed to the office of Earl Marshal, a powerful position that in the sixteenth century was
traditionally vested in the Howard family. This was the greatest mark of the King's esteem to date
and was a major step in the restoration of Howard political power. As Earl Marshal, Arundel also
became one of the senior members of the privy council.45 In the same year that he received this
important appointment, he served as president of the committee of peers that presided over Sir
Francis Bacon's impeachment case. In addition, he held several lord lieutenancies over the years —
Sussex (1608-36), Norfolk (1615), and Northumberland and Cumberland (1633-39).46 These
positions provided their incumbents with great prestige and social power, and their responsibilities
were wide, including the militia, tax collection, and formal and informal mediation between the
center and localities.
By the end of James's reign, therefore, Arundel had become exceptionally influential figure.
He was a powerful landowner, holding vast estates in Sussex, East Anglia, the Midlands, and
Ireland. He also held key positions in government, serving on almost every important commission
and committee. In short, by 1625 Arundel had already come a long way in his quest to rebuild his
family's reputation and fortune.
45The office of Earl Marshal brought great power and status to its incumbent, who was "the head
of the nobility and the custodian of honour." The King allowed Arundel to claim the widest jurisdiction
for this office (ACA, Earl Marshal's Papers, no. 257: 1/1 1 Aug. 1622, Writ establishing jurisdiction of
Earl Marshal). He presided over the court of the Constable and Earl Marshal, which as "a court which,
besides the cognizance of all matters relating to chivalry and deeds of arms, extended its judicial powers
to contracts, slanders, assaults, challenges, and even. ..to appeals of treason," influenced the system of
patronage and thus the well-being of the ruling classes (Tierney, vol. 3, 440-1; Howarth, Lord Arundel,
3). The position only became hereditary in the Howard family in 1672.
46ACA NC G 1/10: 20/30 May 1633, Commission of Lieutenancy to Arundel [et al.] in counties
of Cumberland, Northumberland, and Westmorland; ibid.: 2/12 June 1636, same for county of Sussex.
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Religion
A Church-Papist.. .comes to Church not to seme God, but the King. ..He loves P'opery
well, but is loath to lose by it.
John Earle, Microcosmography
From the moment Arundel took holy communion in the King's Chapel, his true religious identity and
his motivations for publicly adhering to the Anglican Church have been cause for speculation. His
contemporaries as well as modem historians ail have had their own opinions on the subject, naming
the gamut from the claim that he was a genuine convert to Anglicanism to a crypto-Catholic forced
by political circumstances to conceal his true faith to an agnostic. Some of them, directly addres-s the
questions of his true religious leanings as well as his motivations for conforming, but, more often
than not, they discuss one question and not another or merely hint at their conclusions. The aim here
is to present the different arguments and then to address both questions in a comprehensive manner,
integrating the many valid points brought up by previous authors and supporting these conclusions
with new evidence. Ascertaining Arundel's true religious leanings and his motivations for
conforming, as well as how they were perceived by contemporaries at home and abroad, will help
more fully to understand his political and diplomatic career and his 1636 mission to the Emperor.
The opinions of Arundel's contemporaries set forth in works for public consumption give no
clear idea of his religious identity. For instance, embedded among the many barbs directed! at
Arundel in Clarendon's History of the Rebellion, there is one pertaining to his religion, or lack
thereof:
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He was rather thought not to be much concerned for religion than to incline to this
or that party ofany and [he] had no other affection for the nation or the kingdom
than as he had a great share in it, in which, like the great leviathan, he might sport
himself, from which he withdrew himself, as soon as he discerned the repose thereof
was like to be disturbed, and died in Italy, under the same doubtful character of
religion in which he lived*7
Clarendon concluded that because Arundel was indifferent to religion, he had no trouble sacrificing
it to political ambition. The Historical Discourses of Sir Edward Walker, Arundel's personal
secretary during the 1636 embassy, leaves us with the impression that Arundel was a moderate
Christian: "He was in Religion no Bigot or Puritan, and professed more to affect moral Vermes than
nice Questions or Controversies."4* Walker, however, gives no explanation for Arundel's
conversion. Neither does David Lloyd, a Protestant clergyman, but he at least has drawn a
conclusion about Arundel's religion, describing him as a "Church Catholick." Of course none of
these sources are without bias. Clarendon was an old enemy whose remarks about Arundel were
invariably unflattering. Walker on the other hand was Arundel's client, and his biography ofArundel
presents him in a favorable light. And Lloyd, whose work is in any case is often unreliable, was an
Anglican clergyman seeking to honor loyal supporters of the martyred king.
Given the disagreement regarding Arundel's religion and in contemporary works, it comes
as no surprise that historians also hold differing opinions on the subject The first historian really
to address the issue was M. A. Tierney, chaplain to the 1 2th Duke ofNorfolk. Tiemey believes that
Arundel's conformity was motivated by political ambition and hints that he remained a Catholic at
heart: "[Sjeveral of his grandsons are known to have been entrusted to his care; and it is not an inapt
""Clarendon, vol. 1,70-1.
4* Walker, 223.
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illustration of his real sentiments that they were educated Catholics. . . . Dignity and power were
ready to confer their rewards on his conversion."49 However, as pointed out by later historians,
Tierney makes the argument of political ambition on the false assumption that Arundel converted
in December 1615, before his appointment to the privy council; he therefore saw Arundel's
advancement to this important post as the reward for his apostasy." However, the King arguably
would have discussed his conversion with him before appointing him to the council.
Mary F. S. Hervey, Arundel's biographer, stands at the opposite end of the spectrum. Her
account of Arundel's public and private life is generally well-supported. However, on the point of
his religion her analysis — though more thorough than that of her predecessors — is less convincing.
She claims that after Arundel publicly conformed, he became a true convert to Anglicanism.51
Further, she contends that Arundel showed an inclination to Protestantism and willingness to desert
Catholicism in his early years. She sees Arundel's 1614 trip to Italy as the catalyst, as it was during
this trip that he became closely acquainted with the worldly materialism of the Catholic Church. The
Catholic intrigue and abuses that he encountered there were such an affront to Arundel's sense of
integrity, she argues, that he eventually abandoned the old religion: "Lord Arundel's whole being
revolted against th[e] mixture of the spiritual and the material. Political intrigue disguised under the
cloak of religion was abhorrent to his sincere soul."" Therefore, Hervey considers unacceptable
49Tiemey, vol. 3, 429 n. b, 430.
50See the arguments of Mary F. S. Hervey and Godfrey Anstruther below.
51She does not, however, claim that he was a zealot; on the contrary, she specifically points out
that "the minor divergences of doctrine between Catholicism and forms of Protestantism seemed
unimportant to him." (Hervey, 1 17).
"Ibid.
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conduct rather than doctrine to be the main reason Arundel rejected Catholicism, and she deems his
religious conversion as well-considered and sincere. The dire fates suffered by his father and
grandfather as well as the influence of the King may have also played lesser roles. She rejects,
however, the idea that it was an impulsive step motivated by self-interest, as Arundel was appointed
to the privy council months before he received Anglican communion."
There are significant problems with Hervey's interpretation: her analysis is weak and source
material problematic. She bases her assertion that Arundel showed leanings to Protestantism in his
youth in large part upon Lloyd's claims that Arundel was educated at Westminster School and later
at Trinity College and that he at times attended Protestant services. However Lloyd offers absolutely
no authority for these assertions, and I have found no reference to them that cannot be traced back
to him.M Even if Arundel did attend one or both of these institutions, this did not mean that he
would convert to Protestantism. His mother still had control of his education during much of this
time, and plenty of Catholic children, particularly heirs of aristocratic houses, were placed in non-
Catholic schools to receive an education. Also, Catholics were relatively free to attend university
at the time Arundel would have studied at Cambridge. Hervey denies that Arundel's conversion was
out of self-interest on the basis that he was already a privy councillor when he converted and that
he was disgusted with Catholic worldliness. The first, however, assumes that the King had no
foreknowledge that Arundel might conform when he was appointed to the council. The second is
based upon a few critical comments in a time when many loyal Catholics disapproved of abuses.
"Ibid., 112-8.
54Lloyd's Memoires has been characterized as of "slight historical or biographical value.. .wherein
are almost as many errors as lines," and gained its author "not only the character of a most impudent
plagiary, but a false writer and meer scribbler." (DNB, vol. 1 1, 1295).
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She also disregards the fact that most of Arundel's contemporaries considered him to be a secret
Catholic rather than a genuine Protestant.
The Jesuit J. H. Pollen, who published his article on Arundel's religious identity shortly after
Hervey's biography appeared, answers many of her points and makes a convincing case that Arundel
was a crypto-Catholic after his conversion (though curiously he does not state this conclusion very
strongly) and was reconciled to mother Church before he died, all the while castigating his subject
for his faithless lapses.55 He judged Arundel to be a loyal Catholic through early manhood, who out
of loyalty to the King and hopes for further royal favor accommodated himself by degrees to the
times and finally publicly conformed on Christmas Day 1616. He goes so far as to claim that James
made Arundel's promise requisite to his appointment as a privy councillor, a "test" ofhis loyalty,56
though this may be the case, Pollen offers no authority for this assertion.
While Pollen notes that soon after conforming Arundel took certain steps that seem to attest
to his sincerity of his conversion (mainly comments against popery reported by Protestants and the
consecration of his new chapel at Greenwich House by an Anglican bishop), he spends more time
enumerating mitigating factors and drawing Catholic connections throughout Arundel's life. He
points out that the anti-papal utterances may have had something to do with his support of the Oath
of Allegiance, which his openly Catholic wife also supported;57 thus Arundel's desire to show his
S5J. H. Pollen, "Thomas, Earl of Arundel, and His Catholicism, 1585-1646," The Month 138, no.
689 (Nc.v. 1921): 385-98.
56Ibid.,39I.
57As Earl Marshal, Arundel administered the oaths of Supremacy and Allegiance to all present at
the 13/23 April 1640 meeting of the Commons (Maltby, 1). As he himself mentioned five days later, all
the Lords took the Oath of Supremacy (Cope, 62).
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loyalty to the King may explain this. Arundel was on good terms with the papal agents in England
in the 1630s, and he served as a trustee for a Catholic charity." Also, Pollen makes much of the
strong Catholic streak in Arundel's immediate family and finds it probable that the head was
associated with it59
Although much of this evidence is circumstantial, Pollen's argument is strengthened
considerably by an important bit of information to which he was privy and that it seems previous
historians were not, namely that Arundel was reconciled to the Roman church before his death.
Vincenzo Caraffa, the Jesuit Father General, wrote to Father Henry Silesden shortly after Arundel's
death:
I rejoice greatly to hear that the Earl died in the bosom of the Catholic Church.
Moreover, as I am not ignorant of the merits of that noble family towards our humble
order, I will gladly apply to the relief of his soul a thousand masses and as many
rosaries. I pray and beg Our Lord Jesus, that he would approve from heaven of these
our suffrages, and if anything still remains to be atoned for, may He with His blood
blot it out 60
Despite this, Pollen points out that Arundel was determined to conceal his secret to the bitter end,
and that he was aided by his family in this endeavor. When his grandson Philip joined the
Dominican order at Cremona, Arundel and family did all they could to extract him from the clutches
of the friars. Neither his will nor the inscription he wrote for his tomb contain any hint of
Catholicism; even William managed to deliver a non-denominational eulogy for his father.61
"Pollen, "Thomas, Earl of Arundel," 392-3.
59Ibid.,397.
"Ibid., 396: 22 Dec. [1646], Caraffa to Silesden; the original Latin text is printed in Pollen, "The
Religion of Thomas Howard, Earl of Arundel," Times Literary Supplement, 21 July 1921 : 468.
"1Pollen, "Thomas, Earl of Arundel," 397.
249
As interesting as Pollen's arguments are, for many years those who speculated about
Arundel's true religious leanings and motives for conversion— historians, art historians, and Catholic
clergymen alike — did not refer to them. Thus Godfrey Anstruther, a Dominican, makes no real
judgment as to Arundel's true religious bent, noting only that he was uninvolved in the established
Church and uninterested in religious controversy. Instead he turns to righting Tiemey's error in
dating of Arundel's conversion, showing even more convincingly that it took place in December
1616, a half year after his appointment to the privy council, rather than in December 16 IS. In the
absence of evidence that Arundel directly benefitted from his change of faith, Anstruther is at a loss
to explain it. Besides, he believed Arundel to be without political ambition and anyway too high
principled to sacrifice his faith to worldly motives.62 A pair of art historians, Francis Springell and
Graham Parry also seem unacquainted with Pollen's work. Springell only attributes Arundel's
conversion to religious indifference and opportunism,63 while Parry posits the idea that Arundel was
a pious Christian, undistinguished by creed: "It is probably fair to say that he regarded the
theological entanglements with indifference, and maintained the central Christian beliefs in harmony
with a strictness of conduct that amounted to a form of Christian Stoicism."64 In the absence of a
strong leaning to one confession or the other, Parry sees Arundel's conversion as an act of allegiance
to the King rather than the Anglican Church. John Martin Robinson takes much the same view, but
goes a step further by characterizing Arundel's outlook as "more nec—Stoic than Christian" and
"Godfrey Anstruther, A Hundred Homeless Years: English Dominicans, 1558-1658 (London:
Blackfriars, 1958), 197.
"Springell, 5.
"Parry, 115.
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arguing that philosophy and art were more important to him than the Bible. Robinson attributes
Arundel's conversion to political ambition, because he (like the others who subscribe to this
viewpoint) assumes it took place before he secured a privy council seat"
The most complete recent argument about Arundel's religious beliefs has been made by
Edward Chaney in several footnotes to his book on Richard Lassels, an English Catholic on the
Continent during the Civil War. Chaney convincingly argues that Arundel, while not devout, lived
and died a Catholic, effectively countering the views o>f Hervey and Parry.66 He suggests that in
publicly conforming, Arundel was attempting to maintain the "best ofboth worlds." By early 1617,
Arundel was fairly successful in convincing people he had turned against popery.67 However, there
were several signs over the years that he had not given up the old faith. Just over two years after his
public conversion, a Capuchin friar wrote to Arundel expressing his confidence in the constancy of
the Earl's Catholic faith. In wider society, many contemporaries considered him a church papist,
including Panzani, papal agent to Queen Henrietta Maria in the 1630s. Also, the strong Catholic
character of Arundel's family pointed to his own involvement The Catholic treatise A Patierne of
Christian Loyaltie was dedicated to Arundel.6* In 1640, Puritans attacked those they considered
"Robinson, 101, 108.
"Edward Chaney, The Grand Tour and the Great Rebellion: Richard Lassels and The Voyage of
Italy' in the Seventeenth Century, Biblioteca del Viaggio in Italia, vol. 19 (Geneva: Slatkine, 1985), 293 n.
96.
Despite his utterances against popery in early 1617, the Jesuit Edward Coffin had written a
testimonial in January of that year stressing Arundel's solid Catholic background and aid to distressed
Catholics (see quote in Anstruther, Hundred Homeless Years, 197). Surprisingly, Chaney seems to accept
the 16 15 date of conversion (i.e., before Arundel's appointment to the privy council) given in the
Complete Peerage rather than the 1616 date (i.e., after) (Chaney, Grand Tour, 304 n. 10).
"Ibid., 304-5 n. 10. Also see below, p. 255.
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enemies of the true faith, especially Catholics: Arundel's wife, son William, and William's wife were
all among "Fourteen hundred and thirty persons to be proceeded against for recusancy," a list drawn
up by the Long Parliament in December 1640. That same year, the Puritan pamphleteer William
Prynne composed Rome's Masterpiece, which accused Arundel of involvement in a "grand popish
plot."69 Finally, Chaney points to the plaque in the cloister wall of St. Antonio's in Padua behind
which Arundel's entrails were immured, "its very presence there arguing for Arundel's orthodoxy."
It inspired the following comment from Richard Lassels:
In the cloister in the monastery... I found written upon a black marble stone, these
words: Interiora Thomae Howardi Comitis Arondeliae: that is: The bowels of the
Earle ofArondel, late LordMarshal ofEngland. No wonder ifhis bowels be encased
in marble after his death, who in his lifetime loved marble con todas sits entrannjas
with his whole bowels, as the Spaniards say. His Marmora Arondeliana commented
upon by learned Selden, shewed this sufficiently. In this one thing he was happyer
than the other antiquarians of his country and time; that by loving Antiquityes so
much as he did he fell in love with the best peice ofantiquity, the ancient Faith.10
Even Chaney, who draws together most strands of the argument concerning Arundel's true
religious beliefs in his work on Lassels, is not immediately aware of Pollen's evidence of the
deathbed reconciliation. It is only in his 1996 article about Arundel and the sculptor Francois
Dieussart that Chaney, citing Pollen, first unequivocally declares that any lingering doubt about
Arundel's true religious identity is dispelled by the fact that he died a Catholic.71 Chaney's original
oversight is understandable, for it is apparent that this fact has not yet found its way into the
historical mainstream. Neither has much of what Chaney himself has contributed to the debate on
69Ibid., 300 n. 6, 304 n. 10, 324 n. 25.
70Richard Lassels, "The Voyage of Italy," 650-1; quoted in Chaney, Grand Tour, 305-6 n. 10.
'1Edward Chaney, "Thomas Howard, 14th Earl of Arundel," Apollo (Aug. 1996): 49-50
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Arundel's religion. Kevin Sharpe — the author of a massive history of the personal rule of Charles
I and the historian most engaged with Arundel in recent years — does not refer to Pollen (or many
of the others for that matter) and simply maintains, though not incorrectly, that Arundel was
probably a tolerant, private Catholic.72 Likewise, Caroline Hibbard in her book on Catholics and the
Caroline court does not seem to be fully conversant with much of the evidence.
Now let us return once again to our original questions: what was Arundel's true religious
identity and why did he conform? After surveying the scattered secondary source material, the
evidence strongly supports the idea that Arundel was a secret Catholic; however, on the point of his
motivations for taking Anglican communion, the verdict is less definite. Below, both of these issues
will be addressed in a comprehensive manner, for the first time bringing together all of the salient
points brought up by previous authors and supporting these conclusions with new evidence. From
this labor a clearer and more complete view will emerge not only ofArundel's religious identity but
also of how the liberties he took with it inform his actions as a whole.
Up until the fateful day when Arundel took communion in King's Chapel, he seemed a good
Catholic. He was head ofone of the foremost English Catholic noble houses. He had been brought
up a strict Catholic by his devout mother, who made certain that he was instructed in the Catholic
faith as well as conventional subjects. In connection with his education, at Westminster School and
Cambridge (if he indeed attended them), he may have been expected to attend Protestant services.
In this respect, he was not unlike the many upper-crust Catholic boys — particularly heirs — who were
^Sharpe, "Earl of Arundel," 202.
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educated in England73 Arundel received his degree from Cambridge in 1605 and the following year
married Alethea Talbot, the daughter of another very important English Catholic noble house and
herself an unabashed Catholic. A son, James, was bom to the couple the next year. The King stood
as godfather, and the baby thus had an Anglican christening in the Royal Chapel despite the
Arundels' own religious beliefs. The case was the same when the Queen stood as godmother to their
short-lived second son.74 However, this should not be seen as a lapse of faith — many Catholics were
obliged to conform on this point, particularly with the King in attendance."
Arundel's devotion to the Catholic faith was not questioned before bis public conversion and
was in fact the subject for positive comment by foreign co-religionists at the English court who
undoubtedly had contact with him. In 1612, Spanish envoy Alonso de Velasco praised Arundel's
courageous and devoted behavior at the execution of two priests:
On this day the Earl of Arundel showed his courage and devotion for without fear of
worldly reprisal he accompanied them [the condemned priests] on horseback from
the moment they emerged from prison until the moment they expired and he uttered
threats at the executioner lest he cut the ropes before they were fully dead so as to cut
out the entrails and heart while half-alive.76
73It was an especially risky venture to send an heir like Arundel to be educated abroad, as he was
very visible and had the most to lose if he or his parents were prosecuted under the penal laws; also, there
was the danger he would fall ill or into the priesthood (Cliffe, 181).
"Hervey, 1 17.
"Pollen, "Thomas, Earl of Arundel," 389.
76Loomie, Spain and the Jacobean Catholics, vol. I, 196:8/18 June 1612, Alonso de Velasco to
Philip III. According to Pollen, the two were Robert Newport and William Scott (Pollen, "Thomas, Earl
of Arundel," 390).
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In 1612, John Chamberlain wrote to Sir Dudley Carleton that Arundel's trip to Spa was an
opportunity for "a holy as well as a healthful pilgrimage."77 Two years later, Chamberlain told Sir
Ralph Winwood that it was rumored that William Cecil, Lord Roos, gave negative intelligence of
Arundel's presence in Rome and his entertainment and conversation there; the King, however, was
satisfied with his explanation.7* The Spanish ambassador, the Count of Gondomar, characterized
Arundel two years later as "the head of his family and a very genuine Catholic . . . [who] has been
in Italy three years, together with his wife and children, with the king's permission to have the
opportunity to see Italy but the more certain reason is to enable him to live as a Catholic in public."79
In mid-1616, Arundel was still regarded as the "head of the Catholics" by the Venetian secretary
Lionello; and in 16 17, after the conversion, he was still thought to be a Catholic in Spanish circles.*0
At this point one wonders what might move Arundel, a seemingly contented Catholic, to
conform publicly to the established church. The answer is complex; it can be found in the
confluence of three interconnected and, at times, conflicting systems of belief that informed all of
his actions, to one extent or another: first, his loyalty to the King; second, his devotion to Howard
family pride and tradition; and third, his dynastic and personal ambitions. Taken together, one can
easily understand why, under the circumstances, Arundel preferred occasional gestures ofconformity
and private Catholicism.
77Chamberlain, vol. I, 372: 23 July 1612,' Chamberlain to Carleton.
"Ibid., 568-9: 5 Jan. 1615," same to Winwood.
^Loomie, Spain and the Jacobean Catholics, vol. 2, 39: 20/30 June 1614, Gondomar to Philip
III.
KCSPV 1615-7, 245: 21 June/1 July 1616, Lionello to D&S; Loomie, Spain and the Jacobean
Catholics, vol. 2, 93 : 18/28 Sept. 1617, Augustin Perez to Gondomar.
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Arundel's loyalty to the House of Stuart was a great motivation for his public adherence to
the established church on Christinas Day 1616." For him, conforming was a gesture ofappreciation
and allegiance to the crown and did not represent an ideological switch to the Anglican Church. He
owed all that had been restored to him to James; thus the King's influence surely played a large role
in Arundel's decision to conform — it is instructive that he received communion in King's Chapel.
Arundel's unwavering fidelity to the crown throughout his political career and beyond when he was
in exile on the Continent, was noted by many contemporaries, and it was the greatest virtue for
which he wished to be remembered if Walker's "Life and Actions" is any indication.*2 It was also
the basis for his inclusion in Lloyd's MemoiresP Arundel's wife was devoted to the Stuart dynasty
as well. George Conn, the papal agent to Henrietta Maria's court, was disappointed to find that
though Lady Arundel was a steadfast Catholic, she was still unwaveringly loyal to the cause of the
"There is no reason to doubt that Arundel conformed in 1616 (rather than in the previous year, as
some authors have assumed). Both Hervey and Anstruther make a convincing argument in this respect,
and their interpretations are corroborated by contemporary observers (Hervey, 1 15; Anstruther, Hundred
Homeless Years, 197).
*2Another author, in his dedication, listed Arundel's greatest merits as "a Mecaenas to Arts,
and...fbrwardnesse in the seruice of your King and Countrey; neither in hope of praise, expectation of
reward, or least ayme of Ambition, but meerely in your vertue. Since all that know you know so much,
what I from them have learnt..." (James Wadsworth the younger, translator, in his dedication to Cesar
Oudin, A Grammar Spanish and English, trans. J. W. [London: John Haviland for Edward Blount,
1622]).
"Lloyd included his subjects because they had suffered for Protestantism and/or allegiance to
their sovereign. Since Lloyd brands Arundel a "Church Catholick," he was obviously included for his
devotion to his sovereign. The fact that Lloyd included Arundel as a Catholic when he had publicly
converted to Anglicanism leads one to believe that this was actually the case, as it would have been in
Lloyd's interests, as an Anglican clergyman, to include Arundel among those who had suffered for
Protestantism and as he did not hesitate to twist the truth where he could. Being that Lloyd's Mcmoirts
were published so soon after Arundel's death, perhaps the Earl's memory was still too fresh in the minds
of contemporaries for Lloyd to declare Arundel a devoted Protestant safely.
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Palatine family.*4 Despite the fact that the English Catholic authorities condemned the Oath of
Allegiance, she believed that Catholics could and should take it.*5 It was likely that Arundel
supported it as well — the royalist Catholic treatise A Patterne ofChristian Loyaltie, which argued
that Catholics could in good conscience swear to the Oath and penal laws should be relaxed for those
willing to do so, was dedicated to him. The piece was actually penned or was at least inspired and
guided by the Benedictine Thomas Preston, champion of the Oath, and published under Arundel's
cousin William Howard's name.*6
Allegiance to sovereign, however, was not the only factor motivating Arundel to conformity.
The Howard family pride and tradition that was so precious to Arundel also promoted a degree of
public adherence to the established religion and private Catholicism. On the one hand, he sought
to rebuild the family fortune and uphold the Howard tradition of leadership in government by
assuming his rightful place in political life. On the other, the Howards had a strong tradition of
"Hervey, 402.
^Pollen, "Thomas, Earl of Arundel," 392. English Catholic opinion was divided over its legality.
The Benedictines were identified with leniency toward the Oath, while the Jesuits took a hard line against
it.
"David Lunn indicates that Preston actually wrote the work, while Ruth Orun believes that
Howard did so with the inspiration and guidance of Preston. At the government's behest, Preston had
penned numerous books in support of the Oath under the name Roger Widdrington (David Lunn, The
English Benedictines, 1540-1688: From Reformation to Revolution, foreward by Cardinal Basil Hume
[London: Bums and Oates, 1980], 126; Ruth E. Grun, "A Note on William Howard, Author of A Patterne
ofChristian Loyaltie," Catholic Historical Review 42, no. 3 [Oct. 1956]: 330-40; c.f. W. K. L. Webb,
"Thomas Preston O.S.B., alias Roger Widdrington (1567-1640)," Biographical Studies. 1534-1829 2, no.
3 [1954]: 216-68). William Howard was Arundel's first cousin twice over, since their fathers were half-
brothers and their mothers sisters. The dedication states that "the experience I have had of your Noble and
gracious favour to my selfe in particular, gives me assurance, that you will not bee displeased, if for
protection in an undertaking exposed to so much opposition, I addresse my selfe to your Lordship."
(William Howard, A Patterne of Christian Loyaltie: Whereby any prudent man may clearely perceive,
in what manner the Sew Oath ofAllegiance and every Clause thereof, may in a true, and Cat hoi ike sense,
without danger ofPerjury, be taken by Roman Catholikes.... [London: R. Badoer, 1634]).
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adherence to and active promotion of Catholicism. As the head of the senior branch of the family,
Arundel had to find a way to balance these conflicting interests. His ultimate goal was to restore his
family to its previous glory. Ifhe lived as an unabashed Catholic, progress toward it might be halted
or even reversed. A loyal career in the service of the king, however, would augment the legacy he
would leave to future generations of Howards.
In the early modern period it is difficult to separate the elevated desire to uphold family pride
and tradition from the selfish one to advance personal and dynastic interests. It is even harder to
delineate personal from family interests. Nor should we try, because this line of reasoning would
be incomprehensible to Arundel or his contemporaries. The byproduct ofaggrandizement of family
was very often the aggrandizement of self, so in many ways Arundel's desire to further Howard
family interests may also be interpreted as the promotion of his own ambitions. For instance,
Arundel's privy council appointment was certainly an important move forward for him, but it was
just one stepping stone of many to reach his ultimate goal of Howard restoration.
Surely there was a healthy degree of personal and dynastic ambition in Arundel's decision
to conform outwardly. Although the fact that he was appointed to the privy council beforehand
seems to support the idea that he conformed out of loyalty to the monarch rather than mere ambition
to become a councillor, this point does not completely eliminate motives of advancement, as Hervey
and Anstruther suggested. It is important to note that James already knew of Arundel's plans to
conform when he called him to the privy council: Thomas Viscount Fenton, Captain of the Yeoman
Guard, wrote to his cousin John, Earl of Mar that "The Erll of Arundell is made of the consell this
last Tewsdaye; noe man there did know of it before it was spokin. He is or shall be a trew Christian
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and will coram unicat as his Majestic hes saide."*7 In any event, public conversion certainly made
his political advance less complicated. Though neither James nor Charles excluded Catholics from
court life or royal councils, a public gesture of adherence to the established church made their
participation much more acceptable in the eyes of the political nation, particularly that substantial
segment with Puritan sympathies. Thus, given Arundel's most strongly held ideals — loyalty to
sovereign, family pride and tradition, and dynastic and personal ambition — and the situation in
which he found himself, it is apparent why he found outward conformity particularly appealing.
Even after his public act of conformity to the Anglican church, Catholic incidents dot the
landscape of Arundel's existence. Throughout his life, reports continued to circulate that he was
privately still a Catholic, and hard evidence supports this conclusion. Very compelling is this letter
addressed to Arundel by a Capuchin over two years after his supposed conversion:
Jesus t Maria. I placed my sister with you .... I thought to provide for her good as
well spiritual as corporal that hereby she might have better and freer means to be
established in the Catholic faith, for I full well knew your house to be so far remoted
from any persons of suspected religion, and your family so catholicly given, which
you have ever sincerely kept and devoutly professed that you abhor and detest all
other religions as impious and pernicious doctrines introduced by the devil to the
perdition of men's souls."
"HMC, Report on the Manuscripts of the Earl ofMar and Kellie (London: HMSO, 1904-30),
vol. 2 [Mar & Kellie II], 64: 17/27 July 1616, Thomas, Viscount Fenton to John, Earl of Mar. Fenton was
likely correct, as he was at court when Arundel was appointed to the privy council. Both Fenton and Mar
had connections at court. They were childhood friends of James 1, and Fenton was also close to Sir
George Villiers, Master of the Horse, afterwards Duke of Buckingham, calling him "my sone."
"HMC, Report on the Manuscripts ofEarl Cowper (Coke Manuscripts), Twelfth Report, app. 1-3
(London: HMSO, 1888-9), vol. 1 [Cowper I], 105: 30 Apr. 1619," Friar Angel Englis to Arundel.
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Id 1621, the Venetian ambassador Girolamo Lando remarked that Arundel "is known by everyone
to be a Catholic."*9 Arundel held the trust and the proxy votes of Catholic peers throughout his
political career.90 In 1625, his father-in-law Lord Shrewsbury sent his proxy and trusted that Arundel
would be as vigilant as before in bestowing it, particularly in matters of religion and conscience.91
These reports continue through the reign of Charles. John Richards applied to Arundel for
aid in 1630, because of "[bjis charitable disposition towards distressed Catholics."92 Indeed he
continued to serve as a trustee for a Catholic charity.93 The following year, a Protestant knight
seeking a husband for his daughter asked suspiciously if a suitor had at one time "belonged" to the
Earls of Shrewsbury or Arundel.94 George Sprat, a water-bearer, admitted under examination in
1634 that he heard an apprentice named Richard say that "These 'prentices will this night come to
St James's and pull down Queen's Mother's Chapel there, and Somerset House Chapel, and my Lord
of Arundel's Chapel, because he maintained Popery."95
Arundel's many trips abroad to Italy and Flanders only encouraged wagging tongues. Even
when on the King's business to the Emperor in 1636, he was targeted by the Jesuits, who assumed
nCSPV 1621-3, 100: 27 July/6 Aug. 1621, Lando to the Inquisitors of State.
9°He held proxies for four of them in 1626—the Marquis of Winchester, the Earl of Shrewsbury,
Lord Windsor, and Lord Petre (Vernon F. Snow, "The Arundel Case, 1626," The Historian 26, no. 3
[May 1964]: 330).
91ACA, AL 1617-32, no. 272: 9/19 May 1625, Shrewsbury to Arundel.
nCSPD 1629-31, 246-7: Apr. 1630, John Richards to same.
"Pollen, "Thomas, Earl of Arundel," 393.
94HMC, Cowper I, 446: 1 8/28 Nov. 163 1 , T. Gilbert to Coke.
KCSPD 1634-5. 22: 15/25 May 1634, Examination of George Sprat, water-bearer of Saint Giles'
Without Cripplegate, taken before Edward Lord Newburgh.
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that he was a secret Catholic and potential ally. They hoped he would use his influence with the
King to improve the position of English Catholics, and also that he would be won back to open
Catholicism. In keeping with these aims, William Lamormaini, the Emperor's Jesuit confessor,
made certain that Arundel was sufficiently entertained during his travels to Vienna and Prague.96
Thus evidence to support Arundel's Catholic leanings comes from many different sources —
Englishmen and foreigners, those of low and high estate, friends and foes of Catholicism — and may
not be dismissed as mere speculation by rumormongers. Few believed that his conversion was
sincere.
Several works published over the years by writers of varying religious persuasions give more
insight into contemporaries' perception of Arundel. A Grammar Spanish and English, which was
dedicated to Arundel by its translator, appeared in 1622. Although it sounds innocent enough on the
surface, its Catholic lining is exposed after a little detective work, when one discovers that the
translator (J. W.) is actually a Jesuit, James Wadsworth the younger. In 1634, the same year that the
apprentices conspired to raze the chapel at Arundel House, A Patterne of Christian Loyaltie
appeared. This work, which was also dedicated to Arundel, argued that English Catholics could take
the Oath ofAllegiance in good conscience. The Puritan William Prynne, the scurrilous earless critic
of the Caroline court, implicated Lord and Lady Arundel in a grand popish plot of 1640 in his
^For example, Arundel describes a play performed for him by the Jesuits in Prague in a letter to
Windebank {CSP, vol. 1, 597: 20/30 July 1636, Arundel to Windebank).
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polemic Rome's Masterpiece.91 All of these works suggest (or in Prynne's case, proclaim) Arundel's
support for the old faith.
Prynne's accusations, while wild, were obvnously not the first made against the Howards
because of their Catholic leanings. Over the years, Arundel, his wife, and other members of their
family were charged with recusancy. In 1629, the KZing himself ordered the attorney general under
his sign manual to do what he could to prevent the conviction of Lord and Lady Arundel for
recusancy.9' That the accusations continued beyond [his act ofconformity is unsurprising, as the bulk
of his family remained avowed Catholics — his mother, his wife, his younger surviving son, and most
of his grandchildren were all ardent adherents to tb>e Roman faith, and most of them also married
Catholics.99 Arundel was devoted to his family: "He was most faithful and affectionate to his Lady,
indulgent to his Children, and more to his GrandchiLdren. His Recreations were Conversation with
them, and care of their Education." 100 At least one ofhis two children and all his grandchildren were
brought up and educated for the most part as CathoQics.101 Since Arundel was involved with their
"Chaney, Grand Tour, 300 n. 6. In 1637 Prynnse had his ears, which had already been cropped as
punishment for a previous prosecution, completely cut off for his open criticism of Charles's Arminian
religious policies. He also had the initials "SL" for Sedtrtious Libeller branded onto both of his cheeks.
9*BL, Egerton 2553, f. 73: 17/27 Apr. 1629, [Clnarles I] to Attorney General.
"The children of his elder son and heir, Henry Frederick, were brought up under Arundel's
guidance, and they were open Catholics even if their father was not. Two of them, Francis and Philip
(later Cardinal) Howard, joined the Dominican order. A-s far as Henry Frederick was concerned, it made
good political sense for him to outwardly conform or at least to avoid Catholic connections. Many heirs
of the Catholic nobility and gentry employed this tactic to circumvent the penal laws which prohibited
Catholics from inheriting (though they were not consistently applied), thus preserving the family lands
and titles intact in their line. Arundel certainly agreed vwith this strategy.
""Walker, 223.
""Hervey, 448 n. 1. His eldest son Henry Frederick may not have been brought up openly as a
Catholic for the same reasons that Arundel conformed.
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education, it is unlikely that this was solely the doing of Lady Arundel. The strength of Arundel's
family connections to Catholicism are quite overwhelming. He is the son of a martyr and saint, the
father of another martyr (William, Lord Stafford, who was implicated in a Catholic plot by Titus
Oates and executed), and the grandfather of a cardinal (Philip Cardinal Norfolk). The strong
Catholic influence in the Howard family at this time is immediately apparent, and it is likely that
Arundel, as the head of the family, was allied with it.
Even though all this anecdotal evidence strongly suggests that Arundel was in fact a secret
Catholic or church papist, the compelling fact ofhis deathbed profession of the Catholic faith leaves
little room for doubt. 102 Arundel, however, was just as careful to conceal his true religious leanings
in death as in life. No trace of Catholicism, or any other religion for that matter, is apparent in his
letters or his will. His self-composed epitaph expresses only that he wishes for his soul to be
transported to heaven, and reveals nothing about his religious affiliation. It is instead spiritual in
tone and focuses on celebrating his family history.103 Even the eulogy composed by his openly
Catholic son William, Lord Stafford, never mentions his religion — the way Arundel undoubtedly
would have preferred it, for the sake of his heir Henry Frederick and the general welfare of the
Howard family. That in the end he chose Catholicism, particularly after all the pains he took during
his life to disassociate himself from it, speaks volumes. The fact he professed secretly reinforces the
idea that this was the way that he dealt throughout his life with the problems posed by adherence to
Catholicism.
10IHis bowels were even immured in a wall of the cloister of St. Antonio in Padua. See Lassels's
comments about it, on p. 250 above.
103His will, epitaph, and last wishes are printed in Hervey, app. 11.
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It was obviously in the interest of Arundel and his family to deflect suspicions about the
orthodoxy of his religious beliefs. He feared his enemies would take up these suspicions, and that
their activism might lead to official accusations against him that would not only damage his
reputation with the king, but also cause him to lose all that he had managed to recover for Howard
posterity. If Arundel wished to retain his status and perhaps recover the dukedom, he could not
afford to be discovered.104 This goes far in explaining his behavior in the following situations. In
one case, he was very upset that his son William had been married by a Catholic priest, with Lady
Arundel's knowledge but (purportedly) without his own. 105 It is improbable, however, that they
would leave the head of the family completely in the dark about such plans. Arundel likely knew
that the wedding was to take place and absented himself as a precaution, thus avoiding any
accusations about his own religious loyalties. Another, more powerful example is shown in his keen
disappointment at the news that his grandson Philip had joined the Dominican order at Cremona in
1645 . In fact, not only Arundel but his whole family, many ofwhom were open Catholics, engaged
in a very public campaign for his return:
When at last they [the family] learned what had happened, ... the Earl was greatly
perturbed, not only on account of the injury and scandal and disgrace to families of
the highest rank that often result from entering religion thus hastily and rashly, but
l04It seems he did quite a good job of it. In 1618, Tobie Mathew, Archbishop of York, asked
Arundel's assistance in convincing his errant Catholic son Sir Tobie Mathew to return to the Anglican
Church. The Archbishop wrote to Arundel that he believed his son would listen to the Earl because of
"his dependance...on your favour and your judgement." He assured Arundel that his son remained a
dutiful and faithful subject to the K.ing (Lodge, Illustrations, vol. 3, 29 1-2).
105BL, Add. Mss. 1S390, f. 378: 1 1 Aug. 1637,' Conn to Cardinal Francesco Barberini; ibid., f.
410: 18 Sept. 1637," same to same; ibid., f. 458: 23 Oct. 1637," same to same; quoted in Hervey, 407-8.
"It was the priest.. .that so annoyed him. ..especially as Lord Arundel himself had so solemnly declared for
an opposite policy. There was certainly, however, no breach of affection between him and his wife."
(Hervey, 408).
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from the very serious dangers threatening the whole House ofHoward, and possibly
many other persons as well, from this step on the part of Philip. The Earl therefore
left no stone unturned to withdraw his grandson from his purpose, before the thing
should become widely known. ... if this act of Philip is reported to the English
Parliament, as is certain to be the case, Parliament would undoubtedly be moved to
declare the Earl's property proscribed, and himself liable to imprisonment, the
Earl must take some other measures for protecting himself against present and future
dangers, namely, by making clear by authentic proofs that he, so far from being
responsible for Philip's resolution, is excessively grieved, at it and has done all in his
power to divert him from it. Therefore the aforesaid Philip, most humbly entreats
your Eminence, . . . graciously to apply some suitable remedy ... so that it may
appear beyond a doubt even in foro externo, should Parliament think fit to take
proceedings against the Earl, that he himself and all his family are entirely innocent
of connivance in Philip's action 106
In this case, it is obvious that Arundel's chief concern was averting prosecution and the threat to the
status of the family rather than any injury to his religious beliefs. It quickly became apparent that,
despite his grandfather's protestations, Philip had a true calling, for he went on to a very
distinguished career in the Church and eventually became a cardinal.107 In both of these cases,
Arundel's reaction should not be interpreted as anti -Catholic, but rather as avoidance of reprisals
against himself and his family.
106From "Petition of Henry Howard to the Holy See to exclude Philip Thomas Howard," in
Dominicana: Cardinal Howard's Letters, English Dominican Friars. Nuns. Students. Papers and Mission
Registers, CRS Publications, vol. 25 (London: CRS, 1925), 258-60. For a full account of the wrangling
between the Church and the Howard family over the vocation of young Philip, see Anstruther, Hundred
Homeless Years, chap. 9.
Cardinal Norfolk was the founder and ftrst prior of a Dominican monastery at Bomhem in
Flanders and founder of a convent of Dominican nuns at Vilvorde. A royalist, he was involved in plotting
an uprising in favor of Charles IT during the Interregnum. Norfolk was later to play an important role in
Anglo-Roman relations—during the Restoration, he was chaplain and grand almoner to the Queen and
leader of the Catholic party at court, Cardinal Protector of England and Scotland, and chief councillor to
Rome in matters touching England. He rebuilt the English College in Rome and revised the rules of
Douai College.
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Finally, it should be noted that though he was a secret Catholic, Arundel was no religious
zealot. He considered the doctrinal differences between the Christian confessions to be negligible
during a time that they were a source of excitement for many of his contemporaries. 10* He did not
condemn any religion; on the contrary, he was very tolerant of the religious views of others, and
religious differences were for him no barrier to genial understanding.109 This fact, coupled with
common intellectual interests in history, art, antiquities, and architecture, explains his friendships
and patronage of with such men as Selden, Cotton, and Wentworth."0 Selden, for example, was
engaged by the Earl to compile a scholarly catalog of his marbles, the Marmora Arundelliana
( 1628). 111 Arundel's tolerance was highlighted by the fact that he not only associated with the papal
representatives Panzani and Conn,1 12but was also a patron of the Protestant diplomat and Secretary
of State Sir Dudley Carleton (Lord Dorchester) and Samuel Harsnett, Bishop of Chichester. who
""Arundel determined that "the distance between the Catholick and Reformed Churches grew not
from their Controversies, but their Interests; not from the Opinions themselves which might be
compounded, but from the passions of those that managed them...." (Lloyd, 284).
""Hervey, 118.
"0Sharpe, "Earl of Arundel," 202.
111John Selden, Marmora Arundelliana; siue Saxa Greece incisa ex venerandis priscce Orienlis
gloria ntderibus, auspicijs <& impensis herois illustriss. Thomce Comitis Arundellice & Surrice. Comitis
Marescalli Anglice. pridem vindicata & in tedibus ehu hortisque cognominibus, ad Thamesis ripam,
disposita (London: Guilielmi Stanesbeij, 1628).
"JThe Oratorian Gregorio Panzani was sent as the papal envoy to England in 1634, allegedly to
reconcile differences between certain groups of English Catholics; his real mission was to obtain
permission for official papal diplomatic representation at the court of Henrietta Maria. While in England,
he carried on secret talks with Secretary Windebank about a possible reunion between the Catholic and
Anglican Churches. In addition, he was to acquaint himself with prominent Englishmen and
contemporary English opinion and thought. Lord and Lady Arundel were among the notables with whom
Panzani socialized. Panzani's mission was a success— his successor George Conn arrived in 1636 as the
accredited papal agent to the Queen's court (Hervey, 396-7).
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subsequently became Bishop of Norwich and Archbishop of York."3 Another example of his
tolerance which underlines his devotion to the King comes from 1605, long before his conversion.
While in Flanders to take charge of an English volunteer regiment to assist Spain in its war against
the Dutch, Arundel discussed the situation ofEnglish Catholics with the papal nuncio there. Arundel
took the opportunity to support James's recent proposal for an ecumenical council, stating that it
might help to alleviate pressures on Catholics. 114 Arundel, who was so influential in the councils of
state, was uninterested in the details of religious politics. His tolerance is a pleasant divergence from
the religious fanaticism of the time."5 The evidence presented above shows that he was a loyalist
Catholic who was faithful to his monarch and family, and tolerant of the beliefs of others.
Career under Charles I
Regarding Arundel's political loyalties, as opposed to his religious ones, there need be no debate.
He was a strong royalist who faithfully served the House of Stuart, which was responsible for his
restoration. Walker's opinion on this subject echoed that of other contemporaries: "the Vastness of
his [Arundel's] noble Designs . . . being only the Glory and Ornament of his Country .... he must
by all wise and noble Persons be Iookt upon as the greatest Assertor of the Splendor and Greatness
of the Crown." 116 The Stuart kings constantly relied upon Arundel's devotion and expertise, though
he never attained the status of favorite as did his rival Buckingham. Arundel was an upright minister
1"ACA, AL 1617-32, no. 224: 3 Nov. 1617," Carleton to Arundel; Hervey, 118-9.
1"Patterson, 69.
"'Robinson, 108.
116Walker, 223.
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who avoided intrigues and rejected bribes."7 Even during his early years at court, he showed a rare
distaste for graft. In 1606, a correspondent informed William Trumbull: "The Archduke hath sent
my L. Arondell a patent of 1000/. the year to be, if he will accept it, circa la persona. But he
meancth to deliver it back and return shortly to England."1" It is apparent that the Habsburgs
considered him a possible ally from the beginning, probably because of his Catholic faith and the
fact that some ofhis relatives received Spanish pensions. But promoting the faith was less important
to Arundel than serving the crown. He refused to become embroiled in Catholic political intrigue
despite his personal religious leanings. 1 " He was "too honest and cool-headed to become a regular
partisan." 120 His religious leanings were intensely private to him, and they seemed to have had little
or no effect on his public life, including bis conduct of negotiations with the Habsburgs.
Arundel's loyalty to the Stuarts extended to Elizabeth, Queen of Bohemia, her family, and
the cause of the restitution of the Palatinate. He was her friend even before the Arundels escorted
her as a bride to her new home in Heidelberg; there, their personal ties were strengthened further.
The bond of trust and affection between Arundel and Elizabeth is clear from their correspondence.
1"On this subject Walker wrote: "He was free from Covetousness, and so much above a Bribe or
Gratuity (for Favours done) as no Person ever durst tempt him with one." (Ibid.)
"*HMC, Report on the Manuscripts of the Marquess ofDovmshire (London: HMSO, 1924-95),
vol. 2 [Downshire //], 12: 6/16 July 1606, J. Beaulieu to William Trumbull.
1"This is illustrated in a letter from the papal agent Conn to Cardinal Barberini: "[Arundel]
assured me.. .of his own wish to be a good instrument in what relates to the service of Catholics in this
country. With the authority he has, he could, no doubt, do something; but he is as far removed from these
negotiations as he is given up to pictures and statues, around which he would like us to pass all our
time...." (BL, Add. Mss. 15390: 5 Jan. 1637,' Conn to Barberini; quoted in Hervey, 398).
120Edmund Lodge, Portraits of Illustrious Personages ofGreat Britain...with Biographical and
Historical Memoirs of Their Lives and Actions (London: London Printing and Publishing Company, s.d.),
vol. 3, 57.
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For instance, she closed a letter to him in 1634 thus: "... the true affection you have ever borne me,
which makes me write this freelie to you and assure you how constant I ame, in my love to my oulde
bend . . . ."121 Although Arundel long had supported the King's policy of retrieving the Palatinate
through negotiations with the Habsburgs, a policy that she openly opposed, Elizabeth never doubted
his constancy to her cause. This is reflected in the pleasure she expressed when hearing the news
that Arundel had been chosen to conduct the negotiations with the Emperor Ferdinand II in 1636. 122
Arundel was identified with the "Hispanophile" party at court precisely because he favored
dealing with the Habsburgs to regain Palatinate. However this tag was a misnomer, as Elizabeth
must have realized. It was applied liberally not only to those councillors who were actually pro-
Spanish in sympathy but also to pragmatic conservatives like Arundel who were committed to a
peace policy and who saw dealing with the Habsburgs as the surest way to regain the Palatinate. He
did not support unconditional friendship with the Casa d'A ustria but rather believed that negotiations
with the Habsburgs offered the best chance for the restitution of the Palatinate, as did the King, and
his councillors Weston, Windebank, and Cottington. 123 He also knew that England could not bear
the burden of an all-out war with the Habsburgs and their allies to recover it. Finally, it was royal
policy — except during Buckingham's "reign" — to pursue the restoration of the Palatinate through
negotiations with the Habsburgs; this was another good more reason for Arundel to support it.
l21Elizabeth, Queen of Bohemia, 90: 22 Feb. 1634, Elizabeth to Arundel.
1—CSPD 1635-6, 314: 22 Mar. 1636,' Sir Thomas Roe to Elizabeth; ibid., 351: 4 Apr. 1636,"
Elizabeth to Roe; ibid., 373: 19/29 Apr. 1636, same to Laud.
12JThis did not prevent him from talting pleasure in the Swedish successes in Germany, in the
hope they would expedite the restoration of the Prince Palatine (CSPD 1631-3, 206: 20 Dec. 163 I,"
Arundel to Vane).
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Therefore, Arundel was identified as a Hispanophile even though his support for negotiations with
the Habsburgs was based on what he regarded as the best interests ofthe Stuart dynasty and England.
Although he was a supporter of negotiations with the Habsburgs through much of the 1620s
and 1630s, Arundel sympathized with them only so long as he believed that they held out the
prospect of the restoration of the Palatinate by peaceful means. This was clear in his reaction to the
failure of his negotiations in Vienna, which in his mind shattered all illusions that the Palatinate
would be restored by a treaty with the Habsburgs. Upon his return from the Continent, he
condemned Habsburg duplicity in the strongest terms and advocated that active measures be taken
against them, in league with the French, Dutch, and their allies. In 1637, Laud reported Arundel's
new-found opposition to the Habsburgs to Wentworth:
The Earl Marshal being returned have [has] made it appear to us that noe [aid] for the
Prince Elector can be hoped for from Spayne & c. And now I verily believe it will
in time growe into a war. ... the Earl marshal are [is] not only now against Spayne
for there's cause enough for that certainly, but extremely for the Low Cuntrys. And
tis common in Court speech that the Queen of Bohemia is an earnest sutor to the
King that the Earl Marshal maye be restored to his antient honnour of the Duke of
Norfolk for thiss service.124
Despite the failure of his negotiations, Elizabeth was satisfied with Arundel's conduct, stating that
he had "carried himself worthily."125 She was for full restoration or none at all and was pleased that
Arundel had turned back the Emperor's offers to restore only a portion of her son's inheritance.
Arundel's unimpeachable loyalty to his sovereign and to the Palatine House was one of the main
reasons he was chosen to lead the embassy to the Emperor in the first place. His devotion to their
124Laud, vol. 7, 319-20: 1 1/21 Feb. 1637, Laud to Wentworth.
12SCSPD 1636-7, 76: 27 July/6 Aug. 1636, Elizabeth to Laud.
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interests is readily seen in his reaction to the failure of his mission: though he was a long-time
adherent of the peace party, he did not hesitate to abandon this position when it became apparent to
him that negotiations with the Habsburgs would not result in the restoration of the Palatinate. His
penchant to take offense at any perceived slight to his master's honor, as he did to his own or that
of his family, is a further reflection of his constancy to the King that surfaced repeatedly in his
negotiations with the Habsburgs. 126 Arundel's allegiance to the House ofStuart without doubt played
a large role in his conduct of the negotiations.
In spite of Arundel's dynastic loyalty, there was a period when he did not necessarily agree
with "official" royal policies, namely in the years from 1623 to 1628, when Buckingham's will
dominated at court. His preponderance was especially marked after the death of the peace-loving
James I and the accession of Charles I in I62S. Arundel was in disgrace from the beginning of
Charles's reign because he opposed the war with Spain supported by Charles and Buckingham and
he worked to undermine Buckingham's influence. From this time there was an open rivalry between
Buckingham and Arundel.
Arundel had initially been a Buckingham supporter, when both men supported a Spanish
marriage for Prince Charles. In 1621, Arundel won the appreciation of the favorite when he
staunchly supported Buckingham in the Lords when the latter was under fire for promoting
126Another example is his irritation with the French ambassador, the Marquis de Cadenet, who
failed to observe diplomatic etiquette when Arundel escorted him from Gravesend to London in 1620.
The ambassador neglected to advance any further than the head of the staircase when Arundel first came
to his lodgings at Gravesend. The next day when they were to set off for London, Arundel met him in the
street, and would not go further than the foot of the stairs when they reached their destination, Somerset
House. Arundel then informed the ambassador that "the gentleman there would shew him to his lodging."
To be fair, Arundel was likely reacting to a slight not only to himself, but to the King he was
representing. James, whose pride was injured by the incident, in fact approved of Arundel's retaliatory
behavior (Tiemey, vol. 3, 442-3 n. a).
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monopolies.127 But Arundel began to oppose the favorite's policies when, on the heels of Charles
and Buckingham's embarrassing trip to Spain (of which Arundel did not approve), Buckingham
advocated breaking off the Spanish match and declaring war against Spain. This course openly
conflicted with James I's stated foreign policy, and Arundel continued to support the King's policy
of friendly relations with Spain even though he was not against defending the Palatinate by military
intervention.12' Even after Charles's accession, Arundel continued to support this policy, which he
believed to be in the best interests of crown and state, and opposed what he saw as Buckingham's
bellicose, destructive policies. In addition, Arundel and many others at court felt the need to counter
Buckingham's preponderance, particularly due to his machinations to subvert the privy council and
the influence of his rivals in Parliament. This was particularly so for Arundel, who as the "self-
appointed spokesman ofthe 'old' aristocracy resented the predominance ofthe parvenu favourite." 13
Thus an opposition group formed, with Arundel and the earls of Middlesex and Bristol among its
leaders.130
In addition to disagreements over political issues, personal problems exacerbated the clash
between Arundel and Buckingham, particularly when the latter was raised to a dukedom in 1623.
The King offered the same honor to Arundel, but as a new creation instead of the restitution of the
coveted premier dukedom ofNorfolk. Arundel stood uncompromisingly on family pride and refused
to accept anything less than the restoration of his ancestral right. Because of his stubbornness, he
l27See above, p. 234.
121At this point the fate of the Palatinate was unclear.
12,Lockyer, Early Stuarts, 333.
l30Sharpe, "Earl of Arundel," 231-2.
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was granted no title, for James would not give Arundel precedence over his favorite. Buckingham
was made a duke and became the senior English peer, which Arundel found extremely insulting
because he believed the upstart Buckingham had usurped his hereditary right.131 He also objected
to Buckingham's gross sale of honors. The favorite's meteoric rise and disregard for the established
social order, combined with his dangerous foreign policy and irresponsible actions, galvanized
Arundel's opinion against Buckingham and forced him into open opposition. Unsurprisingly,
Buckingham returned Arundel's hostility.132 Since Arundel was a leader of the opposition group,
Buckingham began to suspect that he and other opposition peers were mobilizing clients in the
Commons against him and his policies.133
The enmity that sprang up between them had a frustratingly negative impact upon Arundel's
political career, though he was too powerful and capable to be shoved aside completely.
Buckingham did everything in his power to exclude Arundel from royal favor and condemn him to
a lesser role at court. His tactics were particularly effective with Charles, who preferred the
engaging Buckingham to the reserved Arundel. The culmination of the struggle between the two
noblemen came in 1626, when Arundel's son Henry Frederick married Lady Elizabeth Stuart, a royal
ward, without royal consent. The King was infuriated. Buckingham, on the other hand, was
131Chamberlain, vol. 2, 443: 1 July 1622," Chamberlain to Carleton; ibid., 488: 5 Apr. 1623,"
same to same; ibid., 498: 17 May 1623," same to same; Robinson, 102.
l32The enmity that existed between Arundel and Buckingham was highlighted by a conflict that
Arundel, as Earl Marshal, had with one of Buckingham's clients, Henry St. George, the Richmond
Herald. Arundel had made an example of St. George for disregarding his order that the heralds should not
dwelt in Derby House with their families. Buckingham supported St. George's petition to the King about
the incident, asking that Arundel not be allowed to prejudice St. George "out of spleen" to the Duke
{CSPD 1627-8, 231: 27 June/7 July 1627, St. George to Charles I, with a message from Buckingham).
133Sharpe, "Earl of Arundel," 195.
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delighted with the convenient opportunity to eliminate his rival (and his proxy votes) from the Lords
at a time he was under threat of impeachment by Parliament: he convinced the King to remove
Arundel from the Lords and imprison him in the Tower on the pretext of the unauthorized marriage.
The Lords, however, were outraged at this infringement of their privilege, and they successfully
demanded his release soon afterwards. Arundel was allowed to re-occupy his seat in the Upper
House, but he was fined heavily and remained under house arrest for nearly two years. This incident
made him the symbol of the deep-seated opposition to Buckingham.134
Although Arundel's power struggle with the favorite understandably soured the former's
relationship with the King, Buckingham's assassination in 1628 opened the way for Arundel's full
restoration to his position at court and royal favor.1 " Arundel's ally Lord Treasurer Weston became
the King's chief minister, and Arundel himself re-emerged as a leading figure on the privy council.
The years of Charles I's personal rule (1629-40) marked the zenith of Arundel's political influence.
The King came to rely increasingly upon him for advice. This is clearly seen in his contribution to
the reorientation of English foreign policy from the Habsburgs to France after his return from
Vienna.
During the personal rule, Arundel was entrusted with numerous influential government posts.
He received a commission as General of the Horse in 1629 and was made the Chief Justice in Eyre
of the forests north of the Trent in 1634.136 He sat on important committees of the Privy Council,
l34Snow, 323-49.
1'"Buckingham reconciled with his enemies Arundel, Bristol, and Lord Keeper Williams.
136ACA, NC G 1/10: 1629, Commission to Arundel to be General, Earl of Essex to be Lieutenant
General, and Earl of Holland to be General of the Horse.
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including those for foreign affairs and war.137 In 1638, he was given command of the army raised
for the First Bishops' War with Scotland. Arundel took this appointment very seriously.13* The Earl
of Kingston remarked upon it: "It seemes by the report ofmy Lady of Arundell's taking of an house
in York that hir Lord intends to jerk it in these Scottish garboyles, though I expect not to live to
heare of a second Flodden feild." 139 The accuracy ofKingston's prognostication remains a mystery,
since Arundel's military skill was never tested against the Scots — peace was made before the fighting
ever began.140 During the time of the Scottish troubles, the King came to rely increasingly on
Arundel and Sir Henry Vane, for he felt he "could trust no other."141 Arundel's ascendancy in the
King's confidence was not looked upon with favor by his rivals, particularly influential Puritans who
were excluded from court at this time; they saw his influence with the King and his support of war
l37The council of war was was responsible for supplying the army of the North.
I3*"the Earl saw himself as literally stepping into the armor of his ancestors, the 2nd Duke, the
3rd Duke, the Poet Earl, [and] the 4th Duke, who had occupied similar commands before him."
(Robinson, 113).
1WHMC, Var. Coll. VII, 420: I/I 1 Mar. 1639, Kingston to Sir Gervase Clifton. Clarendon, who
calls Arundel "a man who had nothing martial about him but his presence and his looks," explains that
Arundel was chosen as general because of "his negative qualities; he did not love the Scots; he did not
love the Puritans" (DNB, vol. 10, 75). In 1605 he had been, however, in charge ofan English volunteer
regiment recruited to help Spain ftght the Dutch (Patterson, 69). For the rules for the army Arundel was to
lead against the Scots, see Lowes and ordinances qfwarre, ...in the present expedition for the northern
parts under the conduct of.. .Thomas Earl ofArundel and Surrey, Earl Marshall ofEngland (Newcastle:
R- Barker a. assignes of J. Bill, 1639); an oath to be taken by all of his soldiers is printed in closing. See
The pourtraiture ofhis excellence Sir Thomas Howard [etc.], as Lord General of the expedition against
Scotland (F. T. Walkley, 1639) for an engraved portrait of Arundel on horseback as commander-in-chief.
140Arundel was busy issuing orders up until the signing of the Pacification of Berwick. See, for
instance, his instructions for the infantry (Strafford, vol. 2, 315: 1/1 1 Apr. 1639, Arundel to Sir W.
Pennyman, Colonel of Regiment), and his instructions for the artillery and fortification at Carlisle (ibid.,
349-50: 16/26 May 1639, same to Sir Francis Willoughby).
Hibbard, 118.
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against the Scots as a part ofa great popish conspiracy against English liberties and religion, a view
that was also reflected in Rome 's Masterpiece ( 1640). Arundel's reason for supporting the assertion
of royal authority against the Scots was because he characteristically wished to uphold the
established order. In spite of this opposition, Arundel continued to enjoy the icing's favor, for in
1640 he was appointed to the post of Lord High Steward. As such, he was faced with the
unwelcome task of presiding over the trial of the Earl of Strafford in 1641 .142
The personal rule also marks the apogee of not only Arundel's career in politics but also his
career as a collector and patron of the arts, for it was during this time that his collections reached
their greatest extent and splendor. Anthony van Dyck, the famous Flemish painter, executed several
commissions for Arundel, including a 1635 portrait with his grandson Thomas (later 5th Duke of
Norfolk). His art agent William Petty, formerly a don of Jesus College, Cambridge, and tutor to
Arundel's children, was scouring the Mediterranean for ancient sculpture that would form the basis
of the collection called the "Arundel Marbles," which now resides in the Ashmolean Museum. In
September 1635, Arundel enjoyed his best-known triumph as a curiosity-seeker when he presented
at court Thomas Parr, an "old, old man" thought to be 152 years old."3 During his embassy to the
14JHis "conduct...as President of the proceedings, in a matter so difficult and so momentous in its
consequences, won the approbation of even Strafford's wannest friends." (Hervey, 422). Great pressure
was placed upon peers and MPs alike to accept the act of attainder against Strafford. Charles himself
agreed to it only with great reluctance.
143Parr showed that he was no fool. During his visit at court, when conversing with the King, "He
claimed to have lived under ten kings and queens, well remembered the monasteries, and, when
questioned on religious matters, replied that he held it the safest to be of the religion of the king or queen
that was in being, 'for he knew that he came raw into the world, and accounted it no point of wisdom to
be broiled out of it.'" {DNB, vol. 15, 364). It is dubious that the experience was enjoyable for Parr, for
after meeting the King, he was exhibited for some weeks in London. Onlookers had plenty to see, since
Parr apparently was not only old, but hairy as well, a fact enshrined in a poem by John Taylor, The Water
Poet: "From head to heel his body hath all over, A quick-set, thick-set nat'ral hairy cover." (John Taylor,
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Imperial court the following year, Arundel acquired the library of the German humanist Willibald
Pirckheimer, which included sketches, letters, and books written or illuminated by Albrecht Dtirer,
as well as a Dtirer Madonna painting.144 In spite of his wife's fortune, Arundel's extravagance in
collecting almost bankrupted him.145 For a brief while he entertained the idea of escaping his
creditors by promoting a scheme to colonize Madagascar.146 Nothing came of the scheme but Van
Dyck's magnificent portrait of 1639 showing Arundel and his wife seated on either side ofa globe,
he pointing at the would-be colony with his marshal's staff. 147 He abandoned the scheme, however,
when he discovered the island was crawling with fleas.1'"
In addition to his political appointments and achievements as a collector and curiosity-seeker,
Arundel was also selected for a range of representative duties during the personal rule. He led an
The Water Poet, The Olde. Old. Very Olde Man: or The Age and long Life of Thomas Par. ...who was
Borne in the Raigne ofKing Edward the 4th. and is now living in the Strand, being aged 152. yeares and
odd Monethes. His Manner ofLife and Conversation in so long a Pilgrimage; his Marriages. and his
bringing up to London about the end ofSeptember last [London: [A. Mathewes] for H. Gosson, 1635]).
Parr did not long outlive his new-found fame. He promptly died at Arundel House on 14/24 November
163S, which was attributed to his change of lifestyle and rich diet. His fame, however, lived on: as late as
1835, a quack medicine called "Old Parr's Life Pills" was being hawked in Manchester (DNB, vol. 15,
365).
l44On the Pirckheimer Library, see Howarth, Lord Arundel, 154-6, and Springell, 105-10 n. 60.
M5In the 1630s, Arundel ran up a huge private debt of £121,000; by 1641, it had increased to
£124,448 (Stone, 543, 779).
l46Arundel was involved in various other investment, trade, and exploration ventures. He was a
fen-drainer and ironmaster as well as a shareholder in the Northwest Passage, Virginia, Amazon, New
England, and Fishing companies (Stone, 376).
147Interestingly, a copy of this portrait hangs today in the Kunsthistorisches Museum in Vienna. It
is unknown how the picture came to its collection, but it is possible that Archduke Leopold Wilhelm,
whose personal collection forms the core of the Museum's collection, acquired it from a pre-Civil War
English collection.
1Robinson, 111-2.
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extraordinary embassy to the Hague in 1633 with the King's request that his sister Elizabeth,
widowed after the death of Frederick V the previous year, return to England. She refused his offer,
however, because she feared that withdrawal to England would be construed as an abandonment of
her son's claims to the Palatine lands and dignities. While in the Netherlands, Arundel urged the
States General actively to support young Charles Louis in his claims. Charles was quite pleased with
Arundel's conduct in the Netherlands.1'"
The next and most important of his diplomatic appointments was as ambassador
extraordinary to the Holy Roman Emperor Ferdinand II in 1636 to conclude an agreement for the
restoration of the Palatinate. This embassy, which reoriented the course of Anglo-Habsburg
diplomatic relations, will be discussed in detail in chapter nine. Suffice it to say here that his pride
and his loyalty to the House of Stuart, which were very much a part ofhis public persona, had a great
influence on the progress and outcome of the negotiations. His religion, on the other hand, was
intensely personal and played little or no role. Arundel occupied such an influential position in
England that when he turned against the Habsburgs, his reaction was enough to precipitate the
reorientation of English foreign policy, even if for a short time.
As a great peer of the realm, a well-traveled and experienced diplomat, and an authority on
protocol, Arundel was a natural choice to act as a royal escort to destinations on the Continent. Thus
in 1641, he was chosen to accompany the troublesome Queen Mother Marie de Medici to
Cologne.150 He resigned the lord stewardship before he left, which he was not sorry to do after the
1'"Various letters regarding this embassy are to be found in: ACA, AL 1617-32 and AL 1632-
1723; and Hervey, 3 11-34.
150"A true coppy of a letter.. .from Thomas Earle of Arundel I [appointed to escort Marie de
Medicis Queen Dowager of France to Holland]. ..to Mr. Pym...Read before the Committee 18 Sept.
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trauma of Strafford's trial. And finally, in the following year, he along with Queen Henrietta Maria
escorted the Princess Mary to her new home in Holland after her marriage to William of Orange.
Once Arundel had fulfilled his official duties in Holland, he did not return to England but
instead lived out the remainder ofhis years abroad, in self-imposed exile. 151 The brewing Civil War,
his failing health, and a desire to spend a quiet retirement in the study of art all contributed to his
decision. After some traveling he finally settled in Italy, taking a villa at Padua. There he whiled
away his final years re-exploring Italian cities and playing host to his fellow countrymen. These
years, however, were not spent in peaceful retirement, as it seemed all that he held dear — king,
country, and family — was under attack.
During these final, unhappy years ofhis life, England was never far from Arundel's thoughts.
As he saw its shores recede into the distance for the last time, he was heard to exclaim hopefully:
"May it never have need of me."152 Arundel of course remained a steadfast royalist during the Civil
War. Henry Frederick remained behind in England to fight for the King and to try to maintain the
family legacy in the ruinous years to come. Arundel himself contributed £54,000 to the royal cause
in lieu of personal service to his monarch. This sum was raised only with difficulty, since "he had
depleted his coffers even to the extent ofreducing himself and his Countess to pawn theirjewels and
1641 " (London: Printed for Iohn Thomas, 1641).
Before leaving for the Continent, Arundel transferred most of his business appointments to his
son and heir Henry Frederick, Lord Maltravers. Henry Frederick was called to the House of Lords in his
father's barony of Mowbray to protect the family interest there during Arundel's absence (Hervey, 434).
1S3rbid., 435. It was better that Arundel did go into exile, so he was not forced to witness either
the siege of Arundel Castle and its reduction to ruins or the occupation of Arundel House by soldiers who
carelessly handled and even broke many of his precious marbles; experiencing this destruction first-hand
would have only broken the honest old statesman's heart (Robinson, 1 16).
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plate for their own personal subsistence."1" That he was aable to raise such a great sum from such
slender means reveals Arundel's continued commitment to tChe Stuart monarchy. Despite his loyalty,
he was never successful in regaining the coveted dukedom cofNorfoIk for his line. After his petition
was refused, however, he was created Earl of Norfolk in 1 644, thus ensuring the honor would not
be granted away from his family.154 Although he was denned his final triumph, he was successful
at reassembling the bulk of the inheritance of the 4th Dukes and reclaiming most of the lesser titles
for his line — indeed many of the ten titles held by the pres>.ent-day Duke ofNorfolk were regained
by Arundel.1"
During this time Arundel became estranged from hns family, most of whom congregated in
the Netherlands, and they from each other. They passed their time in exile "aimless, separated,
resentful."156 When they did communicate, it was often too complain about the bad state of their
finances or the unfortunate situation in England, or to respomd to a family crisis, such as his grandson
Philip's joining the Dominicans. Even Arundel's grandson Thomas, who was with him in Padua, was
a disappointment; though Arundel did not realize it, the disturbing behavior exhibited by young
Thomas was an early symptom of madness, which was onl^y confirmed later. Arundel complained
1"Hervey, 438-9. These are hardly the actions of a mam "unenthusiastic about either King or
Parliament but who realised that they stood as much to lose by : staying and attempting to remain neutral,"
per Chaney's assessment (Chancy, Grand Tour, 53).
1MACA, Papers relating to Thomas Howard, Earl of Ar-undel (1585-1646), G 1/90: 6/16 June
1644, Letters patent creating Arundel the Earl of Norfolk. He vwas granted this honor as the lineal
descendant of Thomas de Brotherton, Earl of Norfolk, a youngesrson of Edward IV.
■"Robinson, 1 16.
156Howarth, Lord Arundel, 2 1 2.
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to his friend John Evelyn, who was touring Italy in 1646, of his ungrateful grandchildren shortly
before his death:
if Tom: or Phillippe shall send for any thinge thither nothinge [shall] be delivered
unto them, the one beinge soe ill-natured & frentike as I see him with huge affliction.
the other followinge the directione of a base Irish rascall a Dominican, with such
obstinacy, as I blotte him out ofmy memory and from my House, I resolvinge whilst
I live only to thinke of his huge unnatural I ingratitude toward es me with
detestacion.157
Arundel lamented the misfortunes which had befallen his family and country up until the end.
Evelyn gives a touching account of the end ofhis friend's life: "I took my leave ofhim in bed, where
I left that great and excellent man in teares on some private discourse of crosses that had befallen
his illustrious family . . . and the misery of his country now embroiled in Civil War." 15* Arundel
died in Padua shortly thereafter at the age of 62.
Despite this unhappy end, Thomas Howard, 2nd Earl of Arundel must be remembered for
his achievements rather than his failures. Overall, he was very successful in the areas that mattered
most to him — loyal service to his monarch and restoration of the honor of his illustrious family —
by securing titles and lost estates, patronizing the arts and scholarship, and playing a role in political
and diplomatic affairs. His embassy to the Emperor in 1636 was one of the more visible ofhis many
contributions to English political life in the first half of the seventeenth century.
1"Hervey, 450, in the prelude to Arundel's "Remembrances" for Evelyn, which recommended
worthy sights in several Italian cities (particularly Milan).
1"Robinson, 1 16. It seemed Arundel did not trust his family to mourn his loss respectfully, as he
added the following melancholy line to his epitaph concerning their comportment after his death: "As also
I could wish (if it might bee) those of my Family might mourne for mee only in Ash Colour, in respect it
is the Colour of Ashes into which my flesh is to Dissolve." (Hervey, 461). His will, epitaph, and last
wishes are printed in Hervey, app. II.
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7
Clement Radolt (1593-1670)
Background
Clement Radolt was bom in 1593 to a bourgeois family, probably in Vienna.1 His father Ander
Radolt held a government post as the chief administrator of the court hospital of Vienna
(Hofspitalmeister alda zu Wieri). After the death of Clement's mother, his father re-married in
February 1618, wedding the widow Elisabeth Thenner.2 The marriage was short-lived, however, as
Ander Radolt died in 1621, with sums from his salary and loans he had made to the hospital still
outstanding. His son Clement did not succeed in recovering the money from the government until
1629.3
In 1626, Clement Radolt was married for the first time, to Anna Susanna Grapler. Although
at this point he had only been in the Imperial service a short time, the Emperor sent a representative
to the wedding with the gift of a silver and gold-gilt wine service.4 The marriage, however, did not
last long, as Anna died the following year at age 19, presumably in childbirth as the result ofone of
1See fig. 4.
JHKA, FA R-10, ff. 1-6: 10, 15 Feb. 1618. Mrs. Thenner was the daughter of Caspar Schlogl,
former riding master (Rittmeister).
3Ibid., ff. 34-7: 29 Apr. 1629. The saga of retrieving the money unfolds in ff. 13-48.
4Ibid., f. 7: 23 July 1626; ibid., HFB 716 (1626), f. 228.
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the many illnesses associated with it5 Radolt married again in 1628; this time his bride was Helena
Constantia von Scholz, daughter of a former Vice Chancellor of Lower Austria.6 Radolt also
outlived his second wife. In February 1640 he married for the final time Magdalena BonacinL nee
Countess ofNieva, the widow of former Imperial treasury councillor Hieronymo BonacinL7 By his
several wives, Radolt had three sons — Wolf Franz, Johann Anton, and Franz Galeazzo — and two
daughters — Benigna Constantia and Maria Teresia.* Franz Galeazzo, the youngest, was the child
of Magdalena Radolt, while Helena Radolt was the mother of others.9
Radolt's Catholic religious background is not in any way singular in the way the Catholicism
of John Taylor and the Earl of Arundel was in Protestant England. His religion did not impede his
career but rather made it possible, as the Emperor had little toleration for Protestants in his country
5She was buried in the south aisle of St. Stephan's Cathedral, with Radolt's information engraved
on the marker beside hers, though not his death date (JSSOJahre St. Stephan Symbol und Mitle in Wien
1 147-1197: 226. Sonderausstellung, Historisches Museum der Stadl Wien, Dom-und Metropolitankapitel
Wien, 24. April bis 31. August 1997 [Vienna: Museen der Stadt Wien, 1997], 214; Paul Harrer, "Wien,
seine Hauser, Menschen und Kultur," typed ms. in Wiener Stadt- und Landesarchiv, 1951-7, vol. 3, 173).
6WStLA, GB 1/14, f. 259. The Emperor again gave the couple a silver and gold-gilt beverage
service— apparently this type of gift was standard issue for an Imperial official of Radolt" s rank (HKA, FA
R-10, ff. 11-2: 19 July 1628).
7Pfarrarchiv St. Stephan, Protocollum Copulatorum, vol. 16, f. 152; Anton Koczirz,
"Osterreichische Lautenmusik zwischen 1650 und 1720," Studien zur Musihvissenschafi, 5 (1918): 55 n.
7. She lived until 1662, when she died of obstructed kidneys at age 51 (ibid., n. 5).
"Maria Teresia was baptized on 29 May 1636 and Johann Anton on 12 May 1639 (ibid., 54 n. 2).
9ibid. Franz Galeazzo was not the only child of Clement and Magdalena Radolt, but he was
surely the only one who survived to adulthood, as the others are not mentioned in their father's will. In the
birth registers of St. Stephen's several baby girls were baptized who were very likely their daughters,
despite some discrepancies in the record (noted in parentheses), including Clara on 4 January 1644
(mother recorded as Catharina), Maria Lucretia on 23 August 1648, Anna on 28 March 165 1 (father
recorded as Martinus Radoldt) (ibid., 55 n. 6).
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let alone in his service.10 From all indications, he was observant ifnot devout: both of his daughters
became sisters of the Convent of St. Jakob in Vienna; and his will is full of religious references,
whether it be to masses to be said for his soul, generous bequests to religious foundations, or
personal items of religious significance. 11 Counter-Reformation Catholicism informed his attitudes
and is fundamental to understanding his conduct in both his private and public life.
Education and Early Career
As a young man Clement Radolt studied law.1- He may have already been thinking of a career in
government service, since university training — particularly in law — was viewed as desirable
preparation for employment in the expanding secular bureaucracy.13 He likely received his
preparatory training at a Latin school or with a private tutor, as was the case with many of the
students matriculating in law. Although there were usually no formal requirements for entry into
law school, students needed a firm grasp of oral and written Latin to survive since it was the
language of instruction.14
I0Administrative posts were almost exclusively filled by Catholics in this period (Evans,
Habsburg Monarchy, 76).
"See below, p. 303.
12There is no record that Radolt studied law at the University of Vienna, but there are many holes
in the matriculation records of the law faculty.
13Helmut Coing, "Die juristische Fakultat und ihr Lehrprogramm," in Neuere Zeil (1500-1800):
Das Zeitaiter des Gemeinen Rechts, vol. 2, Handbuch der Quellen und Literatttr der neueren
europdischen Privatrechtgeschichte, ed. Helmut Coing, (Munich: Beck'sche Vcrlagsbuchhandlung,
1977), pt. I, 68; Olaf Pedersen, "Tradition and Innovation," in Universities in Early Modern Europe
(1500-1800), ed. Hilde de Ridder-Symoens, A History of the University in Europe, ed. Walter RQegg,
vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
"Coing, 49, 68-9.
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It was likely that by 162 1 Radolt had finished his studies and was officially a.Juris utriusque
Doctor, that is, a doctor of canon and civil (Roman) law, because he was taken onto the law faculty
of the University of Vienna in that year. The possession ofa doctorate in law opened doors for bis
future career and provided opportunities for social mobility that were eagerly sought by the upper-
middling sort: "it [the doctorate in law] could be used to support the aristocratic pretensions of the
ever more educated urban patriciate . . . [and] also became an important weapon in the great social
reorganization that the rising bourgeoisies were demanding almost everywhere in Europe.'"5
Theoretically, this status also brought with it certain privileges, such as exemption from taxation.
This was particularly true if the doctor of law was a member of a university like Radolt was.16
Radolt held various positions at the University of Vienna over the years. He served as the
procurator of the Rhenish nation, in 162 1 , and twice as procurator of the Austrian nation, in 1627
and again in 1629. 17 The procurators were the elected leaders ofeach of the four nations represented
at the University — Austrian, Rhenish, Hungarian, and Saxon. They served as representatives and
administrators for their respective nations, and as such they each held a seat on the University
consistory. The procurators also elected the rector, with the Austrian procurator being the most
lsWillem Frijhoff, "Graduation and Careers," chap. in Universities in Early Modern Europe, 368.
l6Ibid., 369.
1'Nothing is worse than a man of low condition when he rises to high estate ("Nil est detenus
humili cum surgit in altum"): the motto of Dr. Clemens de Radolt as Rhenish procurator of the University
of Vienna in 162 1. Nothing good without pain ("Nul bien sans peine"): the motto of the same as Austrian
procurator in 1627 (Johann Joseph Locher, Spekulum Academician Viennensis, seu Magistratus
antiquissimae et celeberrimae Universitatis Viennensis, a primo ejusdem auspicio ad nostra tempora
chronologice. historice, el lemmatice [Vienna: Leopoldi Joannis Kaliwoda, 1773-5], vol. I, 187, 229).
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influential because he held the tie-breaking vote." Radolt must have acquitted his duties
satisfactorily, since he was thrice elected to the position of procurator.
By 163 1, Clement Radolt had achieved such reputation among his colleagues that he was
elected dean of the law faculty." The usual term was one year.30 It perhaps seems surprising that
Radolt, while not a professor, was chosen to head the faculty. However, by the seventeenth century
it was not unusual for those who were interested in attaining academic honors and were in the
position to promote faculty interests to be elected to the University of Vienna law faculty instead of
law professors. Indeed, in the years between 1626 and 1740, only twenty professors were chosen
as law deans, while the others were high-ranking civil servants like Radolt.21
Career in the Imperial Service
At the same time as he was carrying out his duties at the University, Clement Radolt began his long
and devoted career in government service in the Imperial court treasury {Hofkammer). It was the
highest Imperial financial authority and had the main responsibility for managing the revenues used
to finance the Imperial court and central government.22 Revenues were derived from two principal
"Artur Goldmann, "Die Universitat, 1529-1740," in Vom Ausgange das Mittelalters bis zum
Regierungsantriu der Kaiserin Maria Theresia, 1140, ed. Anton Mayer, vol. 6, Geschichte derStadt
Wien (Vienna: Verlagdes Altertumsvereins zu Wien, 1918), 90-2.
"Locher, vol. 1, 108, 187-8, 229; ibid., vol. 2, 43.
20Until 1629, the dean usually served a semester, after that date, the term was changed to a year
(Goldmann, 88).
21Ibid., 89.
"Fellner, vol. 1, 78-9. The Hojkammer consisted of four divisions, or Expeditionen: one for
Imperial and Hungarian business; one for Bohemian, Silesian, and Moravian; one for Upper and Lower
Austrian; and the last for mountain towns (Bergstadte), which included matters of the military and its
supply (ibid., 86). Its administrative unity was disrupted after 1564, when Inner Austria and the Tyrol
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sources: the crown domains and regalia; and the grants made by the estates of the hereditary lands.
The Hojkammer administered the first as well as the indirect taxes that were not granted by the
estates, for instance taxes on certain alcoholic beverages and foodstuffs; these revenues provided
primary funding for the court and government The grants of the estates ("extraordinary" revenues)
mainly financed the military, and as such were allotted by the war council (Hojkriegsrat) and
chancelleries rather than the Hojkammer. The Hojkammer, however, still acted in consultation with
these bodies. Thus, despite its seemingly wide purview over Imperial finances, the Hojkammer was
not a central treasury in the modem sense, able to survey completely and control all government
income and expenses, but rather its functions remained restricted throughout most ofthe seventeenth
century.23
In the seventeenth century, the Hojkammer was run by a hierarchy of specialized personnel.
It was overseen by the president (President), who usually came from one of the prominent families
of the Austrian-Bohemian nobility. Under him were the vice president (Vizeprasideni), director
(JDirektor), and councillors (Rate).24 The Hojkammer had its own chancellery consisting ofthe head
secretaries {Sekretaref5 and the necessary clerical personnel (Konzipisteri) to support them, as well
came under the rule of cadet branches of the Habsburg family. These areas developed their own
administrative bodies, including separate treasuries in Graz and Innsbruck, and their revenues therefore
no longer fell under the Hojkammer' s purview.
23Schwarz, 29.
24In 1637, there were six councillors: Johann Baptist Weber, Jacob Berthold von Ungersdorff,
Johann Christoph Schellendorff, Bartholomaus Schollhardt, Hieronymo Bonacini (husband of Radolrs
third wife, Magdalena), and Radolt himself.
25There were three: one responsible for drawing up documents for Bohemia (in German); one for
Hungary; and one for the Empire (Friedrich von Hurler, Friedensbestrebungen Kaiser Ferdinands II.
[Vienna: BraumQUer, 1860], 245-6; Eduard Vehse, Geschicfue des oslerreichischen Hojs undAdels und
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as accounting personnel such as the paymasters (Hofzahlmeister) for civil and military expenditures,
and a bookkeeper (Buchhalter), appraiser (Taxator), registrar (Registrator), and dispatching clerk
(Expeditor).
The Hofkammer council was a coliegial body — every councillor voted on the issues brought
before it
,
and the majority carried the decision. In many ways this system was slow and
cumbersome, but it had the advantages that each councillor was informed of its proceedings and that
the president alone was not held accountable for failed policies.26 The council met frequently to vote
on current financial business brought before it by the secretaries and to discuss ways to increase
revenues, minimize expenditures, secure loans on favorable terms, and redeem mortgaged sources
of revenue. The most important financial issues were to be brought weekly before the privy council,
and if necessary by the president before the Emperor, who was in any case to approve large
payments.27
Radolt's work in the Hojkammer laid the basis for the rest of his career, for he held posts of
increasing importance there over a period of 45 years. He certainly had good reason to seek a
position there. Opportunities for advancement were abundant in the Imperial service at this time,
and jurists in particular were in demand in the expanding Imperial administration. Also, when he
was growing up, the archive of the Hojkammer was located in the hospital overseen by his father —
der osterreichischen Diplomat ie, Gcschichte der deutschen Hflfe seit der Reformation [Hamburg:
Hoffman und Campe, 1851-3], vol. 4, 120-2).
26I am grateful to Dr. Christian Sapper of the Finanz- und Hofkammerarchiv for this information.
"Fellner, vol. 1, 68-77; Christoph Link, "Die Verwaltung in den einzelnen Territorien," in Vom
SptttmilteUdur bis zum Ends des Reiches, vol. 1, Deutsche Verwaltungsgeschichie, ed. Kurt G. A.
Jeserich, Hans Pohl, and Georg-Christoph von Unruh (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt), 499-500.
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perhaps young Radolt first developed an interest in government finances there. In any event, he was
first appointed as a Hojkammer secretary in November 1625, four years after he was taken onto the
University faculty." By 1632, he was promoted to the position of councillor.29 This was the next
logical step for Radolt. Councillors were promoted almost exclusively from the ranks of the
Hojkammer secretaries or the Lower Austrian administration. Also, they were required to have legal
training, political experience, and a knowledge ofmilitary matters, since important financial issues
were often discussed with the aulic council, chancellery, and war council.30 After many years of
devoted service asa.Hojkammer councillor, Radolt was finally appointed director in October 1656.31
It was a position of great responsibility, for he presumably frequently represented the president in
his absence, taking on such responsibilities as leading council meetings and casting the determining
vote in the case of a tie.32 Radolt continued to serve as director up until his death in 1670.
2*HKA, HFB 714(1625), f. 368: 13 Nov. 1625, "Intimations Dekret an Doktor Clemens Radolt
daO er zum Hof Camer Secretario angenomben worden iB."
"His salary was then raised to 1300 gulden (1000 gulden ordinary salary plus 300 additional
annually, * 867 thalers), a level commensurate with the aulic councillors, i.e., members of the Emperor's
aulic council (HKA, FA R-10,ff. 5 1-2: 9 Nov. 1632; ibid., f. 53: 19Nov. 1632; Fellner, vol. I, 86 n. I).
Hojkammer councillors were considered of the same rank as aulic and war councillors under Leopold I.
Only age gave precedence among them (Adam Wolf, "Die Hofkammer unter Leopold I,"
Sitzungsberichte der Kaiserlichen Akademie der Wissenschajten, philosophisch-historische Klasse 1 1
[1853]: 445).
Mlbid.
31AVA, Hofadelsakten, Radolt, Konv. 13 Aug. 1656, f. 4; HKA, FA R-10, ff. 60-7: 13, 15,26
Aug. 1656.
"Although no instructions exist for the Hojkammer director, it is apparent from his title and
salary (1800 gulden annually [1200 thalers], as opposed to the 1300 paid to a councillor and 2600 to the
president) that he occupied a position above the rest of the councillors (I am again grateful to Dr.
Christian Sapper for this information).
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In addition to his regular duties, over the years Radolt took up several special appointments
that were also associated with the Hqfkammer. For instance, he acted as inspector of the Lower
Austrian bookkeeping department in 1637 and as principal commissioner for the visitation of
Gmunden in 1654.33 He made trips to Innsbruck, Pressburg (Bratislava), and places in Hungary,
presumably in connection with financial matters. Radolt also took part in the administration of the
Imperial army beginning in 1639, when he served as councillor of the Lower Austrian Regiment.34
Throughout the 1640s and 1630s he was involved with provisioning the army, first as sergeant
provisioning-master (Obrist Proviantmeister) from 1646 to 1648 and then as general field
provisioning-master {General Feldproviantmeister).i$ The council of war, in cooperation with the
Hqfkammer, appointed the provisioning commissioners, who were responsible for buying,
distributing, and accounting for provisions for the army. At this time, however, the system of
provisioning was not reliable due to money flow and supply problems.36
The work of the Hojkammer in the early modem period, particularly during the Thirty Years'
War, was extremely challenging. As Henry Frederick Schwarz pointed out:
33HKA, FA R-10, ff. 54-5: 31 Aug. 1637; ibid., HZAB 100 (1654), f. 452.
uBeitrage zur Geschichle der Niederdsterreichischen Statthalterei: Die Landeschefs und Rathe
dieser Behorde von 1501 bis 1896 (Vienna: Nieder6sterreichischen Statthalterei, 1897), 439.
35WStLA, GB 1/15, f. 273; KA, Hofkriegsrat, Protokolle, Registratur and Expedit, 1646-59, vols.
294-320. In 1670, after his death, Radolfs family received a monthly payment of 50 gulden (= 33 thalers)
from the army (ibid., vols. 337-8).
'"Christoph Tepperberg, "Das kaiserliche Heernach dem Prager Frieden 1635-1650," in Der
Schwed ist im Land!: Das Ende des DreiJSigfdhrigen Krieges in Niederdsterreich, Ausstellung der Stadt
Horn im Hobartmuseum 22 Juni bis 2 November 1995 (Horn, Lower Austria: Museumsverein in Horn,
1995), 129.
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Of all the manifold problems which faced the House of Habsburg, that of finances
was one of the most serious. It is almost impossible to overemphasize the financial
difficulties under which the administration labored in the seventeenth century. Lack
of money was a constant problem; the Turkish wars of the sixteenth century were a
tremendous drain only exceeded during the period of extraordinary expenses
resulting from the Thirty Years' War. . . . Unable to pay its armies, its diplomats, or
its officials, dependent in large measure on subsidies from Spain or the mortgaging
of its territory, the House of Austria came close to bankruptcy . . . f
The war's impact on Imperial finances was immense. As previously mentioned, the income ofUpper
Austria was lost until 1628 as it was mortgaged to Maximilian of Bavaria to cover his costs for the
Bohemian war. The assumed debt of four million gulden doubled in the years from 16 19 to 1624 .3*
The financial burden on the Imperial government only became worse as the Emperor was forced to
alienate long-term sources of revenue, for instance by mortgaging crown properties, in favor of
"quick-fix" sums often borrowed on unfavorable terms. He was continually seeking loans from
foreign princes and from his own councillors, including Radolt.39 Under these circumstances the
"Schwarz, 28-9. For the attempts of Anton Wolfradt, Abbot of Kremsmunster and Bishop of
Vienna, and president of the Hojkammer from 1623 to 1630, to rationalize and improve the state of
Imperial finances by creating a central treasury, see Schwarz, 120-1, 386, and Fellner, vol. 1, 83-5. To
this end the Inner Austrian treasury was unified for a time with the Hofkammer (Ferdinand II was ruler of
both the main crown lands and Inner Austria).
"Ibid., 83. This sum equaled about 2,666,667 thaiers.
"For instance, when Ferdinand was desperately seeking money to pay the army in 1634, he not
only tried to secure subsidies from the Archbishop of Salzburg and Italian princes, but also required that
almost all of his ministers contribute as well: Eggenberg was to pay 10,000 florins; the Prince-Bishop of
Vienna, 5,000; the other privy councillors, the Hojkammer president, and the Statthaller each 3,000; the
Hojkammer councillors each 800; the Hojkammer secretaries and the aulic councillors each 200, and so
on down to the last civil official (BA, n.s., pt. 2, vol. 8, Januar 1633-Mai 1634, ed. Kathrin Bierther
[Munich: Oldenbourg, 1982], 653: 15 Mar. 1634, StOcklin to Maximilian I). The Hofzahlamtsbucher, or
court treasury books, show clearly that Radolt lent generously—over the years he received payments from
various incoming sources of revenue to pay off loans he had made to the government.
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Imperial government had a difficult time paying the salaries of the many officials who kept it
running 40
Radolt's appointments were not restricted to those directly associated with the Hojkammer.
He filled many other positions in the Imperial government throughout his career. Perhaps the most
prominent were those as an Imperial representative. He traveled on the Emperor's behalf to Italy
(Florence) in 1632, and the following year to the royal court in Poland. In 1634, Rado It journeyed
first to the cadet Habsburg court at Salzburg (where he represented the Emperor numerous times
over the years) and then to several Italian residence cities (including Turin, Genoa, Parma, Modena,
and Florence) to raise subsidies and loans for the Imperial army.41 Perhaps his most illustrious
appointment was as extraordinary ambassador to the court of Charles I in 1636-7. This mission,
which will be discussed in detail below, played a prominent role in Anglo-Imperial diplomatic
relations of the 1630s, not least because Radolt was the first ambassador to represent the Emperor
in England since Count Schwarzenberg's embassy in 1622. After his return from England, Radolt
continued his diplomatic activities, for instance as the Imperial representative in Transylvania in
1659-60.
Radolt's service as an Imperial representative played an important role in his continued
promotion through the social and political ranks. It was certainly influential in his elevation to the
"Wolf, 473.
41G. Gliubich, ed., "Gli uItimi succcssi di Alberto di Waldstein narrati dcgli Ambasciatori veneti,"
Archtvfir Kunde osterreichischer Geschichtsquellen 28 ( 1863), 428: 25 Feb. 1634, Relation of Antonio
Antelmi; BA, n.s., pt. 2, vol. 8, 540: 1 Mar. 1634, Richel to Maximilian I. Instructions for this mission are
in HHStA, RK KrA, Fasz. 107, f. 143 . In the wake of Wallenstein's murder, the Emperor was looking for
money to pay and supply the army, in order to ensure its loyalty to the new Imperial military leadership.
In Venice, Radolt was to look for 4,000,000 florins supposedly hidden by Wallenstein {BA, n.s., pt 2,
vol. 8, 653: 15 Mar. 1634, Stucklin to Maximilian I).
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rank ofbaron (Freiherr) in 1656. In the official grant, the Emperor Ferdinand III specifically stated
that Radolt was being raised to a barony for his more than thirty years of loyal and efficient service
in many capacities to him and to his father Ferdinand II,
the foremost among them [his missions] to the various royal courts in England and
Poland, also many times to Italy, and other countries to various respective Arch- and
Grand Dukes, also [to] other princes and republics and other potentates' courts,
important commissions, missions, and duties entrusted to him.42
In addition to these political and diplomatic duties, Radolt's artistic talents brought him some
rather creative Imperial commissions. At some point, he had become a skilled draftsman with a
particular knack for drawing architectural structures. Whether he had any formal education in this
way, however, is uncertain. The first evidence of his talent surfaces during his embassy to Charles
I in 1636, when he commissioned an engraving of his rendering ofSt. Stephan's Cathedral from the
south from the Dutchman Cornelius van Dalen in London. He had the piece printed in memory of
his homeland, and accordingly dedicated it to Ferdinand II. It was later reprinted in Matthaus
Merian's Topographia Provinciarum Austriacamm.43 Radolt's skills in architectural draftsmanship,
which are immediately apparent in this work, must have been noticed at the Imperial court, for he
42"vorderist aber in denen an die Unterschiedliche Itfinigliche hSffin Engelandt unndt Poln, auch
zu mchrmahl in Italia, unndt andren landern bey und [er]schiedlichen respecktive Erz: unndt
groBherzogen, auch andem fttrstn unndt Republichen und anderer Potentate hoffe, Itime aufgetragenen
wichtigen Commission, absandungen und Verrichtungen." (AVA, Hofadelsakten, Radolt, Konv. 13 Aug.
1656, f. 4).
4i850 Jahre St. Stephen, 213-4, 450. This information was kindly supplied by Prof. Dr. Richard
Perger. A reproduction of the engraving "Turns S. Stephana Viennae Austriae" is printed in the exhibition
catalog, on p. 213. A cartouche in the upper left-hand comer gives a brief history of the Cathedral and
information about the creator of the drawing. It was originally printed, without the cartouche, in Martin
Zeiller, Topographia Provinciarum Austriacarum. Austriae, Styriae, Carinthiae, Carniolae, Tyrolis, etc.:
das ist Beschreibung und Abbildung der furnembsten Stmt und Platz in den osterreichischen Landen
Under und Ober Oslerreich, Steyer, Karndten, Crain und Tyrol (Frankfurt a. M.: Matthaus Merian,
1649).
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was involved with the renovation of the portals and gates of the Imperial palace in Vienna (the
Hofburg) in 1654. By 1660, he was entrusted with the direction ofa construction project to expand
the Hojburg, a duty he fulfilled until Johann Ludwig, Count Starhemberg was named as his
successor in April 1663. 14
Given the crown's notorious shortage of cash through much of the seventeenth century,
financial rewards for its dependents, such as Radolt, were modest — they were lucky to be paid at all,
let alone in a timely fashion. One might ask, then, how the Austrian Habsburgs succeeded in
retaining the service and loyalty of their officials, for succeed they did. The answer is found in the
calculated conferral ofa coveted resource that the crown held an inexhaustible supply — privilege.'45
In the absence of adequate material compensation, the Habsburgs relied heavily on titles ofnobility
to reward and retain loyal servants.
This system of rewards for service ensured a high level of social mobility in the Austrian-
Bohemian nobility. For a successful upper-level bureaucrat like Radolt, it meant the conferral upon
him of increasingly high degrees of rank and status as his career progressed. Therefore, he must be
counted among the " Briefadel" a group of nobles who had earned their titles through careers in the
Imperial service.4* In April 1628, while still a Hojkammer secretary, he made the leap from
"HKA, Niederosterreichische Herrschaftsakten, I527-I660, Fasz. W-6I/A/2/2, ff. 833-4: IS Apr.
1654, Radolt to Vicedom Carl Constantin Ulrich von Genghoven; ibid., ff. 841-2, 850: 5 July 1660,
Hinterlassene Hofkammer to Radolt; ibid., f. 877: 4 Apr. 1663, Hofkammer to Johann Ludwig, Count
Starhemberg.
"John P. Spielman, The City & The Crown: Vienna and the Imperial Court 1600-1740 (West
Lafayette, Ind.: Purdue University Press, 1993), 70-1.
46Rudolf Endres, Adel in der Fruhen Neuzeit, EnzyklopSdie Deutscher Geschichte, vol. 18
(Munich: Oldenbourg, 1993), 22. In the Austrian crown lands, there were five levels of nobility in the
early modem period, listed from the top down: 1) Fiirstenstand (prince); 2) Grqfenstand (count); 3)
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commoner to nobleman when he was raised to the lowest level of nobility, the einfache Adelstand.
At this time, he was already known personally to the Emperor.47 The next month, Ferdinand II
conferred the honorary title ofHofrat, or councillor, upon Radolt.4* These titles paved the way for
bis promotion to Hqfkammer councillor in 1632.49 In 1652, after many years ofdistinguished service
as a councillor and representative in the Imperial service, Radolt was raised to the rank of knight
(Ritter) in the Austrian-Bohemian nobility and honored with the noble title Clement Edler von
Radolt. This title was a personal rather than a hereditary award.50 Four years later, however, under
the grant of the grofies Palatinat, he and his son Franz Galeazzo were elevated to the rank of
hereditary baron in the Imperial and Austrian-Bohemian nobility and his coat of arms was
Herrenstand (baron); 4) Ritterstand (knight); and 5) einfache Adelstand ("simple" nobleman). The first
three made up the high nobility, and the last two the lesser nobility (ibid., 18-9).
47AVA, Reichsadelsakten, Radolt, Konv. 24 Apr. 1628, ff. 1-7. A description and colored sketch
of the new coat of arms is on f. 4 (see fig. 5). A description and sketch are also printed in Johann
Siebmacher, Niederdsterreichischer Adel, ed. Johann Kimbauer von Erzstatt, vol. 4, sect. 4, Grofies und
allgemeines Wappenbuch, ed. Otto Titan von Hefner, new rev. ed. (Nuremberg: Bauer und Raspe, 1909),
vol. 26, pt. 1, 37 1, pi. 203 (Radolt I). It is apparent that his family already possessed a coat of arms. When
the Imperial privy council was considering raising Radolt to the nobility, Ferdinand, King of Hungary,
remarked that his father, the Emperor, knew Radolt personally (AVA, Reichsadelsakten, Radolt, Konv.
24 Apr. 1628, f. 4).
4*HKA, FAR-10, f. 9: 27 May 1628. Hofrat was (and still is) an honorary title often conferred
upon higher civil servants and prominent private citizens.
"This position was considered to be equal in status to an aulic councillor when Radolt was
promoted (ibid., ff. 51-2: 9 Nov. 1632; ibid., f. 53: 19 Nov. 1632; Fellner, vol. 1, 86 n. 1). Most
Hojkammer councillors were either knights or barons in the 1660s, though there were always capable,
ambitious commoners among their number (Wolf, 444; Evans, Habsburg Monarchy, 148).
S0AVA, Hofadelsakten, Radolt, Konv. 1652, ff. 1-8: 18 Sept. 1652, PrSdikatsverleihung.
However, as early as 1621 he was referred to as Clement de Radolt.
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5 Tfce Coat of Arms of Clement Radolt (1628)
In April 1628, Radolt made the leap from commoner to nobleman when Ferdinand U raised him
to the lowest level of nobility, the einfache Adelstand. His family's existing coat of arms was
improved to reflect his new status. With a successful career in the Imperial service, Radolt
continued to rise through the social ranks. In 16S2, Ferdinand HI raised him to the rank of
knight, and in 1656, to the rank of hereditary baron in the Imperial and Austrian-Bohemian
nobility.
From Allgemeines Verwaltungsarchiv, Reichsadelsakten, Radolt, Konv. 24 Apr. 1628, f. 4.
297
298
improved;5 1at the same time, he was promoted from councillor to director of the Hqfkammer. Wolf
Franz and Johann Anton, Radolt's two sons from his previous marriage, were both eligible to receive
the honor at their father's discretion." The rewards of social privilege that the Emperor bestowed
upon Radolt over his long and loyal career attest to the value placed on his service and perhaps also
to the penury of the crown.
In addition to the titles and privileges he accumulated, Radolt managed to do quite well for
himself financially in the Imperial service. Although salaries for Imperial officials were neither
overly generous nor regularly paid, an official was commonly allowed to augment his earnings by
collecting a fee or honorarium for services rendered to those who were not his own superiors. This
system of collecting "user fees" for government service worked well under the circumstances and
was an accepted practice that was clearly distinguished from bribery.53 A high-ranking treasury
official like Radolt surely would be presented with plenty of opportunities to serve the needs of
appreciative clients and accumulate the accompanying rewards.
51The grofies Palatinat, a prerogative often accompanying the elevation to the rank of count and
almost always pertaining to the status of prince, conferred both honorary and financial benefits. The
privileges varied, but usually included the right to legitimize, confer elevations in rank upon those lower
down on the social scale, appoint notaries, and mint money (Schwarz, 396). Radolt's new coat of arms is
described on AVA, Hofadelsakten, Radolt, Konv. 1652, f. 8: 18 Sept 1652, Pradikatsverleihung
Hofadelsakten.
"Ibid., Konv. 13 Aug. 1656, ff. 1-53; HKA, FA R-IO, ff. 64-7: 13 Aug. 1656. For a sketch and
description of the arms, see Siebmacher, vol. 26, pt. 1, 371, pi. 203 (Radolt Il). It is likely that Franz
Galeazzo was given special consideration due to the noble background of his mother. According to
Radolfs wishes, Wolf Franz and Johann Anton could be elevated to the Freiherrnstand during their
father's lifetime, after his death, or not at all; if the latter had been the case, they would have still been
eligible to use the title "Edle von Radolt."
"Spielman, 71.
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Another way Radolt could profit from his office was through manipulation of the system of
court quartering (Hofquartierung) that was instituted by Ferdinand I in Vienna and carried on by his
successors. Under this system, Imperial officials — and their horses — were effectively billeted in the
homes of the Viennese populace. By the seventeenth century, court quartering effectively provided
rent-controlled housing for the underpaid servants and officials of the court. The occupant of the
court quarter paid a fee, or Tax, to the landlord compelled to extend his hospitality. This biennial
contribution amounted to less than the market rental value of the quarter, but still compensated the
landlord in some way (when he could collect it) for the unsolicited invasion of his home.
With this system in operation, court officials like Radolt could and did reap tidy profits by
investing in Viennese real estate. An Imperial official who was eligible for a court quarter and
owned his own home could request, and was usually granted, quarter in his own house. This was
exactly what Radolt did.54 This meant that he not only had the best rooms in the house plus any
remaining rooms not subject to court quarter for his own use (as the owner), but also that he had
control over the second-best rooms in the house (as his own court quarter) for either the use of his
family or to rent out at market value. The higher an official stood in the government hierarchy, the
more spacious his grant of quarter. Thus an owner of a large house, particularly if he were a court
official who held the privilege of court quarter, could make a lucrative living simply by managing
his own property."
MHKA, HQ QB 51 (1638-51), f. 6. In 1643, Radolt requested a visitation of his two houses,
probably to secure more favorable quartering terms for himself (ibid., f. 208).
"Spiclman, 75-7, 88.
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Home ownership apparently proved a worthwhile investment for Radolt. He owned two
properties in the heart of Vienna, both ofwhich remained in his possession until his death and were
passed on to his heirs. The first was a house near St. Peter's cemetery at Bauemmarkt 1 , in a prime
location within eyeshot of St. Stephan's Cathedral. It was a very large house (as can be seen by the
enumeration of its rooms in the court quartering books, or Hofquartierungsbucher), a grand
patrician's home in medieval times, with a courtyard and fountain.56 In 1631, Radolt bought a
second, newer but smaller house at Annagasse 16/18, also centrally located in the present-day first
district of Vienna.57
It is clear that Radolt was able to make a very comfortable living in the Imperial service. The
successful marriages and careers of his children were a further indication of his financial and social
success. His eldest son Wolf Franz served as a Hojkammer councillor like his father. In 1661 he
married Jacobina Barbara, daughter of the Imperial councillor and regent ofLower Austria Martin
Hafner and his wife Helena, nee Teublin.5' Sadly, Wolf Franz did not survive his father — he died
in the house on Annagasse on 10 February 1663, at the age of 29.59 He left behind two daughters,
^HKA, HQ QB 19 (1664), ff. 129-31. In the Hofquartierungsbucher each room, chamber, and
stall in the private houses within city walls is enumerated for the purpose of assignment of living space to
officials of the Imperial court.
"Ibid., f. 343. The house on Annagasse is an early sixteenth century structure (Harrer, vol. 5,
355-6). It was apparently only large enough for the assignment of court quarters for some Hofkammer
clerical personnel (who would not have claim to much space), in addition to the rooms reserved for the
owner (HKA, HQQB 65 [1671], ff. 16-7).
"Koczirz, 54 n. 2. They were married on 21 February 1661 in the Chapel of St. Barbara by the
prelate of Heiligen Kreuz.
5,HKA, FA R-10, ff. 72-3: 29 Apr. 1659; ibid., HZAB 106 (1660-1), f. 6; ibid., HZAB 107
(1662), f. 129; ibid., HZAB 108(1663), f. 5. Wolf Franz died of a catarrh, an illness akin to a cold or the
flu that is characterized by a raw cough and flowing phlegm. He was a councillor from 1659 to 1663.
This implies not only that he had legal training, but also that he had previous experience in government.
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Maria Anna and Maria Franziska, who was bom posthumously.60 Franz Galeazzo, Radolfs youngest
son, also proved quite successful, joining the Imperial service and making a very good match to
boot. In 1667 he married Maria Polixena, Baroness Schwarzenhom, daughter of the famed Imperial
ambassador to the Ottoman Porte, Johann Rudolf, Baron Schwarzenhom and bis wife Helena, nee
Fellner von Feldegg.61 Their first son, Wenzel Ludwig, was bom later that year, he became a man
of independent means and would go on to become a musician and composer of some importance.*2
6°Koczirz, 54-5 n. 2. Maria Anna was baptized on 18 August 1662 and her sister Maria Franziska
on 6 August 1663.
61Peter Meienberger, Johann Rudolf Schmid zum Schwarzenhorn als kaiserlicher Resident in
Konstantinopel in den Jahren 1629-1643: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der diplomatischen Beziehungen
zwischen Osterreich und der Turkei in der erslen Halfte des 1 7. Jahrhunderts, Geist und Werk der
Zeiten, Arbeiten aus dem Historischen Seminar der UnivereitSt Zurich, ed. Rudolf von Albertini, vol. 37
(Bern: Herbert Lang; Frankfurt a. M.: Peter Lang, 1973), 141. The couple was married on 30 January
1667 at the Schottenkirche by the Altenburger prelate (Koczirz, 55). The fate of the Radolt family
through the mid-eighteenth century may be traced in Friedrich von Haan, "Genealogische Auszugc aus
den beim bestandenen Niederosterreichischen Landmarschal I'schen Gerichte publicierten Testamenten,"
Jahrbuch der k. k. Gesellschaft "Adler, " n.s. 10 (1900): 80-319.
"Koczirz, 56. Wenzel Ludwig was baptized at the Michaelerkirche on 18 December 1667, with
Prince Lobkowitz, Count Sinzendorf (president of the aulic council), and Dorothea Elisabetha Princess of
Holstein as sponsors (ibid.). He became an amateur lutenist and composer, his only publication being Die
aller treueste, verschwigneste und nach so wohl frdhlichen als traurigen Humor sich richtende Freindin
(Vienna, 170 1), which was dedicated to Emperor Joseph I. "In Austrian and Bohemian court circles
around 1700 Radolt was...the most important composer of delicately balanced ensemble writing with the
lute prominently featured." (Stanley Sadie, ed., New Grove Dictionary ofMusic and Musicians [London:
Grove's Dictionaries of Music, 1980], s.v. "Baron Wenzel Ludwig von Radolt," by Wolfgang Boetticher).
For more on Wenzel Ludwig's musical career, see: Anton Koczirz, "Klosterneuburger LautenbQcher,"
Musica Dtvina (Aug.-Sept. 1913): 176-7; Bill Samson and Martyn Hodgson, "VonRadolt's Instructions
to Lute Players (Vienna 1701)," FoMRfff Quarterly 45 (Oct. 1986): 48-55; and Tim Crawford, The
Historical Importance of Francois Dufault and His Influence on Musicians Outside France," paper given
at the colloquium "Le luth en I'Occident" at the Musee de la Musique, Paris, May 1998, accessed at
httpy/www.kcl.ac.uk/kis/schools/hums/music/nc/DufauItWP.html, 8 Aug. 2000). As a young man
Wenzel Ludwig dedicated himself to music, and he was subsequently married late in life, on 16 January
1708 to Maria Susanna Francisca, Baroness Grundeman, daughter of Ernst Constantin, Baron
Grundeman, Hofkammer councillor and/or councillor of the Lower Austrian regiment and provincial
commissioner (according to different sources), and Maria Eleonora, nee Countess Schallenberg. Their
distinguished witnesses were Prince Auersperg, Christoph Georg, Count Schallenberg, and Carl. Baron
Hackelberg. The marriage only lasted for eight years, for on 10 March 1716, Wenzel Ludwig died of a
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He was followed by a daughter, Maria Barbara, and another son, Joseph Anton." Franz Galeazzo
took up a position in the Imperial government in 1671, when he requested exemption from court
quartering (Quartiersfreiheit) for his newly inherited house on Annagasse.64 Four years later, he was
serving as Imperial Lord High Steward.65 In 1694, he petitioned to be made a member (through his
wife) of the Lower Austrian landholding nobility .66 The fact that two ofRadolfs three sons followed
their father into the expanding Imperial administration reinforces the tendency towards establishment
of family groupings in certain government branches. The career and fate of Johann Anton is
unknown, and there is no mention of him in his father's will. Both of Radolt's daughters became
sisters of the Convent of St Jakob in Vienna; only Benigna Constantia survived him.
Unfortunately not all of Radolfs children were around to see him laid to rest or to benefit
from his estate. By the time of his death, he had managed to accumulate a very respectable estate.
stroke at 49 years of age. His wife outlived him by 32 years, dying in 1748 of internal gangrene
(innerlicher Brand) at age 59 (Koczirz, 57). Four children of the marriage survived: Franz Karl, Leopold,
Wenzel, and Philipp.
"Maria Barbara and Joseph Anton were baptized at St. Stephen's on 19 September 1670 and 26
December 1671 respectively. Joseph Anton went on to become a Jesuit in Italy. Maria Barbara, also quite
pious, never married. An additional sister and brother died early on—Francisca in 1669 at a half year old,
and Karl Albert in 1675 at two-and-a-half years (ibid., 56).
"HKA, HQ QB 65 (1671), ff. 16-7; ibid., HQ Resolutionen, Kart. 6, 22 Dec. 1671; Karl August
Schimmer, Ausfiihrliche Hauser-Chronik der innern Stadt Wien. mil einer geschichtlichen Uebersicht
sammtlichcr Vorsiadle und ihrer merkwiirdigsten Gebdude (Vienna: Kuppitsch, 1849), 191. Franz
Galeazzo succeeded in obtaining six years' exemption from housing assignments. Now that he was the
owner of the house and was also a court offtcial, he could claim the court quarter in this house for himself
and retain its entire use for his own family.
"Koczirz, 56.
"Siebmacher, vol. 26, pt. I, 371. According to this source, shortly after the petition for the new
title was granted, Franz Galeazzo went mad, and it was bestowed instead upon his son, Wenzel Ludwig.
Franz Galeazzo lived until the age of 68, dying on 14 December 1716 of hectic fever, or Hectica. He was
followed in 1727 by his wife Maria Polixena, who died of a stroke at age 75 (Koczirz, 57).
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On 8 December 1670, Clement Freiherr von Radolt, Hojkammer director, died in his house on
Annagasse at the age of77.67 His body was interred not with his first wife in St. Stephan's Cathedral,
as recorded on the marker there, but in the family vault in the newly built Dominican Church."
Radolfs will offers insight into the financial status of the family in 1670. It is apparent that
he succeeded in building a substantial fortune. By the end of his life, Radolt owned the two houses
in Vienna as well as other properties, various items made of precious materials, debts owed him, and
cash — enough to leave generous bequests not only to his family members, friends, and servants, but
also to many charities, churches, and other religious foundations as well.69 Most important were the
two major properties in Vienna. Radolt left his large house on Bauernmarkt and its contents to his
granddaughters, Wolf Franz's daughters Maria Audi (Maria Anna) and Maria Franzl (Maria
<7Pfarrarchiv St. Stephan, Barleihbuch 1670, f. 146. His doctor determined the cause of death to
be a catarrh, specifically a Slöckh Catharr (Stuck Katarrh).
"Ibid. The vault is located in the right side aisle of the church, turned sideways in front of the
altar of St. Dominick. There is a red marble plate in the floor, on it inscribed: BURIAL VAULT OF THE
FAMILY B. RADOLT 1649, in this grave rests Clement von Radolt, Imperial Royal Hojkammer
Director, who in 1656 was raised with his three sons to the Freiherrnstand by Emperor Ferdinand [II. He
died in 1659. ("Eine rothe Marmorplatte im Boden, darauf: SEPULTURA|FAMILIAE|B. RADOLT] 1649
In diesem Begrabnisse ruhet Clemens von Radolt, k. k. Hof-Kammerdirekor, welcher mit seinem 3
Söhnen 1656 von Kaiser Ferdinand III in den Freiherrnstand erhoben wurde. Er starb 1659." ["Grabmale
und Grabinschriften in der Dominikaner-Kirche zu Wien," Berichte des Allerthums Vereines zu Wien 26
(1890): 211]). Church records, however, belie both this death date and that given in 850 Jahre St.
Stephan, 1668.
"HHStA, Oberstmarschallamt, Kart. 625: original will of 5 Nov. 1668, revised and corrected on
5 Sept. 1670. published on 7 Dec. 1670. This document includes an inventory of specific bequests of 6
November 1668, instructions for burial of 3 1 December 1666, and a benevolent agreement with the
Convent of St. Jakob in Vienna of December 1659 (an agreement which provided for the support of his
daughters there). Radolt wished for a Christian burial in the family vault, without pomp, display of arms,
or anything else of worldly familiarity ("ohn einige pomp, oder furstellung der Wappen, oder was sonsten
von weltlicher gewohnheit").
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Franziska).70 To his heir Franz Galeazzo, he left all his other properties — his garden and several
residences71 — and their contents, with the exception of the house on Annagasse. This along with all
the contents of his living room, his books, etc., he left to Franz Galeazzo's son Wenzel Ludwig, who
must have been a special favorite of his grandfather, however, Franz Galeazzo had care of the boy's
inheritance, at least while he was a minor.72
Apart from these properties, Radolt made many specific bequests, disposing of cash, plate,
and a wide range of jewelry and other artifacts made of precious metals and stones. In the latter
category, for instance, he left to Franz Galeazzo his mother's diamond wedding ring73 as weLl as a
beautiful sapphire ring; to Maria AudI, a hanging pearl and a band, long strip (Streissel) decorated
with diamonds; to Maria Franzl, a golden chain, various rings set with precious and semi-precious
stones,74 and a golden vessel (Schiifflein) containing "almonds" of amber, and to Wenzel Ludwig,
a large diamond lozenge, a neck chain with hanging Agnus Dei, and an honorary medal granted by
the King of England as a token of favor (Gnaden Pfennig).15
^WStLA, GB 1/15, f. 273; Harrer, vol. 1, 689.
7lThe garden is in "Unden Werth" and the residences in "Meyrhoff, Rothes Haus, Plach
Aloflekh."
72As previously noted, Franz Galeazzo requested exemption from court quarter for his newly
acquired house on Annagasse in 1671. 1 have never found any reference to Wenzel Ludwig actually
taking possession of his inheritance. The house was still in Franz Galeazzo's name in 1684, but by 1700 it
belonged instead to the heirs of Ferdinand Emrich, Count Kollonitsch (Schimmer, 191).
73"ein Ring mit einer diemet tafi di paragone, mit welchen mich sein fraw Muetter seel
verehliget"
74One ring was set with a small diamond, another with a ruby, and another with a large emerald.
"For Radolt's mission to England, see chaps. 8-10.
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Radolt's will underlines the importance of the Catholic faith in his life and death. In it he
specifies the many masses to be said for his soul at several churches and monasteries. He left to
these religious foundations not only generous monetary contributions but also rich artwork, such as
various silver and gold-gilt vessels and images carved of ivory (St. Salvador and the cross and
Madonna and child). Radolt also bequeathed to his daughter Benigna Constantia in the Convent of
St. Jakob a image of Mary in gold; for Maria Teresia, he designated his crucifix, had she lived.
Finally, he left sums of money to benefit charities and the poor. Thus, ironically though not
unexpectedly, it is Radolt's last will and testament that provides the most vivid illustration of his
commitment to the Church.
Radolt's long and successful career in the Imperial service are a testament to his ability to
deliver when given tasks ranging from the day-to-day management of finances to extraordinary
missions to foreign powers. The trust placed in him to closely follow the Emperor's commands
combined with his legal training, wliich would be useful for explaining the justice of the Emperor's
actions against Frederick V, made him a qualified representative of the Emperor's interests at the
English court.
Part HI: Anglo-Imperial Negotiations
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John Taylor at the Imperial Court, 1635-6
The Emperor alone held the authority to restore Charles I's nephew, Charles Louis, Prince Palatine,
yet there had been no substantial English representation at the Imperial court since the extraordinary
embassy ofSir Robert Anstruther in 1630-2.1 For several years, the only link between Charles and
the Emperor was Necolalde, the Spanish agent in London, who instead of facilitating
communications between the two sides, did what he could to obstruct them.2 The King's apparent
indifference to advancing actively the Palatine cause with the Emperor, however, was quickly
reversed when the news of the Peace of Prague reached London in the summer of 1635.
By 163 5 , the violence and devastation that the Continental war had wrought, not to mention
the costs of waging it, had convinced many in the Empire of the virtues of peace. In that year, the
Emperor took advantage of his military successes and concluded the Peace ofPrague with Lutheran
Saxony. The Emperor offered its terms to the other Protestant states and cities of the Empire, and
most of them quickly accepted them. In return for their support in the Empire against foreign armies,
the Emperor made concessions to Protestants by retreating from the stringent demands of the Edict
of Restitution. However, he excluded Charles Louis from the amnesty granted to the Protestant
1There had been no permanent English representation in Vienna since the end of Simon Digby's
mission in late 1622. Anstruther was joined to Lord Digby's 1621 mission, but remained in Vienna after
the latter returned to England in September of that year. He embarked, however, upon several
extraordinary missions to the Emperor and Imperial Diet while ambassador in Denmark (Bell, 61-2).
2Bodl. Lib., Clar. Mss. 6, ff. 201-2: 3 Feb. 1635, Windebank to Hopton; PRO, SP 80/9, f. 34: 9
Aug. 1 63 5 , Instructions for Taylor, CSP, vol . 1 , 3 1 0: 25 Aug. 1 63 5 : Secret instructions for Taylor.
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states accepting the agreement, and Calvinism remained outlawed. Whether the Emperor would
grant a pardon was left to his own judgment, and it became painfully clear that "Whatever might be
accorded the children of the late Elector would be only after humble submission, and then out of
charity rather than as a right."3 Not only was no provision made for the restoration ofthe Palatinate,
but even worse for the Palatine cause, the terms of the Peace confirmed Maximilian I, Duke of
Bavaria, in his possession of the Upper Palatinate and electoral dignity.
When news of the terms of the Peace ofPrague reached England in late July, it appalled the
English court and prompted the King to action, albeit belated.4 Since the King and some of his
councillors had promoted negotiation with Spain as the surest route to the restoration of the
Palatinate, they felt betrayed, particularly Secretary Windebank, who had been conducting secret
negotiations with the Spanish envoy Necolalde for a maritime treaty with Spain.5 They believed,
and rightly so, that the Emperor had concluded the settlement with the knowledge and approval of
Spain.6 Their resentment deepened in mid-August when news reached London of Maximilian's
3Beller, "Diplomatic Relations," 348.
4Elizabeth, Queen of Bohemia, sent a memorial and the articles of the peace to England, hoping
they would open her brother's eyes to the intentions of the Emperor (PRO, State Papers Foreign, Holland
[SP 84], vol. 150, f. 43: 9 Aug. 1635, Coke to Boswell; CSPD 1 635, 241 : 12 July 1635, Elizabeth to
Laud; ibid., 63: 12 July 1635, same to Roe).
'"His Majesty hath wondered all this while and hath not forborne to express it to me in plain
terms that the Spaniards had lost their wits or that they were asleep that they were so cold in joining with
him expressing a great inclination in himself to it. But now the cause is evident and if it be true there can
be no hope of good by any treaty between us hereafter...." (BL, Egerton 1820, f. 5 18: 3 Aug. 1635,
Windebank to Hopton). For more on the maritime treaty, see chap. 4, p. 188.
6See chap. 3, p. 144.
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marriage to the Emperor's daughter, the Archduchess Maria Anna, Maximilian's own niece.7 This
union could produce an heir who would secure the Bavarian succession to the Palatinate and
electoral dignity.* It therefore was a serious threat to Palatine restoration, for as long as the Bavarian
succession was not secured, there was still hope that the Palatine lands and electoral title would
revert to the Palatine line.
The Peace of Prague and Maximilian's union with his niece were thus both serious setbacks
to Charles I's policy of achieving the restoration of his nephew by peaceful means. As Windebank
made clear to Lord Feilding, the English ambassador in Venice, this news understandably aggravated
the King and his councillors:
[The King] hath reason to apprehend that the conjunction between [the] Duke of
Bavaria and the Emperor his daughter may have caused some alienation in [the] King
from [the] Emperor and the House of Austria, especially if such advertisements as
daily come to his Majesty from forain partes, together with the copies of articles
published in print of the Peace betwene Emperor and [the] Elector of Saxe, be true,
by which the House of [the] Elector Palatin appears to be absolutely excluded from
any hope of restitution either of territories or dignities, and all settled upon the House
of Bavaria.9
They feared that the electors, who would soon assemble at Regensburg, would ratify the terms of
the Peace of Prague. Official sanction of its terms, including those touching the Palatinate, would
deal a damaging blow to the Palatine cause.
7On the close blood relationship between the Austrian Habsburgs and Bavarian Wittelsbachs, see
chap. 2, n. 37.
'Maximilian's previous marriage to Elizabeth of Lorraine had failed to produce offspring. He did
not lose any time in remarrying after her death in January I63S: he wed Maria Anna that summer.
9HMC, Sixth Report, vol. 1, 277: 10 Aug. 1635, Windebank to Feilding. Windebank wrote to
Aston: "But the more 1 consider that Pctra scandal, the business of the Palatinate, the more I am lost and
in despair of any tolerable issue, especially since the alliance of marriage with the Duke of Bavaria and
the articles exclusive to the Prince Palatine...." (BL, Egerton 1820, 527: Aug. 1635?, same to Aston).
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As England's resentment against Spain for its apparent failure to mitigate the negative terms
of the Peace for the Prince Palatine grew, France seized the opportunity to drive a wedge between
them. The French ambassador extraordinary, the Marquis of Senecterre, proposed an alliance against
the Habsburgs to recover the Palatine inheritance by military rather than diplomatic means. The
Spaniards, for their part, were determined to win Charles back and defended themselves by denying
any responsibility for the outcome at Prague. They encouraged the King instead to solicit an
explanation of its terms directly from the Emperor.10
Debate raged at court over whether to pursue the Palatine interest by way of France or the
Habsburgs. Protestant supporters of the Palatine cause, among them the Queen ofBohemia, Prince
Palatine, and Sir Thomas Roe, argued that negotiations with the Habsburgs were a waste of time. 11
They pushed for decisive military action on Charles Louis's behalf, thus striking a blow for the
Protestant cause in the Empire. They resoundingly preferred an alliance with the United Provinces
and Sweden, but some were also willing to consider an alliance with France, as a powerful
confederate of these Protestant states. The French party, spearheaded by Queen Henrietta Maria, the
Marquis of Hamilton, and the Earl of Holland, promoted an alliance with France.12 Windebank, on
the other hand, warned against French and Dutch aggrandizement, and reminded the council of
France's dealings with the Duke of Bavaria. In short, he argued, France had no real interest in the
10Gardiner, vol. 8. 83.
"For instance, CSPD 1635, 267: 20 July 1635, Elizabeth to Laud, and ibid., 368: 15 Sept. 1635,
same to same.
IJR. Malcolm Smuts, "The Puritan Followers of Henrietta Maria in the 1630s," EHR 93 (Jan.
1978): 36-7; Gardiner, vol. 8, 85.
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restoration of the Prince Palatine, only in turning England against Spain.13 Laud withheld judgment
but recommended, on the suggestion of the Palatine party, that the King send an envoy to Vienna
formally to request the restoration of the Prince Palatine, who would soon achieve his majority. This
move would prevent the Emperor from refusing the Palatine's suit on the basis that he had neglected
this legal formality necessary for restoration and would lead to speedier exposure of the Emperor's
true intentions toward him.14
Between the duplicity exhibited by Spain and concerns about the ultimate aims of the French
and Dutch, the decision was hardly an easy one for the King." Characteristically, Charles avoided
coming down decisively on one side or the other and instead chose to keep his options open.16 He
still believed that he could regain the Palatinate for his nephew by treaty rather than arms, and he
decided to take advantage of the hostilities between France and Spain by making overtures to both
sides and seeing which held better prospects for success." He therefore continued to consider the
alliance with France offered by Senecterre while at the same time sounding out the Habsburgs on
"CSPD 1635, 402: 29 Sept. 1635, Windebank's notes of propositions submitted to the foreign
committee of the privy council.
l4Ibid., 415: 6 Oct 1635," Laud to Elizabeth; Sharpe, Personal Rule, 5 14-5.
"in February 1634, the French and Dutch had made a secret agreement to partition Flanders,
which was exposed to the English in April.
l6Roe later grumbled to Elizabeth that conflicts of interest with France and Holland and their
secret treaty "have, I fear, cooled that brave warmth which appeared in his Majesty's heart.... The study to
get money is the business of these times. They have an easy theme and a specious who declaim against
war, whose expense hath no bounds and success no certainty." (ibid., 441 : 22 Oct. 1635," Roe to
Elizabeth).
17BL, Egerton 1820, f. 518: 3 Aug. 1635, Windebank to Hopton.
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the restoration of the Palatinate. To the latter end, Charles decided to send envoys to the Habsburg
courts in Madrid and Vienna."
The King selected Sir Walter Aston as his ambassador to the Spanish court Aston had
served in the post before, from 1620 until relations between England and Spain were broken off in
162S, and had gained Charles's confidence during his fateful visit to Spain with Buckingham. On
this mission, Aston was to resurrect negotiations for a maritime treaty and protest the terms of the
Peace of Prague. He was also to investigate Spain's earlier proposal for an Austrian marriage for
Charles Louis, his restoration after Maximilian's death, and the satisfaction of claims of the latter's
heirs with the Bohemian electorate. Finally, he was to offer a straight league with the House of
Austria if the Emperor removed the ban and he and his allies gave probable grounds for the
restoration of the Palatine lands and dignities."
Taylor's Appointment and Early Negotiations in Vienna
Charles had still to select a representative for the Vienna post, and by the end of July he settled upon
John Taylor — a solid, if uninspired, choice.20 Although Taylor was of a minor gentry background
"PRO, SP 84/150, f. 43: 9 Aug. 1635, Coke to Boswell. "That which now importeth most is to
make the best advantage of the present revolutions, to draw in that assistance [from the Habsburgs] which
hitherto we have expected without fruit." (ibid.).
"CSV, vol. 1, 306-9: 25 Aug. 1635, Secret instructions for Aston; cf. BL, Egerton 1820, f. 531:
11 Aug. 1635," [Hopton] to Windebank; ibid., f. 528: Aug. 1635?, Windebank to Aston.
'^Ibid., f. 5 18: 3 Aug. 1635, Windebank to Hopton. "His Majesty is dispatching your friend here
to the Emperor with instructions concerninge the Palatinate, and to discuss whether there be any hope yet
of one accommodation, his Majesty being still willing to believe it will be had by treaty rather than by
arms." (ibid.). Taylor's credentials to the Emperor were composed at the beginning of August (HHStA,
StA England, Kart. 2, ff. 135-6: 9 Aug. 1635, Charles I to Ferdinand U). The Spanish resident Necolalde
made the following unflattering comment about Taylor: "No es hombre de fondo o de buenos deseos y el
mayor es tener ocupacion para comer." (PRO, SP 94/37, f. 221: 10 Aug. 1635, Necolalde to Ofiate, the
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that would be considered relatively humble in diplomatic circles, he had connections to the English
court through Wentworth and the Earl of Cumberland. He also had experience dealing with the
Habsburgs on various issues including the Palatinate question, having previously served as a
diplomatic agent in Brussels, Vienna, and most recently Madrid.21 Many of bis missions, like this
one to Vienna, were connected to the secret Habsburg negotiations that the King and Windebank
were conducting. In addition, Taylor was well acquainted with the Imperial court and the operation
of electoral meetings, as he had promoted the peaceful settlement of the Palatinate question at the
electoral meeting held at Regensburg in 1630 and afterward at the Imperial court from 1630 to 1632.
Finally, Taylor and the majority ofhis family were Catholics and known to support friendly relations
with the Habsburgs, which Charles must have felt would put the negotiations on a more cordial
footing."
According to his official instructions, Taylor's main responsibility was to persuade the
Emperor to reverse or modify the decisions made at Prague that were detrimental to the Palatine
cause. He was directed to remind the Emperor of his previous promises regarding the Palatinate, to
protest the terms of the Peace of Prague, and to find out whether this agreement truly represented
Spanish ambassador to the Emperor). "He is not a man of capacity or good desires. And that which more
is, he hath an occupation whereby to live"; the latter statement possibly alluding to the fact that he would
not easily be bribed (ibid., SP 80/9, f. SO: 10 Aug. 1635, Necolalde to Onate, English translation of an
intercepted letter). Taylor's recent mission to Spain to request the recall of Necolalde from England surely
did not endear him to the Spaniard.
21Arthur Hopton, tiie English resident agent in Spain when Taylor was there, made positive
comments about Taylor's good intentions and diplomatic experience, particularly in reference to his
negotiations with the Habsburgs (CSP, vol. I, 1 16: 7 Aug. 1634, Hopton to Windebank; ibid., 1 18: 13
Aug. 1634, same to same).
"indeed, Taylor's uncle Robert and cousin Henry both had served the Archdukes on missions to
England. On Taylor's background and career, see chap. 5.
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the Emperor's firm intention toward the Prince Palatine.23 His secret instructions, however, went
well beyond his official ones and exposed the King's true priorities. Taylor was to negotiate an
agreement with the Emperor for Charles Louis's restoration. If the Emperor revoked the ban and
restored the Lower Palatinate to Charles Louis and gave probable grounds for the restoration of the
remaining Palatine lands and dignities after the death of the Duke ofBavaria, the King empowered
Taylor to offer a provisional alliance and the services of the newly strengthened English fleet If
they agreed to this, Charles Louis would make humble submission to the Emperor and renounce all
alliances with the Emperor's enemies, but he would not agree to relinquish his claim to the electoral
dignity. To further this negotiation, Windebank instructed Taylor to promote distrust at the Imperial
court of Maximilian's ambitions and to stress the advantages of the friendship of the Prince Palatine
and English King. In addition, in line with Laud's recommendation, he was directed to remind the
Emperor that Charles Louis, who would attain his majority in January, would soon demand his
investiture according to the constitution of the Empire.u Given the influence at the Imperial court
of Spain, which despite its claims of friendship had no wish to relinquish the Lower Palatinate
without concessions in return, and particularly Bavaria, which was intent on preserving as much of
its Palatine gains as possible, Taylor's negotiation to affect the restoration of the Prince Palatine
would be challenging.
23PRO, SP 80/9, ff. 34-6: 9 Aug. 1635, Instructions for Taylor.
2ACSP, vol. 1, 3 10-3: 25 Aug. 1635, Secret instructions for Taylor. The two sets of instructions
serve to illustrate Windebank's deeper involvement in Habsburg affairs than Coke (cf. PRO, SP 80/9, f.
86: 14 Jan. 1636, Coke to Taylor, addendum). Charles Louis himself wrote to the Emperor requesting that
he be formally invested with the Palatine lands and titles upon reaching his majority; Charles I supported
his nephew's demand in a personal letter to the Emperor (CSP, vol. 1, 402: 1636, Charles I to Ferdinand
II; ibid., 402-3: 1636, Charles Louis to same).
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The bulk ofTaylor's correspondence during his mission was to be with Windebank, who was
unofficially responsible for coordinating secret negotiations with tb*e Habsburgs. Windebank
conspired constantly to withhold information about the secret negotiations from Coke, who was
officially responsible for diplomatic missions to the Empire. This led to a system where prominent
members of the peace party, who were in on the King's secret Habsburg tforeign policy, established
direct lines of communication with the diplomats who carried it outt on the ground, at times
bypassing the official reporting channels. This was true of Taylor whio, as a representative to a
German ruler, was officially supposed to report to Coke. Windebank reminded Taylor during his
mission: "You must not forget to write more frequently to Mr. Secretaary Coke, and, especially if
you have anything good, you may communicate it to him; otherwise youa are to keep your distance,
and the most secret you are still to impart to myself only."25
Taylor began his journey to Vienna with three men and five horrses on 7 September 1635,
after a brief delay due to financial issues.26 He reached Ostend on 1 1 September and spent some
time in Flanders before proceeding into Germany.27 In late September aind early October he spent
^Ibid., 43 1: 26 Jan. 1636, Windebank to Taylor. Much ofTaylor's coenrespondence with
Windebank is contained in BL, Clar. Mss. They are summarized in CCSP, votl. 1. A selection of the
papers are published in CSP, vols. 1-2. What is preserved ofTaylor's correspondence with Coke can be
found in PRO, SP 80/9-10.
J6PRO, SP 80/10, ff. 103-6: 26 Jan. 1638, Taylor's accounts, Sept.-Masr. 1638; CSPV 1632-6, 435:
16 Aug. 1635, Anzolo Correr, Venetian Ambassador in England, to D&S; ibid., 439: 24 Aug. 1635, same
to same; ibid., 445: 7 Sept. 1635, same to same. Taylor was unwilling to set o«ut without the entire initial
sum promised to him because he understood "the wayes are difficult and char-geable." (PRO, SP 80/9, f.
52: 2 1 Aug. 1635, Taylor to [Coke]). Given his personal financial situation, itz is not surprising that money
was to be a constant theme in his dispatches.
"PRO, SP 16/298, f. 154: 30 Sept. 1635," Journal by Capt. William Sr.mith, of the Tenth Lion's
Whelp; cf. ibid., SP 16/264, f. 164: 6 Sept. 1635, Lords of the Admiralty to Rtobert, Earl of Lindsey;
CCSP, vol. 1, 70: 1 1 Sept. 1635, Taylor to Windebank. Windebank relates in : succession the places where
Taylor stopped on his way to Vienna (CSP, vol.1, 400: 12 Jan. 1636, Windebaank to Taylor).
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time in Antwerp and Diest before proceeding on to the Cardinal Infante's camp at Gennep, where
the Cardinal Infante and Count Piccolomini, a senior officer in the Imperial army, hospitably
received him." After taking his leave, Taylor made the dangerous journey across the war-torn and
plague-ridden Empire toward Vienna, via Cologne, Frankfurt, and DonauwOrth.29 At some point he
found his surroundings threatening enough to invest in four pairs of pistols, one pair for each man
in his party.30 During the journey, he learned of the sad state of the Palatinate, which he reported to
Windebank: "In the Palatinate they are all dead, through misery and of the plague. In Heidelberg,
as I am told, there are not fifty Burghers left, the plague being so extreme great, through the stench
and filthiness in the town and castle."31 In mid-November, he had an audience with the King of
Hungary at Nordiingen; there he heard the ominous rumor that the Duchess of Bavaria was with
child and that the Lower Palatinate was to return to its previous state, that is, under Spanish and
Bavarian occupation.32
After nearly two months on the road, Taylor finally reached Vienna on 22 November 1635.33
He explained his tardiness to Coke: "I arrived here . . . after a long and a very dangerous ioumy the
Countrys being utterly ruined through which I past and a number ofpeople made desperate by want
"Ibid., 398: 18 Oct 1635, Cardinal Infante to Ferdinand II; ibid., 339: 20 Oct 1635, Taylor to
Windebank; CCSP, vol. 1, 71-2: 16 Oct. 1635, same to same; ibid., 73: 21 Oct. 1635, same to Cottington.
"He left Gennep on 22 October and had reached Cologne by 29 October and Frankfurt by 3
November (ibid., 73: 22 Oct. 1635, Capt. Shaw to Windebank; CSP, vol. 1, 346: 29 Oct. 1635, Taylor to
same; ibid., 351:3 Nov. 1635: same to same).
"PRO, SP 80/10, ff. 103-6: 26 Jan. 1638, Taylor's accounts, Sept.-Mar. 1638.
"CSP, vol. l,351:3Nov. 1635: Taylor to Windebank.
32lbid., 358: 1 1 Nov. 1635, same to same.
33Ibid., 368: 28 Nov. 1635, same to same.
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and misary that live only on spoils and robery. I was forced in regard of this to goe with great
convoys or else to stay some tymes two or three dayes for company."" To Windebank, Taylor
described Germany's miseries thus: "Germany, the greatest and whilom the fairest country of
Europe, is now the most miserable, and looks hideous to the eye, through divers mortal wounds
which it hath received even in every member, and gasps for life like a body whose veins are quite
exhaust of blood.""
While Taylor made his way to Vienna, the French and Spanish envoys in London continued
their efforts to lure Charles I to their respective sides. Soon after Taylor's departure, France made
another offer. IfCharles allowed France to levy troops in his territories for the Continental war, put
the ship money fleet under Charles Louis's command, and — most importantly — agreed not to aid
Spain as he had, France would sign no peace that did not provide for the restoration of the Palatinate
lands. However, because of its correspondence with Bavaria, it could not make similar promises
about the electorate. Charles responded with a counterproposal for an exchange which, he argued,
would solve the Palatinate problem and bring peace to Europe: France should restore Lorraine to
its dispossessed Duke, and in return the Emperor would restore the Palatinate to Charles Louis.36
This was the type of agreement that the King preferred, namely one which would achieve the
restoration ofthe Palatinate without requiring him to make any significant concessions. He informed
34PRO, SP 80/9, f. 56: 1 1 Dec. 1635, same to Coke.
"CKP, vol. I, 372: 15 Dec. 1635, same to Windebank.
"This arrangement had been suggested by the Spaniards before. France had annexed Lorraine in
1632 after its Duke's unsuccessful rebellion. The loss of Lorraine was a great blow to Spain, as it
disrupted movement along the Spanish Road (for a description of the Spanish Road, see chap. 2, p. 100).
Charles supported the exchange plan, because he was asked to give up nothing in return.
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Viscount Scudamore, his ambassador in Paris, that he would throw in his lot with France if the
Emperor would not agree to the swap.37 Although Richelieu did not respond to this proposal, it
would continue to resurface in English negotiations with both France and the Habsburgs.3*
While these negotiations were underway, the Prince Palatine Charles Louis arrived in
England in late November. He would achieve his majority in January and hoped that his presence
at the English court would spur his uncle to greater efforts on his behalf. His presence was
uncomfortable for the French envoys Senecterre and Pougny, as they were unable to address the
young Prince as "Electoral Highness" because of France's treaty with Bavaria. The Spanish envoy
Necolalde, however, made it a point to use the title freely.39 Unlike the Emperor, Spain had no real
commitment to Bavaria, which not only continually caused problems for Spain but had also secretly
allied with France.40 By the end of the year, Spain had managed to win the advantage at the English
"CSP, vol. t, 392: 19 Nov. 1635, Instructions for Scudamore. Elizabeth later related to Roe that
the French had found this proposal ridiculous because they thought "Lorraine cost too much blood and
money to give it up for nothing to be rendered them but a stranger Prince's restitution." (CSPD 1635-6,
148: 14 Jan. 1636, Elizabeth to Roe).
"Gardiner, vol. 8, 97-8.
nCSP, vol. 1, 389: 30 Dec. 1635, Windebank to Hopton; ibid., 400: 12 Jan. 1636, same to Taylor,
Sir John Finet, Ceremonies ofCharles I: The Note Books ofJohn Finet. 1628-1641, ed. Albert J. Loomie
(New York: Fordham University, 1987), 188-90; Gardiner, vol. 8, 99-100. However, the Imperial envoy
Clement Radolt, who was sent to England the following year was not free to use the title (HHStA, StA
England, Kart. 18, Konv. 18 i 8, f. 32: 9 May 1636, Radolt to Ferdinand II). The Savoyard envoy also did
not want to give the title because the English failed to give his master that of real alteza (ibid., f. 89: 16
May 1636, same to same).
40Onate had always opposed the ambitions of Maximilian (CSP, vol. 1, 385: 21 Dec. 1635,
Hopton to Windebank).
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court, and its position further improved when John Taylor's reports of the Emperor's intentions
toward the Palatinate reached London.41 The French negotiations stagnated accordingly.
Soon after his arrival in Vienna in late November 1635, Taylor set about making his master's
demands known to the Emperor and, over time, he became increasingly convinced that Ferdinand
would meet these demands. In his reports, he stressed the good intentions of the Emperor toward
the Prince Palatine and England and often inflated Charles's authority in a ridiculous manner. The
Emperor, who was anxious because he was under the impression that the King had sent Taylor to
demand full restitution, was away from Vienna when Taylor arrived. At the beginning ofDecember
he returned and the next day accorded Taylor his first audience/2 As instructed, Taylor protested
against the Peace ofPrague and offered the Emperor an alliance between England and the Habsburgs
in return for Charles Louis's restitution.43 He also made it known that Charles did not expect a full
restoration immediately, but would retaliate if deprived completely.44 The Emperor, who was
relieved that the English demands were not as great as he had supposed, reassured Taylor that he
41Sharpe, Personal Rule, 5 ! 6-7.
42CSPV Z632-6, 472: 3 Nov. 1635, Giovanni Battista Ballarino, Venetian Secretary in Germany,
to D&S; ibid., 482: 1 Dec. 1635, same to same; CSP, vol. 1, 369: 6 Dec. 1635, Taylor to Windebank;
PRO, SP 80/9, f. 56: 1 1 Dec. 1635, same to Coke. According to Ballarino, the Emperor wanted to avoid
offending either England or Bavaria, which he surely would if Charles demanded the full restitution of
his nephew. The Emperor also wanted to consult with Maximilian before making offers to England.
43CSP, vol. 1, 369: 6 Dec. 1635, Taylor to Windebank; cf. PRO, SP 80/9, f. 56: 1 1 Dec. 1635,
same to Coke. The alliance was for the peace and quiet of the Empire, defense of hereditary countries,
and the restoration of the Duke of Lorraine (CSP, vol. 1, 369: 6 Dec. 1635, same to Windebank; ibid.,
401: 12 Jan. 1636: Windebank to Taylor).
"Ibid., 375: 29 Dec. 1635, Taylor to Windebank; CSPV 1632-6, 485: 8 Dec. 1635, Ballarino to
D&S. Taylor's proposals from his first audience are contained in his memorial to the Emperor of 16
December (CSP, vol. 1,377: 16 Dec. 1635, Taylor to Ferdinand II; PRO, SP 80/9, ff. 60-1, 73-4: 16 Dec.
1635, same to same).
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would do all that he could to satisfy the King. He pointed out, however, that he could not remove
the ban as the King wished without the consent of the Imperial Diet.45 Despite the evasiveness of
the Emperor's response, Taylor seemed satisfied for the moment, though he did remark that he
thought the Emperor was attempting to "use up tune" by referring the matter to the Diet.46
Immediately after the audience, the Emperor again left Vienna, this time to hunt at a castle at Ort.47
In late December, soon after the Emperor returned to Vienna from Ort, Taylor had his second
audience. He wrote that the Emperor had agreed to the return of the Spanish-occupied Lower
Palatinate (west of the Rhine) and that he had pressed further for the Bavarian-occupied portion as
well as the removal of the ban. He also had insisted that any acceptable agreement would include
no clause that might prejudice Charles Louis's right to the electorate and remaining Palatine lands.
Taylor assured the Emperor that if this were done, the King would enter into a straight league with
the Habsburgs.4* The Emperor then asked for his demands in writing, but Taylor refused and left.
This move on Taylor's part caused the Emperor and his ministers much anxiety, and, to show
his earnest in the negotiations, he decided to appoint a commission of leading privy councillors to
treat with Taylor, consisting of the Prince-Bishop of Vienna Anton Wolfrath, Lord High Steward
Leonard Hellfried, Count Meggau, the King of Hungary's Lord High Steward Maximilian, Count
4SCSP, vol. 1, 369: 6 Dec. 1635, Taylor to Windebank; CSPV 1632-6, 485: 8 Dec. 1635,
Ballarino to D&S; ibid., 506: 25 Jan. 1636, Correrto same.
46Ibid.
47CSP, vol. 1,369:6 Dec. 1635, Taylor to Windebank. The hunt was one of the Emperor's great
passions. This is evident in the daily tallies of his captures and kills that he recorded in his calendar
(HHStA, Familienarchiv, Familicnakten, Kart. 88).
"CSP, vol. I, 37S: 29 Dec. 1635, Taylor to Windebank. Taylor offered them the assistance of the
fleet (HHStA, StA England, Kart. 1, Konv. 4: 24 Jan. 1636, Ferdinand II to Taylor).
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TrmiHmansdorfE and Imperial Vice Chancellor Peter Heinrich, Baron Stralendorf. Upon the request
ofthe commission, Taylor presented a statement ofthe King's requirements. In writing he demanded
only the restoration of the Lower Palatinate. In addition, however, he orally stated that if the
Emperor restored the Upper Palatinate, Charles would ally with the Habsburgs.49 Taylor did this
because the King wished his diplomats to restrict any sensitive proposals to oral rather than written
forms. Moreover, they were to express these proposals in the most general terms possible, in order
to leave the King the option to wriggle out of them at will. He was very concerned with avoiding
definite commitments to the foreign powers he dealt with before obtaining a commitment from
them.50
Taylor's proposals, though the most important of them were oral, prompted the Emperor to
solicit the Duke of Bavaria's opinion about them. To do so, the Emperor sent his aulic councillor
and steward Ferdinand Sigmund, Baron Kurz, one of his most trusted and influential ministers, to
Munich in early January.51 Kurz's brother Maximilian, as a privy councillor and later Lord High
Steward to Maximilian of Bavaria, was one of the Duke's most important ministers. When
4'CSPV 1632-6, 501-2: 12 Jan. 1636, Ballarinoto D&S.
wSo much so that he often made it difficult for his diplomats to get a clear idea of what terms he
would accept for the Prince Palatine or what he was willing to do in return.
5lHHStA, StA Bavarica, Kart. 5, ff. 433-4: 5 Jan. 1636, Ferdinand U to Maximilian I; ibid., StA
Palatina, Kart. 12, Konv. 2: 1 1 Jan. 1636, Imperial Secretary Walderode to Kurz; CSP, vol. I, 406: 9 Jan.
1636, Taylor to Windebank. The aulic council, or Hojrat, was the Emperor's council of state. It handled
major policy in the Empire and hereditary lands. Kurz was made Imperial Vice Chancellor in the
following year, and he was raised to the Reichsgrafenstand in 1637.
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representing their rulers, however, their close relationship did not prevent them from holding
contrary opinions about important issues of Imperial-Bavarian relations."
The Emperor's seeming commitment to reaching a compromise settlement with England
heartened both Taylor and Windebank, and this in turn lifted their hopes that they could successfully
negotiate a solution to the Palatinate question with the Habsburgs." Taylor wrote to Windebank that
he believed that the Emperor would be willing to remove the ban and restore the Lower Palatinate,
with prospects of negotiations for the restoration of the electorate and Upper Palatinate as well.54
When Windebank received these reports, he was hopeful but not without skepticism. He forwarded
Taylor's dispatch to the King and, despite Charles's concern that Taylor would have the ban removed
by grace rather than right, Windebank expressed the opinion that it appeared that Taylor had been
successful thus far in light of his instructions and what they could reasonably expect:
For the business itself, it is in no ill condition, and if the Lower Palatinate be really
intended to be restored, it is as much as his Majesty requires Taylor to insist upon.
Taylor's pressing the taking off the ban is warranted by his first instruction; and
though this present Prince Elector cannot, indeed with any colour of equity, be
judged within the Ban, yet if he be held to be so by them, the first work must be to
clear it."
"Albrecht, Maximilian I, 162.
"CSP, vol. 1,447: 15 Feb. 1636, Windebank to Taylor.
"PRO, SP 80/9, ff. 66-7: 2 Jan. 1636, Ferdinand II to same, and the latter's reply; CSP, vol. I,
394: 2 Jan. 1636, Taylor to Windebank (cf. PRO, SP 80/9, f. 64: 2 Jan. 1636, same to Coke); CSP, vol. 1,
40S: 9 Jan. 1636, same to Windebank.
"CSPD 1635-6, 179: 2 Feb. 1636, Windebank to Charles I.
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In his judgment, these were "no ill beginnings if they be real."56 At the time, the pragmatic diplomat
Aston in Spain was also hopeful of a solution to the Palatinate question via the Habsburgs.57 At the
beginning of January, he wrote that he believed that the Spaniards would give as much satisfaction
as possible in the Palatinate, though they would still drive a bargain. Furthermore, he thought the
Emperor would comply and Bavaria's influence would not be as considerable as it previously had
been."
Their optimism that they might reach an agreement with the Emperor on the Palatinate
question was not unjustified. On 24 January 1636, Ferdinand declared himself ready to conclude
an agreement with England if the King sent an ambassador with plenipotentiary powers to Vienna.5*
He had taken Taylor's proposals quite seriously, because he also decided to send an envoy to
England to promote an agreement. The Emperor attached great importance to this mission, and he
chose Matthias von Werdemann, an aulic councillor (and thus legal expert) who had previously
served as a diplomatic agent to France, to lead it.60 In addition, Taylor reported that communication
56Ibid.
"He had presented a memorial to the King of Spain on 6 December asking him to support
English negotiations on the Palatinate with the Emperor, Philip assured him that he would do what he
could to achieve English satisfaction on this point (CSV, vol. I, 382: 6 Dec. 1635, Aston to Philip TV).
"BL, Add. Mss. 36450, f. 7: 9 Jan. 1636,' same to Charles I
"HHStA StA England, Kart. I, Konv. 4: 24 Jan. 1636, Ferdinand n to Taylor, ibid., StA
Palatina, Kart. 12, Konv. 2: 24 Jan. 1636, same to same; CSV, vol. 1, 434: 24 Jan. 1636, same to same.
6°HHStA, StA Danemark, Kart. 2, Konv. H, f. 1: 24 Jan. 1636, same to Hofkammer, ibid., StA
England, Kart. 21, ff. 5-6: 24 Jan. 1636, Instructions for envoy to England; ibid., f. 13: 28 Feb. 1636,
Decree for Werdemann; ibid., Kart. 2, f. 51: 4 Feb. 1636, Credentials for same. Ballarino believed that
this decision was taken with the encouragement of Onate, who wished to remove the business from
Taylors hands (CSP V 1632-6, 514:9 Feb. 1636, Ballarino to D&S). Taylor noted that Werdemann was
not to go in the quality of ambassador (PRO, SP 80/9, f. 89: 26 Jan. 1636, Taylor to [?]).
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from Kurz arrived in Vienna indicating Maximilian would agree to the removal of the ban,
investiture of Charles Louis as a prince of the Empire, and return Heidelberg and the Bavarian-
occupied Lower Palatinate.6 1 According to Windebank's calculations and the new instructions of30
December that Taylor would receive shortly, this would be enough to satisfy the King's original
demands.
In the middle of February, England brought additional pressure to bear on the Emperor to
come to a satisfactory agreement on the Palatinate question. A courier from England arrived in
Vienna with fresh instructions for Taylor indicating that the King was even more flexible on what
terms he would accept for the restitution of the Palatinate.62 Windebank directed Taylor to insist
upon the restoration of the Lower Palatinate - or at least its sequestration by a neutral prince — but
not necessarily the Upper Palatinate. Also, he was to deliver Charles Louis's demand for
investiture.63 At the same time, Taylor should make clear to the Emperor that if he delayed in
answering these demands, the King would interpret it as a sign that Ferdinand was reluctant to give
satisfaction. If this were the case, the Emperor should know that the King would take appropriate
61HHStA StA Bavarica, Kart. 5, ff. 442-3: 25 Jan. 1636, Maximilian I to Ferdinand JJ. Taylor
was under the impression that he also agreed to leave the way open for Charles Louis to plead his case to
the rest in the future (PRO, SP 80/9, f. 88: 26 Jan. 1636, Taylor to [?]; CSP, vol. 1, 432: 30 Jan. 1636,
same to Cottington). This may very well be what the Emperor had conveyed to Taylor, as this was a point
the Emperor had pressed with Maximilian, but to which the latter would not agree (HHStA, StA
Bavarica, Kart. S, f. 443: 25 Jan. 1636, Maximilian I to Ferdinand II).
6JThe courier's name was Pierre Peaget.
aCSP, vol. I, 403: 9 Jan. 1636, Instructions for Taylor (cf. PRO, SP 80/9, f. 86: 14 Jan. 1636,
Coke to same); CSP, vol. 1, 400: 12 Jan. 1636, Windebank to Taylor, ibid., 402: [9 Jan.] 1636, Charles I
to Ferdinand II; ibid.: [I Jan.] 1636, Charles Louis to same; HHStA, StA Palatina, Kart. 12, Konv. 2: 1
Jan. 1636, same to same; ibid.: 9 Jan. 1636, Charles I to same. He was also sent a copy of the
propositions Charles had made to the French King (to which he had not yet received an answer), with
orders to share this information with those he saw fit in order to further the negotiation.
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action upon the courier's return to England. As planned, the arrival of the courier and Taylor's
subsequent demands awakened anxiety in the Emperor and his ministers.64
Soon afterwards a second courier arrived in Vienna with copies of the documents from the
previous packet and a letter from Windebank.65 In the letter, Windebank pointed out to Taylor that
from the King's perspective it would be acceptable if the Emperor sequestered the Lower Palatinate
instead ofrestoring it only ifTaylor could procure no better terms; however, ifhe had hopes of better
terms, he should pursue them vigorously.66 Windebank also strongly encouraged Taylor to convince
the Austrians ofwhat he himself propounded in bis letters home, namely that the power of the King
of England could make or break their designs: "so you must really speak the same language and
make these your own principles good in your negotiation there: and so carry it as to beget in them
a belief, that upon the answer you shall receive from them will depend their good or ruin."67 Taylor
believed he could get better terms: "finding they [the latest instructions] contained less than what I
knew they had here resolved to give his Majesty, boldly bore from them, and resolved to put them
roundly to it."6* On 16 February, after delivering the letters of the King and Charles Louis to the
MCSPV 1632-6, 525: 2 Mar. 1636, Ballarino to D&S.
"Sending duplicates of diplomatic correspondence was a widely employed safety measure. The
second courier was Germain Marsham.
"CSP, vol. 1, 428: 26 Jan. 1636, Windebank to Taylor.
"Ibid., 429: 26 Jan. 1636, same to same.
"Ibid., 451: 3 Mar. 1636, Taylor to Windebank.
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hands of the Emperor and King of Hungary, he presented a memorial in response to the Emperor's
of24 January demanding the Prince Palatine's investiture to all of the Palatine lands and dignities."
The same day that Taylor presented this paper, the arrival of the second courier precipitated
new alarm at the Imperial court and inquiries after what Charles required.70 Taylor let the Emperor
and his ministers stew for a while, and on 20 February, he demanded an audience of the Emperor
and King ofHungary and presented yet another paper.71 The following day, Stralendorf, the Prince-
Bishop of Vienna, and Baron Reck sent for Taylor. In answer to his previous two memorials, they
said that the Emperor could not make a decision without consulting the other princes with an interest
in the Palatinate, to whom he would quickly dispatch couriers.72 To this Taylor replied that he had
already gone as far as his commission extended, that he awaited a definite answer as to what Palatine
lands and titles the Emperor was willing to restore, and that if he got none, Taylor would take it as
a refusal, and he would return to England with the news.73
Taylor's resolute carriage elicited a promising reaction from the Emperor. After some
persistence on Taylor's part, on 24 February 1636 the Emperor finally issued a written statement
6,HHStA, StA England, Kart. I: 16 Peb. 1636, same to Ferdinand II; ibid., StA Palatina, Kart. 12,
Konv. 2: 16 Feb. 1636, same to same.
"CSP, vol. 1, 451: 3 Mar. 1636, same to Windebank.
7lHHStA, StA England, Kart. 1: 20 Feb. 1636, same to Ferdinand II.
"HHStA, StK Vortrage, Kart. I , Konv. F, f. 39: 1 8 Feb. 1636, Opinion of privy council.
nCSP, vol. 1,451-2: 3 Mar. 1636, Taylor to Windebank. Taylor was offended that Windebank
would think that he would aim so low as sequestration. Pointing to the strong line he took with the
Emperor, he wrote: "so your Honour sees that John Taylor hath not failed the good opinion you have of
him, who could not possibly be guilty of such a baseness; and of whom you may be still assured, that the
will not only carry things only positively, but in a most superlative way of braveness, for his Majesty's
honour." (ibid., 454).
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agreeing to remove the ban, grant investiture, and restore a portion ofthe Palatinate to Charles Louis
ifhe made humble submission to the Emperor and renounced all treaties made with Imperial foes.74
As soon as an English plenipotentiary arrived, they could conclude an agreement to this effect" In
a paper he delivered of 2 March, Taylor accepted the offer ad referendum.16 The Emperor also
promised that negotiations would be carried on about the return of the electorate.77 As Taylor had
indicated, the situation seemed to offer some real hope of improving the Prince Palatine's situation
and more than met the King's demands as laid out in Taylor's most recent instructions. Before the
end of the month, the Emperor had decided to send Kurz to Munich to solicit Maximilian's input on
the negotiations with England, most particularly those touching the electorate. Kurz was to urge the
benefits of such an accommodation, namely peace in the Empire and an alliance with England, and
convince Maximilian that the Emperor was forced to it. At this point the Emperor was considering
limitation of the electorate to Maximilian's lifetime and even creating an eighth electorate to satisfy
74Ibid., 459: 16 Feb. 1636, same to Ferdinand II; ibid., 460: 20 Feb. 1636, same to same; ibid.,
461: 24 Feb. 1636, Ferdinand II to Taylor, PRO, SP 80/9, ff. 91-2: 24 Feb. 1636, same to same; HHStA,
RK KrA, Fasz. 1 16, f. 149: 20 Feb. 1636, Taylor to Ferdinand II; ibid., StA Palatina, Kart. 12, Konv. 2:
24 Feb. 1636, Ferdinand n to Taylor (cf. Bodl. Lib., Rawlinson Mss. D 867, f. 121: 24 Feb. 1636,
Ferdinand II to Charles I and Charles Louis).
"Taylor's lack of plenipotentiary powers had long been an issue. Ofiate emphasized this problem,
and pointed out to the Imperial councillors that Taylor was of too low of a rank for his mission to be of
real meaning. He also argued to the Imperial privy councillors that England could not be trusted (HHStA,
StK VortrSge, Kart. 1, Konv. F, ff. 40-2: 20 Feb. 1636, Opinion of privy council). It was apparent that
Ofiate did what he could to draw out the negotiations at Vienna to win time, and at the same time preserve
good correspondence with England. Once Taylor's negotiations showed some promise of moving
forward, Onate attempted to retard them (CSV, vol. 1, 447: IS Feb. 1636, Windebank to Taylor).
76HHStA, StA England, Kart. 1:2 Mar. 1636, Taylor to Ferdinand II; CSP, vol. 1, 453: 3 Mar.
1636, same to Windebank.
77Ibid., 496: 9 Apr. 1636, same to same.
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the King.7* The Emperor's consideration of this option at this point was significant, because the
electorate would prove to be the major sticking point in future negotiations for a settlement, and the
creation ofan eighth electorate was the solution that the delegates at Westphalia ultimately adopted.
Giovanni Ballarino, the Venetian secretary in Vienna, was also optimistic that the Emperor would
grant the Prince Palatine his dominions.79 In the meantime, Taylor continued to press for a more
particular answer.
These concessions on the part of the Emperor only fueled Taylor's optimism about the
negotiations' success. They persuaded him that the Emperor was ready to go beyond his declaration
and offer full restoration, albeit in time. He downplayed Maximilian's opposition and the obstructive
effect it could have on the negotiations. By the end of January 1636, Taylor told Lord Cottington
that Maximilian would be willing for the Emperor to remove the ban, restore the Lower Palatinate,
and allow Charles Louis to plead his right to the electorate.M In February and March, Taylor sent
word to England that he believed that the King could recover more than the Spanish-occupied
Palatinate for Charles Louis through the Emperor's agency. He boldly stated that Ferdinand would
not only agree to the King's terms to revoke the ban and restore or sequester the Lower Palatinate
immediately, but also to return the Upper Palatinate and electoral dignity upon the death of
Maximilian:
"HHStA, StK Vortrage, Kart. 1, Konv. F, ff. 55-6: 25, 26 Feb. 1636, Opinion of privy council;
ibid., RK KrA, Fasz. 1 16, ff. 179-86: 28 Feb. 1636, Instructions for Kurz; CSP, vol. I, 475: 12 Mar.
1636, Taylor to Windebank.
™CSPV 1632-6, 525: 2 Mar. 1636, Ballarino to D&S.
"CSV, vol. 1, 432: 30 Jan. 1636, Taylor to Cottington; cf. PRO, SP 80/9, f. 97: 3 Mar. 1636,
same to Coke.
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His Majesty doth come too low unto them, to be content that the Lower Palatinate,
which is beyond the Rhine, should be put into sequestration. For our negotiation, I
know that they will give us all the Palatinate ... if his Majesty stand upon it. To
enable the Prince Palatine to possess this, they will take off the ban, and free him
from all censures whatsoever: that, concerning the Electorate, both to him, as also the
Duke of Bavaria shall remain their full rights to plead their title unto it, so that
neither shall win or lose by this act. They would content his Majesty with this, ifhis
Majesty would be contented: but, if he will not, his Majesty shall have both the
Emperor and King of Spain's hands and promises, that the Electorate shall return to
the Prince Elector after Bavaria's death."
Taylor also continued to hold out the hope that the Emperor was seriously considering a match
between his daughter and the Prince Palatine.*2
Taylor continued to downplay the obstacle that Maximilian's opposition would pose to the
Prince Palatine's restoration. Despite Maximilian's curious attempts to beget a child and prolong his
own life, which he believed could be accomplished by consuming poultry fed with Calabrian
vipers,*3 Taylor believed that the Prince Palatine would not have to wait long for Maximilian's death,
which an astrologer had predicted for August-** Even once it was apparent that the Duchess of
"CSP, vol. 1, 446-7: 13 Feb. 1636, same to Windebank; ibid., 4.54: 3 Mar. 1636, same to same.
Taylor gave the same information in a letter to Lord Feilding, but added: "Because the cheife difficulty is
concerning the Electorat, which at the longest must remaine in the house of Bavaria for the tyme only of
this Duke's life, they have sent one Curtius [Kurz], a great counsellor of this Court unto him, to induce
him thereunto, since there is no other way left under heaven to compass* a general peace but by his
Majestyes intervention. That Duke was reasonable well disposed heereunto before...." (HMC, Denbigh V,
21: IS Mar. 1636, same to Feilding).
RBodl. Lib., Clar. Mss. 8, f. 255: 27 Mar. 1636, same to Windebank; CSP, vol. 1, 432: 30 Jan.
1636, same to Cottington. Taylor said that the Archduchess had requested through a third party a full-
length portrait of the Prince Palatine by Van Dyck.
"PRO, SP 80/9, f. 70: 5 Jan. 1636, Taylor to [?]; HMC, Denbigh V, 21: 15 Mar. 1636, same to
Feilding. He wrote earlier that "The Duke of Bavaria since his marriage feeds on nothing but capons and
chicken fed with the flesh of vipers.... What a child would he beget to irtfect the world?" {CSP, vol. 1,
375: 15 Dec. 1635, same to Windebank).
MBodl. Lib., Clar. Mss. 8, f. 163: 2 Mar. 1636, same to Windebank; CSP, vol. 1, 451: 3 Mar.
1636, same to same. However, Taylor felt that the prediction should pass as a marginal note of which
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Bavaria really was with child, Taylor reported that the disposition of the Imperial court remained
good and that Maximilian would not oppose restoration, as he knew there could be no peace in the
Empire without it. Given this favorable conjunction ofcircumstances, Taylor urged the King to send
a plenipotentiary quickly to conclude the agreement.*5
Kurz, who had departed on 12 March, returned to Vienna on 6 April with Maximilian's
resolution. The Emperor might return the Lower Palatinate on the condition that Maximilian would
retain the Upper Palatinate and receive a sum of money for his war expenses. In addition, he might
restore the electorate after the Bavarian line died out. Maximilian flatly refused the alternation of
the electorate or the creation of an eighth.*6 The Imperial ministers, however, gave Taylor the
impression that the electorate could return to the Palatine line after Maximilian's death." Taylor
reported that Kurz was only able with great difficulty to bring Maximilian around to relinquishing
enough of the Palatine inheritance to assuage the King. Despite Taylor's pressing for a more specific
answer, the Emperor was determined to make no further declaration until a plenipotentiary arrived
from England. This was because Ofiate had informed the Emperor that he had it from Necolalde that
Charles would be content with less than Taylor had demanded. Right when it seemed that Taylor
little reflection should be made (ibid., 454).
"PRO, SP 80/9, f. 103: 9 Apr. 1636, same to Coke; ibid., f. 135: 3 May 1636, same to [?].
"HHStA, StA Bavarica, Kart. 5, ff. 469-73: 27 Mar. 1636, Maximilian I to Ferdinand U; ibid., ff.
475-80: Apr. 1636, Kurz to same; ibid., ff. 606-10: Apr. 1636, same to same.
"CSP, vol. I, 498: 9 Apr. 1636, Taylor to Windebank.
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had convinced the Emperor to relinquish more, the King's inability to keep his policy secret hurt his
chances for an advantageous settlement**
Radolt's Appointment and Journey to England
In the meantime, the Emperor's plans for sending an envoy to England had hit a snag because
Werdemann, the intended envoy, had delayed his departure while wrangling over his diplomatic
status and financial allowance.*9 This delay so annoyed the Emperor, who considered the mission
a matter of great importance and urgency, that at the end of March he sent for Clement Radolt, a
councillor of the Hojkammer, and instead offered him the appointment as Imperial diplomatic agent
to Charles I on the condition that he would leave for England within two days. Radolt accepted the
charge.90 The haste with which the Emperor made this decision confirms that he considered the
mission urgent. His choice of Radolt, however, was not haphazard. The combination of the
Emperor's trust in Radolt to follow his instructions closely and his legal training, which would be
useful for explaining the justice of the Emperor's actions against Frederick V, made him a qualified
representative of Imperial interests at the English court."
From Taylor's perspective, Radolt's appointment was a change for the better. He
recommended the new Imperial envoy to Windebank, remarking that he considered Radolt favorably
"Ibid., 496-7: 9 Apr. 1636, same to same.
"Part of the problem was that Werdemann wished for higher status than that of resident agent.
9°HHStA StA England, Kart. 21, f. 13: 28 Feb. 1636, Ferdinand Q to Werdemann; ibid., f. 22: 22
Mar. 1636, same to Ohaem; ibid., Kart. 2, ff. 53-4: 25 Mar. 1636, same to Charles I. For biographical
information on Radolt, see chap. 7.
"The fact that both Werdemann and Radolt had legal training showed that this was likely a
consideration in the Emperor's selection of them for the post.
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inclined to the Palatine cause because he had close ties to the Prince-Bishop ofVienna, whom Taylor
believed was partial to it: "This gentleman [Radolt] is the Bishop's creature, and I conceive we have
not lost much in the change they made of Monsieur Wcrdeman, but rather gained."9* Taylor also
believed that the Spaniards in England, particularly the venomous Necolalde, were unlikely to
influence Radolt Taylor encouraged Windebank to make good use of Radolt and emphasized the
need to impress the envoy with a show of English wealth and power, particularly sea power, as he
believed this was the most effective way to win the Emperor away from Bavaria.93
Due to the perceived urgency ofhis business, the Imperial Secretary Walderode immediately
gave Radolt his instructions and directed him to proceed to England with all haste.94 On his way
there, he was to stop in Brussels and confer about his mission with the Cardinal Infante, who had
had a hand in securing his appointment.95 Once Radolt had arrived at the English court, he was to
deliver the Emperor's declaration of 24 February 1636 to the King.96 In addition, the Emperor
charged him with explaining the legal legitimacy of his application of the ban to the Palatines, who
should recognize its removal through the Emperor's clemency rather than demanding it as a right97
92Bodl. Lib., Clar. Mss. 8, f. 25 1: 26 Mar. 1636, Taylor to Windebank. Radolt had served under
the Bishop when the latter was Hojkammer President from 1624 to 1630.
93Ibid.; ibid., f. 255: 27 Mar. 1636, same to same; CSP, vol. 1, 476: 12 Mar. 1636, same to same.
^The instructions had originally been prepared for Werdemann.
"HHStA, Belgische Korrespondenz, Kart. 18, no. 746: 28 Feb. 1636, Ferdinand II to Cardinal
Infante.
^Ibid., StA England, Kart. 21, ff. 9-12: 28 Feb. 1636, Instructions for Werdemann/Radolt
^In particular he was to point out that the Palatine's proscription was supported by a decree of the
Diet (CSV V 1632-6, 536-7: 29 Mar. 1636, Ballarinoto D&S).
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One of Radolt's major tasks while at the English court was to collect information about the
King's requirements for the restoration of his nephew. Thus Radolt was to do his utmost to
determine whether the King would be willing to accept the Lower Palatinate and a compromise
solution for the electorate, as Taylor had claimed, and if not, whether he intended to reclaim his
nephew's inheritance by force. If the King would consider a compromise on the electorate, Radolt
was to discover what arrangement he would be willing accept However, if he were pressed for
particulars himself, or if the King would not be satisfied with the offer embodied in the Imperial
decree and a rupture seemed imminent, he should play for time and await further directions from
home. In the meantime, the Emperor would continue to consult with Bavarian and Spanish ministers
regarding future steps for the restitution of the Palatinate.™ At the same time, the Imperial envoy
was to do his utmost to avoid offending England, which under the circumstances was a seemingly
impossible task. Ballarino noted that the Austrians in no way wished to alienate the favorable
inclination of the English crown, and that Radolt's instructions left the way open to settle the
Palatine's claims." They also showed the Emperor offering less than Taylor had hoped, but enough
to satisfy Charles according to Taylor's most recent instructions: a portion of the Palatine lands and
the way left open to settle the claims of the Palatines to the remaining lands and titles in the future.
It was evident, however, that the Emperor hoped for an alliance in return.
In addition to exploring the viability of a compromise solution on the Palatinate, the Emperor
wished to discover what the King would be willing and able to offer in return. The Emperor was
"HHStA, StA England, Kail. 21, ff. 9-12: 28 Feb. 1636, Instructions for Werdemann/Radolt.
nCSPV 1632-6, 536-7: 29 Mar. 1636, Ballarino to D&S.
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very interested in exploring the possibilities for an alliance with England, particularly one that would
bring the English fleet to the Habsburg side. Therefore, Radolt was to encourage the King to join
with the Emperor in a league. If there were a chance that they might conclude one on honorable
terms, they would exchange ambassadors extraordinary. Radolt was not to conclude any agreement
himselfunless the King made a very advantageous proposal that would likely be lost through delay.
The Emperor, who himself had not called an Imperial Diet in more than twenty years, was sensible
to the possibility that the conclusion of such a treaty might require the consent of the English ruling
classes as well as that of the King to be viable. Therefore Radolt was to determine whether the King
required the consent ofothers, namely his ministers or Parliament, in order to enter into an alliance,
and if so, what obstacles they might pose to this work.100
In terms of an alliance, the Emperor was primarily interested in the English fleet. He thus
directed Radolt to determine its size and quality, including the weapons, personnel, and supplies
which with it was outfitted. Furthermore, he was to exercise all diligence to learn how much and
how long the King would contribute to the maintenance and further expansion of the fleet. If the
Habsburgs did not succeed in striking an alliance with England, the Emperor hoped at least to
persuade the King not to aid their enemies. Accordingly Radolt was to discover if the King was
aiding the Swedes, or other enemies of the Habsburgs for that matter, by allowing them to levy
troops in his territories, as reports had indicated. If so, Radolt was to persuade the King to rescind
this aid. Throughout the negotiation, Radolt should encourage the King to send a plenipotentiary
I00HHStA, StA England, Kart. 21, ff. 9-12: 28 Feb. 1636, Instructions for Werdemann/Radolt.
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to Vienna for the conclusion of a settlement. And as a general rule, he should write home for
guidance on more detailed points or issues that came up unexpectedly.101
After receiving his instructions, Radolt left immediately for England. On 26 March 1636,
he departed from Vienna, accompanied only by two servants. 102 On his journey through the Empire
to Flanders, Radolt encountered much the same scene of deprivation, disease, depopulation, and
destruction that the Earl of Arundel, whom Charles had appointed as his ambassador extraordinary
to the Emperor less than a week after Radolt set out, would experience traveling in the opposite
direction.103 Under the circumstances, the going was extremely dangerous. Radolt traveled both by
land and by water, depending on which seemed safest and most expedient. He reported that the route
between Cologne and Brussels was extremely perilous because of attacks by the Dutch. To protect
himself and his belongings, he purchased a pair of muskets and engaged convoys of armed men to
escort him through particularly hazardous areas. This proved a wise move, for at one point during
his trip 30 dragoons attacked his party, but they escaped safely through the valiant defense staged
by his convoy of 15 musketeers. Everywhere prices were high, and Radolt paid dearly for food and
other supplies, transportation, armed convoys, and the posts. He reported that citizens of formerly
prosperous communities were forced to eat grass for nourishment104
l01tbid.
1MIbid., RK KrA, Fasz. 1 16, f. 283: 16 Apr. 1636, Radolt to Ferdinand II; CSPV 1632-6, 536: 29
Mar. 1636, Ballarino to D&S.
l03HHStA, StA England, Kart. 21, ff. 9-12: 28 Feb. 1636, Instructions for Werdemann/Radolt;
ibid., RK KrA, Fasz. 1 16, ff. 282-7: 16 Apr. 1636, Radolt to Ferdinand II.
I04lbid., ff. 283-6: 16 Apr. 1636, same to same.
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When Radolt reached Brussels on 1 1 April, he stopped to confer about his mission with the
Cardinal Infante as instructed.105 In order to promote the settlement of the Palatinate question and
the conclusion of an alliance with England, as the Emperor desired, Spain had promised to invest
the Cardinal Infante with plenipotentiary powers so that he would be prepared to do so if the
opportunity presented itself during Radolt's mission. However, Radolt soon discovered that the
Cardinal Infante indeed had none, but he was assured that the newly appointed Spanish ambassador
to England, the young Count Ofiate, son of the Spanish ambassador in Vienna, would bring them
with him. Radolt, who was under the impression that Spain was not as committed to coming to a
settlement with England as his master, was skeptical. He therefore recommended that the Emperor
remonstrate again with the Cardinal Infante on the matter, and that he enjoin Count Schonberg, the
Imperial ambassador in Spain, to solicit Spain's cooperation in the business. 106 Radolt himself wrote
to Schonberg and asked him to press the Spaniards to send their powers to the venues where they
were treating the Palatinate question with England. By this time, Radolt had discovered that the
King was sending Arundel to Vienna for this very purpose. Under the circumstances, Radolt
believed that the King would not put up with the usual hedging, and that the Habsburgs should be
ready with their powers to treat. He therefore urged that Spain should send its plenipotency,
l05Ibid., f. 287: 17 Apr. 1636, same to same.
106Ibid.; ibid., f. 278: 17 Apr. 1636, same to Schonberg; ibid., f. 277: s.d., Stralendorf to
Ferdinand U. For instance, Radolt believed that the Infante did not necessarily want the Emperor to- lift
the ban from the Palatine house, and further that he wanted Radolt to hold his business in England in
suspense until Bavaria had made a declaration on the electorate (ibid., f. 287: 17 Apr. 1636, Radolt to
Ferdinand II).
337
particularly to Vienna, where Arundel would have corresponding powers to negotiate. Given these
various difficulties, Radolt felt that the business had a strange outlook.107
After his meeting with the Cardinal Infante, Radolt departed from Brussels and arrived on
22 April at Dunkirk, where he was to be picked up by a ship of the royal fleet and transported across
the Channel to England. The English ship, however, had encountered contrary winds and was
unable to fetch him as expected. Radolt waited for three days at Dunkirk, and, unwilling to wait any
longer, he boarded another English ship which carried him safely to England on 27 April.10* Two
days later — less than a fortnight after the Earl of Arundel's departure — Radolt arrived in London.
Wishing to remain incognito, he made no immediate announcement of his arrival. Radolt found
himself in an ambiguous position since Arundel had full powers to treat in Vienna, and it is likely
that he wished to take some time to contemplate his next steps before he introduced himselfat court
The Spanish resident Necolalde, however, soon became aware of his presence. Even he had a
difficult time persuading Radolt to accept his hospitality, but he was ultimately successful, for
Radolt lodged with him during his first few days in London.109 Radolt remained determined not yet
to make his presence in London known to the English court, and he therefore sought to conceal this
fact from the King's Master of Ceremonies, John Finet, who was responsible for arranging for the
visits of foreign diplomats at court."0 However Radolt soon took a house in Drury Lane, and by 2
""Ibid.; ibid., f. 278: 17 Apr. 1636, same to Schbnberg.
l0"Radolt wrote that if he had waited any longer, he would have almost certainty boarded an
English ship that was subsequently seized by the French (ibid., StA England, Kart. 18, K.onv. 18 18, f. 40:
9 May 1636, same to Ferdinand II).
I09lbid., f. 1: 2 May 1636, same to same.
"°CSPV 1632-6, 554: 2 May 1636, Correrto D&S.
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May he officially notified Finet of his arrival through Necolalde and Henry Taylor, the Cardinal
Infante's diplomatic agent in England and cousin of John Taylor."1
Taylor's Negotiations at the Imperial Court, Spring 1636
Back in Vienna, Taylor remained sanguine about Radolt's mission and the outlook of Anglo-
Habsburg relations more generally. His rosy reports illustrate his weakness as a diplomat, namely
that he too readily accepted Habsburg overtures because he was so eager for his mission to succeed.
Although at the beginning of his mission he was more critical, shrewd Habsburg politicians soon
won him over. Taylor soon became convinced that his negotiations had many influential supporters
at the Imperial court, among them the King and Queen of Hungary, the Empress, Count OBate,
Trauttmansdorff, Vice Chancellor Stralendorf, and Walter Leslie, a Scotsman who had risen to
prominence in the Imperial army."2 Ballarino, the Venetian ambassador in Vienna, noted Taylor's
increasing complacency as the negotiation progressed:
Although this gentleman dilates upon the forces of his king and the serious hurt
which he could inflict upon the emperor . . . yet he is seen to insinuate himself into
the closest confidence, associates with the ministers, generally eats at Court and to
all appearance gets further and further from the object which was supposed to be his
special concern, to support his demands with the zeal and fervour which he showed
at the beginning.113
1"HHStA, StA England, Kart. 18, Konv. 1818, f. I: 2 May 1636, Radolt to Ferdinand II.
XnCSP, vol. I, 455: 3 Mar. 1636, Taylor to Windebank. Taylor was particularly pleased with the
intelligence he obtained from Leslie, who was privy to the Imperialists' secret councils. Leslie
corresponded with Windebank and was likely receiving an allowance from him as well (ibid., 447: 15
Feb. 1636, Windebank to Taylor, ibid., 450: 29 Feb. 1636, Leslie to Windebank).
niCSPy 1632-6, 502: 12 Jan. 1636, Ballarino to D&S.
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It is true that in his reports he exaggerated England's leverage with Continental powers and flattered
Charles excessively.1 M This is due, at least in part, to the fact that Taylor believed his master had
a greater role to play as the arbiter of peace in Europe. Consequently, he viewed his own mission
as an important step in that direction and had invested much in its success."5
Taylor's misplaced optimism is particularly apparent in reference to Bavaria, as Maximilian
was a more formidable opponent than Taylor had come to believe. Taylor seems to have taken the
Bavarian threat more seriously in the first months ofhis mission, but gradually convinced himself
that the Emperor might value the friendship ofEngland and allegiance of a restored Elector Palatine
more highly than that of Bavaria."6 By March he was more than convinced: "I laugh at the Duke
of Bavaria, and scom all he can do for them: and I know that they are resolved to leave the Duke of
Bavaria for the King of England, if his Majesty will come bravely up unto him.""7
Despite his bravado and willingness to believe what tended to the success of his mission, it
is important to note that Taylor was not bereft of critical powers. Alongside the exaggerations of
his sovereign's power and optimism about his negotiations, Taylor also made some perceptive
"4The following are just two examples of many: "[The Palatinate lands] are.. .not worthy to bee
putt in ba I lance with those great obligations which the house of Austria and the whole Christian world
must receave from his Majesties powerfull arme." (HMC, Denbigh V, 20: 8 Mar. 1636, Taylor to
Feilding); "It is not possible that the affaires in Germany can have or receive any accommodation without
his Majestie, and unlesse he be associated I shall laugh at any league or confederacy they can make"
(ibid., 23: 19 Apr. 1636, same to same). See also: CSP, vol. 1,374: ISDec. 1635, same to Windebank;
ibid., 376: 29 Dec. 1635, same to same.
"'Frances Haskell aptly explains that "His vision embraced a wider sense of his own mission and
a more exalted role for Charles I, whom he saw as the saviour of Europe against the sinister expansion of
the French, and as the bringer of peace to a war-torn world." (Haskell, 212).
"6CS7>, vol. ?, 375: IS Dec. 1635, Taylor to Windebank; ibid., 426: 26 Jan. 1636, same to same.
"7Ibid., 454: 3 Mar. 1636, same to same.
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observations and astute recommendations in his reports home. His immediate appraisal of the
influence ofBavaria at the Imperial court was accurate: it was a powerful force to be reckoned with.
He warned Windebank, as did Hopton and Aston, that the Emperor was wont to offend Maximilian
before the election of his son, the King of Hungary, as King of the Romans.1" At this time Taylor
realized that until the election was over, Bavaria's ambitions presented a real obstacle to the
restoration ofCharles Louis, as Maximilian would almost certainly use his vote to fend offany threat
to Bavarian control of the Upper Palatinate and electorate. And, though he may have eventually
come to believe that the restoration of the Palatinate was an attainable goal, Taylor never intimated
that it would come without a price. On the contrary, from the beginning he, like Aston, emphasized
that full satisfaction was contingent upon conditions, namely a league between Charles and the
Habsburgs. He warned that those involved would expect compensation and likely would ask for
much more than the Palatinate was worth.1" The real question was what the Habsburgs would be
willing to accept in return for partial restitution, and what the King would be willing to offer.
Finally, for all his confidence in the power of his sovereign to influence the course of European
affairs, he was sensible of the need to convince the Continental powers of this and therefore
continually encouraged Charles to exhibit his military might and his resolve to see his nephew
restored:
"*Bodl. Lib., Oar. Mss. 8, f. 7: 26 Dec. 1635, same to same. Spain was as well, to some extent
CCSP, vol. 1, 464: 5 Mar. 1636: Aston to same). Still, Aston's opinion regarding the Palatinate was that
the Spaniards intended to enter into a treaty with England for its accommodation and would give as much
satisfaction as they could, but would still drive a bargain. Aston believed that the Emperor would fall in
with this agreement and Bavaria's influence would wane. However, he thought it would take some time
and require that Spain be trusted (BL, Add. Mss. 36450, f. 7: 9 Jan. 1636," same to Charles I).
U9CSP, vol. 1, 475: 12 Mar. 1636, Taylor to Windebank; ibid., 479: 19 Mar. 1636, same to same.
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I am of the opinion, that, with his only authority, he [Charles I] shall be able to settle
the affairs of Christendom. In all cases, let his Majesty continue to show himself to
prepare bravely for war; for here, though they have heard much of his greatness, yet
they do not believe it to be so great as indeed it is; and it must be the opinion only of
his power and strength, that must make them break a treaty and peace so lately
concluded with the Duke of Saxony, and the whole Empire; which unless they do,
they cannot give the King of England satisfaction.120
As these comments show, a healthy dose of realism often balanced Taylor's idealism.
Regardless, the King and Windebank clearly did not accept Taylor's appraisals uncritically. 121
In fact, Windebank upbraided Taylor several times for bis lack of discretion in conducting the
negotiations. Their main objection concerned Taylor's indiscreet offers ofa league with the Emperor
before he had extracted assurances of the Prince Palatine's restoration. Windebank warned him
against giving the Emperor the wrong impression: "you must take heed ofengaging his Majesty too
positively in a promise ofa league, which his Majesty will never give hopes of, but upon assurance
of restitution of his nephew:. in this too you must be exceeding wary, leaving still a latitude and
IMIbid., 376: 29 Dec. 1635, same to same; see also ibid., 405: 9 Jan. 1636, same to same; ibid.,
475: 12 Mar. 1636, same to same; ibid., 479: 19 Mar. 1636, same to same. "1 am more afraid of the least
loss of reputation of his Majesty's arms, than of any other difficulty whatsoever I can possibly meet with
in my negotiation; without this, his Majesty will be neither esteemed for a friend nor enemy." (ibid., 475:
12 Mar. 1636, same to same).
121It must be remembered that they had access to information from other sources, including the
reports of Hopton and Aston in Madrid, to help set Taylor's reports in context. Windebank did notice
differences between them, for he remarked to Taylor that he feared the envoy was being too optimistic in
light of Hopton's reports (CSP, vol. 1, 478: 14 Mar. 1636, Windebank to Taylor). For instance, the King
and Windebank knew of the Franco-Bavarian treaty of 163 1 and must have realized that the Emperor
would be more concerned with retaining Bavarian support than Taylor reported (Haskell, 211). Also,
Aston wrote on 19 March that the Emperor's ambassador in Spain "found the Emperor, this [Spanish]
King and all his Ministers so well inclined, to give his Majesty satisfaction, that certainly what was in the
Emperor's power to do would be done [i.e., the removal of the ban, and restoration of the Spanish-
occupied Palatinate]. ..upon equal terms." This was echoed by the young Ofiate, who was preparing for his
embassy to England. He told Aston that upon a treaty of equal conditions, the King would have
satisfaction from the Emperor. However. Aston warned that Spain would be obliged to break with
England rather than Bavaria if Charles pressed for full restoration (CSP, vol. 1, 482-3: 19 Mar. 1636,
Aston to Windebank).
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reservation for his Majesty's final resolution." 122 The Secretary reminded Taylor that the offer of a
league was contingent on the eventual full restoration of Charles Louis to the Palatine lands and
titles, even if the King would accept a partial restoration for the time being.123 By the same token,
Windebank and the King felt that Taylor was too forward with other proposals. When he
propounded the relinquishing of the electoral dignity during Maximilian's lifetime, for instance,
Windebank pointed out that the Austrians should have first made this proposal, which the King then
could have considered on good conditions. He cautioned Taylor to "take heed you stoop not too
low."124 The Secretary also reproved Taylor for the deferential manner in which he addressed the
issue of the removal of the ban, namely as a matter of grace than right Rather than pressing to have
the ban removed, which admitted the legality of its application, Taylor should convince the Emperor
to declare that it did not and never had applied to Charles Louis. If the King were to agree to the
removal of the ban by grace rather than right, the Imperialists would then view it as a concession
rather than a necessity on his part.125 When Taylor defended himself against these accusations,
122lbid., 430: 26 Jan. 1636, Windebank to Taylor, ibid., 478: 14 Mar. 1636, same to same. For
offers of a league see, for instance, p. 3 18 above.
123lbid., 400: 12 Jan. 1636, same to same; ibid., 428: 26 Jan. 1636, same to same. Regarding a
league, the Habsburgs expected Charles to ally with them to maintain peace in Germany, recover
Lorraine, make a grant for Flanders' defense, and force the Dutch to come to terms with Spain (ibid., 475:
12 Mar. 1636, Taylor to Windebank).
I24lbid., 448: IS Feb. 1636, Windebank to Taylor.
125Ibid., 428: 26 Jan. 1636, same to same; ibid., 447: 15 Feb. 1636, same to same; ibid., 478: 14
Mar. 1636, same to same. In January, Windebank did point out to Charles that Taylors pressing for the
removal of the ban was warranted by his first instructions, and that if the Emperor considered Charles
Louis as falling under the ban that it must first be cleared if he was to be restored. The King, however, did
not agree: "If they make vs yeld that the Ban is of validety against my Nepueu, wee shall never haue good
of this treatie; but wee must haue them declare it of no validety, & so not be taken off." (CSPD 1635-6,
179: 2 Feb. 1636: same to Charles I, with tatter's notation).
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maintaining that he never pressed for less than all of the Palatinate and had not engaged the King in
anything.126 In fact, outside of the league and grace, they were generally happy with Taylor's
negotiations.127
Charles and Windebank were not the only ones at the English court to question Taylor's
optimistic reports of the Emperor's intentions regarding the Palatinate. Both the French party and
the Palatines and their supporters continued to argue that negotiations with the Habsburgs were
futile, despite the Emperor's reassurances, and promoted an alliance with the French and Dutch to
recover the Palatinate by force. The princes Charles Louis and Rupert, who meanwhile had joined
his brother in London, represented the Palatine viewpoint at court.12* Their mother, who sent a
barrage of letters to her brother and supporters, chief among them Sir Thomas Roe, reinforced this
view.129
126PRO, SP 80/9, f. 119: 14 Apr. 1636, Coke to Taylor, CSP, vol. 1,451:3 Mar. 1636, Taylor to
Windebank.
127lbid., 478: 14 Mar. 1636, Windebank to Taylor.
12IElizabeth wished for Charles Louis to remain in England until the outcome of the missions to
the Emperor were known. By April 1636, however, she wanted Rupert return to the Netherlands to go
into the field with the Prince of Orange because "He [Rupert] spends his time but idly in England, and she
desires to make him a soldier to serve his uncle and his brother." (PRO, SP 16/3 18, f. 30: 4 Apr. 1636,"
Elizabeth to Roe). Ultimately she was quite successful in this endeavor.
129Sir Thomas Roe, English ambassador and confidant of Elizabeth of Bohemia, attempted to
dissuade Charles from wasting any more time haggling with the Habsburgs. To this end, h'e addressed
two memorials to the King. The first was entitled "Considerations upon the hope given by Taylor of
restitution of the Palatinat, and the ground thereof, as it appeares to his Majestic and the universal!
dangers if it prove illusorye." Roe immediately questioned Taylor's effectiveness in this role and
characterized him as a "Catholic and to their cause affected." (PRO, SP 80/9, f. 101: 30 Mar. 1636, Roe
to Charles I). Roe's next comments further reveal his perception that the Taylors were puppets of the
Habsburgs and his confusion about Taylor's lineage, for he continues, "his education was in Spain by the
Jesuits, and his whole dependence on that crown; being brother to Taylor the Flanders agent, and nephew
to old Taylor the instrument of Gondomar." (ibid.). Roe may be referring to Taylor's cousin Anthony,
who did study at the English colleges in Madrid and Valladolid; however, the latter statement, that Taylor
344
Despite their arguments, it was not apparent that an alliance with France would offer greater
potential for achieving the restoration of the Palatinate than negotiations with the Habsburgs. Arthur
Hopton, one of Charles's most perceptive diplomats, pointed out that while the recovery of the
Palatinate through the agency ofthe Habsburgs was uncertain, England's chances were no better with
the French. An alliance with France would entail recovering it by force, which was always a risky
proposition. Also, France had an interest in supporting Bavarian retention of the electorate, to
gratify Maximilian and weaken his support for the Habsburg cause.130 Although Charles had not
forgiven the Habsburgs for their duplicity , he decided that negotiations with them had more potential
for success than those with France and that the best policy would be to keep his options open. Given
the recent competition for his favor generated by the outbreak ofwar between France and Spain and
the lure of the Ship Money fleet, he did have some reason to believe that he could improve his
nephew's prospects through negotiation rather than force of arms. 131 In the end, the arguments ofthe
was nephew to Dr. Robert Taylor (Anthony's father] is indeed correct. The same month, Roe addressed a
second memorial to the King, "A second discourse (by Sir Thomas Roe] given to his Majesty, how the
Prince Elector may be made considerable in a war, or in a treaty in Germany," in which he reviewed the
difficulties of the Prince Palatine's position and recommends that a treaty should immediately be opened
with Holland, Sweden, France, and the German Protestant states (CSPD 1635-6, 342-3: Mar. 1636, Roe
to Charles I). The same year, an anonymous English gentleman, and "sometimes pensioner of
Habsburgs," suggested that England plot with the French, Dutch, and Moriscos to recover the Palatinate
(BL, Harleian Mss. 6209: 1636, "An infallible means for the recovery of the Palatinate with small charge:
as also for the King of France to recover those territories which are kept from him and other distressed
princes, nobles and natives, by the King of Spain and House of Austria; and also a means to weaken the
said house").
130Foran earlier French attempt to separate Maximilian from the Emperor, see chap. 3, p. 130.
1""Yesterday Mons. Seneterre pronounced to the King, that war was declared with Spain, which
leads to the inference that the league is concluded, and the announcement made to discover how we
would stand in this neutrality, especially the King's fleet being ready to sail, and an expectation of
Spanish ships to convey men and money into Flanders. What his Majesty will resolve is too deep a sea
for Roe, but the opinion of wise men is that we may look on a while and let these elephants waste their
strength. In the meantime all parties will look upon his Majesty, and he may take his opportunity to
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Habsburgs' critics did not deter Charles from pursuing the course upon which his heart was set,
namely the restoration of the Palatinate by peaceful means.
In light of Taylor's encouraging reports, Charles thus resolved to send an ambassador
extraordinary with plenipotentiary powers to the Imperial court to conclude a treaty for the final
settlement of the Palatinate question. 132 The Emperor and his ministers, who had repeatedly alluded
to Taylor's lack ofpowers to conclude the agreement, refused to publish the terms they had offered
him until the King sent a plenipotentiary.133 Taylor hoped that he would receive the necessary
powers, but Charles did not trust him to handle a matter of such great importance.134 Taylor
therefore waited for the powers in vain.135 Once the English had decided to send an ambassador,
they still doubted the veracity of Taylor's assessment of the political and diplomatic situation in
Vienna. Coke warned Taylor that he had better not have given the King false hopes for an
accommodation: "The hopes you had given ofa fid restitution and of relinquishing the Bavarian for
us have occasioned the imployment of this great person to whom you must make good the grounds
throw a little weight into the scale which may best profit him, and when both parties are out of breath,
sway the end, and reap the benefit of the war (CSPD 1635, 41 : 23 Apr. 1635," [Roe] to Elizabeth);
Sharpe, Personal Rule, 5 18-9). War with France had given new impetus to Olivares's schemes for
drawing England into Spain's orbit. Indeed, the Spanish council of state agreed in 1636 that if Spain's
naval resources could be supplemented by those of England, "we shall be masters of the sea." (Elliott,
Olivares, 508).
1"Springell, 2-3.
mCSP, vol. 1, 45 1-3: 3 Mar. 1636: Taylor to Windebank; ibid., 488: 27 Mar. 1636, same to
same.
134Ibid., 447: 15 Feb. 1636, Windebank to Taylor.
1"Taylor's commission was ad referendum, meaning that he could only accept proposals subject
to the assent of his principals (ibid., 447: 13 Feb. 1636, Taylor to Windebank).
346
of thes hopes that hee may not find him, selfe dishonored by vaine apparences: but that hee cumeth
on solid grounds."136 These ominous words would take on new meaning in the months ?h<»«H
The first phase of Anglo-Imperial negotiation in the latter years of the 1630s encompassed
first the political and diplomatic upheaval that greeted the news of the Peace of Prague at the English
court and then the dispatch of John Taylor to Vienna and his negotiations from November 1635
through April 1636. This development not only shows Charles Fs continued commitment to his
major foreign policy aim, the restoration of his nephew to the Palatinate, but also demonstrates his
commitment to achieving this objective by peaceful means. Although he was courted by both the
Habsburgs and their opponents at this time, as the outbreak of war between France and Spain and
the reinforced fleet intensified the competition for his favor, he did not come down decisively on one
side or the other. Instead, he decided to listen to the overtures from both sides to see which held
better prospects for restitution. That having been said, the King still believed he would best achieve
this through negotiations with Habsburgs, in spite of their apparent duplicity, because they were in
the best position to effect his nephew's restoration. He had therefore dispatched John Taylor to the
Emperor's court in Vienna and Lord Aston to the King of Spain's court in Madrid. Over the next few
years, both envoys conducted secret negotiations with the Habsburgs for the restoration of the
Palatinate. In both cases, the King dangled the possibility ofa league in front of the Habsburg rulers
to persuade them to make an advantageous offer.
The first phase ofTaylor's negotiation in Vienna seemed to offer real hope for improving the
Prince Palatine's situation and meeting the King's demands for his restoration. Although he hoped
l3SPRO, SP 80/9, f. 1 19: 14 Apr. 1636, Coke to Taylor.
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for full restoration in time and made this demand requisite to a league, he was willing to settle for
less (though it was not apparent what, ifanything, he was prepared to offer in return). The Emperor,
for his part, was committed to reaching a compromise settlement with England. In the interests of
peace he wished to mediate an agreement between his allies on the one hand and the English King
on the other that would be satisfactory to all involved. The demands of Spain and especially
Bavaria, however, limited what he could realistically offer to England. Still, a promising start was
made when the Emperor agreed to restore an undetermined portion of the Palatine lands to Charles
Louis in return for his formal submission to the Emperor, an offer which would meet the King's
minimum demands. It was also encouraging that the Emperor took Taylor's proposals seriously
enough to send Clement Radolt as his envoy to England to promote an agreement.
While it was apparent that the Emperor hoped for a league, during this stage of Taylor's
negotiation he did not make his offers of restoration contingent upon one. Therefore both the King
and the Emperor were trying to inch toward that elusive point where they could gain the maximum
advantage for the minimum sacrifice, but there was still plenty of gray area in between. The
compromises that both sides slowly but surely made and Taylor's optimistic dispatches strengthened
the hopes of the King and Windebank that they could indeed negotiate a solution to the Palatinate
question with the Habsburgs. This optimism motivated the dispatch of the Earl of Arundel, one of
the greatest noblemen of the realm, as ambassador extraordinary to conclude an agreement.
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The Earl of Arundel at the Imperial Court and
Clement Radolt at the English Court, 1636
Preparations for the Embassy
Upon Taylor's assurance that plenary restitution was within reach, Charles I decided to send an
embassy ofsuch importance to the Emperor that he could not fail to give a definite answer about his
intentions regarding the Palatinate. Therefore, on 1 April 1636, the King resolved to send Thomas
Howard, 2nd Earl of Arundel, to Vienna as ambassador extraordinary to determine whether the
Emperor actually meant to deliver on his promises (see fig. 6).1 Windebank immediately wrote to
Taylor to notify him of the decision that the King had taken based upon his positive reports:
I pray God bless the business; whereof I cannot but hope very well, ifyour grounds
hold: which you must look to considering that, upon those frequent and often
reiterated assurances, which you have given his Majesty, of full and entire
satisfaction, his Majesty hath make choice of this great person, the greatest of his
subjects, to labour in this employment . . . .2
The King had many reasons, in addition to Arundel's political and social status, to select him
for this important post. Charles believed that Arundel possessed additional qualities that would
increase his chances to bring the negotiations with the Emperor to a successful conclusion:
1'fllustrissirmts & excellentissimus Dominus Thomas Howardus Comes Anmdelice, & Surriea
primus Comes, & Comes Marescallus Anglice . . . ad sacram Caesar."" Ma." Ferdinandum secundum, &
ad reliquos Imperii Eiectores, Principes et Ordines, Legates exlraordinarius (London: s.n., 1636).
2CSP, vol. I, 502-3: 10 Apr. 1636, Windebank to Taylor. Roe also wrote excitedly to Elizabeth,
Queen of Bohemia, that "an advice is come from Taylor that has arrested all, and it is this day resolved to
send the Earl of Arundel to Vienna to approve the truth." (CSPD 1635-6,3\4: 22 Mar. 1636," Roe to
Elizabeth).
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6 IUustrissimus & excellentissimus Dominus Thomas Howardus (1636)
Soon after the King selected Arundel as ambassador extraordinary to the Emperor, this broadside
declaration of Arundel's style and title in this capacity was published and distributed.
From Bodleian Library, Oxford University, Ashmolian Manuscripts 845, f. 153.
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Arundel's loyalty to the House of Stuart, this high moral standards, his political and diplomatic
experience, and even "his very pride and stubbornness would stand him in good stead at the
Emperor's court, where fair words, flattery, and procrastination were certain to be used."3 His
"Italianate manners, dignified bearing, command of foreign languages and wide-ranging interest in
continental culture" also made him well-suited to ambassadorial duties.4 Moreover, he was well
acquainted with the Palatine House. After the wedding of Frederick V and Princess Elizabeth in
1613, Arundel and his wife accompanied tDieir entourage to Germany.5 Later, in 1633, the King
dispatched Arundel to the Hague to persuade Elizabeth to return to England after her husband's
death.6 His experience with the Palatine fatrnily and his familiarity with their affairs, coupled with
his high standing in England, made him a nartural choice to serve as ambassador extraordinary to the
Emperor three years later.7 The King's confidence in his choice is neatly expressed in a summary
of Arundel's instructions: "His Majestie considering what the great interests both of the Prince his
nephew & his own honor & general peace htath thought fit to imploy such a considerable person as
the Erie Marshal uppon whose wisdom & fi<delitie an[d] good affection both to his sister & nephew
Hee doth intierly relie."*
3Beller, "Diplomatic Relations," 357.
4Robinson, 103.
sSpringell, 6.
6Elizabeth, however, would not budge because she feared that her return to England would be
construed as a retreat, thus endangering her son's prospects for restitution (Robinson, 103).
'Arundel was the Earl Marshal and premier earl of the realm. In 1636, the sole marquis, the
Marquis of Winchester, rarely attended court since he had to pay off his father's debts, and the only duke,
the Duke of Buckingham, was eight years of age.
"PRO, SP 80/9, f. 115: 1 1 Apr. 1636, Imstructions for Arundel, with abstract.
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Although his appointment to the post was a great honor and would afford him the opportunity
to travel abroad in ducal style, Arundel was not entirely pleased with it9 From the beginning he
realized that his mission would be a difficult one and that it did not necessarily enjoy widespread
support at court or elsewhere, not even among his colleagues on the foreign committee. Shortly
before his departure from England, he expressed his reservations to Sir Thomas Wentworth: "And
I hope your Lordship will notwithstanding assist me with your best Wishes and Prayers in this so
desperate a Business, which would not want Enemies enough in our own Country and Court, if it
wanted in Germany."10 Although he hoped that the parties involved could settle the Palatinate
question by peaceful means, Arundel saw clearly that, despite the Emperor's assurances ofhis desire
to give the King satisfaction, it would be difficult to persuade him to restore Charles Louis fully to
the Palatine lands and dignities. The influence of the Emperor's allies Spain and Bavaria would
make the task more challenging, as Spain wished to retain its foothold along the Spanish Road and
Maximilian was set on keeping as many of the lands and dignities so recently accrued to his house
as he could." According to the King, Arundel's negotiations were intended to be England's last
attempt to restore the Prince Palatine and settle the Continental conflict by peaceful means. Arundel,
9Many at court believed Arundel would exert himself in his mission because he hoped to regain
the title of Duke of Norfolk as his reward (CSPV 1632-6, 558: 9 May 1636, Correr to D&S). Arundel
paid the greater part of the expenses for his splendid train out of his own pocket; see below, n. 30.
10Strafford, vol. 2, 3: 17 Apr. 1636, Arundel to Wentworth.
"Maximilian noted that Arundel had doubted the outcome of the negotiation from the beginning:
"Gleichwol ist aufi obbedeiten avisen auch dies abzunemen, dafi der graf von Arundel selbsten die sachen
nit so gar fur richtig halt, sondcm sehr zweifett, ob er, was sein kfinig bei Iherer Kayserlichen Mayestat
suechen und begehren laBt, werde erhalten kQnden." (Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, Kastenschwarz
10 1E: 14 June 1636, Maximilian 1 to Prince-Bishop of Vienna; quoted in Hun, Regensburger
Kurfurstentag, 107-8 n. 76).
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who had consistently supported this approach in the King's counsels in the past, regarded his mission
a worthwhile effort.12 If the Habsburgs remained recalcitrant despite his attempts at a peaceful
solution, the King vowed that this would finally convince him of the futility of negotiation with the
House of Austria and would instead take more active measures to regain the Palatine lands and
dignities for his nephew.13
Despite his misgivings about his mission, Arundel did not take the fatalistic attitude of the
Queen of Bohemia, Prince Palatine, and their supporters that any attempt to come to a satisfactory
agreement on the Palatinate question with the Habsburgs was bound to fail.14 Elizabeth
diametrically opposed any course which for expediency's sake might result in the partial restitution
of the Palatinate. 15 Although she opposed negotiations with the Habsburgs because she doubted that
they would conclude an honorable settlement and believed that they would only serve to damage the
reputation ofEngland and the Palatine House, if her brother must send a mission, she was glad that
Arundel was the one chosen to lead it. To Roe she wrote:
You may easily believe the news of the ambassador to Vienna did a little surprise me,
but, as you say, since there is no remedy, we must make the best of it that we can.
I am glad my lord of Arundel is chosen, for he being the greatest, I hope he will be
12Springell, I.
"CSPy 1636-9, 4: 12 June 1636, Francesco Michiel, Venetian ambassador at the Hague, to D&S;
ibid., 16: 3 July 1636, same to same.
14Correr describes an outburst by the Prince Palatine when word came to his ears that the King
had no intention of going further with his business than in the past, and that this decision was taken on
Arundel's advice. The Palatine's harsh words were directed at Arundel, who, greatly offended, asked the
King to excuse him from his mission. Needless to say, the King did not consent to this (CSPV 1632-6,
541-2: 11 Apr. 1636, Correr to D&S).
"When she raised this worry to Archbishop Laud, he informed her that a compromise solution
might be the best that she could hope for (Laud, vol. 7, 254: [Apr.] 1636, Laud to Elizabeth).
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the last sent, and that another lesser man will not be fit to be sent after so great a one
hath failed; for I am confident he will do nothing, but have such another delaying
answer as Taylor had.16
Elizabeth hoped that Arundel's commission would be to accept "tout ou den," that is, all or nothing.
If his mission were unsuccessful, by her reasoning, it would plainly expose the Emperor's true
intentions toward her house. Then her brother would no longer accept the Emperor's delaying
answers, but instead would take decisive action as he had vowed to do.17 Roe buttressed this belief
when he reported that "If it fail . . . the King has protested he will do that which his honour, his
interest, and nature require. ... It was but a lengthening of the patience she had so long had for a
companion, and this mask (if it be one) being taken off, the King will put on armour to revenge it
nil
As soon as Arundel was chosen to lead the embassy, Coke drafted the instructions that would
guide Arundel in his negotiations with the Emperor. The King gave him plenipotentiary powers to
treat on his behalf. In the first instance he was to insist that the Emperor remove the ban and fully
restore Charles Louis to the Palatine lands and dignities. Only once they had agreed upon this could
the time and manner of restitution be treated. Not only the Emperor, but also the electors and the
King of Hungary had to consent to any agreement that they made. If it became apparent that the
Habsburgs were not responding to these demands and they were treating simply to gain time,
Arundel was to leave immediately and make it plain that England would negotiate instead with their
16PRO, SP 16/318, f. 29: 4 Apr. 1636,' Elizabeth to Roe.
17CSPV 1636-9, 4: 12 June 1636, Michiel to D&S; ibid., 16: 3 July 1636, same to same.
"CSPD 1635-6, 3 14: 22 Mar. 1636,' Roe to Elizabeth.
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enemies — particularly France." However, if they granted these terms, the King empowered him to
offer a "strict league for the common peace" by which England promised to mediate a peace in the
Empire advantageous to the Emperor and to bring the Dutch and French to an agreement with Spain.
The assistance that the King would offer the Habsburgs ifthe belligerents did not comply was stated
only in vague terms: "[Tjf any of these [the renegade German states, Sweden, the United Provinces,
France, and various Italian states] shall refuse just and reasonable conditions and disturb the peace,
we will assist the Emperor and his House as far as without breach of treaties we may be able, and
to this end will maintain a powerful fleet at sea, and will suffer our people to serve him where we
see cause . . . ."20 While the King was willing to join in a league for the common peace, he had no
intention of entering the war on the Habsburg side in return for the partial restoration of the Palatine
lands and dignities, even with the promise of the rest to come, as Windebank had made abundantly
clear to Taylor in March: "His Majesty, upon restitution of that which is presently in their power,
and promise of the rest, as well dignities as territories, will really join with them in a league for the
peace of Christendom: but, if they expect he shall break his treaties with any of his neighbors, or
enter into a war for their sakes, they will find themselves deceived."21 These were the same type of
vague offers that Charles had made in the past, and were hardly motivation for the Habsburg party
"PRO, SP 80/9, ff. 105-14: 1 1 Apr. 1636, Instructions for Arundel, with abstract. In return for a
league with England, the French would be expected to agree to the Palatinate-Lorraine swap previously
suggested by Charles.
J0Ibid., f. 105: II Apr. 1636, Instructions for Arundel, with abstract.
"CSP, vol. I, 503: Mar. 1636. Windebank to Taylor, CSPV 1632-6, 544: 1 1 Apr. 1636, Correrto
D&S.
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to agree to the full restitution of the Prince Palatine.22 The King's reluctance to commit to a straight
league would prove the major sticking point for Arundel and Taylor in their negotiations with the
Habsburgs.23
The perceptible hardening ofEngland's stance on the restitution ofthe Palatinate was readily
apparent in Arundel's instructions. The terms set forth were far more uncompromising than those
embodied in Taylor's instructions of December 1635, a mere three months earlier.24 His optimistic
dispatches relating promises offull restitution obviously affected the King, who seemed determined
once and for all to discover the Emperor's position on the Palatinate. Arundel's instructions called
for promises of full restitution, even if they were only fulfilled in time. Taylor's, on the other hand,
called for the restoration of the Lower Palatinate (or at least its sequestration by a neutral prince,
though the King backpedaled on this) and probable grounds of the rest later. He was specifically
directed not to press too insistently for the Upper Palatinate, for the King and Windebank recognized
that the chances of regaining it were slim given Maximilian's determination to maintain his hold on
it. In addition, they empowered Taylor to offer the Habsburgs a provisional alliance and the services
"This despite the fact that Aston in Madrid had warned the King that he could not expect to get
something for nothing, nor achieve the quick result he obviously desired (BL, Add. Mss. 36450, ff. 7-8: 9
Jan. 1636,' Aston to Charles I; CSP, vol. 1, 466: 5 Mar. 1636, same to Windebank).
aln May, not long after Arundel had departed from England, Hopton advised Aston that the King
was no longer as open to a league with the Habsburgs as he had been when Aston received his
instructions. The common opinion at court was that if Arundel should receive an unfavorable answer
from the Emperor, the King was poised to tum to France instead, a notion which Hopton believed the
King was more than willing to perpetuate to appease the critics of his foreign policy at home and pressure
the Habsburgs to yield more to his negotiators abroad. Hopton's measured opinion, however, was that the
King "intends only to make a home trial, but not to fall off from the House of Austria." (BL, Add. Mss.
36448, f. 52: 1 1 May 1636," Hopton to Aston). Time would show the accuracy of his prediction.
24See above, p. 322.
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of the fleet in return for these terms. Arundel, on the other hand, had to demand more stringent
terms from the Habsburgs and could only offer them a league for the common peace in return. In
comparison to Arundel's instructions, Taylor's were much more flexible and encouraged the
exploration of alternative routes to a settlement."
However, secret instructions — whether written or verbal — often tempered official ones.26
The Venetian Correr claimed that Arundel told him that the King intended to discover the true
intentions of the Emperor toward his nephew, and then subsequently to reduce his demands to fair
limits. He would insist upon the restitution of the Lower Palatinate and investiture of Charles Louis
as a prince of the Empire, and then upon the death of the Duke of Bavaria treat about the rest,
exchanging the electoral vote for the Upper Palatinate. The King would compensate the Spaniards
for their share of the Lower Palatinate with a general peace, so his nephew could enjoy the
possession of his dominions and he himself would be relieved of the burden of this obligation."
Arundel's unofficial negotiations at the end of his embassy bear out these assertions. Also, it was
considered that Arundel should offer the Emperor, if he should press, assistance by sea, the present
offer of aid and confederation being considered senselessly low ("groll").2*
Before his departure, Coke furnished Arundel with the usual commissions and letters which,
along with his instructions, in effect formed a diplomatic packet. Besides his instructions, the packet
"CSV, vol. I, 403-4: 9 Jan. 1636, Instructions for Taylor, Haskell. 213.
"Although secret instructions have not been found, they almost certainly existed, as Coke's list of
considerations relating to Arundel's mission attests (PRO, SP 80/9, f. 285: [Mar. 1636], Coke's notes).
"CSPV 1632-6, 544: 1 1 Apr. 1636, Correr to D&S.
2*PRO, SP 80/9, f. 285: [Mar. 1636], Coke's notes.
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included the following: credentials to the Emperor and the electors, princes, and free cities of the
Empire, the Prince of Orange, and the States General; official letters to the Emperor, King of
Hungary, and various Imperial officials; a safe conduct; copies of Taylor's instructions, his
propositions to the Emperor, and the Emperor's replies; copies of correspondence between the King
and the Emperor, and personal letters that Arundel should deliver to various persons, among them
a letter from the King to his sister at the Hague.29
While his official papers were being prepared, Arundel was busy selecting the members of
his entourage. He carefully assembled a party of distinguished men to accompany him on his
journey — an entourage befitting a premier duke. Arundel was intent on gathering the most
"exclusive, efficient, and brilliant company" possible.30 Edward Rossingham wrote ofthe entourage
NIbid., f. 121: 15 Apr. 1636, Commissions and letters given to Arundel; HHStA, StA England,
K.art. 2, ff. 138-9: 10 Apr. 1636, Charles I to Ferdinand II; ibid., ff. 78-9: 15 Apr. 1636, Henrietta Maria
to same; ibid., StA Palatina, Kart. 12, Konv. 2: 13 Apr. 1636, Charles Louis to same; BL, Add. Mss.
33596, f. 3: 1 Apr. 1636, Charles I to Stralendorf. Arundel's commission to treat with the Emperor is a
beautifully illustrated document on vellum, signed by both Charles I and Charles Louis. It is wonderfully
preserved at Arundel Castle, with a perfect great seal (ACA, Papers relating to Thomas Howard, Earl of
Arundel (1585-1646), G 1/88: 28 Mar. 1636, Commission empowering Arundel to treat with Ferdinand
II). The privy council ordered English mayors and officers to allow Arundel and his entourage to embark
on ship without search and to supply him with horses, carts, and watercraft as required (CSPD 1635-6,
341 : 10 Apr. 1636, Privy council to all mayors and other officers).
"With such an entourage, Arundel's private expenses greatly outran his official ones. He spent
his private funds on things that would bring his retinue to the near-royal level that he felt would do justice
to his family's ancient status. It has been stated that upwards of £70,000 was spent on the embassy
(Springell, 16 n. 34). If this figure is accurate, Arundel spent nearly £50,000 of his personal fortune on
the embassy. He was also compelled to use his own funds to cover official expenses while he was abroad,
hoping that they would be reimbursed upon the submission of bills of extraordinaries. Records for two
payments to Arundel exist: the first accounts a reimbursement of £12,000 for expenses incurred from the
beginning of the embassy in April through mid-August 1636, including his living allowance of £6 per
day; the second was a warrant for £7,262, the balance remaining of £19,262 that was due to him beyond
his allowance (HMC, Cowper II, 79: Apr.-Aug. 1635 [sic], Arundel's accounts Apr.-Aug. 1636; PRO, SP
16/346, f. 79: 14 Feb. 1637, Warrant to pay Arundel; Bodl. Lib., Add. Mss. C 303, f. 161: Warrants to
pay expenses of English ambassadors). Since the second sum ties in perfectly with the first, one may
assume that together they form the complete account of Arundel's official extraordinary expenses. It can
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that "Many gentlemen of quality make all possible means to go this journey; but my lord marshal
is very choice of his company."31
Among his administrative staff, Arundel brought along Sir Edward Walker, his personal
secretary and future biographer, to carry out various duties.32 Sir John Borough, an authority on
international law, was engaged as his official diplomatic secretary. Arundel expected Walker and
Borough to take on a great deal of responsibility in their administrative duties.33 Arundel also
employed William Crowne, a member of his household, as a private diarist to record the events of
the journey. In keeping with his commitment to recording family history, Arundel wished to
preserve this great moment for posterity.34 In addition to Arundel's secretarial contingent, Johann
Joachim, Count Rusdorf was chosen to accompany the embassy, not only by the Queen of Bohemia
to act as her personal representative during the upcoming negotiations but also by express wish of
thus be concluded that he was compensated for most, if not all, of the payment due him, as these warrants
authorize all his extraordinarics plus about half of his allowance. Since Springe 11did not consult the first
of the two documents mentioned, he mistakenly claims that "about £25,000 was spent and accounted for,"
a sum he obviously calculated by adding together the two figures in the warrant (Springell, 14). The
funds Arundel had at his disposal may point to an additional reason for his selection for the post, though
it was not likely a central one. His finances were not as healthy as one might expect The burden of debt
that the embassy and his craze for collecting, among other factors, placed upon him contributed to the
wild plan he floated in the late 1630s to colonize Madagascar and escape his creditors.
31Arundel attempted to convince his friend John Selden, lawyer and author of many learned
treatises, to accompany him. Selden excused himself on the plea of ill health (Birch, vol. 2, 238: 9 Apr.
1636, Edward Rossingham to SirThomas Puckering).
."2For Walker's short biography of Arundel, see his Historical Discourses.
3jArundel had helped both of these men to positions in the College of Arms; at the time, Borough
was Garter Principal King of Arms, and Walker Blanch-Lion Pursuivant-at-Arms Extraordinary
(Springell, 9-10).
MIbid., 13-4.
360
the King.35 Having previously represented Frederick V as an unofficial ambassador to the Imperial
court, the Emperor, his councillors, and other influential persons of the Catholic camp personally
knew Rusdorf. Among Arundel's entourage he was the most closely acquainted with the problems
of the Palatinate. However, it is likely that the King sent Rusdorf in large part to satisfy Elizabeth,
since he did not take an active role in the negotiations per se.
Besides those attending to the administrative and diplomatic work of the embassy, both
official and unofficial, various gentlemen and young relatives of Arundel and some ofhis colleagues
attended the embassy for the purposes of leisure. Among these men were Arundel's cousin William
Howard, a Catholic who was in close contact with the Jesuits and papal representatives; William
Harvey, the King's physician and the discoverer of circulation of the blood; Arundel's son, William
Howard, later Viscount Stafford; Secretary Windebank's son, Francis; and Borough's son, Caisho.
All except his cousin William planned to visit Italy while on the Continent. The retinue was rounded
out by numerous cavaliers and officers acting as escorts, officials, messengers, and servants. And
the multitude grew as the journey progressed.36 Perhaps the most significant addition was the artist
Wenceslaus Hollar, who joined the entourage at Cologne. Arundel commissioned Hollar, later
famous for his drawings and particularly his engravings, to make watercolors and drawings of the
towns and landscapes along the route. With such an entourage, Arundel "traveled in great state and
almost royal fashion," which was almost certainly his intention.37
"CSPD 163S-6, 349: 12 Apr. 1636, Warrant to pay Rusdorf.
^According to the Theatrum Europeum, he brought 97 people with him (Arthur Bechtold, "Eine
Reise durch Franken im DreiBigjahrigen Krieg," Archrvdes Historischen Vereins von Unterfranken wid
AschqffenburgGl [1928]: 21 n. 6).
"Springell, 13-4,44.
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The Progress of the Retinue to the Imperial Court
On 17 April 1636, Arundel and his party set out from Greenwich and on the following day embarked
on His Majesty's snip Happy Entrance, bound for the Netherlands.3* Three days later, on 20 April,
they reached the Hague. Arundel related that at Ryswick, the coaches of the Queen ofBohemia and
Sir William Boswell, the English ambassador at the Hague, met him. His first night there he and
some members of the entourage went to the court of Elizabeth, Queen of Bohemia, where Arundel
presented them to her. The next day he had an audience with the Estates General, the Prince of
Orange, and — most importantly — Elizabeth.39 During their meeting, she objected to the vagueness
ofhis instructions, because she believed they left room for a compromise settlement of the Palatinate
question. She was against any attempt to bargain with the Habsburgs and any scheme to negotiate
a partial restoration ofthe lands and titles, even ifthey promised full restoration in time, which under
the circumstances was bound to be the best solution available. She told Arundel that she did not
believe there would be an honorable way to recover the Palatinate by treaty, to which he replied that
"he was as little confident of it as she was, but he would do his best."40 In the end, however, he
"CSPD 1635-6, 356: 16 Apr. 1636, Lords of the Admiralty to Sir John Pennington.
"PRO, SP 80/9, ff. 123-4: 22 Apr. 1636, Arundel to Secretary; ibid., SP 16/318, f. 152: 22 Apr.
1636, Francis Windebank to his father. According to Arundel's report to the Secretary, he took a private
house to avoid ceremony. However in a separate account of his reception at the Hague, Arundel related
that at Ryswick the Prince of Orange and some of the representatives of the Estates General met him with
a fleet of coaches belonging to several ambassadors and conducted him to a house appointed for the
entertainment of ambassadors, where he was defrayed during his stay (ACA, AL 1632-1723, no. 359:
Apr. 1636, Arundel's account of his reception at the Hague).
4°CSPD 1635-6, 367: 24 Apr. 1636, Elizabeth to Roe. She also objected to any request for the ban
to be removed, as opposed to simply having it declared void, as this would indirectly recognize its
lawfulness.
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found her "willing to apply herself wholly to his Majesty's order and direction" where negotiations
for the restitution of the Palatinate were concerned.41 He thus assumed her approval of his mission,
if with reservations. 42 After receiving her letters for delivery at the Imperial court, he left her "in
settled satisfaction" on 25 April and continued his journey through the United Provinces and into
Germany.43
Contrary to Arundel's belief, however, his assurances did not assuage Elizabeth's fears.
Although he believed that she was satisfied with, or at least resigned to, his mission, she continued
41PRO, SP 80/9, ff. 123-4: 22 Apr. 1636, Arundel to Secretary. He later added that "The matter
she most blanched at was the marriage [proposed] with the Emperor's daughter, as being many years
older than the Prince, and of no comely person. To which I replied that princes in marriages did rather
respect states than persons, and that in this, the Prince Elector married the Palatinate rather than the
Emperor's daughter, and therefore should more endeavour to advance his estate than to please his eye or
fancy." (ibid., fF. 125-8: 24 Apr. 1636, same to same). The marriage of the Prince Palatine to the
Archduchess was just one of the many schemes advanced to help settle the question of the Palatinate. The
Imperialists saw it as a way to keep Charles Louis under their control, while his supporters saw it as a
way to obtain a more favorable settlement.
42This is significant, because in Coke's list of considerations relating to Arundel's mission, one of
the main ones was whether Arundel should tum back if Elizabeth objected too heftily to his negotiation. It
is unclear whether this was actually incorporated into his secret instructions (PRO, SP 80/9, f. 28S: [Mar.
1636], Coke's notes).
43ACA NC G 1/10: 22 Apr. 1636," Elizabeth to the Emperor, Empress, and King and Queen of
Hungary. Shortly after his departure from the Hague, Arundel's wife sent him a tender letter which gives
a glimpse into their family life. She asks for news of him and relates news of home: "My deereste harte, I
can not chuse but write though I have lettel hope this will com to your handes, I never harde from you
sence you embarked, which makes us thinke some letters of you[rs] have miscared, heere is a gentelman,
that told my cousen William Howardes wife that you went from the Hagge on tuesday last, but how to
beleve it
, I know not, because I heare not from your selfe, all heere are God be praysed vere well, and just
as you lefte us, our deere little babes wishe oftten for your good and spedy returrne, which I most humbly
beseech Almighty God to send with all his good blessings and send us all an hapye meeting, which shall
be they daly prayres of your most faythfull loving wife Alathea Arundel I and Surrey." (ibid., Howard
Letters and Papers 1636-1822, Various Letters, vol. 1:15 Apr. 1636," Alathea, Countess of Arundel, to
Arundel).
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to voice her objections to her supporters in strong words.44 She still dreaded the acceptance of a
compromise based upon the restitution of a portion of her son's inheritance, with the fate of the
remainder to be settled at a future date, and remained convinced that military intervention would be
the only way to bring about a full and honorable restoration.45 She expressed her fears openly to her
old friend Sir Thomas Roe:
She has seen Lord Arundel and his instructions, and to her judgment finds that on
Roe's side [of] the seas they are resolved to make an end of the Queen's business,
well or ill; it is no matter so they be not put to a war; for he has in commission if he
cannot get all, to be contented with one part and assurance of the rest to follow, what
assurance that can be God knows! and fifteen years experience shows what their
promises are.46
44Roe brought the matter to a point with Elizabeth when he wrote, "What he hears is, that her
letters and Lord Arundel's differ.... He writes that she was so content with his embassage and instruttions,
that he left her in settled satisfaction; on the other part she has expressed to some a full dislikc.of
dividing her son's inheritance and deserting the dignity of the Electorate to courtesy, and consequently to
desperation, and of involving him in the ban by taking the investiture as a new grant of favour and not of
right. Roe has interpreted these doubts that seeing the King was resolved to make trials of a treaty, she
submitted to his wisdom and was satisfied with the election of a person of quality, (especially concluding
it would be the last, and that she trusted the Prince should be restored or the vizard be taken off,)" (CSPD
1635-6, 401 : 1 May 1636,' Roe to Elizabeth). Elizabeth denied that she had led Arundel to believe that
she had accepted his mission and claimed that he not only misinterpreted her position but also the Prince
of Orange's support (ibid., 533: 4 June 1636," Elizabeth to Roe; ibid, 525: 1 1 June 1636, same to Laud).
45The words of Edward Rossingham echo Elizabeth's fears about Arundel's mission: "The
emperor does offer the Lower presently, and the Higher with the electoral dignity, after the Duke of
Bavaria's decease, who is an aged man, [and] therefore cannot live long. If this offer of the emperor
should be accepted, and that after the Duke of Bavaria's death the other two were prolonged, and not
forthwith delivered, (and many other accidents might happen before that time) the young elector, who is
now innocent, may be engaged in some business that the emperor may cavil at; so all former promises
may be rendered void." (Birch, vol. 2, 238: 9 Apr. 1636, Rossingham to Puckering).
46CSPD 1635-6, 367: 24 Apr. 1636, Elizabeth to Roe. She continued by begging Roe, "if it be
possible, to draw her brother from accepting any such thing, and also of thinking of a match between
Charles [Louis] and the Emperor's daughter, who is both old and unhandsome, besides all other reasons
of dislike." Her tone was quite different with Archbishop Laud five days later, when she said that she
would not dispute the King in anything, and that if he wished to send an ambassador, "she is glad he
made so good a choice as of the Lord Marshal, of whose affection she is most confident, and that he will
agree to nothing that shall be dishonourable." (ibid., 373: 29 Apr. 1636, same to Laud). She goes on to
ask him to head off any thoughts the King might have of accepting partial restoration and points out the
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If the King bad resolved to make trial ofa treaty, Elizabeth had no choice but to submit to him, but
she would continue to promote her own agenda where possible.47 As far as the King's choice ofan
ambassador was concerned, though she could not doubt Arundel's friendship and constancy to her
cause, and "she thinks the Lord Marshal loves her person and children well, yet she sees he is no
enemy to the house of Austria, and she knows he loves not the Dutch, neither high nor low, and
would have the honour to end this business any way so it be pleasantly, for though he be Marshal,
he is not martially given in this business."4* Elizabeth would later see the error of her
prognostication upon Arundel's return.
After leaving the Hague, Arundel made his way into Germany. Eighteen years of war had
left the German landscape devastated, and the ambassador and his entourage encountered terrible
scenes of war, famine, and plague on their journey to Vienna. The diary kept by William Crowne
reveals the devastation wrought by the war in the Empire. Crowne gives a detailed description of
damage it would do his reputation. Laud, who attempted to act as a mediator between the King and his
sister, tried persuade her to adopt a more rational stance toward the negotiations. To assuage her fears, he
pointed out that Charles never thought of less than the Lower Palatinate, with the rest to come, and that
she could not hope for more. He attempted to persuade her to forget about restoring her son by force
when there was still a chance to do so by treaty (Laud, vol. 7, 253-4: [May] 1636, Laud to Elizabeth;
ibid., 260-1: 26 June 1636," same to same; CSPD 1635-6, 391: [30 Apr.?] 1636," same to same). Once
Arundel's complaints of the inconclusive nature of negotiations with the Emperor reached England, she
became more pliable and declared herself well pleased with his conduct and willing to follow the
counsels of her brother, who maintained he was determined to lose no more time (CSPD 1636-7, 76: 6
Aug. 1636, Elizabeth to Laud).
"CSPD 1635-6, 401-3: 1 May 1636,' Roe to Elizabeth; ibid., 406-7: 5 May 1636," same to same.
Roe and Elizabeth continued their attempts to influence the King to a harder line via Laud. Their
discussions on the subject of the negotiations can be traced in the CSPD.
4*Ibid., 367: 24 Apr. 1636, Elizabeth to Roe.
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the condition of the lands through which they crossed and the places of interest they visited. The
diary remains a valuable record of the desolate condition of Germany during the war.'"
Accounts of the journey given in the letters of individual members of the retinue reinforce
the dismal picture presented by Crowne. At various points along the way, Arundel felt compelled
to employ escorts of musketeers or cavalry for their protection. When traveling by boat, members
of the party often chose to sleep on board rather than expose themselves to attack by land.50 Arundel
was in constant fear for the safety of his friend Dr. Harvey, who "making of excursions into the
woods, making observations of strange trees and plants, earths etc. and [was] sometimes like to be
lost. So that My Lord Ambassador would be really angry with him, for there was not only danger
of thieves but also of wild beasts."51 The devastation was widespread, and it quickly became
apparent to Arundel that the journey across the Empire would be very costly, as prices were at three
times their usual level; thus he asked the Secretary to send his bills of exchange as quickly as
possible.52
Arundel hastened toward Regensburg to wait upon the Emperor before the opening of the
Diet, which was set for 7 June.53 The retinue wound its way to the southwest, traveling sometimes
4,However, he does not record observations of the diplomatic maneuvering that went on.
"Wise precautions given the fate that befell two of Arundel's entourage and their local guide (see
chap. 10, p. 439).
51John Aubrey, BriefLives, ed. A. Clark (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1898), vol. I, 301; quoted in
Springell, 12. Arundel's fears were not unfounded; see the incident in chap. 10, p. 441.
"PRO, SP 80/9, f. 140: 8 May 1636, Arundel to Secretary.
"Ibid., SP 16/321, f. 40: 24 May 1636, Francis Windebank to his father, CSP, vol. 1,519: 6 May
1636, Arundel to same.
366
by land and sometimes by water.54 Soon after leaving the Netherlands, they encountered the first
ravages of war so vividly described in their letters and in Crowne's diary: fighting at the fortress of
Schenkenschanz, where the Dutch were besieging the Spaniards, blocked their progress. The
Spanish governor refused to grant safe passage to Arundel's party. Thus they were compelled to wait
at a distance and observe the fighting for some days, until the Dutch took the fortress and allowed
them to pass." They continued to Wesel, where they hired eighteen wagons; their train, along with
a cavalry escort, was so impressive that the citizens of Duisberg took their approach as an enemy
attack and closed the city's doors against them.
Despite these obstacles, the party arrived safely at Cologne on 2 May, where they remained
a week to make further preparations for the journey.56 From the relative safety of this city, young
Francis Windebank wrote to his father:
My Lord Ambassador and all his company are safe and well arrived at Cullin
[Cologne], this being the only town we have yet come to that is free from sickness
[thus far], for we ha.ve lain in some towns, that we have been scarce secure, of the
house we have lain in hath been free [from sickness] ... we are now past all those
infected places, for between this [Cologne] and Frankford [Frankfurt], there are
scarce any people left so that my Lord carries all his provisions ofvictuals from here
with him.57
Four days after their arrival, Arundel took the opportunity to send a letter to John Taylor in Vienna,
informing him that he was making haste to reach the Imperial court. Arundel asked Taylor to
MCrowne recorded that the entourage changed modes of transport no less than thirty times during
the mission (Springell, 46).
"CSPV 1632-6, 562: 16 May 1636, Correrto D&S; Bechtold, 21-2.
*CSP, vol. I, 576: 2 July 1636, Arundel to Windebank.
"PRO, SP 16/3 19, f. 83: 4 May 1636, Francis Windebank to his father.
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determine what place would be the most convenient for him to meet with the Emperor and present
his credentials and letters. Taylor should then forward this information to Arundel at Nuremberg.5*
The ambassador also wrote to Windebank and requested a copy of Leicester's commission and
instructions for France as well as additional letters of credence. While in Cologne, Arundel visited
the cathedral and the Jesuits' new church and college.59
Arundel hoped while there to meet Maximilian of Bavaria's brother, the elector of Cologne,
whom he hoped would exert his influence with Maximilian for a peaceful solution to the Palatinate
question. But the elector had left for Bonn, a move Arundel took as evasion.60 He did, however,
manage to meet with the elector of Mainz, who expressed a keen desire for peace in Germany and
promised his good offices for Arundel's negotiations. In fact, Arundel encountered a general
"vehement inclination to peace" in Germany generally and noted that "his Majestie is by all men here
exceedingly magnifyed & honored for his pious endeavors in that way."61 This was unsurprising
considering the devastation that worsened daily as the war dragged on.
After leaving Cologne on 8 May, teams ofhorses towed the entourage up the Rhine on boats
(pictured in Hollar's drawings).62 Travel was quite hazardous because they were obliged to move
through some areas of skirmish, notably at the fortress of Ehrenbreitstein at Koblenz, where the
S*CSP, vol. 1, 576: 2 July 1636, Arundel to Windebank.
59There he encountered "little Dr. Harvey, who means to convert them [the Jesuits]." (ibid., 519:
6 May 1636, same to same).
"Springell, 19.
6lPRO, SP 80/9, f. 140: 8 May 1636, Arundel to Secretary.
62HMC, Denbigh V, 27: 17 May 1636, Taylor to Feilding; Beller, "Diplomatic Relations," 361.
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combatants momentarily suspended the siege to allow Arundel's barges to pass upstream." It was
not unusual for shots to ring around them, and sometimes they were directly shot at. Rampant
plague contributed to the unsafe conditions, and often they thought it wiser to sleep and eat on the
boat rather than disembark.
The company next passed into the Lower Palatinate, which was badly devastated. The
populace of the once-prosperous territory was famished. What he saw there grieved Arundel:
what miserable effects of war appeared . . . especially in the Palatinate. The tenth
man (as they report) not left alive. Most of the country [was] desolate and
unmanned. Many towns upon the river-side [were] ruined and without inhabitants.
In the best towns most peopled [there was] not so much bread to be bought as would
suffice one man for one day. Not only the townsmen, but the soldiers [were] starved
for want of meat.64
Crowne reported that the conditions there were so bad "that the poore people are found dead with
grasse in their mouthes." Arundel distributed food to the deprived inhabitants regularly during the
journey. Conditions did not improve when the entourage reached Mainz. They remained on the
boats, because no food was available in that city. The local people were near starvation, and the
crowd that gathered on shore struggled wildly for the leftover food Arundel distributed: "hcere
likewise the poore people were almost starved, and those that could relieve others before, now
humbly begged to bee relieved, and after supper all had reliefe, sent from the ship ashore, at the sight
of which they strove so violently, that some of them fell into the Rhine and were like to have bin
drowned."65
"Parker, TYW, 146.
"PRO, SP 80/9, f. 154: 24 May 1636, Arundel to Secretary; quoted in Beller, "Diplomatic
Relations," 363.
"Crowne, 8-9.
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From Mainz they continued to Frankfurt, and along the way "all the Townes, Villages, and
Castles bee battered, pillaged or burnt."" Francis Windebank wrote again to his father of the
deprived state of the German territories: "My Lord was forced to carry all his provision of victuals
with him, for by the way there was not any thing to be gotten for money, the people almost all
starved, and do daily die with grass in their mouths. The chiefest men of the towns told the us that
horseflesh would be a great feast if they could get it.""7 The sorry state of the country caused travel
expenses to skyrocket. After his arrival in Frankfurt, on 13 May, Arundel wrote that the high cost
of the journey by boat and of provisions was regrettable but unavoidable.6* The letters of credence
and bills of exchange that Arundel had requested earlier were not waiting there, and he was forced
to buy a letter of credit from a Frankfurt citizen for the trip to Nuremberg.69 Due to the outrageous
cost of the journey, he again asked Coke to send him bills of exchange, this time to Nuremberg.70
During the retinue's four-day stay in Frankfurt, its members visited the cathedral, cemetery, and
synagogue.71
From Frankfurt the company traveled overland to Nuremberg, and from there it continued
through the Upper Palatinate to the Danube River. Arundel had no choice but to spend some nights
"Ibid., 9.
67PRO, SP 16/320, f. 42: 15 May 1636, Francis Windebank to his father.
"Boat hire on the Rhine was £60 a day for two boats (Springell, 20).
nCSP, vol. 1, 537: 3 1 May 1636, Borough to Windebank.
roPRO, SP 80/9, f. 149: 15 May 1636, Arundel to Secretary; ibid., f. 151: 16 May 1636, same to
same.
"Crowne, 9-10.
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in his coach because whole towns were laid waste, "where neither bread nor bed was to be found."72
It was a wise move to bring provisions along with them, for they encountered several places along
the journey where not a soul remained. One of these villages was Neunkirchen, where the travelers
found a burning house but little else. They remained the night with carbines in their hands for
protection, as they periodically heard gunfire in the woods around them. They took advantage of
what they could there by roasting the meat for Arundel's supper over the coals of the burning
house.73 This was not the first time the party was compelled to camp among the wreckage of a
formerly prosperous settlement and subsist on the supplies they had prudently packed.74
The party reached Nuremberg on 2 1 May and remained there for eleven days.75 Once again,
no bills of exchange were waiting for Arundel. He complained to the secretaries of state that he
needed more money and letters ofcredence and was ill-informed ofevents in England. He requested
^PRO, SP 80/9, f. 154: 24 May 1636, Arundel to Secretary.
73Crowne, 10-11. They learned later that the inhabitants of Neunkirchen had fled because of the
plague and had set the house in question on fire to prevent travelers from becoming infected.
74They were, however, determined to make the best of the situation, as Francis Windebank
reported to his cousin: "all our provisions of victuals, we carried with us, otherwise we must have fasted,
for almost all places we came into, the people are starved and dead. One night we came to a village where
we lay, which we had wholly to our selves for there was not one living creature left in it. By good fortune
there was one bam full of good straw, which we laid under a hedge, and slept as well on it as ever I did in
my life. My Lord had a very good lodging which was his coach. Thus we have passed through a very
brave country, but all spoiled and depopulated. Divers poor souls we have offered bread unto, that hath
been so far famished they were past eating." (PRO, SP 16/321, f. 115: 29 May 1636, Francis Windebank
to Robert Reade; ibid., f. 40: 24 May 1636, same to his father).
75CSP, vol. 1, 576: 2 July 1636, Arundel to Windebank.
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"frequent weekly notice" in the future so that the Emperor's and Spanish ambassador's intelligence
of developments in England would not be better than his own.76
During his embassy, Arundel corresponded regularly with Secretaries Coke and Windebank,
passing on essentially the same information to both. Unlike Taylor's negotiations, Arundel's were
not of a secret nature and thus did not lead to clandestine lines of communication between him and
leading members of the peace party at court Greater contact with Coke was to be expected, since
he was the Secretary responsible for missions to the Empire, and as such had prepared Arundel's
instructions and provided him with his "diplomatic packet";77 it was to Coke that he directed his
requests for revocation, his bills ofextraordinaries, and most of his appeals for money while he was
abroad. Windebank was a personal friend ofArundel, and an ally at court, which might help explain
the frequency of Arundel's contact with him. Arundel obviously wrote to both to keep himself as
informed as possible about the views of the government on his negotiations. He also felt a duty to
keep both Secretaries informed of his negotiations.7'
76PRO, SP 80/9, f. 154: 24 May 1636, same to Secretary; ibid., f. 160: 28 May 1636, same to
same; CSP, vol. 1, 529: 24 May 1636, same to Windebank. When Arundel's complaints reached the
King's ears, he told Sir Henry Vane that it was necessary for the government to hold strict
correspondence with Arundel. Vane replied that Arundel was sent letters weekly, but that in time of war
their timely delivery could not be accounted for. The King accepted this explanation, but desired that in
the future miscarriage be prevented with the same vigilance as the Spanish ministers practiced (CSPD
1635-6, 532: 13 June 1636, Vane to Windebank).
77PRO, SP 80/9, fF. 105-16: 1 1 Apr. 1636, Instructions for Arundel, with abstract; ibid., ff. 121-2:
IS Apr. 1636, Commissions and letters given to Arundel.
7*He sent dispatches especially to Windebank when he knew that Coke would not be able to share
his: "I send you just what I send to Mr. Secretary Coke, because I make account he will be absent in the
progress." (CSP, vol. 1, 615: 20 Aug. 1636, Arundel to Windebank).
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Arundel spent much of his time in Nuremberg taking in the sights and viewing works ofart.
It was at this time that he purchased for the low price of350 thalers the valuable library ofhumanist
Willibald Pirckheimer from his great-grandson, who had to sell "in consideration of the hard times
and the difficulty ofobtaining food."79 Before Arundel left, hie received his first post from England,
which significantly improved his humor.*0
As Arundel made his way toward Austria, Taylor journeyed from Vienna to Nuremberg to
meet him, as Arundel had previously instructed, to give him the latest tidings from the Imperial court
and discuss the prospects for the negotiations; Arundel arrived on 23 May." From this point on,
Arundel took control of the negotiations as ambassador extraordinary, while Taylor, as resident
agent, served in a subordinate capacity.*2 Upon their first meeting, Arundel seems to have formed
a good opinion ofTaylor and his negotiations thus far, writing "Mr. Taylor seems to me an honest
and clear-hearted man, and to have done the King our master very good service: he hopes well."*3
Taylor informed Arundel that he need not rush to meet the Emperor before the Diet convened, as
Ferdinand II was currently at Linz waiting for the electors to assemble in Regensburg, and they
"Springell, 107 n. 60; Albert GQmbel, "Die englische Mission des Grafen von Arundels in
Niimberg, Mai und November 1636," Archivalische Zeiischrift 1 1 (1904): 100-17. Pirckheimer was a
close friend of the artist Albrecht Dflrcr, and Arundel's purchase included manuscripts illustrated by
Diirer and other masters. A number of the printed volumes also had original illuminations by Diirer.
*°CSP, vol. 1, 536: May 1636, Arundel to Windebank; CSPV 1632-6, 563: 17 May 1636,
Ballarino to D&S.
"Taylor had received Arundel's instruction on 15 May and had acquainted the Emperor, King of
Hungary, and Oflate with the news of his coming (CSP, vol. 1, 576: 2 July 1636, Arundel to Windebank).
cPRO, SP 80/10, f. 35: 25 Nov. 1636, Taylor to [?]; HMC, Denbigh V, 41: 25 Nov. 1636, same
to Feilding.
"CSP, vol. I, 535: May 1636, Arundel to Windebank. He also added: "in truth he appears to me
an hearty, well-affected servant to the King, and to have done this business well."
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seemed in no hurry to do so. The Emperor therefore desired that the ambassador first meet the King
of Hungary at Nordlingen, where he was waiting until the electors called him to Regensburg, and
then journey on to wait on him at Linz." Taylor also bore unwelcome news that would further
complicate the negotiations — the Duchess of Bavaria was expecting a child, whom Maximilian
hoped would prove an heir to his estates.*5 However, this did not significantly dampen Taylor's
hopes for a positive outcome to the negotiations; he was willing to believe the Duchess's declaration
that she did not intend for her child to hinder a peaceful resolution to the Palatinate question.16
Arundel, though disheartened, did not lose all hope for a full restitution after the Duke's death: "the
point will be, that the King our master's friendship may be valued before the Duke of Bavaria's;
which I shall endeavor to make them see. In the mean time, I hope, in England the reputation of our
fleet . . . will help well what I shall say here.'"7
Arundel remained in Nuremberg several days in expectation of his meeting with the King
of Hungary at Nordlingen. Weary of waiting, on 1 June Arundel left for Regensburg, which was
nearly as close to Nordlingen as Nuremberg, but was two days' journey closer to Linz. He arrived
**Ibid.; ibid., 576: 2 July 1636, same to same.
"it appears that Maximilian's consumption of viper-fed capons and chickens to increase his
virility, at which Taylor had scoffed, may have indeed been effective.
"The Duke of Bavaria might have an heir, but Taylor believed the report that "his Dutchesse,
though certainly now (as they say) with child, hath given the Emperor assurance. .Aim. she would wish,
rather Chen to hinder so great good by what was in her womb, that she had never bene borne." (HMC.
Denbigh V, 25: 26 Apr. 1636, Taylor to Feiiding). He also wrote, regarding the impediment Maximilian
might present to the election of the King of the Romans, that the Habsburgs felt assured of victory. He
added, "the Duke of Bavaria must not.. .stand betweene the peace of Christendome, which they assuredly
doe hold this treaty doth bring along with it, and that his Majesty will bee the gloriousest King the world
hath." (ibid-, 26: 3 May 1636, same to same). Taylor expressed the same opinion to Coke (PRO, SP 80/9,
f. 103: 9 Apr. 1636, same to [Coke]).
"CSP, vol. I, 529: 24 May 1636, Arundel to Windebank.
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there on 3 June, but discovered to his dismay four days later that bis meeting with the King of
Hungary was cancelled." Arundel believed the King avoided him "for fear of offending the old
vulpone his uncle and brother of Bavaria."*9 To avoid further delay, Arundel promptly dispatched
Taylor ahead to Linz to request an audience with the Emperor. The next day, Arundel and his party
followed, traveling down the Danube via Passau to Linz.90
Radolt's Early Audiences at the English Court
While Arundel was making bis way across the Empire, Radolt, accompanied by Henry Taylor and
Necolalde, had his first audience with the King on 8 May, at which he delivered his compliments."
Given the optimism of Taylor's dispatches, the King and his ministers hoped for good issue from
Radolf s mission, and they looked forward to a substantive explanation of the Emperor's intentions
where the Palatinate was concerned. In his address, however, Radolt held himself to generalities,
in spite of the King's prodding for further information, because he reasoned that the Emperor would
soon be engaged in negotiations with Arundel in Vienna.92 The papal agent Gregorio Panzani
MIbid., 538: 8 June 1636, same to same; ibid., 576: 2 July 1636, same to same. In Rcgcnsburg,
the monks of the Schottenkirche (the church and monastery of St. James, founded by Scottish
Benedictines) presented Arundel with a petition. They reported that they had suffered terribly during the
war and therefore requested Arundel to ask the King to assist them in rebuilding, as their house was
descended from the Scottish royal house and had received support from Scottish monarchs in the past
(BL, Add. Mss. 15970, f. 45: [1636], Brother Silvanus Mainus to Arundel).
"CSV5, vol. 1, 561: 23 June 1636, Arundel to Windebank.
9°lbid., 576: 2 July 1636, same to same.
9lHHStA, StA England, Kart. l8,Konv. 1818, f. 32: 9 May 1636, Radolt to Ferdinand II; Finet,
198-9. The Queen, Prince Palatine, and royal ministers were also present at the audience. Finet noted that
neither Henry Taylor nor Necolalde presented Radolt to the King.
"HHStA, StA England, Kart. 18, Konv. 1818, ff. 32-3: 9 May 1636, Radolt to Ferdinand n.
Correr was not far off base when he speculated that Radolt was waiting to receive news of Arundel's first
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reported that the Queen, who favored a French alliance, did her best to undermine Radolt." At his
second audience five days later, Radolt again spoke in generalities, much to the dissatisfaction of
the English, giving a long oration on the miseries visited upon the Empire by war and the desirability
of a general peace.94 He again avoided the issue of the Palatinate, but to stave off their discontent,
he intimated that he had a more particular charge that would be better presented in writing.95
The situation worsened at Radolt's third audience, on 27 May at Somerset House, because
he still had not delivered any written proposals and again avoided making reference to the Palatinate.
When asked by the King himself about the special charge he had mentioned at his previous audience,
Radolt again gave only a vague answer, whereupon the King lost his patience.96 Charles Louis, who
was also present at the audience, declared openly that these were the usual tricks employed by the
Habsburgs, and that they would continue to delay until armed force compelled them to do otherwise.
Several courtiers apparently found this interchange amusing, for Hopton reported that while the
audience was going on, "Goring, Percy and Jermayn stood in a door and laughed at him so openly
audience with the Emperor (CSPV 1632-6, 554: 2 May 1636, Correrto D&S). On 19 May, in response to
Radolf s audience, the King wrote the Emperor a letter sending his compliments and expressing his hopes
for the good outcome of Arundel's negotiations for the restitution of the Palatinate (HHStA, StA England,
Kart. 2: ff. 140-1 : 19 May 1636, Charles 1 to Ferdinand U; ibid., StA Palatina, Kart. 12, Konv. 2: 19 May
1636, same to same).
"Smuts, "Puritan Followers," 38.
94lbid., StA England, Kart. 18, Konv. 1818, f. 87: 16 May 1636, Radolt to Ferdinand II.
"CSPV 1632-6, 562: 16 May 1636, Correrto D&S.
96PRO, SP 80/9, f. 169: 2 June 1636, Coke to Arundel.
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as he saw it and hath complained thereof to Secretary Windebank and hath written of it into
Germany."97
At this point, many at court were unsure of what to make of Radolt and his mission. Soon
after his third audience, Hopton wrote to Aston in Spain about the divided opinion on the subject:
By what concerns this gentleman I find a strange difference in the opinions, the one
making him a messenger to mock us, the other esteeming of him and his message
well, which although it came not so home to the business of the Palatinate as was
hoped save a very good intimation of the Emperor his disposition to an
accommodation, which is not to be despised considering the condition of the Lord
Marshall's embassy.9*
However, Radolt's evasive conduct at these and subsequent audiences increasingly raised suspicions
at court that the main goal of his mission was to gain time, and thus preserve English neutrality.99
Correr noted the dissatisfaction at court, but also pointed out that Radolt's field of movement was
necessarily limited because Arundel held full powers to negotiate at Vienna: "The slowness of this
minister [Radolt] about opening the business of the Palatine is noted with some jealousy, because
they think his proposal to negotiate by writing is only a device to gain time; although in any case he
cannot do much here because the Earl of Arundel on the other side holds absolute powers."100
"BL, Add. Mss. 36448, f. 52: 1 1 May 1636,' Hopton to Aston. Radolt also was a source of
amusement for the court ladies when he paid a ceremonial visit to the Queen on 25 May and made an
hour-and-a-half long speech in Latin that she did not understand and Secretary Windebank could not
interpret, "possibly because he was tired of listening." (ibid.).
"Ibid., IT. 52-3: 1 1 May 1636," same to same. Radolt wrote that Hopton had lately arrived from
Spain, and he was to go to Brussels inGerbier's place (HHStA, StA England, (Cart. 18, Konv. 1818, f. 41:
9 May 1636, Radolt to Ferdinand II).
"PRO, SP 80/9, f. 238: 14 Sept. 1636, Coke to Arundel.
l00CSPV 1632-6, 562: 16 May 1636, Correr to D&S. He further observed: "Some think that the
councillor [Radolt] may be awaiting news of Lord Arundel's negotiations, but the general opinion is that
the real object of the Austrians [Habsburgs] is to gain time with regard to granting the satisfaction which
England claims; employing mild inducements in order not to compel her to have recourse to force, as
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Colter's observation was later confirmed, because when the Emperor discovered Arundel was on bis
way to the Imperial court, he duly informed Radolt to confine his negotiation to generalities and
await further instructions."" Thus, the theater of negotiations had effectively moved to Germany.
Radolt' s omission to attend the King when he retired for the summer to the country generated
more bad feeling. At the end of May, soon after his third audience, the King left London for
Hampton Court, earlier than usual due to the plague. The French, Dutch, and Venetian ambassadors
and the Savoyard and Florentine residents followed suit, but Radolt and Necolalde did not Radolt
thus allowed the King to leave for the country before declaring the objects ofhis mission or opening
negotiations with the King and his ministers.102 Furthermore, the fact that neither the Imperial nor
the Spanish envoy followed the court gave the impression of an inattentive Habsburg front
While those at the English court were forming opinions about Radolt's mission, the Imperial
envoy was doing the same concerning the intentions of King and his subjects. In May, Radolt
carefully investigated and reported on the topics given in his instructions. On the subject of the
that, in any case, could not fail to be most harmful to their interests and aims, unless they succeeded in
arriving at a solid alliance." (ibid., S6S: 2 June 1636, same to same). Correr believed that Charles was
unlikely to purchase satisfaction for the Palatines at the price of a league that would require him to
become involved in the war, which was on the mark where the provision of land forces was concerned.
He also noted that Radolt did not offer Charles Louis territory in Flanders in compensation for his lost
Palatine lands; in any case bom the King and his nephew were against the idea (ibid.).
""CSPV 1636-9, 17: 5 July 1636. Ballarino to same; ibid., 35: 1 Aug. 1636, same to same.
l02CSPy 1632-6, 570-2: 30 May 1636, Correr to same. Radolt himself eventually left London to
escape the plague, spending a leisurely summer walking and riding in the country and making no
appearance at court. He reported that in any case the King was on progress and that his ministers had
dispersed due to the plague, thus allowing little opportunity for him to negotiate or gather intelligence
(HHStA, StA England, Kart. 18, Konv. 1819, f. 17: 1 Aug. 1636, Radolt to [Imperial Secretary
Walderode]). During Radolt's retirement in the country, the King ordered his subjects to assist him by
providing accommodation and entertainment as the occasion might require and to allow him to practice
his religion, or "answer the contrary at theire perills." (PRO, SP 80/9, f. 177: [May] 1636, Royal order for
Radolt's reception).
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chances that the King would break with the Habsburgs and ally with their enemies if not satisfied
in the Palatinate, Radolt wrote that he did not doubt that the King and Parliament desired the
restitution of the Prince Palatine.103 However, he did not think an open rupture would develop
between England and the Habsburgs if they did not fully restore the Palatine, because the King
would then have to ally with the French and Dutch to effect his nephew's restoration. He was not
inclined to join with either of them, because the former were untrustworthy and the latter maritime
competitors. Most importantly, however, he would not ally with the French and Dutch because it
would almost surely involve him in a land war. To support this war would require calling
Parliament, which the King was unwilling to do. 104 Moreover, war would disrupt freedom of trade,
the revenues derived from which were the mainstay of his income. Radolt concluded, therefore, that
the King highly esteemed his friendship with the Habsburgs not only because he hoped to effect the
restoration of his nephew through them, but also because of the benefits he gleaned from trade,
particularly with Spain. In fact, Radolt believed that the King intended the fleet for the security of
the realm and fostering trade rather than waging war.105
As instructed, Radolt moved to discover more about the size and quality ofthe English fleet.
He sent the Emperor a list detailing the financial contributions raised from cities and counties in
1 636 for six months' support of the fleet (including munitions and provisions), the number and
""One of the reasons that the King would not abandon the restoration of his nephew was because
it was costly for him to help support the Palatines in exile (HHStA, StA England, Kan. 18, Konv. 1818, f.
34: 9 May 1636, Radolt to Ferdinand II).
104Ibid., ff. 1-2: 2 May 1636, same to same; ibid., ff. 33-4: 9 May 1636, same to same. However,
the fact that the Earl of Leicester had been sent to France to negotiate an alliance did give Radolt pause.
I05lbid., ff. 1-2: 2 May 1636, same to same; ibid., ff. 33-4: 9 May 1636, same to same.
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capacity of the ships supported, and the number of personnel manning them. These ships each
boasted between 30 and 40 pieces of artillery.106 Radoit believed, however, that only 35 of the 45
warships reported existed, 25 of which were either deficient or still being prepared for service. He
noted that the young and inexperienced Earl ofNorthumberland was currently Admiral of the fleet;
however, the experienced and formidable Pennington supported Northumberland as Vice Admiral
(see fig. 7). 107 Despite the fleet's perceived deficiencies, Radoit still believed that one English ship
could combat three or four of its French counterparts.1™
Radoit also addressed the question of whether the King would be willing and able to enter
into an alliance with the Habsburgs. The envoy had no doubt that Habsburg opponents would
attempt to obstruct it by arguing that the Emperor's intention in these negotiations was to draw out
time and preserve English neutrality, as the King of Spain had been doing for so many years.
However, RadoIt believed that these critics would not hold the King back from an alliance ifhe were
persuaded that the Emperor sincerely wished to settle the Palatinate question. The envoy thought
that an alliance of some sort would be struck eventually, depending upon whether the young Ofiate
l06In all, it was reported that the English fleet consisted of 45 ships capable of carrying 20,350
combined tons and was manned by 10,660 sailors, and that £218,500 (which Radoit converted to
1,556,666 florins) was collected in 1636 for six months' support, including provisions and munitions
(ibid., f. 8 1: 1636, List of contributions to fleet, broken down by county and city).
K01List ofhis Maiesties Ships, with others ofthe Merchants that are now set forth under the
Command ofthe Right Honourable, Algernon Percy, Earle ofNorthumberland, ...Generall and Admirall
ofhis Majesties Fleet for this Expedition; with the names of the Captaines and Lievtenants that are
employed in this Action; with the names of the Ships ofhis Majesties, that are making ready for a supply
(London: Printed for Thomas Walkley, 1636).
""Ibid., f. 42: 9 May 1636, Radoit to Ferdinand II.
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7 A List of his Maiesties Skips . . . that are now set forth under the Command of the
Right Honourable, Algernon Percy, Earle ofNorthumberland (1636)
This broadside lists the English ships under the command of the Earl of Northumberland,
Admiral of the Fleet. In addition to a portrait of Northumberland, with the fleet waiting ready
behind him, it bears the names of the ships as well as the captains and lieutenants employed upon
them. In total, 35 royal ships and three London merchantmen are listed. A similar broadside
was published with the likeness of Sir John Pennington, Vice Admiral of the Fleet, and the
names of many of the same ships with their masters, masters-mates, boatswaines, pursers, and
gunners. Radolt, who was instructed to discover all he could about the size and quality of the
English fleet, sent both of these broadsides back to Vienna, along with other information. He
noted that Northumberland was young and inexperienced, but Pennington, who supported him,
was experienced and formidable. Despite the fleet's perceived deficiencies, Radolt believed that
one English ship could engage in combat with three or four of its French counterparts.
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brought the promised plenipotentiary powers to England, of which Radolt remained doubtful.109
Given Leicester's mission to France, Radolt reasoned that the friendship of the King was not to be
disdained, and that the negotiations in Vienna would shed some light on what concessions in the
Palatinate would satisfy the King and draw him to the Habsburg side. Still, Radolt maintained that
such an alliance, if it indeed came about, would not offer the Emperor himselfmuch advantage. The
King might be strong at sea, but he did not have the financial means to make a decisive difference
in the land war."0 Furthermore, Radolt believed that the Habsburgs' enemies were not profiting in
the current situation — the King was giving them little financial support and was not presently
allowing them to levy troops in Britain." 1
At this point, less than two weeks after his arrival in England, Radolt requested leave to
return home. Although he had originally been instructed to remain for three months, he did not see
any great need to do so given that he had already reported on most of the matters required by his
instructions and that Arundel was on his way to Vienna with plenipotentiary powers to treat with the
Emperor on the Palatinate question. Throughout the rest of his mission, Radolt continued to ask for
his recall, complaining that his limited understanding ofEnglish and French, which were the primary
Ibid., fF. 87-9: 16 May 1636, same to same. Radolt seemed generally suspicious of the
Spaniards' intentions. He reminded the Emperor that he should not declare what concessions he was
willing to make in the Palatinate until Spain had finally declared its intentions in the Lower Palatinate. If
the Emperor were to make a resolution without this assurance, Spain would then reach its goal of
ensuring English neutrality without making any concomitant commitment to restore its holdings in the
Lower Palatinate (ibid., f. 35: 9 May 1636, same to same).
"°By the same token, if there were a break in Anglo-Habsburg relations, Spain would be most
affected (ibid., f. 88: 16 May 1636, same to same).
1"Ibid., ff. 33-5: 9 May 1636, same to same. The exception was the English regiments that had
been in the Low Countries since Elizabeth's reign, which were still allowed to recruit in Britain.
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languages spoken at court, limited his effectiveness. He also objected to the strange and ultimately
hostile way of proceeding in England. Finally, he yearned to practice his religion openly, and in
familiar and comfortable surroundings in Vienna."2
By the beginning of June, Radolt had reconsidered some of his previous opinions after
delving further into the question of whether the King needed Parliamentary consent to enter into a
league with the Habsburgs. What the envoy discovered was that Parliamentary supporters wished
to use the issue of the Prince Palatine's restoration to force the King to call Parliament. It was
apparent to Radolt that Parliamentary supporters would very much like to see the Prince Palatine
restored, but not through a league with the Habsburgs. Instead, they wished to effect the restoration
by arms, through an alliance with the French and Dutch. They reasoned that this alliance would
require a greater military commitment to the Continental war than one with the Habsburgs, and
would thus oblige the King to call Parliament for financial support. An alliance with the Habsburgs,
on the other hand, would not require the same commitment of resources, which the King might raise
without calling Parliament This league, therefore, represented a way for the King to restore his
nephew and continue to rule without Parliament. It follows, then, that Parliamentary supporters
would do their utmost to prevent the conclusion of an Anglo-Habsburg league. They would much
rather go to war on the anti-Habsburg side, than to continue to put up with the King's absolute rule
and to pay what they considered illegal taxes to support an alliance with the Habsburgs. In the end,
"2lbid., ff. 41-2: 9 May 1636, same to same; ibid., f. 87: 16 May 1636, same to same; ibid.,
Konv. 1819, f. 5: 1 Aug. 1636, same to same; ibid., ff. 58-9: 9 Oct. 1636, same to same; ibid., Konv.
1820, f. 12: 16 Jan. 1636, same to same; ibid., f. 22: 30 Jan. 1636, same to same. While in England,
Radolt took up the cause of a Jesuit tutor, who was punished for instructing the sons of the principal lords
of the realm in his house {CSPV 1636-9, 126: 16 Jan. 1637, Ballarino to D&S).
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Radolt concluded that the King did not require the consent of Parliament to enter into the alliance,
though doing so might bring great odium upon him and provoke resistance to his extra-Parliamentary
financial exactions."3
Given Parliament's determination to ally with the anti-Habsburg side, Radolt strongly
recommended that the Habsburgs accept the restoration of the Prince Palatine in exchange for a
league, not because they could expect England to make a great contribution to the Habsburg war
effort, but in order to keep it from contributing its resources to the anti-Habsburg side. He reasoned
that ifthe King should be pressed to other alliances and accordingly seek the help of Parliament, the
Habsburgs would be facing a strong adversary, because he believed that between its fleet and land
forces, England possibly commanded more men, money, and war preparations than any other state
in Europe. He thus advised the Emperor to take Arundel's negotiations for Palatine restoration
seriously and hoped that opportunities had not been lost in the negotiation because of his early
reports."4
Arundel's Negotiations at Linz
[My Lord Marshal] has found many difficulty** by the waye in regard ofthe desolation
of Germanic, and it is to bee feard will find more when bee comes to [the Imperial
Court]."1
Gervase Clifton to his father. Sir Gervase Clifton
mHHStA, StA England, Kart. 18, Konv. 1818, ff. 132-3: 6 June 1636, Radolt to Ferdinand II.
"-Ibid.
"5HMC, Var. CollfVn, 413: 23 May 1636, Gervase Clifton to his father.
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While Radolt struggled to grasp the King's intentions and the value of English friendship for the
Habsburg side, Arundel's negotiation with the Emperor was about to commence at Linz. On 15 June
1636, Arundel and his entourage reached Linz and received a very cordial reception from the
Emperor. The Emperor immediately sent out important officials, coaches, and servants to escort
them through the city with great pomp to their quarters:
The English Envoy, the Earl of ARANDAL (sic) and his stately entourage arrived
by water at Linz and His Imperial Majesty sent his Chamberlain, Count Leonhard
Harrach, to welcome him and to bring him in the Imperial coach attended by the
Court Stewards to his prepared quarters, where he would be entertained during his
stay as the Emperor's personal guest. At this residence the envoy was welcomed by
the Comptroler of the Household Count Nfegau and by a Gentleman in Waiting
Mallart, who was chosen to attend the envoy permanently."6
The Emperor ordered that the expenses of Arundel and his entire suite be defrayed while in Linz.
This was unusual and thus was regarded as a special mark of favor. Indeed, the Emperor showed
the ambassador remarkable courtesies, which Ballarino believed reflected his propensity toward
accommodation. 117
The following day, Arundel had his first audience. The Emperor and Empress ceremoniously
received him, and he delivered his compliments along with his credentials and various letters. 1"
Two days later, on 1 8 June, he had his second audience at which he delivered a memorial to the
Emperor detailing his master's demands regarding the Palatinate. This document made it absolutely
clear that the King would not be satisfied with less than a full restoration of his nephew to the
"6Khevenhuller, vol. 12, 1879-80; quoted in Springell, 23.
1"CSPV1636-9, 10: 22 June 1636, Ballarino to D&S.
"*PRO,SP 80/9,f. 178: 16 June 1636, Arundel to Secretary. Including a letter from Charles
Louis; see Khevenhuller, vol. 12, 2096.
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Palatine lands and dignities.1 " As instructed, Arundel demanded the Emperor's firm assurance of
plenary restitution as a first step, before there could be any discussion of means and conditions. If
these demands went unsatisfied, he cautioned, the King would be forced to take more vigorous steps
to reinstate his nephew. Arundel pressed the Emperor for a speedy reply, reminding him that there
was no need for drawn-out negotiation since he had already made promises of full restitution to
Taylor. Ferdinand, however, was evasive, speaking in courteous generalities and refusing to give
the ambassador a straightforward reply to his demands.120 Characteristically, he wished to avoid
declaring his position on the Palatinate question until he knew that of Maximilian. To Arundel's
requirements for plenary restitution, therefore, the Emperor carefully replied that he must consult
Bavaria if he hoped for complete restitution.121
The truth was that the Emperor and his ministers were taken aback by Arundel's insistence,
because they interpreted the sending ofan ambassador as an indication that England had no intention
to resort to force. Ballarino expressed this when he noted that "The high tone of the ambassador has
surprised them, and they may now have to do something in earnest, though they are not sure what
or how."1— In an attempt to meet the challenge this presented, the Emperor decided not only to
appoint a commission to negotiate with the ambassador, but also moved quickly to consult his allies
"9HHStA, StA England, Kart. I, Konv. 4: 18 June 1636, Arundel to Ferdinand D; ibid., StA
Palatina, Kart. 12, Konv. 2: 18 June 1636, same to same.
1MPRO, SP 80/9, ff. 178-9: 16 June 1636, same to Secretary; ibid., ff. 181-8: 23 June 1636, same
to same.
I2llbid., f. 190: 30 June 1636, same to same; CSP, vol. 1, 572: 30 June 1636, same to Windebank;
ibid., 576: 2 July 1636, same to same; CSPV 1636-9, 17: 5 July 1636, Ballarino to D&S.
122Ibid.
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about giving satisfaction to the English King. On the one hand, he sent his auiic councillor Tobias,
Baron Haubitz to Munich with Radolt's relations to determine Maximilian's stance on restoration and
convince him that they should strive not only to garner Charles's goodwill but also to draw England
into the Imperialist camp. 123 On the other hand, the Emperor asked the Spanish ambassador Ofiate,
who was convalescing in Vienna, to set out at once to take part in the discussions on a matter so
closely concerning Spain.124 In fact, one of the Emperor's major aims in attempting to settle the
Palatinate question and conclude an alliance with the English King was to assist the Spanish war
effort by preserving the sea route as the most viable way for Spanish troops and money to reach
Flanders. In May, Radolt had observed the same when he pointed out that Spain would be the power
most affected by a break in Anglo-Habsburg relations: "so wurdts niemants mehr alfi der Kfinig in
Spanien empfinden dan wan man der Zeit durch Engelandt in Niderlandt nit khomben khan, so ist
aller PaaB zu mehr gestfirt." 125 The Emperor, for his part, earnestly wished to come to an agreement
with England on the Palatinate question, and Radolt's reports played a significant role in convincing
him to make the added effort required to find a compromise settlement acceptable to all involved.126
123Haan, Regensburger Kurfiirslentag, 238 a. 61.
l!4KHStA, StA Palatina, Kart. 12, Konv. 2: 20 June 1636, Ferdinand II to Maximilian I; ibid.: 20
June 1636, same to Onate; CSPV 1636-9, 10: 22 June 1636, Ballarino to D&S.
125HHStA, StA England, Kart. 18, Konv. 1818, f. 88: 16 May 1636, Radolt to Ferdinand U. "No
one would feel it more than the King of Spain if the Netherlands presently could not be reached through
England's agency [i.e., with England's assistance], thus all passage [through the Channel] would be
interrupted all the more."
mCSPV 1632-6, 55 1: 26 Apr. 1636, Ballarino to D&S; Haan, Regensburger Kurfurstentag, 238.
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Arundel, who was sensible of these delays, welcomed the Emperor's request six days later
to see his plenipotency. He sent Taylor to deliver it to Stralendorf that very day.127 What concerned
the Imperial councillors most, of course, was what the English King was prepared to offer in return
for any concessions the Emperor might make in the Palatinate. They were hoping for active
engagement on the Habsburg side. Upon inspection of Arundel's powers, the Imperial councillors
noted that in return for full restitution ofthe Prince Palatine, Charles was ready to offer "a permanent
friendship and peace" to the Habsburgs.12' Despite the vague offers of interposition for the common
peace offered by the English King, the Imperial councillors still believed that they could interpret
a league from this declaration.129
On 26 June, Arundel had his third audience with the Emperor. He again stressed that the
King insisted upon the promise of his nephew's full restoration as prerequisite for further talks and
pressed for a plain answer on this point. He would be disappointed, for Haubitz had not yet returned
to Vienna with an answer from Maximilian.1.10 Although Arundel did not receive an answer as he
had hoped, the Emperor assured him that he would not depart unsatisfied. Ferdinand informed the
ambassador that he would appoint a commission to treat with him on these matters.131
137HHStA, StA England, Kart. I, Konv. 4: 23 Mar. 1636, Charles I to Ferdinand rI; ibid.: 23 June
1636, Ferdinand II to Arundel; CSP, vol. 1, 561: 23 June 1636, Arundel to Windebank; ibid., 577: 2 July
1636, same to same; KhevenhQlIer, vol. 12, 2097.
12*"einer bestendigen freundtschafft und fried."
1^HHStA, StK Vortrage, Kart. I, Konv. F, ff. 74-9: 25 June 1636, Opinion of privy council;
ibid., StA Palatina, Kart. 12, Konv. 2: 25 June 1636, same.
130KhevenhuIler, vol. 12, 2099.
mPRO, SP 80/9, f. 190: 30 June 1636, Arundel to Secretary; CSP, vol. 1, 572: 30 June 1636,
same to Windebank; ibid., 577: 2 July 1636, same to same.
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That same day the Emperor appointed his commissioners, the Prince-Bishop ofVienna and
Dr. Justus Gebhardt133 Vice Chancellor Stralendorf was also active in the negotiations of the
commission. They lost no time in arranging their first meeting with Arundel, which took place the
following morning, 28 June, at Vice Chancellor Stralendorf s house. The commissioners first offered
Arundel their own plenipotency, but Arundel, who did not doubt the validity of their commission
and did not wish to waste time reading it, merely requested that they send a copy to him the next
morning. From there, the negotiations quickly ran aground, mainly because of the opposing
viewpoints held by Arundel and the commissioners about the prospects for a league.133 The
commissioners informed Arundel that Taylor had led the Emperor to expect that the negotiations
would not only encompass the Prince Palatine's restitution but also a reciprocal treaty. Arundel did
not address this statement but instead insisted that the Emperor should declare ifhe was willing or
able to restore the Prince Palatine fully or not.134 In reply, the commissioners maintained that they
would not reach an agreement if either side insisted upon extreme terms. Instead of immediately
committing to full restitution, without a concrete offer of a league on the table, they wished Arundel
to outline several acceptable options for restoration. In an attempt to overcome their caution,
Arundel replied that the King would not require full restitution immediately; their declaration that
they would fully restore the Prince Palatine in time would suffice to move on to the next stage of the
1"HHStA, StA Palatina, Kart. 12, Konv. 2: 26 June 1636, Plenipotency for Imperial
commissioners. Gebhardt was undoubtedly appointed for his legal expertise, so he could explain the
justice of the Emperor's actions to the English ambassador.
13>Ibid.: 28 June 1636, Relation of Imperial commissioners.
l34PRO, SP 80/9, f. 190: 30 June 1636, Arundel to Secretary; CSP, vol. I, 573: 30 June 1636,
same to Windebank; ibid., 577: 2 July 1636, same to same.
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negotiation.135 After several volleys made it clear they were making little progress, they adjourned
the meeting.
An even more unwelcome surprise awaited Arundel the following morning. When Taylor
delivered the commissioners' plenipotentiary powers to his quarters, he found within them that not
only was the restitution to be treated of, but also an. offensive and defensive league against the
common enemies (foedus turn offensivum quam defensivum . . . contra communes hostes), which the
Imperial ministers claimed that Taylor had offered.136 Arundel took this to mean a league against
the enemies of the House of Habsburg. Since he was ignorant of the verbal offers of a league that
Taylor had made to the Emperor and Aston to the King of Spain, this claim understandably upset
Arundel as the King had only authorized him to offer a league for the common peace. A commotion
thus ensued. Arundel moved immediately to discover ifTaylor had made such a promise, which he
deemed a great injury to the King indeed, or if the Imperialists had inserted the offensive clause of
their own accord. Arundel immediately sent Borough to Stralendorf for an answer. Taylor, who
flatly denied having made such an offer, accompanied Borough in an attempt to clear his name.
When confronted with the plenipotency, Stralendorf was forced to admit that the Imperial secretary
who drafted the commission from Taylor's memorials had wrongly inserted the clause. Once the
1"Khevenhuller, vol. 12,2109-21.
l36PRO, SP 80/9, f. 190: 30 June 1636, Arundel to- Secretary; CSP, vol. 1, 573: 30 June 1636,
same to Windebank; ibid., 577: 2 July 1636, same to same; ibid., 575: 26 June 1636, Plenipotency for
Imperial commissioners. In his report to Windebank, Arundel enclosed a copy of the councillors' powers.
Taylor had indeed offered an offensive and defensive league, but one against the enemies of the common
peace. He suspected that the Imperialists may have inserted the clause to play for time so they could
consult Bavaria and Spain (PRO, SP 80/10, f. 77: 10 Feb. 1637, Taylor to Aston).
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Imperialists inspected these papers, they discovered the strongest words that Taylor had used in the
written record were strictest league (arctissimum foedus).
Therefore, Arundel immediately demanded an audience with the Emperor and on 30 June
presented him with a memorial to clear the record, which adamantly denied any offers of an
offensive and defensive league. The Emperor, however, maintained that Taylor had indeed offered
an offensive and defensive league, though not in writing.137 Arundel's claim that England had never
suggested an alliance with the House ofHabsburg surprised the Emperor and his councillors as well
as the Spaniards at the Imperial court. In an attempt to prove otherwise, they gathered together the
documents that they believed showed England had indeed proposed such an alliance in return for
restitution, and they exhibited them to Arundel. at The Emperor also presented him with a memorial
to that effect.139 Taylor, however, continued to deny that he had made the proposals that the
Imperialists claimed. In truth he had made verbal offers of a league to the Emperor authorized by
his secret instructions, but this information seems to have been deliberately withheld from Arundel
1"HHStA, StA England, Kart. 1, Konv. 4: 30 June 1636, Arundel to Ferdinand II; ibid., StA
Palatina, Kart. 12, Konv. 2: 30 June 1636, same to same; PRO, SP 80/9, f. 191: 30 June 1636, same to
Secretary, CSP, vol. I, 573: 30 June 1636, same to Windebank.
1"HHStA, StK Vortrage, Kart I, Konv. F, ff. 74-8: 25 June 1636, Opinion of privy council;
ibid., ff. 80-4: 28 June 1636, same; ibid., ff. 89-96: 30 June 1636, same. Arundel was given a "paper long
and tedious" intended to prove that Taylor in Vienna and Hopton and Aston in Spain had indeed treated
of an offensive and defensive league against the enemies of the common peace and that James I had
earlier promised one to the Emperor. Arundel remained unconvinced (PRO, SP 80/10, ff. 77-8: 10 Feb.
1637, Taylor to Aston).
139HHStA, StA England, Kart. I, Konv. 4: 2 July 1636, Ferdinand II to Arundel; ibid., StA
Palatina, Kart. 12, Konv. 2: 2 July 1636, same to same; CSP, vol. 1, 577-8: 2 July 1636, Arundel to
Windebank.
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by Windcbank and the King.140 Although Charles most likely never actually intended to enter into
the contentious league, he had directed Taylor to use it as a means to tantalize the Habsburgs into
restoring the Palatinate.
Because the King and Windebank had not informed him of the negotiations that had led up
to his mission, Arundel understandably became very frustrated with his treatment and his inability
to procure an answer from the Emperor and thus requested his recall.141 According to Arundel, he
had received no message or compliment either from the Spanish ministers Onate and Castaneda,
whom he had expected to support his negotiation, or from the King ofHungary, which he interpreted
as a slight.142 On top of this Ferdinand continued to delay, because he still had received no reply
from Maximilian, and attempted to divert Arundel's attention by entertaining him and his company
with feasts, hunting parties, and other festivities.143 The ambassador protested to Windebank that
the King had sent him to Germany only to treat of the manner, time, and conditions for a full
l40Ibid., 310-3: 25 Aug. 1635, Secret instructions for Taylor. Far from hiding his offers of a
league from the government, Taylor repeatedly corresponded with Windebank about this very subject
(ibid., 369-71 : 6 Dec. 1635, Taylor to Windebank; ibid., 400: 12 Jan. 1636, Windebank to Taylor, ibid.,
429-30: 26 Jan. 1636, same to same; ibid., 476: 12 Mar. 1636, Taylor to Windebank; ibid., 478: 14 Mar.
1636, Windebank to Taylor). All of Taylor's correspondence concerning this league was with
Windebank; Coke was excluded from these secret negotiations with the Habsburgs.
141For example, CSP, vol. 1, 578: 2 July 1636, Arundel to Windebank.
l42PRO, SP 80/10, f. 79: 10 Feb. 1637, Taylor to Aston; CSP, vol. 1, 578: 2 July 1636, Arundel to
Windebank.
l43PRO, SP 80/9, ff. 181-8: 23 June 1636, Arundel to Secretary; CSP, vol. 1, 578: 2 July 1636,
same to Windebank; HMC, Denbigh V, 28: 19 June 1636, Harvey to Feilding; ibid., 29: 26 June 1636,
same to same; CSPV 1636-9, 10: 22 June 1636, Ballarino to D&S. "Yesterday my lord was feasted by the
nobility an the house of the Count of Melan, the cheife major-domo of his Majestic. We drunke hard, and
had many expressions and many good wishes." (HMC, Denbigh V, 29: 26 June 1636, Harvey to
Feilding). On June 20, they also witnessed a horrific public execution of seven leaders of an armed
peasant revolt against the Emperor. This event was captured by both Crowne and Hollar. Crownc's
description and Hollar's drawing are both reproduced in Springell, 65 and pi. 39.
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restitution of the Palatinate, which the Emperor had already agreed to beforehand.1*4 Later Taylor
wrote that the reason for the delay was that the Imperialists were not prepared to negotiate a treaty,
not thinking that the King would so quickly send a plenipotentiary ofArundel's stature — this is the
reason they dallied and did not give ananswer that would please him without first consulting Bavaria
and the Spanish ambassador. 145 Arundel noted darkly yet perceptively that "Nothing can be expected
from hence, but what the extremity of their affairs shall compel them unto." 146
Like Aston, Hopton, and Taylor, Arundel realized that the most effective way to achieve the
restoration of the Palatinate would be to accept a partial settlement for the present, with the hope of
gaining the rest in the future even if the Emperor did not make explicit promises to that effect1"
He asked Windebank to represent the advantages of accepting such a settlement to the King: "I do
guess by appearances, that, ifwe get any thing, it must be by degrees, and not by leaps; and that a
promise after Bavaria will not be had, but a going on in part, and leaving the rest to treaty. This, I
doubt, will prove the best" 14* Arundel thought it wise to accept a partial settlement, as long as the
1+1Arundel was greatly incensed when the Prince-Bishop told him the King ought to be satisfied,
for the present if the Emperor removed the ban, declared that the Palatine a prince of the Empire, and
restored a part of the Lower Palatinate. In any case, Arundel did not have a high opinion of the Prince-
Bishop's political acumen (CSPV 1636-9, 18: 5 July 1636, Ballarino to D&S; ibid., 35: I Aug. 1636, same
to same).
14SPRO, SP 80/10, f. 77: 10 Feb. 1637, Taylor to Aston.
>A6CSP, vol. 1, 578: 2 July 1636, Arundel to Windebank. In this dispatch, he includes a journal of
his proceedings from the beginning of his negotiations.
147Ibid., 484: 19 Mar. 1636, Aston to same; ibid., 707: 3 Dec. 1636, same to same. Aston pointed
out that if the King insisted on plenary restitution and gave no indication that he might accept less, when
it came down to the wire the Spaniards would likely break with England rather than Bavaria.
1Ibid., 583: 9 July 1636, Arundel to same.
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Emperor made an open declaration that he would neither bar the Prince Palatine from claiming more
in the future nor expect England to ally with the Habsburgs against the Dutch and French.149
Despite the softening in his position, the Imperialists' manner of treating still disgusted
Arundel. Thus, to express his displeasure, he dispatched the greater part of his entourage to
Regensburg and departed from Linz with a reduced party on 3 July to make excursions to various
Austrian, Bohemian, and Bavarian cities.150 He planned to meet the Emperor again in Regensburg
for the upcoming electoral meeting, to which the latter had referred the deliberations on the question
of the Palatinate, in the hope of procuring a more definite answer at that time.
As he had hoped, the Imperial ministers were taken aback by the manner of his sudden
departure. The Prince-Bishop ofVienna reported to Maximilian that without any further negotiation,
Arundel had informed the Emperor of his departure through his assigned gentleman-in-waiting, von
Molart, without saying where he was bound. According to the Prince-Bishop, Arundel gave out that
this was his custom as he could not stay too long in one place, and he let it be known that he would
reappear in good time, according to his humor. The Imperialists were unsure, however, whether he
would return to Linz or Regensburg, or would stay out altogether.151 Their worries were not
"9CSPV 1636-9, 35: 1 Aug. 1636, Ballarino to D&S.
150Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, Kastenschwarz 101A: 7 July 1636, Prince-Bishop of Vienna to
Maximilian I; quoted in Haan, Regensburger Kurfurstentag, 234-5 n. 44. This move was not favorably
regarded by some at the English court, the Prince Palatine in particular (CSPV 1636-9, 33: 30 July 1636,
Correr to D&S; ibid., 47: 19 Aug. 1636, same to same).
"1"Hat der gesanter ohne ainige vernere negotiation des anderen tages fine den mehrern thai I
seiner leuth und roB nach Regenspurg abgefertigt. Er aber fur sen) persohn ist nth wenig leuthen und
rossen die Donau hinunter gefahren und Ihre Kayserliche Mayestat nur durch seinen verordneten
commissarium, den von Molart, doch ohne benennung ainiges orthes, wohin die raifi angesechen, von
seiner abfarth erinnern lassen, mit vorgeben, das dises also sein brauch sey; er bediene sich auch dieser
freyheit bey seinem konig; er konne nit solang ahn ainem orth verbleiben; er wolte schon zu reenter zeit
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completely ungrounded, because after bis first encounter with the commission, Arundel did ask for
his recall.152 The Emperor and his ministers were not sure what to make of Arundel: they were not
used to his insistent and plain way of treating and regarded him as a man of quick humor.
When Elizabeth heard of Arundel's carriage and his proceedings with the Imperialists thus
far, she was also unsure what to make of them. Her letters speak to her conflicting feelings and
continued fears regarding the negotiations, but her confidence in Arundel remained firm. She wrote
to Laud that the Earl "carried himself worthily" and to Roe that "Arundel has done well hitherto, yet
she fears an afterclap."153 Roe, for his part, felt uninformed of Arundel's progress, grumbling that
he "hopes the Earl of Arundel works better than he writes."154
Despite Arundel's request for a recall, Coke ordered him to remain in Germany at least to
keep up the appearance that a positive outcome for the negotiations with the Emperor was possible.
The English hoped that this pressure would make the French more willing to conclude a treaty
favorable to England. Coke wrote: "it is not thought counsellable to make any open breach which
may be a disadvantage to any other treaty that may be thought of for putting this business in any
other way."1" The King had sent the Earl of Leicester to Paris in May to muster support for the
sich wider einstellen. Dariiber mahn ihme seinen humor gelassen. Niemandt abcr waiB, ob er wider hirher
oder nach Regenspurg kommen oder gahr auBbleiben werde." (Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv,
Kastenschwarz 10IA: 7 July 1636, Prince-Bishop of Vienna to Maximilian I; quoted in Haan,
Regensburger Kurfurslentag, 234-5 n. 44).
1"Gardiner, vol. 8, 160.
1"CSPD 1636-7, 61 : 24 July 1636, Elizabeth to Roe; ibid., 76: 6 Aug. 1636, same to Laud.
I54lbid., 70: 20 July 1636," Roe to Elizabeth.
1"PRO, SP 80/9, ff. 201-2: 30 July 1636, [Coke] to Arundel.
396
restoration of the Palatinate and Lorraine at the same time that he had dispatched Arundel to
Germany.156 Just as the English hoped that Arundel's negotiations would apply pressure to France,
in lum they designed Leicester's to do the same to the Emperor.157 In true Caroline fashion, the King
would grant English aid to whichever side was most likely to advance the cause of the Prince
Palatine. Therefore, he instructed Arundel to take a more conciliatory tone at the Imperial court in
the future.
Taylor, for his part, remained with the Imperial court and attempted to keep the negotiations
on track by calming the agitation caused by Arundel's brusque manner of negotiating, his denials of
offers of a league, and his abrupt departure from the Imperial court. In an attempt to smooth
Arundel's ruffled feathers as well, Taylor sent letters to him in Vienna and Prague conveying the
Emperor's hope and expectation ofhis return to the bargaining table at Regensburg.15* In his weekly
reports to Windebank, even the ever-optimistic Taylor began to express some apprehension
regarding the eventual outcome of the negotiations. His cousin's manner of treating with the
Imperialists and his hasty departure from Linz also alarmed William Howard. He wrote a letter to
Windebank suggesting that Arundel should show more patience in his dealings with the Imperial
councillors:
156Arthur Collins, ed., Letters and Memorials ofSlate in the Reigns of Queen Mary, Queen
Elizabeth, King James, King Charles the First. Part of the Reign ofKing Charles the Second, and
Oliver's Usurpation (London: Printed forT. Osborne, 1746), vol. 2, 374-7: 19 May 1636, Instructions for
Leicester. For more on Leicester's negotiations, see Sharpe, Personal Rule, 525-36. Interestingly, it seems
that the King considered not sending an ambassador to France because it might have a negative impact on
the Emperor's trust that a settlement could be reached with England (PRO, SP 80/9, f. 285: [Mar. 1636],
Coke's notes).
1"Gardiner, vol. 8, 160.
1stCSP, vol. 1, 587: 21 July 1636, Taylor to Windebank.
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I thought it not amiss to let your Honour know, that I fear my Lord Ambassador is
too impatient of delay: if it would therefore please your Honour to write a word or
two to him, that may put him in mind of a little sufferance against they meet next
upon their treaty, I am persuaded it may do a great deal of good. Your Honour will
easily believe, that they will part with as little as they may, and get as good
conditions for it as they can; but I am so confidently assured, from Father
Lammcrman [Lamormaini], that the Emperor intends to do all that lies in his power
to give content, and that with all expedition may be, as I make no doubt but the
business will be happily concluded, if, as I say, my Lord come a little better prepared
with patience. He naturally hates delay in any thing; and I cannot blame him if he
have a mind homeward . . . .1S9
As indicated by William Howard, the Catholic clergy expressed support for England's
attempts to resolve the Palatinate question by diplomacy, as its settlement was widely regarded as
a prerequisite for peace in the Empire. It seemed that confessional politics had fallen victim to war
weariness in the Empire, even among the Jesuits. Before Arundel had left England, Taylor reported
that both former militant leader Lamormaini and the Queen of Hungary's Capuchin confessor
Quiroga were among those who had "advanced this business." 160 Everywhere Arundel encountered
the Catholic religious in his travels, they showed an intense desire for peace.161 As Borough related
to Windebank, Lamormaini was particularly friendly to the embassy and arranged for lavish
entertainments to be presented to Arundel when he visited Vienna and Prague:
Father Lammerman [Lamormaini] the Jesuit, Confessor to the Emperor, and of great
power, hath in all places way-layed his Excellency, and caused the Fathers of that
Society to present him with sundry entertainments of honour, all of them tending to
l59Ibid., 581: 3 July 1636, William Howard to same; ibid-, 594: 30 July 1636, same to same.
IMIbid., 455: 3 Mar. 1636, Taylor to same. Jesuits were increasingly involved in attempts to make
peace after the Peace of Prague (Steinberger, 24). Robert Bireley maintains that both the confessors and
their rulers followed a more moderate course after the Peace of Prague, resulting in a substantial
reduction of the role of confession in politics (Bireley, "Religious War," 103).
l61For instance Brother Trifoni wrote Arundel a flattering letter (ACA, AL 1632-1723, no. 363:
[1636], Trifoni to Arundel).
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manifest the assurance here conceived, that his Excellency is come to restore peace
to the Christian world, and more particularly to this deplored Germany . . . .'a
One of the reasons these clergymen paid Arundel special attention was surely because he was the
head of the most powerful traditionally Catholic family in England. The Howards had made many
sacrifices for the faith, among them Arundel's own father, a martyr, and his mother, the foundress
of the Jesuit college at Ghent. They also believed Arundel was secretly inclined toward Catholicism,
and they wanted to encourage him to help improve the situation of English Catholics. The Catholic
religious, and the Jesuits in particular, had many reasons to seek the ambassador's favor, the foremost
of which was peace. On his journeys, Arundel visited many monasteries, churches, and Jesuit
houses, and at these places they "all regarded him at this time as the emissary of peace, and their
welcome was proportionate to their desire for the cessation of war."163
At the beginning of July Arundel and the remainder of his entourage took a boat from Linz
down the Danube to Vienna, where they arrived after two days' travel on 5 July.1" He had an
audience there the following day with the Archduke Leopold Wilhelm, who like the Earl was a great
collector of art, and the Queen of Hungary, the same Spanish Infanta who nearly became the bride
of Charles [. He also conferred with her confessor Quiroga, who, as William Howard reported, had
shown himself a supporter of Arundel's business: "My Lord had a great deal of conference at Vienna
with Chiroga, a Capuchin and Confessarius to the Queen of Hungary; a man well affected to our
'aCSP, vol. 1, 595: 30 July 1636, Borough to Windebank.
1"Hervey, 371.
1"CSP, vol. 1, 583: 9 July 1636, Arundel to Windebank.
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King's State and this particular business, or else I am much deceived: he also seemed to me to be
very confident that my Lord's business would succeed . 1,165
During bis stay in Vienna, Arundel visited several Jesuit houses. At the Jesuit-run University
(the Alte Universitdt complex near Seipel Plalz in modem Vienna),166 the students performed a
masque in his honor, followed by a musical performance and banquet. He then viewed the
Probation Hans — also a part of the University complex — the occupants of which aspired to holy
orders. Afterwards Arundel visited the Profes Hans on the ancient square called am Hof, where a
distinguished senior scholar delivered an oration to welcome him. He took a tour of this building
and concluded his visit at the adjoining church, where they listened to a beautiful hymn accompanied
by an organ rumored to have five thousand pipes.167
After one week in Vienna, and a final audience with the Queen of Hungary, Arundel and his
party set out for Prague, which they reached on 16 July.16* Once there, Arundel made a bittersweet
visit to Hradcany Castle, where the Winter King had once lived, to see the famous collections of
1"Ibid., 595: 30 July 1636, William Howard to same.
I66ln 1623, the Jesuits took over the philosophical and theological professorships at the
University with Ferdinand ITs promise that he would integrate their own college into the University and
remodel its buildings, as well as build a new administration building (the Domus Universitatis, today at
Sonnenfelsgasse 19) and a stately, imposing church for the entire University. The cornerstone for the
expanded complex was laid in 1624, and in 163 1 the church (Universitatskirche, also known as the
Jesuitenkirche), which in keeping with the time was decorated in an austere early baroque style with
simple appointments, was consecrated.
1"Crowne, 23; see also Springell, 115 n. 1 12-3. This church, now called Neun Chore der Engel
("Nine Choirs of the Angels"), still stands today on am Hof.
"'Arundel had intended to leave for Prague on 9 July decided against it, being "something
troubled with a catarrh"; he resolved to take his journey the next day, but did not leave until the
following. Arundel was not in the best of health during his mission (CSP, vol. 1, 587: 14 July 1636,
Taylor to Windebank; ibid., 587:21 July 1636, same to same).
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Rudolf II. There he encountered a room where the portraits of the English nobility still hung as a
reminder of the short reign of Frederick V and Elizabeth. He viewed the room where the
defenestration had taken place and the three gilt crosses erected to mark the location where the
Imperial councillors and their secretary had miraculously survived their fall.169 After leaving the
Castle, Arundel visited Waldstein (Wallenstein) Palace, which the King of Hungary had inhabited
since the general's untimely death in 1634.
The entertainments prepared by the Jesuits for the English visitors in Prague were even more
lavish than in Vienna. Arundel enjoyed a banquet and a humanistic play performed by the students
at the Jesuit College, "Pax in Anglia, diu exul in Germaniam postliminio reditura," the theme of
which was the restoration of peace in the Empire by the English King and his ambassador.170 The
support shown for his mission pleased Arundel, and he once again began to express optimism about
the outcome of his negotiations:
The Jesuits make great demonstration of their affections to the business; and in a
little comedy, which they made me at Prague, did our King great honour, in making
him the restorer of the publick peace. . . . many think it a bonum omen to the
business, that they who are so powerful here own it so much; which they would not
do if they did not hope for good success.171
169Beller, "Diplomatic Relations," 366.
l?0In a letter to Windcbank, Borough enclosed "the subject of the interlude presented at Prague to
the Earl Marshal by the Jesuits" (CSP, vol. I, 595-7: 30 July 1636, Borough to Windcbank). See also
Crowne's account of the play (Crowne, 33-7). As the play they staged indicated, the Jesuits in Prague had
ingeniously adapted to the prevailing humanistic tendencies of the time. Their curriculum included Latin
and Greek, and they often organized splendid performances in the courtyard of their college to attract the
populace. By this indirect method they sought to convert people to their teachings (Springell, 123-4 n.
155).
171CSP, vol. 1, 597: 30 July 1636, Arundel to Windebank.
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To Windebank Arundel wrote that be believed that the world inclined to putting the interests of the
Prince Palatine into general account, and that he hoped that the Emperor and his family would
recognize how useful the King's help could be.172
After a week's stay in Prague, Arundel and his company left on 23 July for Regensburg,
where the Imperial Diet was scheduled to meet. On their way out of the great Bohemian city, they
passed the battlefield of White Mountain, where Frederick and his allies had made their fateful last
stand against the Catholic League army. After fifteen years, human remains still littered it,173 When
the party reached Regensburg four days later, the Emperor and many of the electors had not yet
arrived. Considering it undignified to wait there alone and in any case wishing to avoid diplomatic
competition ("puntoes") with the Spanish ambassador, Arundel instead struck out with a reduced
company on 3 1 July for the Fugger city of Augsburg.174
Meanwhile, Taylor continued discussions about the meaning of the proposed league with
Ofiate and the Prince-Bishop of Vienna. They assured him that they only intended the league to be
directed against enemies ofthe common peace, and not (necessarily) those of the House ofHabsburg
and that "They yeeld that a restitution in integram is practicable but not to be hoped for at once."175
Upon receiving these reassurances, Taylor regained his former optimism about the outlook for the
negotiations. He lionized his King by maintaining that there could be no accommodation of affairs
172Ibid-, 599: 7 Aug. 1636, same to same.
173Crowne, 37.
174PRO, SP 80/9, f. 209: 6 Aug. 1636, Borough to [?]; CSP, vol. I, 599: 7 Aug. 1636, Arundel to
Windebank; Crowne, 39.
17SHMC, Denbigh V, 30: 6 Aug. 1636, Taylor to Feilding.
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in Germany without his involvement 176 Taylor, apparently unaware that Arundel's negotiation had
brought Radolt's to an effective halt, continued to have good hopes for his negotiation in England
as well. Taylor wrote home in July that the King and his ministers should soon discover the
Emperor's expectations for an Anglo-Habsburg league from his envoy. However, he did have an
inkling that Radolt was not completely satisfied with the progress of his mission, for Taylor also
wrote, "Radolt doth write something disgustedly," but added "it is good to keep him in good blood
and be constant in your resolutions; wherein I am confident you will have satisfaction."177
Indeed, Radolt had little to be happy about. In late July, news of Arundel's negotiation at
Linz and his strong reaction to the suggestion of the offensive and defensive league with the
Habsburgs reached the English court. The Habsburgs' presumption greatly offended the English.
After reading Arundel's account of what had passed, the King deliberated many hours with his
council. As a sign of his displeasure, he sent orders to one of his captains carrying Spanish silver
to unload his cargo at Dover, however, the ship had already sailed for Dunkirk. In an attempt to
minimize the damage done by Arundel's report, Radolt met with Windebank, one of the few English
ministers who would receive him, to discuss the issue. The Imperial envoy related to the Secretary
that it would surprise the Emperor if the King indeed objected to the idea of an offensive and
l76G£P, vol. 1, 586: 14 July 1636, Taylor to Windebank; ibid., 592: 28 July 1636. same to same;
ibid., 597: 30 July 1636, Borough to same; ibid., 616: 20 Aug. 1636, Taylor to same. Taylor stated in a
letter to Lord Feilding: "In the full powers which the Emperor granted his commissioners, they say that
"by me the King had offered a league offensive and defensive with them and their house contra
communes hostes,' but by this they mean not enemies of the house of Austria, but of the common peace. 'I
hope the conclusion of this business will bee to his Majesties immortal glory, and that Christendome shall
owe his peace unto his Majestie, for though I see the Princes generally do desire peace, yet they will not
bee able to obtaine it but through the King's power and assistance....'" (HMC, Denbigh V, 30: 6 Aug.
1636, same to Feilding).
I77CS7>, vol. 1, 593-4: 28 July 1636, same to Windebank; ibid., 582: 7 July 1636, same to same.
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defensive league, as it was first suggested by Taylor and not the Imperialists. Windebank answered
that ifTaylor had promised such a league, he had done so against his instructions, for the King had
no intention of making enemies of other states.17*
Back in the Empire, Maximilian in the meantime had made his reply to the Emperor's
inquiries regarding the restoration of the Palatinate. The Emperor wished to compromise with
England on this issue in the interests ofa general peace, but only with the concurrence ofbis allies,
Maximilian in particular. At this time, the belief circulated freely that peace should be made before
Germany was completely desolated and enveloped by anarchy. This fact made Dr. Harvey hopeful
of the success of the embassy:
Our greatest certenty groweth from the necessity they have heare of making peace
on any condition, wheare ther is noe more meanes of making warr or scarce of
subsistence; and this warfare in Germany without pay is rather a licence to prey and
of oppression, and threateneth in the ende anarchy and confusion, then a just and
laudable warr to establish peace and justice."179
It has already been shown that Lamormaini and other clerics supported the negotiations in the hope
that they would bring peace, and his opinion still counted in the Emperor's counsels. For these
reasons, the Emperor was willing as far as he could to meet English demands, but consideration of
his allies limited the concessions he could viably make. Maximilian's vote in the upcoming election
at Regensburg would be crucial to the election of the King of Hungary as King of the Romans;
achieving this election at Regensburg was even more pressing in light of the Emperor's declining
l7*HHStA, StA England, Kart. 18, Konv. 1819, f. 6: I Aug. 1636, Radolt to Ferdinand D.
I79HMC, Denbigh V, 29: 26 June 1636, Harvey to Feilding. Later he stated that "wee finde heare
greate expressions and many wishes for the success of my lord his embassadg; how the effects will prove
we hope well, butt cannot certeynly assure our selves. I thinke the miserable condition of Germany doth
more then requier it [peace]." (ibid., 30: 9 July 1636," same to same).
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health. "° The Emperor was not prepared to dislodge the Duke from his electoral seat if the cost for
doing so was the loss of the Imperial crown."1 For the same reason, the King of Hungary avoided
vexing the "old vulpone" Maximilian, even though peace would have been even more desirable to
him as the future Emperor than it was to his father. With so much at stake, Haubitz remonstrated
with Maximilian in the hope that he would take a more flexible attitude to the restitution of the
Palatine lands and titles.
Although Maximilian defended the interests of Catholicism in the Thirty Years' War, his
main concern was to raise the House of Wittelsbach to undisputed prominence in Central Europe,
and part of this design was to cement his hold on his Palatine gains. Through the relentless
determination with which he pursued this goal, Bavaria became a power of consequence, whose
interests other European states had to take into consideration. Maximilian and his wife, Maria Anna,
were expecting a child, which — if it proved male — would become his long-awaited heir to the
Bavarian titles and estates. It was unlikely that Maximilian would willingly dissipate the patrimony
he could leave by sacrificing the gains that he had so recentiy acquired."2 The Prince Palatine's
situation, however, was not hopeless. Maximilian also did not want these gains to remain
perpetually in dispute either, he wanted to pass on a secure inheritance to his heir. To achieve this
security, it was important for him to gamer the acceptance of the major states of the Imperial and
"°CSP, vol. I, 599: 7 Aug. 1636, Arundel to Windebank. The Habsburgs could not count on the
vote of the Elector of Trier, who had placed himself under French protection. This made Maximilian's
potentially the swing vote.
1"CCSP, vol. I, 80: 26 Dec. 1635, Taylor to Windebank. Nor was Spain ready to countenance
this (CSP, vol. I, 622: 30 Aug. 1636, Aston to Charles I; ibid., 666: 25 Oct. 1636, same to Windebank).
ICHMC, Denbigh V, 26: [Apr.?] 1636, Leslie to Feilding.
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international community that still disputed the legality ofhis acquisitions, among them Sweden and
England. When the Emperor sent Kurz to convince Maximilian to consent to the restoration of the
electorate and lands in March, Kurz persuaded the Duke to agree to the return of the Lower
Palatinate, on the condition that he would retain the Upper Palatinate and a sum ofmoney for his war
expenses.1*3 The Emperor also gave Taylor hope that he might restore the electorate after
Maximilian's death. This was not total restitution, but it provided some hope that the two sides
might reach a compromise. Taylor reported that the King of Hungary went shortly thereafter to
Munich to "induce the Duke of Bavaria as much as he can, to what is treated with England. Hee
[Maximilian] makes heere faire shews to a better disposition unto it then was conceived hee would,"
to which he cautiously added, "which doth awaken some little suspition that it is for ends of his
owne, and that when they [the Diet] shall bee assembled hee will doe as formerly.""4
In response to the pressure applied by Haubitz for an answer on the question of the Palatine
lands and dignities, Maximilian drafted a memorandum to the Emperor which offered a perceptive
assessment of the political situation surrounding them. He brushed aside the threat of English
military intervention and pointed out that the value of Charles's promised assistance was
questionable, since he could hardly finance his fleet and could not expect a large infusion of revenue,
'DCSP, vol. I, 498: 9 Apr. 1636, Taylor to Windebank. See chap. 8, p. 328.
"4HMC, Denbigh V, 25: 26 Apr. 1636, same to Feilding. Taylor continued to underrate the Duke
as an obstacle to the negotiations. A month later he wrote that the King of Hungary had gone to Munich
"to dispose him [Maximilian] to our business, which certainely hee will hinder what hee can, but hee that
will not bend must break, and we have no way but fortiter et suaviter." (ibid., 27: 17 May 1636, same to
same).
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as he was on bad terms with Parliament."5 However, in the interests of a general peace, he was
willing to give up his share of the Lower Palatinate in return for payment of his war expenses if
Spain would do the same. If the Emperor felt compelled to restore the Upper Palatinate, he must
again relinquish Upper Austria to Maximilian until he received payment of his war expenses; this
was as good as a denial, because Maximilian knew full well the Emperor would never assent to
Bavarian re-occupation of this province. Finally, by no means would Maximilian relinquish the
electorate."6 That he showed himself willing, under certain circumstances, to give up the Lower
Palatinate was a significant concession given his previous hard line on any kind of restoration. His
continued recalcitrance on the point of the Upper Palatinate and particularly the electorate, however,
lt5HHStA, StA Bavarica, Kart. 5, ff. 507-16: 30 June 1636, Maximilian I to Ferdinand II; ibid.,
ff. 518-27: 30 June 1636, same to same; ibid., StK Vortrage, Kart. I, Konv. F, ff. 101-2: 5 July 1636,
Protocol of privy council. The Duke reasoned that "[sjhould England try to attack by land, it was known
from the examples of 'Vere and Hamilton' what kind of 'Miracles' they were able to perform. Agreed, the
fleet was considerable, but the many ships had too few soldiers on board, no ammunition and insufficient
provisions. Even if these ships were equipped with men and material for six months, it was of little use to
rely on them, as the cost would first have to be approved by Parliament King Charles had fallen out
completely with his Parliament and never intended to summon it again. Even if the King of England were
able to keep up the fleet for a longer period at his own expense, and without approval of Parliament,
where could England attack the German Empire with her ships? There were no common frontiers. ...The
'status belli* would therefore not be influenced at all." (HHStA, StA Bavarica, Kart. 5, ff. 518-27: 30 June
1636, Maximilian I to Ferdinand 11; Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, DreiBigjShriger Kriegsakten, no. 225,
ff. 1-35; quoted in Springell, 28-9). It is apparent from this statement that Maximilian was not overly
concerned about what the consequences of arousing England might be for Spain. In 1640, however, he
took the threat of English intervention in the war much more seriously because of Parliament's
expressions of support for this course (Kathrin Bierther, Der Regensburger Reichstag von 1 640/1641,
Regensburger Historischc Forschungen, vol. I [Kallmunz: Lassleben, 1971], 79; see below, p. 544).
'"HHStA, StA Bavarica, Kart. 5, ff. 507-16: 30 June 1636, Maximilian I to Ferdinand II; ibid.,
StK Vortrage, Kart. 1, Konv. F, ff. 101-2: 5 July 1636, Protocol of privy council; Bodl. Lib., Rawlinson
D 867, f. 120: s.d., Maximilian I to Haubitz; CSPV 1636-9, 18: s.d., same to same.
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and the King's insistence on some kind ofaccommodation regarding it ensured that it would remain
one of the greatest obstacles that the English diplomats would have to tackle.1*7
Maximilian responded in much the same way a month later in his response to Radolfs June
dispatch, which had been forwarded to him by the King of Hungary in the hope of persuading him
to make further concessions in the Palatinate. It was apparent that while Radolfs reports may have
influenced the Emperor's policy toward England, Maximilian did not allow them to sway Bavarian
policy substantially. His dismissal of the King was clear. He again pointed out that the English
alliance was not necessarily worth having, because the King would have little to offer without the
financial support of Parliament. Furthermore, Maximilian was convinced that the King would not
aid the French and Dutch if he were not satisfied in the Palatinate. He wished to rule absolutely and
would do whatever was necessary to prevent calling Parliament, including forgoing an alliance with
the anti-Habsburg powers for the recovery of his nephew's patrimony. The real question, then, was
whether Charles would rather rule absolutely or restore his nephew as an elector of the Empire at the
cost of submitting himself to Parliamentary prescription."* In Maximilian's opinion, the English
I*7Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, DreiGigjahriger Kriegsakten, no. 225, ft". 1-35; quoted in
Springell, 29. Maximilian recommended that the Emperor temper Arundel's discontent with the delays in
his negotiation by pointing out to him that the decision about restoration was not to be made by the
Emperor alone—he would have to consult representatives of the Diet as well.
1"HHStA, RK KrA, Fasz. 1 17, ff. 252-3: 28 July 1636, Bartholomaus Richel, Bavarian Vice
Chancellor, to Trauttmansdorff. "Mich bedunchkt, die Englische schlauche ministri probieren dengueten
hem Radolt auf allerlay prob. Erstens haben sie erforschen wollen, ob er ein soldat abgeben mochte.
Darumb haben sie ihme einen teufel ins gelafi gewtsen, ob er nit zu schreckhen wer, und haben bald in
consequenz darauf fondiert, man werde am Kayser lichen hof gewiQ dartiber erzuttern, warm nur der
Arundel such wild stellen werde. Jcrzt versuechen sie ihne auf ein ander weiB und wollensehen, was er
fur ein politicum abgebe, und ob von den vorigen schrdekhen er sich erholt, und sagen, der khdnig hab
das ganze scepter absolute in der hand, mfige seines gefallens ohnersuocht oder ohngehindert des
pariaments handlen, wie er wolle, und wann er mit Osterreich coniungiert, so khdnde er sich und
consequenter seine plenitudinem potestatis dem parlament zu drutz manteniem. Hergegen khinde das
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ministers were simply inflating England's power and the King's ability to direct his policy at will in
order to advance Arundel's negotiation with the Emperor. The Duke, therefore, declared his
intention to discover more about the designs of the English Calvinists, and report his findings to the
Emperor.1*9
Thus while Radolt believed that the Emperor should take seriously English threats ofalliance
ofwith the anti-Habsburg side, Maximilian effectively downplayed them in order to protect his own
position in the Palatinate. He tried to persuade Ferdinand that England was more likely to turn
against France over Lorraine than against Austria over the Palatinate. He therefore counseled the
Emperor not to be "in any violent hurry to give satisfaction by a prejudicial and disadvantageous
adjustment," because the Palatine would surely be satisfied with less."0 Maximilian also advised
the Emperorto conceal his apprehension that England might retaliate against the Habsburgs, because
the Palatine would accordingly raise his expectations for what could be regained. Ballarino believed
parlament dise des khonigs so grat absolut regierung nit comportieren. Herauf wolt ich den Radolt mit
seiner politics gem horen, was er met, warm er an des khonigs start were, ob er lieber das hefft und den
sigl fiber seine underthanen in der hand behaldten und alQ reenter absolutus rex sein wolte, und den
Pfalzgraf Carl htnfuran so wol alB bishero und wie sein vatter als anherr gethan wolle laBen fahren und
allein litteris et interciBionibus favorisiem, oder aber ob er sich lieber seines parlements titel und
praescriptis underwerffen wollte, damit er sich mit andem conjungiem und khrieg fieren khonde. Und ob
der Khonig lieber den Pfaltzgrafen zu cinem churflirsten als sich zu einem rechten herm und khSnig
sehen werde." (Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, Kastcnschwaiz 101 A: Maximilian I's commentary on
Radolt's dispatch of 6 June 1636: quoted in Haan, Regensburger Kurfurstentag, 243 n. 86).
1"HHStA, RK KrA, Fasz. 1 17, ff. 253-4: 28 July 1636, Richel to Trauttmansdorff. When
Maximilian and his ministers made allusions to religion relating to the negotiations with England, it was
usually with a pointed political end. In this case, he invokes the image of the English Calvinism to create
a them-vs.-us mentality conducive to retaining the greatest possible portion of his Palatine gains'.
Although he was pious, the interests of the Bavarian state and Wittelsbach dynasty determined his policy
in the first line and at critical points took precedence over all other interests, including those of the
Church (Albrecht, "Konfessionelle Zeitalter," 366-8). For more on Maximilian's commitment to dynastic
interests, see chap. 2, p. 79.
X*>CSPV 1632-6, 551: 26 Apr. 1636, Ballarino to D&S.
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that Maximilian's arguments may have convinced the Emperor to instruct Radolt to proceed with
more reserve in his offices, but at the same time to avoid offending Charles and promote the
advantages of maintaining good relations with the Habsburgs, particularly in trade."1
It seems that Taylor greatly underestimated Maximilian in the months leading up to Arundel's
arrival at the Imperial court when he wrote: "Prepare yourselves bravely, and do not fear the Duke
of Bavaria. I scorn that he should be put in balance with his Majesty, for he and his whole House
is too light." 192 It appears that the English negotiators had more to fear from Maximilian than Taylor
had supposed.193 Arundel obviously would have his work cut out for him.
"1Ibid.
1nCSP, vol. 1, 499: 9 Apr. 1636, Taylor to Windebank.
By this point, Arundel had noticed Taylor's propensity to optimism where the negotiations
were concerned. He wrote to Windebank in early September: "Indeed I think Mr. Taylor an honest well-
affected man; but, I must confess, I find him so extremely affected to his business, as he is so continually
confident of good success daily, when all things to my understanding run cross, as I desire him to put me
in the way; for, in truth, I do as much desire a good end this way as he, but I must not be fed with general
words when the effects are contrary." (CSP, vol. i, 629: 8 Sept. 1636, Arundel to Windebank). This was
mild in comparison to what Ballarino had reported, namely that Arundel had complained about Taylor
negotiating one way in Vienna and writing home about it in another, a situation which prematurely
precipitated his embassy. The Emperor and his ministers told Arundel that Taylor had offered a league in
return for the Lower Palatinate, for which Arundel claimed he had no such order and deserved severe
punishment (CSPV 1636-9, 35: 1 Aug. 1636, Ballarino to D&S). Of course Arundel knew nothing of
Taylor's secret instructions.
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The Earl of Arundel at the Regensburg Electoral MeetIng and
Clement Radolt at the EnglIsh Court, 1636
Negotiations in Regensburg
For the errant your lordship goes for. I doe most heartilie wishe in well. ..and yen I
cannot be bee verie doubtful of the event, in regarde of my former knowledge of
Germany. Ifyour lordship can prevaile soe fan- as to make the Interests of our master
with the Emperor wey downe those of Bavaria when they shal bee putt into the scale,
I confess your lordship shal have done a greats woorke. Butt you will have to do with
a craftie, subtile and wise Prince; and one that hath great power not only in Germany
but in Italy, and with the Jesuits noe prince in Europe more.
Sir Henry Vane to Arundel
As delegates began to descend on Regensburg in expectation of the electoral meeting in late August,
a communication arrived from Radolt describing the reaction at the English court to Arundel's report
of his negotiations at Linz. In an attempt to salvage the negotiations, Imperial ministers
recommended that the Emperor should finally make his intentions known to Arundel, as the
ambassador had been requesting since his arrival . 1 To this end, they advised that the Emperor should
again consult Spain and Bavaria regarding what to offer the King of England in return for his
friendship and alliance. They still advised that the Emperor should lift the ban from Charles Louis,
reinstate him as a prince of the Empire, and restore him to a portion of the Palatine lands in return
1Also, they observed with chagrin that the Spanish ambassador in England had no plenipotency
for this work, as the Spaniards had promised (HHStA, StK. Vortrage, Kart. 1, Konv. F, f. 109: 26 Aug.
1636, Opinion of privy council).
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for his humble submission.2 How much to restore, however, would depend upon the declarations
of Spain and Bavaria. Concerning the electorate, they noted that it was unlikely that the Emperor
could restore it until after the expiry of the Wilhelmine line because of Maximilian's resistance. In
return for the Emperor's declaration, they would expect Arundel to declare his master's intentions
where an Anglo-Habsburg alliance was concerned. In any case, the councillors directed Radolt to
protest to the King and his ministers that they could not blame the Emperor for the delay in the
negotiations. He was also to continue promoting good relations between the two crowns. Finally,
since the business was at a crucial juncture, be was not to leave England despite his repeated requests
for a recall.3
Oblivious to the developments in his absence, Arundel returned to Regensburg on 1 3 August
1636, just in time to witness the Emperor's state entry into the city.4 Since he had received so many
expressions of goodwill on his journeys and encountered a real desire for peace in the Empire, he
had a more positive opinion of his business than when he left Linz. Still, he was not overly
confident of a favorable outcome ofhis negotiations. He expressed his uncertainty in a letter to Lord
Feilding: "What the progres or end of this long intended and expected Diet will be is altogether
inccrtaine."5
2Though under certain conditions, one of them being religious concessions. The Imperial side,
however, was pitching its opening offer high, intending for it to be negotiable.
3HHStA, StK Vortrage, Kart. I, Konv. F, ff. 109-12: 26 Aug. 1636, Opinion of privy council.
4Crowne,42-3.
5HMC, Denbigh V, 35: 19 Aug. 1636, Arundel to Feilding.
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Habsburg military successes over the summer months influenced tIme dynamic ofArundel's
negotiations once he returned to Regensburg. Habsburg armies had done particularly well in the
field against the French.6 The military situation made the Habsburgs progressively more confident,
a fact which Arundel conveyed to Lord Feilding:
They say the King of Hungaria proceeds with great successe in Burgundie, and that
the French have not onely left the seige of Dole but are with much Losse retyred out
of those parts, which with the Cardinall Infants prevaylings in France and the
expulsion of the French out of the State of Milan makes them heer looke high and
think better of themselves then of late they did.7
The result was that the Habsburgs, and Spain in particular, demanded greater concessions from
England — namely provision of land forces and greater access to the fleet — inn return for any Palatine
lands or titles that they might restore. In addition to Spain's more comfident posture, Bavaria
continued to be a major obstacle to restoration after Arundel's return to Regensburg; he wrote wryly
to Feilding, "P.S. —The Duke ofBavaria's interests in this courte, and the Spaniardes more insistinge
upon thayre share then was expected may perhappes hasten my retourne."* These developments did
not make Arundel's task any easier. In his first interviews with the Emperor and Oflate in
Regensburg, the former lapsed into taciturnity and the latter demanded war against the enemies of
Spain.9
6CSP, vol. 1, 593: 28 July 1636, Taylor to Windebank; ibid., 626: 2 Sepc. 1636, Arundel to same.
7HMC, Sixth Report, vol. I, 280: 3 Sept. 1636, same to Feilding.
"Ibid.
9CSP, vol. 1, 612-3: 20 Aug. 1636, same to Windebank. Arundel was dissatisfied with their
unwillingness to come to an accommodation, and he told Ballarino bitterly that '"they make a great
mistake here if they build on their present success, as nothing is more inconstant than the fortune of war."
(CSPV 1636-9, 65: 16 Sept. 1636, Ballarino to D&S). He was right; just a few w<eks later, fear of new
difficulties with the Turks made the Emperor more willing to listen to Arundel's overtures (ibid., 78: 7
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Once settled in, Arundel again turned to the task of obtaining a clear declaration of the
Emperor's intentions regarding Palatine restoration. Two days after his arrival, on IS August, the
Emperor accorded him an audience, at which they exchanged the usual courtesies. In an attempt to
move the Emperor to a decision, Arundel delivered a memorial to him on 1 8 August which outlined
the English position. As previously, he denied in it that the King had offered an offensive and
defensive league and insisted upon the promise ofeventual total restitution as preliminary. He also
refused to negotiate on the ground of mercy instead ofjustice, and again asked for an explicit answer
to the King's demands as represented in the memorial.10 On 20 August, the Emperor again received
Arundel, and this time the ambassador pressed even more insistently for a decision. The Emperor,
however, only assured him yet again of his determination to bring the matter to a satisfactory
conclusion- 11
While waiting for a more definite answer from the Emperor, Arundel exchanged formal calls
with the representatives ofpowers attending the electoral meeting. He passed the time in ceremonial
visits, and he made little progress in the negotiations. Arundel partly attributed this to the
Imperialists' practice of negotiation by papers, which he saw as conducive to delay. Although he
was obliged to conform to this custom, it was apparent to him that the renewed exchange ofwritten
proposals was not moving the negotiations forward any further than previously. He believed that
Oct. 1636, same to same).
l0HHStA, StA Palatina, Kart. 12, Konv. 2: 18 Aug. 1636, Arundel to Ferdinand II; PRO, SP 80/9,
ff. 213-4: 28 Aug. 1636, same to same. These were in answer to the Imperial decrees of 30 June and 2
July, in which the Emperor maintained that Taylor had indeed made offers of an offensive and defensive
league (HHStA, StA England, Kart. I, Konv. 4: 2 July 1636, Ferdinand II to Arundel; ibid., StA Palatina,
Kart. 12, Konv. 2: 2 July 1636, same to same).
"CSV, vol. 1, 61 1-5: 20 Aug. 1636, Arundel to Windebank.
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"business of this nature, were rather to be negotiated privately in confidence; for that many thinges
on both sides might perhaps be spoken and proposed which were not fitt to be committed to publique
paper."12 Therefore, on Arundel's suggestion, the Imperial ministers agreed to treat by conference
as Arundel desired.13
During this time Arundel exchanged visits with Ofiate, with whom the question of a league
remained a point of conflict The Spanish ambassador still refused to accept Arundel's claim that
England had never suggested an offensive and defensive alliance with the House of Habsburg
because he could not believe that Arundel had not been briefed on the secret agreement made by
Cottington in Spain and the league lately proposed by both Taylor and Aston, all with the full
knowledge of the King.14 He continued to stand upon what he termed Spain's convenientias — an
English rupture with France and Holland — which he claimed was consistent with a paper that had
passed between Cottington and Olivares during their secret negotiations in 163 1. 15 However,
England could join with Spain by degrees. The best way to start, he suggested, was for England and
Spain to enter into the "fit" league lately proposed by Taylor and Aston. In return, Spain would
12PRO, SP 80/9, f. 240: 14 Sept. 1636, same to Secretary.
13Ibid., f. 227: 3 Sept. [sic] 1636, same to same; CSP, vol. 1,619: 25 Aug. 1636, same to
Windebank; ibid., 626: 2 Sept. 1636, same to same. Arundel was having further problems. He protested
to Windebank that he could not make out the cipher in a letter he had received: "but for my life [I] cannot
make out three words of it in three hours, it being so laborious to find out the figures so out of order, and
my eyes so weak, and I dare trust no other body withal." Meant to confound enemies, in this case the
cipher baffled the recipient as well (ibid., 618: 25 Aug. 1636, same to same).
l4But not the other members of the foreign committee.
"PRO, SP 80/9, f. 229: 9 Sept. 1636, Arundel to Secretary. For more on the Cottington Treaty,
see chap. 4, p. 181. The paper proposed that the restoration of the Palatinate would be contingent upon
England bringing the Dutch to satisfactory terms (Gardiner, vol. 7, 187; L. J. Reeve, "Quiroga's Paper,"
919).
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restore the part of the Lower Palatinate it occupied to Charles Louis. Ofiate also cautioned Arundel
against relying wholly on the Emperor for restitution. Because one share of the Lower Palatinate
was under Spain's control, and the other under Bavaria's, he declared that they alone had the power
to restore it. Only the removal of the ban and the restoration of the electorate were in the Emperor's
power.16
Annoyed, Arundel replied that he had come to Germany to negotiate only with the Emperor,
who had promised full restitution to Taylor, and not to address the so-called convenientias of Spain.
According to Arundel, the Emperor claimed the right to restore the Lower Palatinate and had given
assurances that Spain's only share in the restitution would be by way of mediation.17 Arundel
pointed out that he had no instructions to negotiate with either Spain or Bavaria, much less to
promise them compensation for concessions made in the Lower Palatinate. Besides, he retorted, the
Habsburgs could not expect anything, much less a league, from the King of England unless his
nephew was first restored. Arundel also denied that the King had assented to the aforementioned
paper of Cottington, which he declared was Olivares's own fancy." Arundel acknowledged that
Taylor and Aston had offered a "fit" league, but pointed out that such a league was in any case
l6Ibid.; CCSP, vol. 1, 108: 9 Sept. 1636, same to Windebank.
17PRO, SP 80/9, f. 230: 9 Sept. 1636, same to Secretary.
"PRO, SP 80/9, ff. 229-30: 9 Sept. 1636, Arundel to Secretary. Oiiate actually sent Arundel
copies of correspondence that had passed between Aston and the Count-Duke (ibid., SP 80/10, ff. 77-8:
10 Feb. 1637, Taylor to Aston). Arundel wrote home asking for information about the question and
answer exchange between Aston and Olivares that Onate had referred to, but Windebank obviously chose
to ignore the ambassador's request. The King, who claimed he did not remember the exchange, asked
Windebank to check into it, noting "If ther had been Arondell should have had the Copies of them for I
command to both you Secretaries." (CSP, vol. 1, 636: 12 Sept. 1636, Windebank to Charles I, with tatter's
notation; ibid., 61 8: 25 Aug. 1636, Arundel to Windebank).
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subject to interpretation." Unbeknownst to Arundel, England had already given assurances of a
closer alliance with Spain in its secret negotiations with the Habsburgs, though there bad never been
a consensus between the two sides about what form this league would take.20
Arundel was appalled by Ortate's insistent behavior (and vice-versa), since he had been under
the impression upon leaving for Germany that the Spaniards would do all they could to further his
negotiations.21 He was mistaken on this point: Spain intended to milk the Palatinate for all it was
worth by using it to enlist English help against the Dutch and French.22 Charles would not get
something for nothing as he had hoped.23 However, it was not clear that they would not reduce their
demands to a level that the King would consider reasonable, such as the active assistance ofthe fleet,
upon which the Spaniards relied to keep their lines of communication with Flanders open.
"Ashamed that he was so badly informed about Astra's proceedings in Spain, Arundel actually
pretended he had seen Aston's papers but did not presently have them, and he took Onate's copies so he
would have some idea of what had passed there. "By this I saw with what disadvantages I treat hear in
this businesse, when I am not made acquainted with the particulars of their proceeding in Spaine, that so
neerly conceame my Ambassage." (PRO, SP 80/9, ff. 222: 26 Aug. 1636, Arundel to Secretary; CSP, vol.
1, 613: 20 Aug. 1636, same to Windebank).
20Spain expected England to enter the war against Holland and now France, while England saw
the active assistance of the fleet and mediation of the Continental conflict as fulfilling its requirements.
21PRO, SP 80/9, ff. 222-4: 26 Aug. 1636, Arundel to Secretary.
"The reports and advice that the King had been receiving from Hopton and Aston in Madrid
pointed out that Spanish concessions in the Palatinate relied heavily upon the prospect of a treaty with
England and that even then partial restitution might be the most that could be hoped for. Spain, though
no great friend of Maximilian, could not afford to alienate him completely by promoting England's
interests in the Palatinate considering the impending election of the King of the Romans (BL, Add. Mss.
36450, f. 7: 9 Jan. 1636,' Aston to Charles [; ibid., ff. 101-3: Dec. 1636, same to Windebank; ibid., ff.
1 1 1-2: 7 Feb. 1637," same to Arundel; CSP, vol. 1, 622: 30 Aug. 1636, same to Charles 1; ibid., 655-6: 24
Sept. 1636, same to Windebank; ibid., 666: 25 Oct. 1636, same to same; ibid., 687: 12 Nov. 1636, same
to same).
23BL, Add. Mss. 36450, ff. 7-8: 9 Jan. 1636,' Aston to Charles I; CSP, vol. 1, 466: 5 Mar. 1636,
same to Windebank; ibid., 637: 13 Sept. 1636,' same to same.
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OHate's son, who was then serving as ambassador in England, echoed his father's frustration
with England. The young Oftate wrote of the arrogant English attitude to his negotiations there. The
councillors at Whitehall, he complained, "assume the right to ask for a lot, and to hand over the
Palatinate politely to them is a little thing considering our Iting's need of them."24 Aston also
professed his shock at Arundel's refusal to treat ofany league at all and his lack ofknowledge of his
and Taylor's previous negotiations.25
Charles, however, obviously did not regard the services offered by the fleet in exchange for
the Palatinate as nothing. During his conversation with Ofiate, Arundel pointed out the benefits that
the Spaniards had reaped over the last two years through the agency of the English fleet.26 A few
months later, Aston also reminded Olivares of the advantages they had enjoyed over the previous
two years with the help of the fleet, which the Spaniards should take into account when they
considered the restitution of the Palatinate: "I thought it fit to tell him . . . That they had now a fair
opportunity offered them in that business to repay the courtesies and obligations which they had
received from his Majesty in these two years; whereby there may be happy beginnings laid of further
friendships and stricter correspondencies . . . ."27 In spite of their reliance on the assistance of the
fleet to preserve their supply route to Flanders, the Spaniards maintained their poker faces with
impressive sang-froid. If the fleet were to become an effective bargaining counter, however, the
24Loomie, "Spanish Faction," 46-7.
"CSV, vol. I, 636: 13 Sept. 1636," Aston to Windebank; ibid., 665-6: 12 Nov. 1636, same to
same.
26PRO, SP 80/9, f. 229: 9 Sept. 1636, Arundel to Secretary, CSV, vol. 1, 614: 20 Aug. 1636, same
to Windebank.
27CSP, vol. 1, 706: 3 Dec. 1636: Aston to Windebank.
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King would have to test the Spaniards by withdrawing or at least cutting back on the assistance it
was already providing to Spain. Onate's reply to Arundel's reference to the fleet was to acknowledge
that courtesies had been done, but that its main task was to defend English sovereignty of the seas,
not protect Spanish shipping.2* What it came down to was that Charles I claimed that the Lower
Palatinate alone was not worth consent to a league, and the Spaniards maintained that the protective
services of the fleet alone were not valuable enough to relinquish their hold on the Lower
Palatinate.29 Their tune, however, would likely have been quite different if they had not been freely
enjoying the services of the fleet and England offered these to their enemies instead. The failure to
do this was one of the major failures of the King's foreign policy during the personal rule.
On 3 0 August, the Emperor finally responded to Arundel's most recent memorial, once again
essentially offering the terms of 24 February. He disavowed that he had ever promised to restore
the Prince Palatine fully to his patrimony and refused to consider it as a matter of justice,
maintaining that any concessions made to him would spring purely from the Emperor's grace.30 In
return, he wished to know what the King was willing to do regarding a league with the House of
"PRO, SP 80/9, f. 229: 9 Sept. 1636, Arundel to Secretary.
19CSP, vol. I, 706: 3 Dec. 1636: Aston to Windebank.
30HHStA, StA England, Kart. I, Konv. 2: 29 Aug. 1636, Ferdinand II to Arundel; ibid., StA
Palatina, Kart. 12, Konv. 2: 30 Aug. 1636, same to King of Hungary; PRO, SP 80/9, f. 247: 29 Aug.
1636, same to Arundel; CSP, vol. I, 627: 29 Aug. 1636, same to same.
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Austria.31 For what he regarded as a paltry offering, Arundel was rankled that the Emperor asked
him to do so.32
Not surprisingly, after his discussions with Ofiate and the Emperor's answer, Arundel again
began to despair of a favorable outcome for the negotiations. He identified the difficulty precluding
agreement to be Onate's insistence on Spain's convenientias: "without Spain," he wrote, "I find the
Emperor will never do anything."33 Seeing no real prospect for success, he hinted that he wished for
a swift recall.34
Meanwhile, the Emperor continued to labor to bring his allies to reason where the restoration
of the Palatinate was concerned. In the interests of achieving peace, he wished to find a compromise
that both England on the one hand, and Spain and Bavaria on the other, could accept Ferdinand
feared that Arundel, being of quick humor, would walk out on the talks if he did not receive a
definite answer soon, thus resulting in a rupture between England and the Habsburg states. Besides
allowing a chance for peace to slip away, this would cause Spain serious difficulties in its conflict
with the Dutch and French and prolong the war in the Empire.
3lThis response was set out by the Imperial privy council on 19 August. Like the Spaniards, the
councillors seemed baffled that Arundel denied a league when one was being treated in Spain by Aston
and had been broached verbally by Taylor. They were eager to discover what the King actually required
for his nephew and what type of confederation he would be willing to enter into in return (HHStA, StfC
Vortrage, Kart. 1, Konv. F, ff. 103-7: 19 Aug. 1636, Opinion of privy council).
33PRO, SP 80/9, f. 227: 3 Sept. [sic] 1636, Arundel to Secretary; CSP, vol. I, 626: 2 Sept. 1636,
same to Windebank.
33Ibid., 61 1: 20 Aug. 1636, same to same.
34PRO, SP 80/9, ff. 227-8: 3 Sept [sic] 1636, same to Secretary, ibid., f. 230: 9 Sept 1636, same
to same.
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The Emperor therefore convened a secret conference between Bavarian, Spanish, and
Imperial representatives at the beginning of September for the allies to decide upon the offer they
would make to the English ambassador. Throughout these proceedings, the Imperial commissioners
tried to mediate between the opposing views of its allies on the one hand and England on the other.
The following were present at the meeting: Vice Chancellor Stralendorf and the Prince-Bishop of
Vienna representing the Emperor, Count Onate representing the King of Spain; and the Bavarian
councillor Kurz and Chancellor Richel representing Maximilian. The Emperor expected each power
to give a categorical reply on the question of Palatine restitution so that the Emperor could finally
give an answer to Arundel, whom they had kept waiting though Charles had sent him with full
powers to negotiate a final settlement. The Prince-Bishop of Vienna declared that "It would be
essential to give 'the child a name' and to announce — after four months of waiting — which territory
and how much of it one was prepared to restore. It was not enough to give ambiguous terms,
because the English ambassador would then answer in the same uncertain way about the alliance,
and things would not go forward."" He stressed the advantages of an English alliance for Spain and
the disadvantages for all involved if they raised English ire against them. The Prince-Bishop also
cautioned against offending Arundel to the point that he would pick up and return to England before
the negotiations had reached a logical conclusion. The Emperor and his allies clearly expected
Arundel to abandon his initial demands and bargain for a less ambitious but advantageous
."'Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, Geheimcs Staats-Archiv, Kastenschwarz 4366, and Kgl. bayr.
Reichs-Archiv allgemeines, 30-jahr. Krieg; quoted in Springcll, 41 n. 28.
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accommodation for the Prince Palatine. However, he had stuck to his instructions and refused to do
so thus far.34
In keeping with Maximilian's previous declaration on this question, Richel replied that in the
interests of peace Bavaria would surrender its portion of the Lower Palatinate ifSpain would do the
same, on the condition that the electoral dignity remained in the Wilhelmine line until its
extinction.37 That Maximilian showed himself ready, under certain circumstances, to give up the
Lower Palatinate showed a significant softening of the Bavarian stance on restoration. His aim, most
likely, was to relinquish the Lower Palatinate with the intention ofsecuring the electorate and Upper
Palatinate for his line.3* Ofiate in turn agreed to surrender Spanish-occupied areas of the Lower
Palatinate, which Spain held to offset its war expenses, but only if England compensated his King
with either an alliance or payment.39 Since in his earlier memorial to the Emperor Arundel had flatly
denied the offer of an offensive and defensive league to the Habsburgs, they should not press this
issue with him but should ask him what form an Anglo-Habsburg league might take, and under what
conditions. This showed that Spain was willing to consider a scenario where the league was not an
^Ibid.^O-l n. 28.
"Bodl. Lib., Rawlinson Mss. D 867, f. 120: s.d., Maximilian I to Haubitz; CSPV 1636-9, 18: s.d.,
same to same. Further conditions included that all fortresses in the Lower Palatinate be razed, toleration
would be accorded to Catholics in all restored territories, and the line of the Palsgrave of Neuburg should
be preferred to inherit over that of the Prince Palatine if the Bavarian Wittelsbachs died out.
3'Albrecht, "Kriegs- und Friedensziele," 264.
"HHStA, StA Palatina, Kart. 12, Konv. 2: [Sept.] 1636, Oiiate's statement.
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official offensive and defensive arrangement.40 Both Spain and Bavaria agreed that the Emperor
should remove the ban after Charles Louis made humble submission.41
The proceedings of this conference determined the basic form of the Emperor's resolution
on Palatine restoration, which the Prince-Bishop of Vienna, Gebhardt, and Imperial Secretary
Johannes Walderode von Eckhauscn delivered to the interested parties on 1 1 September.42 The
electoral dignity and Upper Palatinate were to remain with the Bavarian Wittelsbachs, as granted by
investiture and confirmed by the Peace of Prague.43 However, the Emperor wished to restore the
Lower Palatinate to Charles Louis if the English would offer adequate compensation, that is, a league
with the Habsburgs and financial compensation for Maximilian. The Emperor would then remove
40There was a wide spectrum of available options between a league for the common peace on the
one hand and an offensive and defensive league on the other. A league of general cooperation, for
instance, would require the King to engage himself, though not on the same scale as a straight alliance. A
league of amity and alliance or a league of aid and assistance "would not break the peace or give offense
to any"; financial assistance and the aid of the fleet would fall into these categories (Gardiner, vol. 7,
196). Common ground, therefore, could have been found in the last two options.
4lSpringell,41 n. 28.
4JHHStA, StK Vortrage, Kart. 1, Konv. F, ff. 1 19-22: 1 1, 12 Sept. 1636, Relation of Imperial
commissioners; ibid., StA Palatina, Kart. 12, Konv. 2: 1 1, 12 Sept 1636, same; ibid., StA England, Kart.
18, Konv. 1819, ff. 65-7: [9 Oct.] 1636, Radolt to Charles I; ibid., ff. 68-71: [9 Oct] 1636, same to same;
PRO, SP 80/9, f. 241 : 14 Sept. 1636, Arundel to Secretary; CSP, vol. 1, 646-7: 14 Sept. 1636, same to
Windebank.
43No treaty for their restoration would be made until the Wilhelmine line expired. This was the
same as saying never, Arundel commented, because at least five males of the line were then living
(Maximilian and his brothers Ferdinand, Elector of Cologne, and Albert, and the tatter's sons) and the
Duchess was expecting a child (PRO, SP 80/9, f. 244: 14 Sept. 1636, Arundel to Secretary; CSP, vol. 1,
646-7: 14 Sept. 1636, same to Windebank).
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the ban (as an act of grace not justice) and invest Charles Louis as a prince of the Empire.*4 He also
implied that toleration for Catholics in the Lower Palatinate was a condition for its restoration.
Arundel was insulted by these unfavorable terms since Taylor had led the King to expect
much more. Indeed, Arundel pointed out, the Emperor had given express hope in his February
decree that he would make some accommodation regarding the electorate and Radolt had further
confirmed this in a public speech made to the King.45 In exchange for such a paltry return, he
refused to accept the offer, which would have amounted to committing England to war on the
Habsburg side. He retorted acidly to the Imperial delegates that "he wished gratefully to
acknowledge the Emperor's efforts to enlighten him as to 'what could and what could not be done,'"
and that this answer would have saved him three months and a trip to the Continent ifthey had given
it to Taylor earlier.46 In reply to Arundel's caustic comments, the Prince-Bishop of Vienna
maintained that the offer was neither trivial nor out of line with what the Emperor had led the
English to expect, as he had promised to do all that he could to restore the Prince Palatine while still
being fair to his allies. Arundel made a swift comeback by pointing out that the Emperor had
restored the lands and titles of other princes who had taken up arms against him, ofwhich the present
^HHStA, StK Vortrage, Kart. I, Konv. F, ff. 1 19-22: 11,12 Sept 1636, Relation of imperial
commissioners: ibid., StA Palatina, Kart. 12, Konv. 2: 1 1, 12 Sept. 1636, same; ibid., StA England, Kart
18, Konv. 1819, ff. 65-7: [9 Oct] 1636, Radolt to Charles I; ibid., ff. 68-71: [9 Oct] 1636, same to same;
PRO, SP 80/9, ff. 240-1: 14 Sept 1636, Arundel to Secretary.
45At this point Arundel read aloud both the decree of 24 February and one of Radolt's
propositions (HHStA, StA England. Kart. 18, Konv. 1819, ff. 6S-7: [9 Oct] 1636, Radolt to Charles I;
ibid., ff. 68-71: [9 Oct.] 1636, same to same).
'"Ibid., StK Vortrage, Kart. 1, Konv. F, ff. 1 19-22: 1 1, 12 Sept. 1636, Relation of Imperial
commissioners; ibid., StA Palatina, Kart. 12, Konv. 2: 1 1, 12 Sept. 1636, same; ibid., StA England, Kart
18, Konv. 1819, ff. 65-7: [9 Oct] 1636, Radolt to Charles I; ibid., ff. 68-71: [9 Oct] 1636, same to same;
PRO, SP 80/9, ff. 240-1: 14 Sept 1636, Arundel to Secretary.
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Prince Palatine was guiltless.47 Furthermore, if the King accepted the Emperor's offer, the Prince
Palatine might have to wait until the world ended to receive his inheritance.4* The Prince-Bishop,
attempting to restrain his indignation at Arundel's sarcastic reply, asked him to propose a way to
accommodate the business, most particularly the electorate. Arundel responded that there might still
be grounds for an agreement if the Emperor restricted the transfer of the electorate to Maximilian's
lifetime and then allowed it to revert to the Palatine line afterwards.49
Under the circumstances, Arundel felt his negotiation was at an end. He was convinced that
the Imperialists had no intention of restoring the Upper Palatinate, let alone the electorate, on
acceptable terms: "After the extinction of the Bavarian dynasty of the Wittelsbach (linea
Wilhelmica) he [Arundel] proposed to meet again for further negotiations and examine, what chances
the Prince Palatine then had . . . .nS0 With this Arundel rose and left, and the conference ended.
In short, the Emperor had offered nothing more than the terms of24 February 1636, except
that he specifically named the Lower Palatinate as the portion of the Palatinate lands that he would
'"To this Gebhardt, the lawyer, attempted to explain the justice of the Emperor's actions towards
the Palatines.
""mente durera il mondo" (HHStA, StK Vortrage, Kart. 1, Konv. F, f. 122: II, 12 Sept. 1636,
Relation of Imperial commissioners; ibid., StA Palatina, Kart. 12, Konv. 2: 1 1, 12 Sept. 1636, same; ibid.,
StA England, Kart. 18, Konv. 18 19, f. 66: [9 Oct.] 1636, Radolt to Charles I).
49Ibid., StK Vortrage, Kart. I, Konv. F, ff. 1 19-22: 1 1, 12 Sept. 1636, Relation of Imperial
commissioners; ibid., StA Palatina, Kart. 12, Konv. 2: 1 1, 12 Sept. 1636, same; ibid., StA England, Kart.
18, Konv. 1819, ff. 65-7: [9 Oct.] 1636, Radolt to Charles I; ibid., ff. 68-71 : [9 Oct.] 1636, same to same;
PRO, SP 80/9, f. 241: 14 Sept. 1636, Arundel to Secretary.
50HHStA, StK Vortrage, Kart. I, Konv. F, f. 122: 1 1, 12 Sept. 1636, Relation of Imperial
commissioners; ibid., StA Palatina, Kart. 12, Konv. 2: 1 1, 12 Sept. 1636, same; ibid., StA England, Kart.
18, Konv. 1819, ff. 65-7: [9 Oct.] 1636, Radolt to Charles I; ibid., ff. 68-71: [9 Oct.] 1636, same to same;
PRO, SP 80/9, f. 240: 14 Sept. 1636, Arundel to Secretary; ibid., SP 80/10, ff. 78-9: 10 Feb. 1637, Taylor
to Aston.
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restore to Charles Louis. Having said this, it should be noted it was due to the exertions of the
Emperor, who sincerely wished to come to an agreement with FngianH on the Palatinate question,
that Bavaria and Spain stepped back from their extreme positions and the Emperor was able to offer
the entire Lower Palatinate to Arundel. However, the Emperor could not afford to alienate his allies
to please England.5 1 It should also be kept in mind that they intended this as a negotiable offer. The
Prince-Bishop of Vienna had told Arundel two weeks earlier that the Emperor would not stand upon
an offensive and defensive league and that in turn the King would not stand upon his demands of
plenary restitution." Apparently, Arundel did not understand the Habsburgs' way of treating, as it
was likely that they saw this as an opening rather than a final offer.
Arundel had an audience with the Emperor the next day and made his formal answer to what
he regarded as the Emperor's inadequate offer. He informed the Emperor that he would relate the
offer to his King, who he did not doubt would not be pleased, as the Emperor had led him to expect
a very different outcome from the negotiations.53 The Emperor responded by saying that the terms
offered were the most generous thus far, and that he was confident that this would not be the case.
Also, he would of course notify Radolt of what had passed, as Arundel requested.54
Given Taylor's earlier representations, the vehemence of Arundel's reaction to their offer
surprised and concerned the Imperialists. They intended to continue deliberation on the question of
5lHaan, Regensburger Kurfursuntag. 238.
"PRO, SP 80/9, f. 223: 26 Aug. 1636, Arundel to Secretary.
"Ibid., ff. 240- 1:14 Sept. 1636, same to same; Bodl. Lib., Rawlinson Mss. D 867, f. 113: 12
Sept 1636, same to Ferdinand II; CSP, vol. 1, 643-4: 14 Sept. 1636, same to Windebank.
54HHStA, StA England, Kart. 21, ff. 27-8: 13 Sept. 1636, Ferdinand II to Radolt
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restoration, and they feared the repercussions that his negative reports to the King and his withdrawal
from Regensburg in a dissatisfied state might bring. The day after they communicated the Emperor's
offer to Arundel, Imperial ministers met with their Bavarian counterparts to discuss whether they
might further accommodate England." The Bavarians, however, only sought to calm their fears by
arguing that neither would Arundel abruptly break off the negotiation, for he would wait to hear the
opinion of the electoral college on Palatine restitution which the Emperor would request, nor would
England immediately turn to France given their mutual suspicion. The Imperialists, however,
remained unconvinced by their arguments and recognized that Arundel could in fact raise England's
ire against them. The privy council therefore decided to move to retain his goodwill and prevent his
departure as long as possible while they attempted to discover England's true requirements for
restoration and deliberate on what further offers they could make. In any case they held it advisable
that the Emperor lay the question before the electoral college for its opinion as a matter nearly
touching the Empire.5" Further, the Imperialists sought to cushion the blow of Arundel's report and
head offany misrepresentations he might make about what had passed. They therefore immediately
informed Radolt of the events leading up to and following the Emperor's declaration and instructed
him to discover whether Arundel had reported the story otherwise. If so, Radolt should inform the
King what had really passed and assure him of the Emperor's sincere intention that they settle the
business with fair conditions for all sides.57
55The Prince-Bishop of Vienna believed that they might be more likely to make concessions in a
conference with Imperial ministers than in one where all of the interested parties were present (ibid., StK
Vortrage, Kart. 1, Konv. F, f. 123: 1 1, 12 Sept 1636, Opinion of privy council).
"Ibid., ff. 123-S: 1 1, 12 Sept. 1636, same.
"Ibid., StA England, Kart. 21, ff. 28-9: 13 Sept. 1636, Ferdinand U to Radolt.
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The Emperor's declaration that plenary restitution, which was to be the basis of Arundel's
negotiations, was not an option convinced the ambassador that his negotiation was at an end. From
his perspective, the Habsburgs had finally openly shown their duplicity where the negotiations with
England were concerned. Arundel could well agree with Roe's evaluation that "Such a proposal
seals the assurance of a long abuse [to the Prince Palatine]."5* Seeing that there was nothing further
for him to do, he again requested his recall.59 He wrote of the doubtfulness of bis negotiation and
his desire to return home to Sir William Hamilton:
for myself, the account I can yet give, is that according to my instructions I have
solicited this business, but to deal truly with you, I have not procured either so quick
a dispatch or so favorable an one as I conceived, the interest of the King my master's
desires tending so much to the public tranquility does deserve the Spaniards holding
up their own interests and this Court perhaps looking more on near ends than those
at further distance though more useful for them. I have given account unto his
Majesty of the present state of the affairs here, and the winter drawing on
accompanied with my own infirmity of body make me desire to draw homewards,
hoping that a good end of this business will cooperate with the General Peace which
moves from your part, here we conceive the appearance ofthis Diet is not answerable
to expectation and the events very uncertain.60
When Arundel's report of the Emperor's offer reached England, the King began making serious
approaches to France about a treaty, and he also went about strengthening his sea power.61 Coke
i%CSPD 1636-7, 133: 20 Sept. 1636,' Roe to Elizabeth.
"PRO, SP 80/9, f. 243: 14 Sept. 1636, Arundel to Secretary; ibid., ff. 269-70: 23 Sept. 1636,
same to Windebank; ACA, AL 1632-1723, no. 368: 16 Sept. 1636, same to Sir William Hamilton; CSP,
vol. 1, 640: 14 Sept. 1636, same to Windebank. The state of his health made him desirous to journey
home before winter: "my discourse and preparations rather tend towards an inclining homewards than
otherwise, by reason of the winter's approach...." (ibid.).
"ACA, AL 1632-1723, no. 368: 16 Sept. 1636, Arundel to Hamilton.
*'CSPD 1636-7, 162: 13 Oct. 1636,' Laud to Elizabeth
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duly dispatched Arundel's revocation.62 However, until he had it in hand and could present it to the
Emperor, he could not leave for home.
Taylor, on the other hand, remained hopeful of the success of the negotiations with the
Emperor. He encouraged the King to accept the proffered terms in the hope that a way to further
restitution would be found in the future. He reported that the resolution given Arundel was not the
Emperor's last and final offer, but a basis for further negotiation. Once the Habsburgs had an idea
of what the King was prepared to offer in exchange, Taylor argued, they would modify their
demands and the concessions they were prepared to offer. The Emperor had already offered the
Lower Palatinate, and he believed he still wished to find a way to satisfy the King on the point of
the electorate. He urged the King to accept the terms offered and vie for the rest later: "when the
Prince Elector shall be in possession of his right, you may open or shut that flood-gate as you
please."63 As for what England would offer in return, though the Habsburgs wished for a straight
league, Taylor thought they might reduce their demands to lessening the Dutch and securing
Flanders, which the King could meet with the fleet alone.64
While Arundel waited for his recall in the weeks following the Imperial proposal, the two
sides continued to meet about the business of the Palatinate, though they achieved little. During this
time, Arundel repeatedly alluded to his departure.65 He felt reproached for rejecting an offer he
62PRO, SP 80/9, ff. 277-8 1: 7 Oct. 1636, [Coke] to Arundel, revocation with copy addressed to
Ferdinand II; HHStA, StA England, Kart. 2, f. 144: 7 Oct. 1636, Charles I to Ferdinand II.
"CSP, vol. 1, 663: 15 Oct. 1636, Taylor to Windebank; ibid., 647-8: 14 Sept. 1636, same to
same; ibid., 652-3: 23 Sept. 1636, same to same.
"Ibid., 663: 15 Oct. 1636, same to same.
"CSPV 1636-9, 78-9: 7 Oct. 1636, Ballarino to D&S.
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deemed wholly inadequate: "I hear daily they censure me freely, that I must either like the
Emperor's offer better than I make shew, or want wit or good intention.'"6 Arundel was humiliated
by rumors that the King would send Sir Robert Anstruther to negotiate in his place, and he lamented
"yet I have been enforced to swallow all in silence."67 Father Lamormaini actually congratulated him
on the outcome ofthe negotiations, which Arundel related to Windebank: "He vowed to God he was
in earnest, and thought I also took it as a grace dropped from heaven. I then could not choose but
to tell him, that indeed I took it as a grace from heaven, that I had so plain an answer, which I had
as plainly reported to the King my master: but I should interpret it as such grace I could not
understand . . . "u
Despite the admonitions of others and blows to his pride, Arundel would not accept an offer
he deemed inadequate. At this point his suggestions for recovering the Palatinate and reducing the
influence of the House of Austria consisted of England sending a representative, perhaps himself,
to lay the Palatinate question before the general peace conference planned for Cologne and/or doing
what it could diplomatically to prevent France and the Habsburgs from reaching an agreement49 He
6*CSP, vol. 1, 661: 8 Oct. 1636, Arundel to Windebank.
67PRO, SP 80/9, f. 230: 9 Sept. 1636, same to Secretary; CSP, vol. I, 677: 29 Oct. 1636, same to
Windebank.
6'Ibid., 649-50: 18 Sept. 1636, same to same; PRO, SP 80/9, ff. 267-8: 17 Sept. 1636, same to
Secretary.
69Ibid., f. 244: 14 Sept. 1636, same to same; CSP, vol. I, 646: 14 Sept 1636, same to Windebank;
ibid., 649-50: 18 Sept. 1636, same to same. Sending Arundel to Cologne was actually considered, first on
his return journey to England, and then as an extra mission {CSP V 1636-9, 76: 2 Oct. 1636, Correr to
D&S; ibid., 109: 12 Dec. 1636, same to same; ibid., 156: 6 Mar. 1637, same to same).
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explained to Windebank that he had done his utmost to bring the negotiations to a satisfactory
conclusion, and that he could "do no other than I have, and be true to what I was commanded."70
Soon after Arundel received the Emperor's answer, on 18 September, the electoral college
met and set out the major issues they planned to tackle during the session. These included the
negotiation of peace in the Empire (particularly with the foreign powers involved), the reform of
the Imperial army, proceedings against the elector ofTrier, and — ofcourse — the election of the King
of the Romans.71 Moreover, the Emperor, who was still looking for a way to accommodate England
on the question of the Palatinate, asked the electoral college to give its opinion on the matter.
Meanwhi le, back in England the events ofSeptemberwere set to spark a diplomatic eruption.
In any case, the Habsburg diplomats were not in high favor at the English court. Radolt had made
no appearance at court over the summer. Coupled with the similar inaction ofthe young Ofiate, who
had lately arrived in England and quickly adopted a contemptuous attitude toward his hosts, the
English suspected that the aim of the Habsburg diplomats was to create artificial delays and prevent
England from taking decisive action. 72 The new Spanish ambassador arrived in July but did not have
his first audience until October.73 When he finally did, he greatly offended the King by using an
English Jesuit as his interpreter. At the time, Correr remarked that:
nCSP, vol. I, 665: 22 Oct. 1636, Arundel to Windebank.
7IHaan, Regensburger Kurfurstentag, 114-21.
^CSPV 1636-9, 33: 30 July 1636, Correr to D&S; ibid., 46: 19 Aug. 1636, same to same; ibid.,
80: 10 Oct. 1636, same to same.
^Ofiate was in any case insulted by his reception, or lack of one. No naval salute greeted him, no
ministers visited him, and he did not see the King, who was absent on progress (HHStA, StA England,
Kart. 18, Konv. 1819, f. 5: 1 Aug. 1636, Radolt to Ferdinand II).
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This hanging back, in addition to the prolonged incognito and the scandal of the
Jesuit will have not only utterly discredited this minister but will serve to increase the
bitterness against the House of Austria because of the Palatinate, which increases
daily. They feel perfectly sure that in Spain as in Germany the Austrians merely aim
at diverting England by compliments from those vigorous resolutions which they
recognise she ought to take against them.74
Radolt had his own reasons to be discontented with the young Ofiate, and the Spaniards more
generally. When Radolt asked him about his plenipotentiary powers — a copy of which the Spaniards
had already exhibited to the Emperor — the Spanish ambassador admitted that he did not have them.
His King first wanted to know what conditions Arundel would offer, and then he might send Ofiate
or his father further powers." To Radolt, this was yet another example of Spain's lack of
commitment to the business at hand.
When news of the Emperor's offer of 1 1 September reached the English court in early
October, this made matters even worse. A courier arrived with Arundel's report and his request for
his recall, and Radolt received the news plus further instructions from the Emperor. As Arundel had
warned the Emperor, the English greeted the offer with a burst of indignation, finding it much less
favorable than the Emperor had led the King to expect. As a result, the King began to lend a fresh
ear to French overtures.76 This spurred Radolt to action. He immediately requested an audience with
the King. Moreover, he asked that this audience take place before the King sent the courier back to
Germany.77
74CSPV 1636-9, 80: 10 Oct. 1636, Correr to D&S.
7SHHStA, StA England, ICart. 18, Konv. L819, ff. 5-7: I Aug. 1636, Radolt to Ferdinand U.
76PRO, SP 80/9, f. 238: 14 Sept. 1636, Coke to Arundel.
77HHStA, StA England, Kart. 18, Konv. 1819, f. 5S: 17 Oct. 1636, Radolt to Ferdinand II; Bodl.
Lib., Clar. Mss. 10, f. 1 15: 5 Oct. 1636, same to [Windebank].
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The King granted Radolt an audience on 9 October, at which the envoy raised questions
about the accuracy ofArundel's relation and complained about his strange manner of proceeding at
the Imperial court. Radolt then read the relation that the Emperor had sent to him detailing what had
transpired during the conference between Arundel and the Imperial commissioners, in Latin as well
as in English to ensure that the King would understand its content and that the interpreter would not
change its meaning.7* At the end, he added a few points of his own, particularly that he wondered
that Arundel would slight the Emperor's ample offer, particularly as he himself had not yet declared
what benefit the Habsburgs might hope for in return from the King.79 The King and Coke, who was
also present at the audience, assured Radolt that what he had read was not materially different from
what Arundel had reported. However, the King promised to read through Radolfs relation himself
and verify that no discrepancies existed between the two.*0 Despite these assurances, Radolt
apparently still suspected that Arundel might have acted contrary to the King's direction. But when
he discussed the matter with Coke later that day, Coke informed him that Arundel had indeed held
to his instructions, as the King had commanded him not to join in a treaty without the restitution of
7'Ibid., ff. 65-7: [9 Oct.] 1636, same to Charles I; ibid., ft 68-71 : [9 Oct.] 1636, same to same.
^Ibid., f. 67: [9 Oct.] 1636, same to same. Radolt also complained of propositions made by
Joseph Avery, the King's agent at Hamburg, to the Swedish Chancellor Oxenstiema, which openly
contradicted the King's intentions as declared by Arundel and were now openly spread abroad in print
(ibid.; ibid., Kart. 21, f. 29: 13 Sept. 1636, Ferdinand II to Radolt).
*°Ibid., ff. 55-6: 17 Oct. 1636, Radolt to Ferdinand II. Further, they complained that Radolt
himself had led them to expect a better offer than had materialized, just as Arundel had in his meeting
with the Imperial commissioners.
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the electorate. The secretary ominously added that ifArundel's mission was not successful, the King
would have to look elsewhere to restore his nephew.* 1
By this point, Radolt had apparently changed his mind about the intentions of the English,
because his reaction was to brush off this threat. In Radolt's opinion, the English were simply using
scare tactics in an attempt to obtain full restoration from the Habsburgs in exchange for assisting
Spain in the Channel. He believed that the King would neither openly break with the Habsburgs if
he were not completely satisfied in the Palatinate nor enter into a league with them ifhe were. If the
Emperor would not consent to offer more, Radolt suspected that the King might reconsider his
answer and accept the current offer.*2
By the time Radolt received a response to his relation of 9 October, he was convinced that
the negotiations had effectively broken down. He reported that he was no longer received with
respect, and that the few people with whom he earlier bad contact at court had withdrawn from him
out of fear of offending the King and his ministers.*3 On 16 October, Radolt returned to court to
receive a written answer to his relation. Coke's letter assured him that there was no material
difference between Arundel's report and his own.*4 After receiving this answer, Radolt requested
an audience with the King, at which he announced his intention to take his leave and requested his
"Ibid., f. 56: 17 Oct. 1636, same to same.
*2Ibid., ff. 56-7: 17 Oct 1636, same to same.
"Furthermore, he felt his effectiveness was hampered by his meager understanding of English. In
any case, he was eager to return home and had repeatedly requested his recall.
"HHStA, StA England, Kart. 18, Konv. 1819, f. S3: 13 Oct. 1636, Coke to Radolt According to
Correr, Radolt also delivered a letter from the Emperor to the King promising satisfaction in the
Palatinate, and the convenience of its appearance prompted speculation at court that the Imperial envoys
had composed it in England as an expedient (CSPV 1636-9, 84: 17 Oct. 1636, Correr to D&S).
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passports. He did this in an attempt to discover whether the King considered the negotiations broken
off or not, reasoning that the King would grant the passports if this were the case. Some at court
believed that Radolt was doing this merely for effect*5 As it turned out, Radolt indeed received his
dismissal from the King and his passports (but no departing gift), and then retired once more to await
his recall from the Emperor.*6 However, as Radolt would soon discover, the Emperor was not yet
prepared to grant it
As Radolt waited for his revocation, Arundel's finally arrived in Regensburg on 25 October.
To bis dismay, along with his recall he received not his own instructions, but those intended for
Leicester.*7 At the same time, Windebank instructed Taylor to remain to continue the negotiations
MFinet 212. This was an attempt to sound out rather than alarm the English. It was apparent that
Radolt had every intention of leaving if the Emperor gave him leave to do so, though even at this point he
did not rule out that the Emperor might send another envoy in his place. Finet wrote that Radolt
"pretended and gave out" that he would leave England. Finet related that Radolt had an audience at the
end of the summer to take his leave of the King; however he also mentions that Radolt emerged in
January, after three months, so it is likely that these events took place in October, when Radolt
reappeared at court.
"HHStA, StA England, Kart. 18, Konv. 1819, f. 82: [Oct] 1636, Radolt to Charles I; ibid„ f. 59:
17 Oct. 1636, same to Ferdinand II.
"Ibid., Kart 2, f. 144: 7 Oct 1636, Charles I to same; PRO, SP 80/9, ff. 277-81: 7 Oct. 1636,
[Coke] to Arundel, revocation with copy addressed to Ferdinand II. Arundel's replies to the secretaries
are: PRO, SP 80/10, ff. 7-8: 29 Oct. 1636, Arundel to Secretary; and CSP, vol. 1, 677: 29 Oct. 1636, same
to Windebank. Coke acknowledged in a letter to Arundel that he had received his numerous complaints
that his instructions were not sent with the revocation and that no duplicates had been received. Coke
maintained that he had sent Arundel's instructions and that they could not have been mixed up with
Leicester's since no packet was sent to Leicester at that time. He suspected someone had tampered with
his letters: "I am...jealous of some miscariage by the way: And desire your Lordship to examine whether
the pacquet which Saddler brought came to your hands under my ordinarie seal and without any breach
or changc.in Sadlers pacquet I sent also his Majesties letters to the Grand Duke of Florence and to the
Cavaleere of Malta his Ambassador with the Emperor: Yet your Lordship doth not mention in any letters
the receipt of either of them which maketh me doubt of more then mischance... it must needs bee
presumed, diat my pacquets have beene intercepted and stopped upon the way." (PRO, SP 80/10, f. 39:
1 1 Dec. 1636, [Coke] to Arundel).
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after Arundel's departure." The arrival of the ambassador's recall took the Imperialists by surprise.
The Emperor and his councillors had expected Arundel to continue bargaining with them on the
terms of restoration and the matter of a league. Wishing to avoid a complete rupture in the
negotiations and the consequences of England's antipathy, they quickly moved to delay his
departure. Arundel made it clear that they should not trifle with him and that they could not
withhold most of what he demanded for the Prince Palatine and remain on good terms with
England.*9 Whereas the Imperialists before had been aloof, they now oozed goodwill toward
Arundel, who reported "For whereas before I remayned in a manner neglected with out so much as
receaving any visile or civile respect from any one of them; now there passeth not a day wherein they
expresse not some evident argument of their desire to give me contentment.'"0 The Emperor, who
was aware of Arundel's interest in art "sent him eleven books of most exquisite ones [drawings],
which he doth above all things esteem, and which he carrieth still about with him.""
The King of Hungary, who arrived in Regensburg at about the same rime that Arundel
received his recall, was particularly gracious to him and urged him to remain and conduct the
"CSP, vol. 1, 662: [9] Oct. 1636, Windebank to Taylor. Taylor's letter of 14 September provided
the basis of this decision. He was told that, notwithstanding Arundel's revocation, "yourself shall remain
there in that quality which you held before my Lord's coming thither, and shall still continue the treaty."
(ibid.).
"PRO, SP 80/10, ff. 7-8: 29 Oct. 1636, Arundel to Secretary; ibid., ff. 1 1-2: 4 Nov. 1636, same
to same; CSP, vol. 1, 677: 29 Oct. 1636, same to Windebank; ibid., 681-2: 4 Nov. 1636, same to same.
9°PRO, SP 80/10, f. ll:4Nov. 1636, Arundel to Secretary; CSP, vol. I,681:4Nov. 1636, same
to Windebank.
"Quoted in Hervey, 388.
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negotiations further.92 This was a promising sign. A moderate and pragmatic prince, the King of
Hungary was willing to satisfy the English King as far as he possibly could. He was soon expected
to ascend the Imperial throne, and as Emperor he would prefer his realm to be at peace and to have
England as a friend rather than an enemy.93 Still, he could not realistically trade the time-tested
league with Spain and Bavaria for a new friendship with England.94 As always, any agreement
would have to come with the concurrence of his allies; therefore he, like his father, endeavored to
moderate their demands on the question of the restitution ofthe Palatinate. Also promising was the
Emperor's request that the electors give their opinion on how to accommodate the electorate.95 This
turn of events gave Arundel hope that they could still find a compromise solution to the Palatinate
question, as Windebank reported to Lord Feilding:
My Lo. Marshall whome we expected to have bene upon his way homeward hath
given advice of better inclination in the good successe of his negotiations than have
appeared since his employment there, and it seems he holdes them real! and worth
his stay, otherwise, he wold not have bene amused just upon bis departure, especially
now in the depth of winter . . . .96
wPRO, SP 80/10, ff. 5-7: 29 Oct. 1636, Arundel to Secretary; ibid, f. 79: 10 Feb. 1637, Taylor to
Aston; HMC, Sixth Report, vol. 1, 281: II Nov. 1636, Arundel to Feilding; ibid.: 18 Nov. 1636, same to
same.
"Ferdinand II, whose health was declining, let his son deal with many of the problems arising at
the electoral meeting. Well before Leslie had remarked that the Emperor "is somewhat sicklie and
beginith to be werie old, I feare he s[h]al not live long." (HMC, Denbigh V, 26: [Apr.?] 1636, Leslie to
Feilding). Arundel wrote in September that "Want of exercise and cold coming on with these slow
proceedings are thought to be very prejudicial to the Emperor's body, which is very infirm." (ACA, AL
1632-1723, no. 368: 16 Sept. 1636, Arundel to Hamilton). Then, on 8 November, the Emperor lost
consciousness for two hours (Franzl, 284).
"Khevenhuller, vol. 12,2121.
,5PRO, SP 80/10, f. 79: 10 Feb. 1637, Taylor to Aston.
"HMC, Sixth Report, vol. 1, 28 1: 5 Dec. 1636, Windebank to Feilding.
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Aston also believed that a good conclusion of bis negotiation was possible, but he would have to
bargain with the Spaniards.97
Given new hope that they could arrange an acceptable solution for the Palatinate question,
Arundel was convinced to delay his departure and resume negotiation with the Imperialists in
unofficial, private discussions.9* He was absolutely determined to discover "the uttermost they will
do."99 These discussions were important because they revealed that not only the Emperor, but to all
to all appearances Maximilian as well, was open to reevaluating bis position on this problem.1™
Ballarino noted that the Emperor, King of Hungary, and even Ofiate showed an exceptional desire
to settle it."" Arundel also took a more moderate stance. He made this insightful comment to
Windebank: "if they will do well, though short of our expectation, we must give them good
conditions, though short of their expectation."102 He recognized the goodwill of the Emperor and
King ofHungary, but also understood that under the circumstances they must necessarily limit their
concessions.
97BL, Add. Mss. 36450, f. 63: s.d., Aston to Arundel.
"Since he had his revocation in hand, he must have done this out of renewed hope for the success
of his negotiations, or, at the very least, so as to have made every attempt to bring them to a satisfactory
conclusion.
"PRO, SP 80/10, ff. 6-7: 29 Oct. 1636, Arundel to Secretary; ibid., f. 1 1: 4 Nov. 1636, same to
same.
™CSPV 1636-9, 93: 4 Nov. 1636, Ballarino to D&S. Springell brushes aside these unofficial
talks as of no importance (Springell, 35; Haan, Regensburger Kurfurstentag, 236 n. 5 1).
mCSPV 1636-9, 102: 25 Nov. 1636, Ballarino to D&S.
mCSP, vol. 1, 682: 4 Nov. 1636, Arundel to Windebank.
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Arundel was authorized to negotiate a compromise, and in the unofficial talks he began to
make use of the powers granted him by attempting to negotiate a deal by which the Emperor would
restrict the electorate to Maximilian or to bis immediate line. At the beginning of November he
suggested to Trauttmansdorff that the electorate alternate between the two Wittelsbach lines after
Maximilian's death rather than after the expiry of the Bavarian line. At the same time, Arundel asked
the Prince-Bishop of Vienna if they could agree that the electorate would only be perpetuated in
Maximilian's direct line.103 When news of the birth ofMaximilian's son, Ferdinand Maria, reached
Regensburg, Arundel further modified his suggestions.104 He still believed that the "linea Gulielmi
may be brought to linea Maximilian? and accordingly communicated to the King ofHungary that
Charles would be satisfied ifthe Emperor transferred the electorate to the Palatine line after the death
ofboth Maximilian and Ferdinand Maria. 105 Finally, as a last effort, Arundel suggested the creation
of an eighth electorate, though for whom is unclear.106 Arundel's proposals were seriously
considered by the Emperor and King of Hungary, who earnestly wished to find a solution to the
Palatinate question and make a treaty with England. In consequence, Trauttmansdorff asked Vice
Chancellor Richel to reexamine the Bavarian attitude to the Palatinate question.
However, in spite of the sincerity and goodwill of the Emperor and King ofHungary, which
Arundel was inclined to believe, it soon became apparent that it was not enough to overcome the
103"ob es nit dahin zu rich ten, dafi die chur allain tuff die Maximiiianische Iini perpetuiert werden
konne."
""HHStA, Hausarchiv, Familienkorrespondenz A Kart. 10: 3 1 Oct. 1636, Maximilian I to
Ferdinand II. Ferdinand Maria was born on 3 1 October 1636.
1aiCSP, vol. I, 682: 4 Nov. 1636, Arundel to Windebank.
l06Haan, Regensburger Kurfurslentag, 236-7.
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opposition of Spain and Bavaria.107 In early November, the Prince-Bishop of Vienna, Walderode,
and Gebhardt came to Arundel, and "Gepart made a long speech distinguisd with a hundred hems
and haws, and was in substance wors then in the manner in which itt had bene deliverd," telling the
ambassador that the Emperor would restore the entire Lower Palatinate in return for compensation
to Spain and Bavaria, the latter by financial means. The Upper Palatinate would remain with
Maximilian in return for the expenses he had incurred in his service to the Emperor, likewise the
electorate was confirmed to Bavaria, and the Palatines should succeed to it only when the
Wimelmine line should fail.10* Arundel's efforts to limit the duration of the electoral transfer to the
Bavarian Wittelsbachs had come to naught. He knew that the King would not be satisfied with any
agreement that did not include some provision for the electorate for his nephew, and it did not appear
this was forthcoming; thus, when this became obvious, he made his formal response to the Emperor
and made plans for his journey homeward.109
Arundel determined to leave Regensburg, in spite of requests by the King of Hungary to
remain and await the opinion of the electoral college that the Emperor had requested. He took his
formal leave of the Emperor and of the King and Queen of Hungary amid demonstrations of good
understanding, and, after leaving Taylor instructions, he departed Regensburg on 18 November.1 10
™CSP, vol. I, 701: 23 Nov. 1636, Arundel to Windebank.
1"PRO, SP 80/10, f. 80: 10 Feb. 1637, Taylor to Aston; CSPV 1636-9, 93: 4 Nov. 1636,
Ballarino to D&S.
109HHStA, StA England, Kart. I, Konv. 4: 4 Nov. 1636, Arundel to Ferdinand II; CSPV 1636-9,
102: 25 Nov. 1636, Ballarino to D&S.
""The King of Hungary sent with him a letter for Charles I, which expressed his desire for peace
and continued hopes for an agreement, and further letters to both the King and Queen expressing his
goodwill (ACA NC G 1/10: 12 Nov. 1636, King of Hungary to Charles I; HHStA, StA England, Kart 2,
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Taylor wrote ofhis departure: "His lordship tooke his joumy hence on Tuisday last, the 1 8th of this,
and though these Princes much indeavoured to have stayed him here, yet being commanded to
retume, [he found] itt not fitting to have attended longer their resolutions." 111 Arundel believed that
he had not omitted any attempt to bring his mission to a good conclusion. 112 Taylor also related that
Arundel had "omitted nothing that was possible for the advancement of this businesse.""3 After
Arundel's departure, the Imperialists expressed satisfaction with his conduct, and even the Pope's
nuncio said "for his Excellency's person, I never knew any Ambassador give so general a satisfaction
in this court as he does; they hold him a wise counsellor, a diligent servant to his master, a fair
honest dealer, and a stout cavalier." 114 These were precisely the qualities that had prompted Charles
to appoint Arundel to the post in the first place.
Later on, however, Taylor wrote that the Spaniards demanding too much and Arundel
granting too little had hampered the negotiations. Most particularly he pointed to Arundel's refusal
to contemplate a league when one was already on the table: "The Conde of Ofiate demanded too
much, and my Lord Marshall granted too little, but for anything 1 could ever learn from him, he
could entend him selfe to nothing further, and had no order to grant them any particular
convenientias (whereat I much wondere) more then whatt they should have received by the league
f. 46: 16 Nov. 1636, same to Henrietta Maria; ibid., f. 55: 16 Nov. 1636, same to Charles I).
111HMC, Denbigh V, 4 1: 25 Nov. 1636, Taylor to Feilding.
"2CSP, vol. I, 701: 23 Nov. 1636, Arundel to Windebank.
113PRO, SP 80/10, f. 81: 10 Feb. 1637, Taylor to Aston.
U'CSP, vol. I, 702: 23 Nov. 1636, William Howard to Windebank.
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in generall.""5 Arundel's ignorance of Aston's and Taylor's proposals and his refusal to treat of a
league — or even hear of one beyond a league for the common peace — also surprised Aston."6
One can hardly blame Arundel for the outcome ofhis negotiations. He conducted them as
directed in his instructions and in letters from the secretaries. Much of the problem can be attributed
instead to the King and Windebank's manner ofconducting foreign policy. Their secrecy about the
developments of the various missions was obstructive to their success. It often handicapped his
diplomats in their negotiations, Arundel and Taylor included, because they were unaware or ill-
informed of developments regarding the Palatinate at other courts. The problems created by the
King and Windebank's subterfuge was highlighted, for example, by the complaint of the Earl of
Leicester, the English ambassador in France, that he had no intelligence of Arundel's negotiation
with the Emperor.
It is constantly reported, and beleeved here, that my Lord Marshall [E. of Arundel]
retired unsatisfyed from the Emperours Court; and because I have bin divers Time
asked of it, both by the Ministers of this State, and forrein Princes, I am a little
ashamed I could give none, but ignorant Answers; which I perceived makes many
thinke, that my Intelligence, or my Memorie, is very ill; and perhaps they may
imagine, that I am not trusted, nor though worthie to know any Thing, but by the
Way of vulgar Breath."7
If that were not bad enough, the King also kept information about his secret negotiations at one
Habsburg court from his diplomats conducting secret negotiations at another. Hence the complaint
ofAston in Spain, who grumbled that everything was hidden from him about Arundel's negotiation
"sPRO, SP 80/10, f. 80: 10 Feb. 1637, Taylor to Aston.
"6CS7», vol. 1, 636: 13 Sept. 1636," Aston to Windebank; ibid., 665-6: 12 Nov. 1636, same to
same.
"7CoIlins, vol. 2, 451: 26 Dec. 1636, Leicester to Coke.
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except that Arundel was to demand full restitution and that the only notice he received was from the
Spaniards themselves. Aston believed that he could have helped Arundel's negotiation if the
government had better informed him about the ambassador's proceedings in Germany."*
By advancing offers in secret negotiations at Habsburg courts and refraining from informing
Arundel and other diplomats of them, one must wonder what their goals were for his mission. It is
likely that they harbored hopes, given Taylor's rosy reports, that they finally had enough leverage
to move the Habsburgs to restore the Prince Palatine without commitment to an offensive and
defensive league, to which they knew the loyal Arundel would never assent, particularly if he were
uninformed of the King's previous machinations on this point. Also, the King may have hoped
further that the presence of a grand ambassador extraordinary might move the Emperor to agree to
an acceptable arrangement and thus prevent the electoral college from confirming the terms of the
Peace of Prague and Maximilian from recording his vote as an elector of the Empire. Once this had
taken place, it would be even more difficult to extract the Palatine lands and titles from the clutches
of the Bavarian Wittelsbachs as opposed to just Maximilian himself. It is an understatement to say
that the King did not always make astute policy, and these hopes like many others proved illusory.
In addition, the King and Windebank may have hoped that a compromise agreement negotiated by
Arundel, who had been a faithful friend to Elizabeth in the past, would be more palatable to her and
her supporters than one negotiated by Taylor, whom they widely regarded as a papist and a Habsburg
sympathizer.1" Arundel's loyalty to the House of Stuart was beyond reproach, and since he had no
"'BL, Add. Mss. 36450, f. 104: 13 Dec. 1636," Aston to Arundel.
1"Her opinion obviously carried some weight, because Arundel had been instructed to turn back
if she objected too heftily to his mission.
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knowledge of the secret negotiations, the King could trust his ambassador not to commit him further
than he was willing to go. This was important, because the King could not denounce Arundel's
negotiations at will, as he later did Taylor's. Finally, as Coke pointed out when Arundel asked for
his recall, a high-profile embassy like Arundel's served to apply pressure to the French, with whom
Leicester was currently negotiating.
The Aftermath of the Embassy
With Taylor firmly installed in his old position, Arundel and his retinue ventured back to England.
They returned for the most part along the same route they had followed into Germany. Their first
stop was in Nuremberg, where the city magistrates presented Arundel with two Dttrer portraits, one
of the artist himself and one of his father, and amused him with lavish entertainments. 130 They may
have staged this extravagant display to express the city's regret for the misfortune that had befallen
two ofArundel's servants while they were on an errand to Nuremberg in late August: his gentleman
Lampleigh and trumpeter William Smith, having completed their task, were returning to Vienna by
post horse when a gang of marauders attacked and violently murdered them and their local guide in
the forest just outside the city, and then tied their corpses to trees. 121 Arundel, whom this occurrence
IJ0The latter portrait is almost surely "The Painter's Father," which is attributed to DOrer and now
hangs in National Gallery, London. Interestingly enough, Arundel's inclination to Durer's work was
rivaled by that of Maximilian I (Albrecht, "Maximilian I," 366). In addition to the paintings, the city
gifted Arundel forty bottles of wine and three baskets of fish, delivered by thirty men in livery (Bechtold,
29).
I2IBL, Add. Mss. 15970, f. 36: 8 Sept. 1636, Arundel to William Petty; PRO, SP 80/9, f. 231: 9
Sept. 1636, same to Secretary; CSP, vol. 1, 629: 8 Sept. 1636, same to Windebank; ibid., 633: 10 Sept
1636, Borough to same; Gumbel, 107-9. Borough described the barbarity of the murders: "Mr. Lamplugh
having all his body beaten black and blue, was shot through the head with a pistol; Mr. Smith had one of
his eyes beaten out, and his head cut off, save that it hung by a little part of skin; the guide had his head
cleft almost to his ears." (CSP, vol. 1, 633: 10 Sept. 1636, Borough to Windebank).
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greatly grieved, suspected that Nuremberg soldiers were the offenders.122 Besides the Durer
paintings, Arundel received another gift while in Nuremberg. Colonel Leslie had followed him there
to present him with a gift from the Emperor — a diamond worth two thousand crowns — and- to try
to persuade him to resume the negotiations, the latter to no avail.123 The Emperor and his ministers
still feared a rupture with England, even though the Spaniards tried to rationalize it away by asstutely
pointing out that England would not commit to war, much less to the loss of trade with Spain, given
not only the strained relations between the King and his subjects but also those between Englaod and
France. 124 Sadly, the Spaniards knew the motivations of the King only too well and were able to use
this to their own advantage.
From Nuremberg the ambassadorial party traveled with an escort of a hundred muskzeteers
through the woods to Wurzburg, where the Bishop presented Arundel with yet another Durer
painting, a Madonna.125 The ambassador was so enamored of this work that, as he revealed to his
art agent William Petty, it traveled with him in his carriage for the remainder of the trip: "I wish you
sawe the Picture of a Madonna of AD [Albrecht Durer] which the Bishoppe of Wirtzberge garve me
1—This because the English victims' boots were stripped off, probably in a search for jewels, but
their clothes were left on; in addition, it was suspected that the guide was killed because he may ha»ve
recognized the attackers (ibid.). Arundel asked that the King consider Smith's widow in some way CPPD,
SP 80/9, f. 23 1: 9 Sept 1636, Arundel to Secretary).
123[n the records of the Imperial treasury, a diamond ring worth 2,850 gulden (1,900 thalers;, or ■
£400) was given the English ambassador (HKA, HZAB 83 [1636-7], f. 10S).
124CSPV 1636-9, 102: 25 Nov. 1636, Ballarino to D&S; ibid., 132: 27 Jan. 1636, same to saame.
Purportedly the Emperor sent a further express after Arundel indicating his willingness to come to an
agreement and suggesting that Maximilian and Charles Louis should hold the electorate jointly (ibi«d.,
1 17: 29 Dec. 1636, same to same).
125During the war, rulers offered such an armed escort to distinguished travelers as a mark of
respect and hospitality, much as a gift of wine or food would be given (Antoni Maczak, Travel in EZarly
Modern Europe, trans. Ursula Phillips [Oxford: Blackwell, 1995], 169).
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last weeke as I passed by that way, and though it were painted at first upon an uneven board, and is
vernished, yet it is more worth then all the toycs I have gotten in Gennanye, and for such I esteeme
it, havinge ever carried it in my owne Coach since I had it."126
The German countryside was just as desolate as when Arundel's company had passed through
it six months before. They encountered ruined villages, a starving and disease-ridden populace, and
gangs of marauders, the Croats being particularly feared. At Hanau, 22,000 people had died of the
plague in the first seven weeks ofan Imperial siege that had started in September 1635 and had only
recently been raised.127 Wild animals were starving for want of prey; the propaganda piece
Lamentations ofGermany recounted such an incident involving Arundel's party:
My Lord, the Earle of Arundel, travelling homewards, towards Frankefort on the
Maine, a Boore or Peasant of the Countrey, being their guide, and having his legs
bare, a Foxe pursued him, among my Lords followers, and would not forbeare
snatching and biting his bare heeles, (such was his hunger) till they gave him a blow
to the necke, and so tooke him alive. His eyes were sunke, his bones stucke out, and
hee was so extreme leane, that his sides almost met together. They carried him alive
with them in the Coach, and after a few daies he died.12*
People fared little better than animals. Crowne recorded that at Mainz "his Excellence went on
shore, to see if it were any way inriched since our being there, but alas, wee found it as miserable
126BL, Add. Mss. 15970, f. 60: 5 Dec. 1636, Arundel to Petty. In WDrzburg, he received a further
gift of 32 bottles of wine, fish, and fodder for his horses (Bechtold, 3 1 ).
127Crowne, 59. Also, at Hanau a woman was attacked because she had "killed many Dogs & sold
their flesh at a great rate to many people." (ibid., 60).
12*Philip Vincent, The Lamentations of Germany, wherein, as in a glasse, we may behold her
miserable condition, and reade the woefull effects ofsinne (London: Printed by E.G. for Iohn RothwelL,
1638), 53. This story is not confirmed by Crowne. If the coach in question was Arundel's, one might ask
if he would really allow an animal, no matter how feeble, anywhere near his cherished Madonna.
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as before, with divers poore people lying on Dunghills almost starved, being scarce able to crawle
for to receive his Excellencies almes."1M
Again an obstacle barred the company from continuing its journey, despite the safe conduct
the Emperor had issued to Arundel. At Koblenz, the new Imperial governor was not only rude, but
downright hostile. He would not immediately grant Arundel safe passage, and some ofhis men fired
on members of the entourage. The treatment they received at his hands greatly offended Arundel:
On Thursday last the 1 1/1 of this December I arrived heer at Colen: where I should
have been much sooner, had it not been for the most insolent & barbarous usage of
the Governor of Coblens towards me & my people who not onely caused me to stay
one whole day & part of another, before I could gett leave to passe, notwithstanding
my qualitie of an Ambassador, the Emperors special! letters [of] recomendation &
his safe conduct under seale: but my Trumpeter retouming towards me from the Fort
of Erbretstein (whether with his knowledge & good liking, & with an open letter I
had sent him for obtayning like libertie of the French Governor there) was taken &
made prisoner called shelme [rascal] & traytor, had his hat slash't with a sword by
[the Spanish Governor's] Lieutenant (his hed [bjayrely scaping) was bound with a
peece of match to the principail skipper that guided the boat, who had his finger cutt
of & so with two other skippers likewise bound together led prisoners to the
Governors house in the Towne where after much ado I at last procured their liberty
of which barbarous act I am now framing an authentique narration therein relating
all the particulars & circumstances . . . .I3°
Conversely, the nearby French commander was courteous to the travelers and let them proceed
without any further trouble. 131Arundel and his entourage passed without significant incident through
12,Crowne, 60-1.
130PRO, SP 80/10, f. 40: 14 Dec. 1636, Arundel to Secretary; HMC, Denbigh V, 44: 30 Dec.
1636, Taylor to Feilding. Crowne relates that Arundel sent his steward after the missing men, "who found
them tyed by the Armes together, the Skippers finger cut off, and the Trumpeters head escaped very
narrowly from being cloven in two had not his strong Hat defended it." The lieutenant "also had
threatened to hang them up the next day together, but with much adoe [the steward] brought them away
with him." (Crowne, 63).
m"hearing by the Trumpeter [of] the [Imperial] Govemours base usage towards His Excellencie,
presently plac'd their canons against his [the Governor's] house, and vowed his Sonne should give fire to
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the rest of the Empire and into the Netherlands, where they traveled by sleigh to make a final stop
at the Hague before crossing the Channel to England.
Arundel again had an audience with Elizabeth, but this time he clearly showed his
disillusionment with the duplicity ofthe Habsburgs, and Spain in particular. He made it clear to her
that he had become convinced that a peaceful solution to the Palatinate question could not be found,
at least not through negotiations with them. Still loyal to the Prince Palatine's cause, Arundel
advocated immediate military intervention by the King as the only way to recover his nephew's
rightful inheritance, and he vowed to bare the truth of the situation to all at the Stuart court.
Elizabeth was of course quite pleased with this turn of events. She had opposed the mission from
the start because she feared Arundel might reach a compromise agreement on her son's restoration
without her approval. To be sure, she had expected the embassy to fail, but she did not suspect that
it would bring such a strong anti-Habsburg advocate as Arundel now was to the Palatine cause.
Arundel's status at court was such that he was in a position to expose the Habsburgs as the hypocrites
they were and to convince those who mattered, including the King, that England could expect
nothing from them by diplomacy and that war was the only realistic means to her son's restoration. 132
Elizabeth wrote gleefully to Roe:
them the next morning, and would send him such a breakfast, as that hee should need no dinner...." (ibid.,
62).
'nCSPD 1625-49, 539: 30 Dec. 1636, Elizabeth to Laud.
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The Lord Marshal is come from Ratisbon full of discontent He has spoken very
freely that there is nothing to be gotten from there, and that the King must make her
son considerable in putting him into action, and that speedily, else all will be spoiled.
He has promised to deal freely with the King in it- The mind he is in is much
adverse to the Spanish faction.133
Although the embassy was not successful, Elizabeth was very satisfied with Arundel's
conduct of the negotiations. The ignominious compromise settlement she had feared had not
materialized, and this she attributed at least in part to Arundel's resolute conduct of the negotiations.
Both Elizabeth and her friend Roe applauded Arundel's comportment and showered praise upon
him.134 Even Rusdorf, who was unable to influence Arundel's behavior in the way he would have
liked in Regensburg, had to admit that he carried out his instructions with enthusiasm and skill.135
Like Elizabeth, Roe was convinced that Arundel's new-found opposition to the Habsburgs would
have a great effect at court. He wrote to Charles Louis that "In his embassy he has performed
towards the Elector all offices of honour and sincerity, and if he do not change in our cold and
watery air, it is in his way to be the author of a turn of all affairs."136 Change his opinion he would
not. Once Arundel reached England he showed his constancy to the Palatine cause: he advocated
war to support the dynastic interests of the House of Stuart.
Arundel and his retinue departed from the Hague and arrived back in England by 6 January
1637. Once there, they journeyed up the Thames from Gravesend. On their way up the river Lady
l3'JCSPD 1636-7, 239: 3 1 Dec. 1636, same to Roe.
134lbid.
13SHaan, Regensburger Kurfiirstentag, 108. While in Regensburg, Rusdorf made few friends and
had little communication with the other representatives there.
mCSPD 1 636-7, 249: 10 Jan. 1636, Roe to Charles Louis.
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Arundel met them, and she offered her husband a rich feast aboard her barge to welcome him home.
They then proceeded to Hampton Court, where the King eagerly awaited Arundel's report of his
negotiations with the Emperor.137 The King warmly received Arundel on 8 January, and during a
long audience the ambassador expressed his dissatisfaction with the outcome ofhis negotiations with
the Emperor (see figs. 8 and 9).
Arundel's return in tandem with the arrival of the first reports of the election of the King of
Hungary as King of the Romans spurred the Habsburg diplomats at the English court to action. 1M
Radolt reemerged in early January, so suspicions that he had not left England proved correct 139
Based on his observations, he reported that the news of the election had delivered an unexpected jolt
and caused great indignation at the English court.140 For his part, the young Count Ofiate, who had
been insultingly dormant since his arrival in July, had the audacity to request an audience the same
day that Arundel's first audience was scheduled.141 Ofiate began his audience by announcing the
1"Hervey, 393.
I3*These reports were followed by letters from the King of Hungary and Ferdinand II announcing
the former's election as King of the Romans and promising friendship between their two nations (PRO,
SP 80/10, f. 44: [22] Dec. 1636, King of Hungary to Charles I; ibid., f. 46: 22 Dec. 1636, Ferdinand II to
same). Taylor reported from Regensburg that the King of Hungary was crowned King of the Romans on
30 December (HMC, Denbigh V, 44: 30 Dec. 1636, Taylor to Feilding). Radolt immediately sent letters
of congratulation back to Vienna (HHStA, StA Palatina, Kart. 12, Konv. 3: 9 Jan. 1637, Radolt to King of
Hungary; ibid., StA England, Kart. 18, Konv. 1820, ff. 3-4: 9 Jan. 1637, same to same).
1"Though this was due more to the fact that he had not yet received his recall than a backfired
attempt to alarm the English.
l40KHStA, StA Palatina, Kart. 12, Konv. 1819, f. 3: 9 Jan. 1637, Radolt to King of Hungary.
He was actually insulted when Arundel was received before he was.
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8 The Kingly Cock, Crispin de Passe (1637)
This Dutch broadside satirizing Caroline foreign policy was likely intended for an English
audience. The English King is shown asleep on his throne, with his sword unbuckled. Through
the window, his fleet lies anchored, ready for action. On his right, the Spanish ambassador (the
young Onate) pacifies him with soothing music, a chest of riches, and a basket of playthings. On
his left, the King of France, sword in hand, and the princes Charles Louis and Rupert attempt to
rouse Charles, while the rest of the Palatine children offer him victors' laurels. Louis attempts to
open Charles's eyes to the duplicity of Spain: "Looke on your owne deare blood, these breaches
faire / Who this tirants rage as exiles are, / And never more shal repossess their land / By peace,
as you doe dreame, but by strong hand." The "hispaniolized courtier" (perhaps Cottington)
intervenes to stop Louis and responds: "Tis better to dance, be merrie, jovial! still, / With
Spanish Pis to lets our purses fill, / Better with pictures gaie to feed our sight / Than naked corpses
gor*d with blood in fight" At this point Arundel returns from his embassy to the Emperor,
unsuccessful but not empty-handed. Expressing his indignation and disillusionment with the
Habsburgs, Arundel advocates that England take active measures to restore the Prince Palatine:
"It is our Cannon and the martiall wight / that exercis'd in warre is . . . that must get / Better
content than any Legate yet. / Take out of every towne one man of ten / And with those well
train'd well arm'd English men / Invade we Flanders, this is the way I tender / To make them on
good termes the Paltz surrender."
Courtesy of His Grace, the Duke of Norfolk
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9 Thomas Howard, Earl ofArundel's Return from his Embassy in 1636 (s.d.)
Close-up view of the Earl of Arundel returning to the English court from his embassy to the
Emperor, after The Kingly Cock (fig. 8). Arundel is shown carrying a basket full of prizes he
acquired during his stay on the Continent (likely representing the DOrer paintings and
Pirckheimer Library, among other gifts and acquisitions), but with nothing to report.
Courtesy of His Grace, the Duke ofNorfolk
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"happy issue" of the election and coronation of the King ofHungary as King of the Romans.142 He
then attempted to divert the King's displeasure away from the Habsburgs by blaming Arundel for
the failure of his mission and loudly declaring Habsburg goodwill, much to the King's
discontentment.143 When asked pointedly by the King what Spain's requirements were to reach an
agreement on the Palatinate question, Onate gave a singularly noncommital reply and again
withdrew from court144
Onate's criticism ofArundel's comportment, however, did not influence the King in the least.
Like his sister, the King was well contented with his ambassador's conduct and his attempts to bring
the negotiations to the best possible conclusion under difficult circumstances. Shortly after
Arundel's return to England, Laud wrote that "The Earl of Arundel has done the business he was
trusted with very honourably and clearly, and his Majesty ever had and declared to him a very good
opinion of his service, so that there is nothing left for the Archbishop [Laud] to do but to honour him
MCSPV 1636-9, 127: 8 Jan. 1637, Correr to D&S. Sir Thomas Roe reported this news to
William, Earl of Exeter, in the following manner: "On Thursday last, to welcome my Lord of Arundel,
the Spanish Ambassador demanded an audience, to declare to the King the election of the King of
Hungary to the crown of the Romans, which he jeeringly said must be very acceptable news to his
Majesty: when indeed it is a ratification and demier coup against the Prince Elector and, as it were, the
seal set to his utter banishment: for if that election be allowed...then he [the Duke of Bavaria] is ratified
an Elector, and the other proscribed." He added hopefully, "Your Lordship knows that to the Duke of
Bavaria is born a son and heir, which is another block, but some report him dead." (PRO, SP 16/343: f. 4:
12 Jan. 1637, [Roe] to Exeter).
l43GSP, vol. 1, 669: 1636, Charles I's questions for Onate; ibid., 670: 1636, Onate's replies; CSPV
1636-9, 126-8: 8 Jan. 1637, Correr to D&S. Onate complained that Arundel "had not brought back
satisfaction from Caesar because he did not wish to. If he had chosen to treat upon the offers that had been
made to him the affair would have been settled by now, but this time he had allowed his natural
impetuosity to overcome his reason." (ibid.).
1CSP, vol. 1, 716: 15 Jan. 1637, Windebank to Aston.
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for his noble carriage within."145 Anzolo Correr, the Venetian ambassador, remarked that "His
Majesty cannot praise enough the prudence and sincerity with which the Earl conducted his last
embassy to Caesar."146 Windebank also commended Arundel to Lord Feilding: "My Lord Marshall
is retoumed home with little satisfaction in his negotiation though himself used all the prudence and
dexterity that could be expected from so grave a counsellor to have brought the Austrian party to
reason."147 For a time it seemed as if Arundel's performance might even prove enough for him to
regain the coveted dukedom. Laud relayed to Wentworth that "'tis common in Court speech that the
Earl Marshal maye be restored to his antient honnour of the Duke of Norfolk for thiss service,"
meaning his resolute carriage during the embassy.14*
Even though the King and his ministers were apparently more than satisfied with Arundel's
conduct of the negotiations, the ambassador could not forget the failure of his embassy or the role
that the Spaniards in particular had played in it. The Habsburgs had "in effect, refused all manner
of justice, or hope of restitution, either of dignity or territory, except a few villages, which would
scarcely find a prince bread. He hath in all his Ambassage carried himself very nobly, and like a
right English Earl, and is not insensible of the loss ofhis labour and other falsehoods of the Austrian
[Habsburg] deceit."149 In Arundel the Habsburgs, and Spain in particular, had made an influential
enemy. Whereas before he had been an advocate of a peaceful solution to the Palatinate question
14,CSPD 1636-7, 411: [Jan.?] 1637, Laud to Elizabeth.
mCSPV 1636-9, 156: 6 Mar. 1637, Correr to D&S.
I47HMC, Sixth Report, vol. 1, 281: 15 Jan. 1636, Windebank to Feilding.
""Laud, vol. 7, 320: 21 Feb. 1637, Laud to Wentworth.
14,PRO, SP 16/343, f. 4: 12 Jan. 1637, [Roe] to Exeter.
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negotiated with the Habsburgs, he now became their outspoken opponent and favored an alliance
with the French, even if the result were war:150 "The time had come, he felt, to heal the wounds
inflicted on his master not with the salve of diplomacy, but with iron and fire."151
Arundel vehemently denounced the Spaniards for obstructing rather than facilitating his
negotiations, as they had given the English cause to expect. "I am very sorry," Arundel wrote, "to
be a witness of the offices of Spain coming so short which I have so much heretofore defended to
their evil willers."152 He scathingly remarked to Lord Aston, who was still carrying on his
negotiations in Spain:
I beseech your lordship agayne to comend my service to the Conde Duke, and let him
be assured that never any man found him self more deceived, in the proceedings of
all the Spanish ministers in Germany, then I did; for I was most prompte to have,
with all sincerity, layed groundes of the frendshippe betwixte the twoe Crownes, as
the King my master comanded; but I confesse I was as little in love with the old
Conde Ognata [Ofiate] there, as most have bin where he hath treated. If they dislike
our proceedings heere, or our Prince Electors protestation, they must stoppe it in
time, with reall effectes, and not make this the second parte of our Kinges beinge in
Spayne.153
Arundel returned the visits of the younger Ofiate "merely as a ceremony." The fact that he was
quicker to lay the blame at the door of Spain rather than the Emperor is a testament to the
willingness the latter had shown to accommodate England.
150Gardiner, vol. 8, 202.
mSharpe, Personal Rule, 522.
1nPRO, SP 80/10, f. 29: 18 Nov. 1636, Arundel to Secretary.
153lbid., SP 16/344, f. 174: 24 Jan. 1637, same to Aston. Arundel complained about Spain to
anyone who would listen, including Radolt (HHStA, StA England, Kart. 18, FConv. 1820, f. 10: 16 Jan.
1637, Radolt to Ferdinand II).
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Arundel's clarification of the diplomatic situation and his weight in English counsels drove
home his opinion that there was no point in continuing diplomatic negotiations with the Habsburgs
to regain the Palatine lands and dignities.154 As the Venetian ambassador to England noted, "He
really has become a partisan in this cause, pretending that his reputation is concerned, and one can
really believe that his representations and persuasions will ultimately produce considerable
results."155
Despite growing support at the English court for war against the Habsburgs and an alliance
with France, Radolt continued to downplay this threat. He reasoned that the King had a strong
financial incentive not to break with the Habsburgs because he derived substantial income from
Spain, not only from direct payments for the services of the fleet in the Channel and the coining of
Spanish bullion in England, but also from customs revenue derived from trade with Spain. Radolt
thus maintained that England would remain neutral and continue to reap these rewards. Further, he
believed that England would not join with France in an alliance because of the underlying tension
between these two powers. Nor did he think the King would provide financial support to the
Swedes, though he might allow them to levy troops in Britain, an eventuality the Emperor feared.1 56
On 25 January 1637, Radolt officially announced the election of the King of the Romans to
Charles.157 The King's humor where the Habsburgs were concerned, however, was not conducive
154Laud, vol. 7, 319-20: 21 Feb. 1637, Laud to Wentworth; HMC, Denbigh V, 47: 25 Feb. 1637,
Rudolf Weckherlin to Feilding.
WCSPV 1636-9, 147: 20 Feb. 1637, Correrto D&S.
156HHStA, StA England, Kart. 18, Konv. 1820, ft. 10-2: 16 Jan. 1637, Radolt to Ferdinand n.
1"Ibid., ff. 23-4: 25 Jan. 1637, same to Charles I; ibid., f. 22: 30 Jan. 1637, same to Ferdinand II;
Finet,212.
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to a favorable reception to this news. On the contrary, he found it exceedingly offensive that the
Duke of Bavaria had recorded his vote as an elector of the Empire, thus effectively stepping into the
Prince Palatine's shoes. Therefore, when Radolt expressed his hope to the King that he would be
glad to hear the news of the election, the King attacked the envoy so vehemently that the latter was
too stunned to reply:
The King replied that if the King of Hungary would signalise his present fortune by
showing just and right intentions towards the public weal and the liberty ofGermany
in particular, restoring those princes who are oppressed to their legitimate authority,
he would be as glad as the rest He then entered upon the merits ofhis nephew's
claims, showing with every sign of anger, how little pleased he was with Caesar's
recent behaviour, and how he felt compelled to abandon his previous mildness and
proceed to use force Alarmed or confused by these words, Radolti either would
not answer, or had none ready. He tried as well as he could to justify the intentions
of the emperor and his son towards the interests of this crown, and so concluded his
office, without entering into further particulars. I5*
This response grieved Radolt, but under the circumstances, it was surprising that he would hope for
a different reaction. He reported disappointedly that Charles had no intention of answering in
writing his official announcement of the election. Further, the King told Radolt that he found it
unnecessary to answer the letters from the Emperor and King of Hungary because the satisfaction
they had promised to Arundel did not materialize; however once they had granted it
, he would be
happy to do so.159 To make matters worse, the Emperor had seat a gentleman messenger with an
announcement of the election to the English court. The King refused to admit the messenger to his
presence and only sent word to him that he might return to Germany whenever he pleased. In the
end, the messenger only received an insulting verbal answer, prepared by Coke, before he returned
™CSPV 1636-9, 133: 30 Jan. 1637, CorrertoD&S.
1"HHStA StA Palatina, Kart. 12, Konv. 3: 30 Jan. 1637, Radolt to Ferdinand O.
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home.160 Radolt wrote that these slights so injured his "German heart" that he did not dare air his
opinion publicly on the subject. 161
The day after Radolt's announcement, Arundel gave a full account of his mission to an
attentive King and council.162 As he had promised the Queen of Bohemia, he did not mince words:
he clearly expressed his opinion that the Habsburgs had no intention of settling the Palatinate
question and that continuing negotiations with them was futile. He now declared himself in favor
of an alliance with France and entreated Charles to arm his nephew promptly for fear that the King
be "despised by his enemies for inactivity and remain exposed to scorn, whereas he should rather
be an object ofdread." 163 Arundel's report elicited the applause ofall present. His calls for the King
to take decisive action on his nephew's behalf, backed by the Queen, Holland, and others favoring
alliance with the anti-Habsburg side proved decisive.164
The King and his ministers openly expressed their resentment at the Habsburgs' offensive
carriage in the matter of the Palatinate and decided that taking action against them was indeed
necessary. On the same day that Arundel made his report to the council, they decided that England
l60lbid.: 27 Feb. 1637, same to Ferdinand 01; BL, Add. Mss. 36450, f. 123: 22 Mar. 1637," Aston
to Windebank
161HHStA, StA Palatina, Kart. 12, Konv. 3: 30 Jan. 1637, Radolt to Ferdinand II.
1"Borough, Arundel's official secretary, prepared a written report of the chief occurrences of the
embassy in which he restates many of the arguments made by the ambassador in his dispatches to
Windebank and Coke (PRO, SP 80/10, ff. 55-69: 1636, Summary of Arundel's negotiations).
163Rusdorf, Consilia el Negotia Politica (Frankfurt a. M.: J. Maximilian, 1725), 183-4; quoted in
Springell, 37; CSPD 1636-7, 383: 3 Feb. 1637 Arundel to Aston; CSPV 1636-9, 133-4: 30 Jan. 1637,
Correr to D&S.
1"The war lobby rose to new prominence in the King's counsels when the duplicity of the
Habsburgs became apparent and greatly dissipated the influence of the peace party, which would not
recover until the Scottish rebellion was underway (see chap. 1 1, p. 521).
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should take steps to secure an alliance with France, which now appeared to be the only viable
diplomatic option for regaining the Palatinate. 165 Also, England was to make preparations at sea, and
— on the suggestion ofArundel and Holland — the King resolved to lend his nephew vessels from the
newly equipped ship money fleet to harass Spanish shipping.166 Furthermore, the King instructed
Charles Louis to issue a formal protestation against the election of the King of the Romans without
his participation.167
The hostility toward the Habsburgs and clamor for war at court grew daily, and by the end
of February, Radolt began to take these threats more seriously. He informed the Emperor that
Arundel had become one of the most zealous supporters ofEngland's alliance with the anti-Habsburg
powers, libeling the House of Austria to the applause of the English people. 16* As plans for an
Anglo-French alliance and the loan of the fleet to the Palatine circulated at court, both Radolt and
Necolaide, who had earlier brushed aside the possibility ofEnglish hostilities against the Habsburgs,
l65Ibid., 130: 23 Jan. 1637, same to same. Roe could hardly contain his glee. He wrote to John
Dury, a Protestant ecumenic ist and supporter of the Prince Palatine, "It is resolved that the Prince Elector
shall have a good fleet, fitted and paid, to concur with the whole league in any design for the common
good. He shall have free levies for men and open passage; munition both for himself and his friends, and
there will be means found to put him in arms and to join him with the troops in Germany that still stand
for the common cause, and all this in conjunction with France." {CSPD 1636-7, 400: 28 Jan. 1637, Roe to
Dury).
1&6HMC, Denbigh V, 47: 25 Feb. 1637, Weckherlin to Feilding; CSPV 1636-9, 141: 13 Feb. 1637,
Correr to D&S; CSPD 1636-7, 479: 1 1 Mar. 1637, List of ships lent to Charles Louis; CSPD 1637, 252:
29 June 1637,' Newsletter ofC. Rossingham; Sharpe, Personal Rule, 525-9. He was put in charge of
fourteen ships.
l"CSPV 1636-9, 133: 30 Jan. 1637, Correr to D&S; Gardiner, vol. 8, 203-4. This course had
been advocated earlier by Roe {CSPD 1636-7, 216: Nov. 1636, Roe to Charles Louis; ibid., 250: 10 Jan.
1636, same to same).
l6*HHStA StA Palatina, Kart. 12, Konv. 3: 27 Feb. 1637, Radolt to Ferdinand III. In his report
he acknowledged the receipt of the Emperor's letter of 1 February and decree of 29 January, and included
Charles Louis's protestation.
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remonstrated heftily against these plans. They also complained about the publication and circulation
of the Palatine's protestation. 169
With the Habsburg diplomats on the defensive and plans for a French alliance moving
forward, Arundel was certain that the Spaniards would quickly become cognizant of the benefits of
English friendship, as he explained to Aston:
As they [the Spaniards] have been the main impediment to all our proceedings, the
King finds himself obliged to join with his other friends, and try if in their company
he may have better fortune to obtain his so just demands for the Prince Elector . . .
. As their ambitions and dominion are vast, so is the enemy contracted against them,
and their pieces lying so divided, and to be nourished from so remote parts, may let
them see that the king is as much to be sought by them as they by him, and the
experience of his power may gain that value in the world which their pride desires
to eclipse, and that our nation shall hold that ancient and just attribute, the balance.170
Arundel had apparently discovered the need to call Spain's bluff. In the end, the Earl Marshal had
certainly shown himself to be more martial than the Queen of Bohemia had originally estimated.
In the end, the failure of Arundel's mission was a disappointment to both the Emperor and
Charles. However, signs of hope remained that future Anglo-Imperial negotiations could be
successful. The Emperor, for his part, earnestly wished to come to an agreement with England. He
had made sincere attempts to modify the demands of his allies and find a middle way that all sides
1<wIbid., RK KrA, Fasz. 1 19, ff. 63-6: 27 Jan. 1637,' Charles Louis's protestation; ibid., StA
Palatina, Kart. 12, Konv. 3: 27 Jan. 1637,' same; ibid.: 27 Feb. 1637, Radoltto Ferdinand III;
Khevenhiiller, vol. 12, 2302-7; CSPV 1636-9, 153: 27 Feb. 1637, Correrto D&S. The protestation, by its
very nature, omitted referring to the King of Hungary as King of the Romans or as King of Bohemia,
which was sure to irritate the Emperor as it did Radolt (BL, Add. Mss. 36450, f. 123: 22 Mar. 1637,'
Aston to Windebank). Charles Louis also issued a manifest dated 12 January 1637, which included
documents relevant to the Palatinate question, in attempt to convince the Emperor, princes of the Empire,
and foreign rulers that he should be fully restored to his lands and titles (KhevenhQller, vol. 12, 2199-
302). He disseminated a further document regarding the restitution of the Palatinate dated 2 February
(ibid., 2307-22).
1CSPD 1637, 246-7: 27 June 1637," Arundel to Aston.
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could accept. For instance, he had used Radolt's reports from England to try to extract greater
concessions in the Palatinate from Bavaria.171 Maximilian's influence was strong at this point, and
though he was not as alarmed as the Emperor about the possibility of England allying with their
enemies, he was beginning to> find reasons to reconsider his previously obdurate stance. Spain,
which was less tractable, continued to insist upon a league against its enemies in return for its share
of the Lower Palatinate. However, evidence exists that not only the Emperor but also the Spaniards
would have been willing to consider less than a straight league ifCharles had given them reason to
do so. The English showed, an inclination to compromise as well — Arundel modified English
demands for the restitution of the Palatinate toward the end ofhis negotiations. The unofficial talks
that took place subsequent to his departure did not result in an acceptable or even a better offer of
restitution, but they gave hope for future negotiations because all sides showed some willingness to
compromise.172
Having said this, there was no question that the King sent Arundel into a difficult negotiating
situation, one that the machinations ofhis own government made even more difficult. The King and
Windebank deliberately withheld information from him about the secret negotiations with the
Habsburgs — including offers ofa league in exchange for the restoration of the Palatinate — that had
been taking place on and offsince the Treaty of Madrid in 1630. Since Arundel was not negotiating
from the same knowledge base as the Habsburgs, this limitation greatly impaired his ability to
"1Particularly the point that England would be a powerful adversary at sea.
l72Under these circumstances, the English diplomats at Habsburg courts agreed that the King's
best tactic would be to accept the part of the Palatinate currently offered and attempt to gain more in the
future.
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negotiate an acceptable settlement. The conduct of the King in this case was unforgivable and
injurious to the success of his own foreign policy.
While Arundel was in Germany, Clement Radolt was facing challenges of his own as he
sought to represent the Emperor at the English court under less than optimal circumstances. The fact
that Arundel had full powers to negotiate at the Imperial court essentially preempted Radolfs
mission before it had even begun and moved the theater of negotiation to Germany. At this point,
the Imperial envoy was left with the unenviable task of doing damage control at the English court
when either Arundel or the Emperor sent distasteful news back to England. With little to do but
gather intelligence and deliver the Emperor's announcements and decrees, it is unsurprising that
Radolt had little desire to remain in England — particularly as his lack of language skills and
alienation from English ministers presented considerable challenges to the first activity, and the
King's hostility provided him with little reward for his pains in the second. The Emperor, however,
was not yet prepared to recall his envoy, as he hoped that Radolt's presence might help to move the
negotiations with England forward, or at least keep them from slipping to the point that they were
irrecoverable.
With Arundel's return to England and the turning of English opinion against the Habsburgs,
John Taylor was left to continue the negotiations on the Palatinate question with the Emperor. The
King wished him to do so in case an opportunity materialized to improve his nephew's lot. However
this time Taylor no longer had the same support for his negotiations, not only because of the failure
of Arundel's embassy and the subsequent unpopularity of the policy of negotiation with the
Habsburgs, but also because the King refused to recognize the new Emperor, Ferdinand HI. Taylor's
task, therefore, would be a challenging one.
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11
John Taylor at the Regensburg Electoral Meeting and
the Imperial Court, 1636-9
the business of the Palatinate had been so long sick, that it was presently to be cured,
or there was no means to keep it longer alive.
Aston to Windebank
Negotiations in Regensburg
After Arundel's departure from Regensburg, Taylor remained behind to continue his negotiations
with the Emperor on the Palatinate question and to await the forthcoming declaration of the electoral
college and a further declaration from the Emperor on this subject. While he was waiting,
Windebank instructed him to protect the interests of the Prince Palatine and encourage the Emperor
and electors to a more favorable resolution on his restoration.1 Given Arundel's experience, Charles
was not particularly hopeful that Taylor could move the Emperor and his allies to a quick decision.
Still, because of Taylor's optimism that they could reach an acceptable settlement, the King wished
to continue the negotiations. Besides, the Emperor was the only one who could legally lift the ban,
invest Charles Louis as a prince of the Empire, and confirm him the possession ofany restored lands
and dignities. Finally, the appearance of a healthy diplomatic relationship with the Emperor had
strategic value for England. This was particularly true in the winter of 1636-37, when an Anglo-
1CSP, vol. I, 662: [9] Oct. 1636, Windebank to Taylor, ibid., 701-2: 1636, Arundel's
remembrances for Taylor upon his departure from Regensburg.
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French treaty seemed likely, and England could use the possibility of an agreement with the
Habsburgs to increase its leverage with France.2
Taylor therefore picked up the negotiations where he had left off when Arundel had arrived
on the scene in May 1636. Soon after Arundel's departure, he wrote hopefully to Windebank that
good news of the negotiations would overtake Arundel on his homeward journey.3 This was not to
be, in spite of several compromise solutions advanced by both Taylor and the Emperor in the waning
days of the electoral meeting and a newfound willingness on the part ofMaximilian of Bavaria to
consider them.
Taylor's optimism about the negotiations for the restitution of the Palatinate was not entirely
ungrounded. Although Arundel had negotiated with the Emperor for almost a half year and they still
had reached no agreement, the English ambassador's conduct of the negotiations influenced the
Emperor considerably. Ferdinand's commitment to coming to an understanding with England
coupled with Maximilian's reevaluation of his stance on the Palatinate question offered real hope that
they could indeed achieve a compromise settlement-4 Despite the obstacles to be overcome, the
Emperor had long believed this was possible. However, he could not afford to alienate his allies,
Spain and Bavaria, in the process. In order to offer a settlement that would be acceptable to England,
JHaan, Regensburger Kurfwrslentag, 231.
JCSP, vol. I, 699: 19 Nov. 1636, Taylor to Windebank; ibid., 704: 25 Nov. I636, same to same;
HMC, Denbigh V, 4 1: 15 Nov. 1636, same to Feilding. Taylor reported that the Emperor was willing to
return the Lower Palatinate, with the consent of Spain and Bavaria, and further that he would treat
afterwards about the Upper Palatinate if England offered satisfaction. Taylor also related that Ferdinand
was considering an alternation of the electorate between the Palatine and Bavarian lines after the death of
Maximilian's son (CSP, vol. 1, 699: 19 Nov. 1636, same to Windebank).
4Haan, Regensburger Kurfurslentag, 233.
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he needed the buy-in ofhis two allies, both of which had reasons for compromise and intransigence
on this question. Under the circumstances, the Emperor faced an uphill battle. Yet he had already
achieved some success in this area: it was due to his efforts that Spain and Bavaria had retreated
from the extreme stance they had taken earlier and the Emperor had offered the immediate
restoration of the Lower Palatinate to the Prince Palatine. In doing so, the Emperor was hoping not
only to lay a basis for peace in the Empire, but also to conclude an alliance with England. At the
very least, this would keep England from the arms of France and secure its naval assistance for
Spain. Thus when Arundel rejected his offer, the Emperor sought other means to satisfy the King.5
In September the Emperor had called upon the electors to give their opinion on the issue of
restitution in an effort to win the support of the electors for a compromise agreement with England
and at the same time to press Maximilian to greater flexibility.6 The electors were split on the
question whether or not England should be granted satisfaction, and the balance was not necessarily
tipped in its favor, as Taylor observed: "Some of them are certainly for us, but the greater partie
against us; of Bavaria and Colen [Cologne] there is no doubt, and Saxony, which I would have
hoped should not have bine, is an enemy into our b[usiness]."7
'Ibid., 238.
sHHStA, Mainzer Erzkanzlerarchiv, Reichstagsakten, Fasz. 138, Konv. 3: 4 Dec. 1636, Imperial
declaration; CSP, vol. 1, 700: 21 Nov. 1636, Leslie to Windebank; HMC, Denbigh V, 41 : 15 Nov. 1636,
Taylor to Feilding.
Ibid, 42: 2 Dec. 1636, same to same. The Duke of Saxony's antagonism toward England was
due to some unpleasant remarks that Joseph Avery, the English envoy in Sweden, had made about him to
the Swedish Chancellor Oxenstiema. Avery charged that Saxony had forsaken the Prince Palatine by
entering into the Peace of Prague. His comments were published and thus came to the attention of the
Duke, who was greatly offended and thereafter uninclined to support English interests. For more details
on Avery's comments and the diplomatic fallout that occurred as the result of them, see Dassler,
"Diplomatischer ZusammenstoQ."
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Despite the Emperor's efforts, his plans were frustrated. Maximilian had no desire for the
electoral college to dictate what concessions he should make to England; if he would make them,
it would be at bis own behest and not that of the electoral college. The electors saw reason for
reserve, and the opinion they eventually gave was accordingly noncommital.* On the one hand, they
acknowledged that the Peace of Prague committed the Emperor and Empire to support Bavaria in
its possession of the Palatine lands and electorate. They had no such commitment to Spain,
however, and would have sooner seen Spanish troops out ofthe Palatinate, which to them constituted
a foreign force of occupation on German soil. On the other hand, they recognized the importance
of the settlement of the Palatinate question to the peace of the Empire and that they must consider
England's interests to achieve it. Since the Empire was already at war with two powerful states, the
electors wished to avoid adding the enmity of yet another. In the end, however, the electors' only
decision was that the interested parties should negotiate the specific points of a settlement,
particularly the point ofthe electorate, among themselves. Ifthe Emperor wished to satisfy England,
therefore, he would have to do so by coming to an understanding with Spain and Bavaria.9 The
Emperor, worried that the English negotiations would break over this reply, asked for a further
'It was obvious that the spiritual electors, one of whom was Maximilian's own brother, would
take his side where the electorate was concerned in order to preserve the Catholic majority in the electoral
college. Saxony felt bound by the decision made at Prague and in any case believed that the restoration of
the Lower Palatinate would be adequate compensation for the Palatines. Only the Elector of Brandenburg
believed the Prince Palatine should be fully restored to his lands and—after Maximilian's death—the
electoral dignity; even so, at this point he did not feel comfortable sharing this opinion in the electoral
college (Haan, Regensburger KurfOrslentag, 239).
9HHStA, RK Reichstagsakten, Fasz. 101b: 12 Dec. 1636, Opinion of electoral college; PRO, SP
80/10, f. 81: lOFeb. 1637, Taylor to Aston.
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opinion on what should be done if the King decided to restore his nephew by force.10 However,
Bavaria successfully hindered the question being taken up again.1 1 At the end ofDecember, Taylor
wrote apprehensively to Lord Feilding that "They [of the Diet] are still busy about our business, 'but
Bavaria's ambition hindereth their resolution, who cannot be drawne yet to any reason, and the
Emperor and King of Spaine having bound themselves unto him to mayntaine him in the Electorate
. . . have bound their hands, and can do nothing without his consent""2 Without the clear support
of the electoral college, the Emperor had lost a potent tool that he could have used to motivate his
allies, Maximilian in particular, to further concessions.
In an effort to move the negotiations forward, both the Emperor and Taylor put forth
compromise proposals during the last months of the electoral meeting. Taylor, who recognized that
the main obstacle remained the electorate, made proposals regarding it that went beyond those made
by Arundel before he left Regensburg. Taylor intimated to the Emperor that the electorate need not
return permanently to the Palatine line after Maximilian's direct line had ceased, as Arundel had
proposed. Instead Taylor suggested that his master would be content with the alternation of the
electorate after Maximilian's line died out.13 As a further concession Taylor suggested that they
might exclude the question of the electorate from the negotiations in the short term; however, they
10HHStA, StK Vortrage, Kart. I, Konv. F, ff. 134-7: 12 Dec. 1636, Opinion of privy council;
ibid., ff. 138-9: 13 Dec. 1636, same; ibid., StA Palatina, Kart. 12, Konv. 2: 13 Dec. 1636, Ferdinand II to
electoral college.
11Haan, Regens burger Kurfurstentag, 239-40.
12HMC, Denbigh V, 46: 27 Dec. 1636, Taylor to Feilding.
l3Albrecht, Maximilian /, 959; Haan, Regensburger Kurfiirstentag, 237, 241.
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must address its fate in the future if they were to achieve a lasting settlement Although Taylor's
proposals were of an unofficial nature, the Imperial party seriously considered them.14
The Emperor, who believed that an agreement with England would bring Germany closer
to lasting peace, attempted to persuade bis allies to make further concessions in the Palatinate. On
the one hand, he asked Maximilian to consider the restitution ofboth the Upper and Lower Palatinate
in return for financial compensation if the Prince Palatine agreed to forgo the electorate.15 On the
other, he reminded the Spaniards of the advantages ofan agreement with England since the success
of their war with the Dutch was reliant upon the safe passage of their military supplies through the
English Channel to Flanders. English hostility would endanger these transports as well as those of
American silver to Seville.16
Spain, however, was intent upon obtaining an active commitment from England before it
ceded any of its lands in the Palatinate. The Spanish ministers in Regensburg made it clear that
Spain would restore them only ifEngland would join in a league with the Habsburgs. Since Charles
was not inclined to make this commitment without his nephew's restoration up front and a larger
share of his inheritance than part of the Lower Palatinate, Spain's insistence upon an offensive and
defensive league made the Emperor's work even more difficult. The Emperor approached Oflate
several times in an attempt to persuade him to offer more liberal conditions on the Palatinate, which
l4Ibidn 237.
"See below, p. 469.
l6There were those in England interested in the profits of privateering who supported this course,
among them the Earl of Warwick.
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the latter persistently resisted." This intransigence, however, belied Spain's willingness — ifpushed
— to consider an alignment with England that amounted to less than a commitment of war against
the French and Dutch. To effect this, however, it would be necessary for Charles to withdraw
English naval assistance from Spain for a time and accept the loss of revenue that this action would
bring.
Indeed, the negotiations between Spanish and Imperial ministers in Regensburg show that
the Spaniards stubbornly insisted upon the right to reoccupy the Lower Palatinate, which Imperial
troops had reconquered in 1635, as they were unwilling to forfeit this valuable bargaining counter
with England. As early as March 1635, in a secret decree, the Emperor had promised that he would
restore the left bank of the Lower Palatinate to Spain. However, despite this agreement, the Emperor
resisted openly returning this area. One of his reasons was that he believed this might imperil the
English negotiations." Taylor had made it clear to the Imperial councillors that Charles would rather
have the Lower Palatinate from the hands of the Emperor than those of Spain." The Emperor also
feared that restoring it to Spain would motivate France to attack the Empire openly and endanger the
nCSPV 1636-9, 1 17: 29 Dec. 1636, Ballarino to D&S.
"HHStA, StFC Vortrage, Kart. I, Konv. F, ff. 34-5: 18 Feb. 1636, Opinion ofprivy council; ibid.,
f. 44: 25, 26 Feb. 1636, same. Ferdinand issued the secret decree in the expectation of continued
payments from Spain and on the understanding that the Spaniards would not insist upon its immediate
execution, in case this caused difficulties.
"Ibid., ff. 61-4: 18 Apr. 1636, same. The English negotiations were also a consideration for the
aulic council when it voted against allowing Spanish troops to move back into the Lower Palatinate in
December 1635 (ibid., Reichshofrat, Resolutionsprotokolle, vol. 106, ff. 82-3: 19 Dec. 1635, Resolution
of aulic council). During the next year the Emperor did, however, eventually let the Spaniards back into
select locations, including Frankenthal. This move aroused English ire because the fortress city was
settled upon Elizabeth as a part of her marriage agreement. During his embassy, Arundel complained
repeatedly of their treatment of the population there (PRO, SP 80/9, f. 229: 9 Sept. 1636, Arundel to
Secretary).
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Peace of Prague, a basic tenet of which was to drive foreign armies from the Empire. Most
importantly, however, he did not want to alienate the electors, who wished him to promote Imperial
rather than dynastic interests, by preferring Spain's interests in the Lower Palatinate. This point was
of particular concern to the Emperor before the election of his son as King of the Romans. Publicly,
therefore, Ferdinand continued to withhold his permission for Spain to reoccupy the Lower
Palatinate.30 The Spanish ministers Onate and Castafleda were unsuccessful in pressing their case
until the end of December 1636, after the election.21 In spite of the Emperor's long-standing refusal
to grant their request, he conducted his negotiations with England as ifSpain maintained full power
in the Lower Palatinate because of the promise he had made to Spain.22 Thus it was apparent that
the Emperor was not in a position to withhold these lands from Spain indefinitely, despite his initial
wish to consider England's interests, as Spain still regarded them as a payoff for its support against
his enemies.
By this point, Spain's recalcitrance where restoring the Lower Palatinate was concerned was
also unwelcome to Maximilian, who had become more interested in reaching a tenable agreement
with England on the Palatinate question, though for very different reasons. The Emperor wished to
avoid Charles's enmity and thus was ready to make relatively significant concessions to satisfy him.
Maximilian, on the other hand, wished to reach an agreement on the Palatinate question because he
}0The Spanish ministers Onate and Castafleda did not give up easily. In February 1636, they
delivered a memorial on this subject, but Imperial councillors continued to reject the idea (HHStA, StK
Vortrage, Kart. I, Konv. F, ff. 34-S: 18, 25, 26 Feb. 1636, Opinion of privy council).
21At the end of December 1636, the King of Hungary allowed Spanish troops to reoccupy the
Lower Palatinate (ibid., RK KrA, Fasz. 1 18, ff. 251-60: 29 Dec. 1636, King of Hungary to Imperial
commissioners).
"Ernst, 238-40.
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knew that until he did, he could not feel secure in his possession of his newly won acquisitions, in
spite of terms of the Peace of Prague. With France's entry into the war to buttress Sweden, he feared
that military events might determine the ultimate fate of his Palatine gains. Maximilian realized that
if Imperial forces were defeated, he could lose them all.23 The concessions he was willing to make,
however, were understandably limited. Under the circumstances, he believed that from his side the
sacrifice of the Lower Palatinate should be adequate to affect a settlement; he had no intention of
relinquishing the Upper Palatinate and disliked Taylor's compromise proposals regarding the
electorate. He would not assent to the creation ofan eighth electorate, which the Emperor had earlier
suggested, and was critical of the suggestion that the electorate alternate between the two lines as
the Palatine line had not honored this same arrangement, which the Treaty of Pavia had established
in 1329.24
The real question Maximilian had to consider was whether Bavaria possessed the political
influence and military power to maintain sole possession of the electorate in the face of long-term
opposition. Even Maximilian recognized the difficulty of this situation. Behind the scenes, he thus
began to reevaluate his hard line on this subject and at the end of December 1636 he asked his
council to give an opinion on Taylor's proposal that the electorate alternate between the two
Wittelsbach lines after the cessation of his direct line. This was an important step, because for the
first time Maximilian joined the Emperor in acknowledging that an adjustment to the settlement of
23Albrecht, "Kriegs- und Friedensziele," 263.
24HHStA, StA Palatina, Kart. 12, Konv. 4: 21 Jan. 1638, Maximilian 1 to Ferdinand III; Albrecht,
"Kriegs- und Friedensziele," 263; Haan, Regensburger Kurftirstentag, 242-4. Maximilian's brother, the
Elector of Cologne, was also convinced that this arrangement was not to be relied upon (HHStA, StA
Palatina, Karl. 12, Konv. 3: 16 Feb. 1637, Ferdinand, Elector of Cologne, to Maximilian I).
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the Palatinate question made at Prague might be necessary. At the end of December, the Bavarian
council issued its opinion: Maximilian should accept Taylor's proposal ifthe situation warranted it.25
Maximilian again asked his councillors to review the question in light of his rationes pro et
contra, a memorial detailing reasons for and against his insistence upon strict adherence to the
provisions accepted at Prague regarding the Palatinate. On the one hand, he pointed out reasons for
holding to the provisions, including that they obligated the Imperial estates to support the Emperor's
investiture of the electorate in the Bavarian line. On the other hand, Maximilian iterated reasons that
spoke for a compromise with England on the Palatinate question. The foremost among them was
that he could not feel secure in his possession of the electorate as long as no agreement was reached
with the English King and the Palatine family, whose cause continued to gamer the support of anti-
Habsburg powers. He could not rely upon the terms of Prague while the Palatines and their allies
refused to accept it: this was the main reason that Maximilian, despite his claims that he did not fear
English retaliation, dared not break off the diplomatic dialog with England on this question. Also,
if England allied with France and Sweden, as it would likely do, his attempts to exclude the
Palatinate question from general peace negotiations would certainly fail. Once the question was
taken up there, Maximilian's ability to influence the outcome would be limited. For this very reason
Maximilian was becoming very interested in the idea of settling the Palatinate question through
special negotiations of the affected parties, independent of a general peace congress.26 He acceded
^Haan, Regensburger Kurfilrstentag, 244.
26Albrccht, "Krieg- und Friedensziele," 264.
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that it was unreasonable to think that the electorate could be kept in the Bavarian line by military
force, and that it made much more sense to participate in negotiations for a compromise settlement
Upon careful consideration of the rationes, the Bavarian council judged on every point
against principled adherence to the terms of Prague, ifcircumstances required it. They argued that
Maximilian could depend on neither the other German princes nor the Emperor to defend his Palatine
gains in an emergency, and that if he did not modify his extreme stance, the negative attention of
Palatine supporters would be directed solely at Bavaria. The council therefore again strongly
recommended that Maximilian accept Taylor's proposal for the alternation of the electorate after his
direct line died out.27
While the Bavarian council was debating the fine points associated with Taylor's proposal,
the Emperor continued his quest for a viable compromise and again asked. Maximilian to reconsider
his stance on the Palatinate question. The Emperor's commitment to a compromise solution was
evident. On 31 December 1636, Ferdinand proposed yet another option for settling the problem,
namely that Charles Louis forgo the electorate in return for the restoration of the Upper and Lower
Palatinate, for which Maximilian would be financially compensated." When Imperial ministers met
with Bavarian councillors to discuss this proposal on 17 January 1637, the latter, however, fell back
on the opinion of the Elector of Mainz, which the Duke had solicited in the interim, rather than their
previous recommendations. The Elector had counseled against an alternation of the electorate or the
restoration of the Upper Palatinate, but had recommended that Maximilian continue the negotiations
27Haan, Regensburger Kurfurstentag, 246-7.
2*The exaction of payment for the Upper Palatinate was necessary for Ferdinand to redeem Upper
Austria, which he had pledged to Maximilian as security for the repayment of his war expenses and in
lieu of which he now held the Upper Palatinate.
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with England to prevent it from joining the enemy camp.39 The Imperial ministers, however,
informed the Bavarians that they would not get much further toward reaching an enduring settlement
with England with this tactic..'0 They warned that even ifthe King would be satisfied with the return
of the Lower Palatinate for the time being, they could not rely on this settlement, for as soon as
Charles Louis reestablished himself in the Empire, he would look for allies to support his pretensions
to the electorate and Upper Palatinate. These arguments again persuaded the Bavarian ministers that
the best course under the circumstances was to accept the proposal for the alternation of the
electorate. Maximilian was urged from several sides to resign himself to this eventuality.31
The fact that Maximilian asked for these opinions at all confirmed that he was willing to
consider compromises in favor ofa lasting settlement on the Palatinate question. He was seriously
considering a compromise solution for the regulation of the electorate, which remained the greatest
obstacle in the negotiations with England. To achieve an enduring settlement Maximilian recognized
that he would need to deal with England, and he therefore wished to establish a more positive
relationship with that nation. An episode of late December 1636 reflected his concern. At that time
^Haan, Regensburger Kurfurstentag, 247. At the beginning of February 1637, Maximilian also
requested the opinion of his brother Ferdinand, Elector of Cologne, on four questions regarding the
Palatinate: whether the resolution presented to the Earl of Arundel should be upheld; whether financial
compensation should be accepted for the Upper and Lower Palatinate; or alternatively, whether an
alternating solution for the electorate after the cessation of his line should be accepted; and finally,
whether discussion on the Palatinate question should be renewed in the electoral college. Ferdinand, in
consultation with their brother Albrecht, answered that he saw no reason to retreat from the resolution
presented to Arundel, though under certain circumstances the alternation of the electorate might be
considered after Maximilian's direct line died out, plus three further descendants of the Bavarian line
(HHStA, StA Palatina, Kan. 12, Konv. 3: 1637, Elector of Cologne to Maximilian I; ibid.: 16 Feb. 1637,
same to same).
"Indeed, one of the reasons Arundel had broken off his negotiations and left Regensburg was
because the Emperor had tried to exclude the electorate from the negotiations.
31Haan, Regensburger Kurfurstentag, 247-8.
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it came to the Emperor's ears that Arundel had informed Elizabeth that both the Emperor and the
King of Hungary had shown readiness to give England satisfaction, and that all the difficulties in
settling the affairs of the Palatinate emanated from the Duke of Bavaria. When Maximilian heard
this, he was concerned enough to send for Taylor and protest to him that he had indeed shown a
sincere desire to settle the dispute, but that Arundel's harshness had stood in the way of an
agreement. Taylor's only response was to point out that he had no orders to treat with Maximilian.32
This incident, however, illustrates Maximilian's concern to defend his reputation to England on this
point.
By the time the electoral meeting concluded on 23 February 163 7, the many conferences held
between Imperial and Bavarian councillors at Regensburg had laid the basis for Maximilian's
strategy for any further negotiations undertaken with England. He conceived ofthree different levels
of concessions that they might make to England, each of which they might successively offer if the
previous proposal did not satisfy the King. The first line was to hold to the Peace of Prague and
insist that the Palatine lands and titles remain with Bavarian line in perpetuity. When they had used
all diligence to press this arrangement and England still would not acquiesce, they should offer level
two concessions, that is, the restoration of the Lower Palatinate to the Prince Palatine, but the
electorate remaining with the Bavarian line until it died out. This was the official offer made to
Arundel in September 1636. However, if the King still refused this offer and threatened to break off
the negotiation, as a last resort they might offer third level concessions, namely the alternation ofthe
electorate after the expiry of Maximilian's direct line plus three further descendants of the Bavarian
i2CSPy 1636-9, 132: 27 Jan. 1637, Ballarino to D&S.
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line. The Upper Palatinate would remain with the Bavarian line and was not to be subject to
negotiation.33
In the end, however, the outcome of the electoral meeting at Regensburg left England with
little to be pleased about, at least on the surface. The King of Hungary had been elected as King of
the Romans, and the stipulations of the Peace of Prague regarding the Upper Palatinate and the
electoral dignity had been confirmed. Furthermore, the Duke of Bavaria had recorded his vote as
an elector of the Empire, thereby effectually stepping into the shoes of the Prince Palatine. The
setbacks that the Imperial army had suffered at the bands of the Swedes and French since September
and Imperial fears that England would join with them did not sufficientiy strengthen Taylor's
bargaining position.34 The answer the Emperor had finally given Taylor regarding the Palatinate on
29 January only confirmed what he had earlier offered to Arundel.35 With the closing ofthe electoral
meeting, Anglo-Imperial negotiations had reached nearly the same point they had been a year
previously, with the Imperial decree of 24 February. Despite the Emperor's efforts, a settlement on
the Palatinate had eluded him at the electoral meeting.36 Further, while Maximilian was privately
considering concessions on the electorate, he publicly continued to maintain his hard line. And the
33HHStA, StA Palatina, Kart, 12, Konv. 4: 21 Jan. 1638, Maximilian I to Ferdinand Id.
Maximilian justified the electorate remaining with three further descendants of the Bavarian line by
pointing out that the Palatines had not honored this same arrangement, which the Treaty of Pavia had
established in 1329, and instead kept it for themselves for almost 300 years.
"HMC, Denbigh V, 42: 2 Dec. 1636, Taylor to Feilding; ibid., 43: 29 Nov. 1636, same to same.
The Imperialists suffered a decisive defeat at the hands of the Swedes at Wittstock in October 1636.
35HHStA, StA England, Kart. 1, Konv. 4: 29 Jan. 1637, Ferdinand U to Taylor, ibid.: 30 Jan.
1637, Taylor to Ferdinand 11; ibid., StA Palatina, Kart. 12, Konv. 3: 29 Jan. 1637, Ferdinand II to Taylor,
PRO, SP 80/10, f. 75: 29 Jan. 1637, same to same.
'"Haan, Regensburger Kurjurstentag, 250.
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Spaniards, for their part, continued to demand their comenientias in return for their share of the
Lower Palatinate.
Still, there were grounds for hope. Even though the Spaniards had successfully insisted upon
the return of the Lower Palatinate, this did not mean that they were against restoring it to Charles
Louis. On the contrary, Olivares wanted to use it as a bargaining chip to secure England's assistance:
in late 1636, he instructed Onate to handle the Elector of Mainz's claims to areas of the Lower
Palatinate skillfully and to satisfy him without actually giving up any of the disputed territory, for
Spain needed it to win England's friendship. Thus he was willing to restore the Lower Palatinate to
the Prince Palatine, but naturally with a corresponding concession from England. Likewise, in the
course of the negotiations with England during the electoral meeting, Imperial ministers did not
doubt Spain's readiness to restore the Lower Palatinate in the interests of a settlement."
Furthermore, the Emperor continued to labor for a settlement, and Maximilian showed a new
willingness to compromise, born of self interest." They further resolved the business, though the
Emperor's memorial of 29 January did not reflect this, with Onate and Maximilian agreeing to the
restoration of the Lower Palatinate, the alternation of the electorate, and the way left open for
negotiations for the Upper Palatinate in the future. Maximilian's new-found flexibility even caught
"Ernst, 242.
"imperial ministers assured Taylor that the King of Hungary had persuaded Maximilian to
restore the Lower Palatinate and perhaps the Upper (the latter in return for financial compensation), and
accept the alternation of the electorate after the cessation of his direct line. According to Taylor, the
Emperor declared that he had consulted with the electors and those with an interest in the Palatinate (i.e.,
Spain and Bavaria), and determined that the greatest obstacle to an agreement was the point of the
electorate. However, Ferdinand believed this problem could be overcome startle linea Guilielmiana, or
before the Bavarian line died out (PRO, SP 80/10, f. 81: 10 Feb. 1637, Taylor to Aston; ibid.; ibid., f. 90:
16 May 1637: same to [?]).
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Ofiate off-guard, who believed he could rely on the Duke's recalcitrance to divert the blame away
from Spain for being the main obstruction to a settlement that would contribute to peace.39
Ominously, however, the wily Spaniard would not subscribe to this secret resolution unless they put
the negotiations for the restoration of the Palatinate solely into the hands of his son, who was
currently serving as the Spanish ambassador in England.40 Thus after the electoral meeting at
Regensburg, the Palatinate question remained an important issue in European pontics, and an Anglo-
Imperial solution to this problem, while certainly challenging, remained a possibility. As Taylor was
preparing to leave for Vienna to reassume his post there, the Emperor took the opportunity again to
declare to Taylor his readiness to reach a final settlement on the Palatinate.41
English Negotiations for an Alliance with France: A Brief Flirtation
While the electoral meeting was winding down, a disgruntled Arundel had returned to England and
informed the court that the Habsburgs were not willing to yield what England demanded for the
39Ibid.; ibid., f. 101: 22 Jan. 1638, same to same; CSP, vol. I, 787: 8 July 1637, same to
Windebank.
'""PRO, SP 80/10, f. 101 : 22 Jan. 1638, Taylor to [?]; CSP, vol. 1, 771: 27 June 1637, same to
Windebank. In Taylor's opinion, this was a ruse to prevent the negotiation from moving forward, and
Ofiate proposed it to maintain the illusion that Spain was not the main obstacle to an agreement Ofiate
felt compelled to take some action as Maximilian had shown himself to be more flexible than the
Spaniards ever thought he would (PRO, SP 80/10, f. 90: 16May 1637, same to [?]; ibid-, f. 101:22 Jan.
1638, same to same). As time would tell, Taylor hit close to the mark with this assessment As long as the
young Ofiate was in control of the negotiations with England, chances that a settlement would be reached
were slim, as he insisted upon Spain's convenientias as a prerequisite. Taylor reported that when he later
informed Radolt of Spain's proceedings in Regensburg, the latter was indignant (ibid., f. 9: 16 May 1637,
same to [?]). This is illustrative of Habsburg disunity on this question.
41HHStA, StA Palatina, Kart. 12, Konv. 3: 8 Feb. 1637, Opinion of privy council. Ferdinand also
requested that another plenipotentiary be sent to Vienna to continue the negotiations for a league. Charles,
however, was not willing to send yet another ambassador, particularly after the return of Arundel, who
had became one of the most zealous supporters of an alliance with the anti-Habsburg powers.
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Prince Palatine. As a result, the King turned away from the Habsburgs and instead toward Franoce
and its allies. In January 1637, the privy council decided that Charles should lend ships to bus
nephew with the aim of striking at Spanish shipping, and the King began seriously to entertaun
French overtures for an alliance. French diplomats had been angling for this alliance since 1634, dute
to the impending conflict between Spain and France, but they had only received a lukewarm
response whi le the Habsburg negotiations were underway and the peace party was ascendant at count.
The pro-French party, which included Queen Henrietta Maria, the Marquis ofHamilton, and the earrls
of Holland, Leicester, and Northumberland, as well as the Protestant supporters ofthe Palatine causae,
including Elizabeth, Charles Louis, Roe, Coke, and his secretary Georg Rudolf Wee kherlin, strongLly
supported the prospective alliance with France.42 These groups were united on this issue and rising
in the King's counsels. The peace party, which fragmented with the collapse of the Spanish maritime
treaty and Arundel's return from Regensburg, was unable or unwilling to mount any meaningfful
resistance, though a few powerful figures at court such as Laud and Windebank continued to express
opposition to war, into which a French alliance would surely draw England.43 Windebank declared
war a " remedy wors than the disease. "44 The continued duplicity of the Habsburgs, however, angered
the King, and he decided that a league with the anti-Habsburg powers was the surest way to recov»er
the Palatinate, even if it meant war.45 Under these circumstances, a French treaty seemed imminemt,
and for a time it seemed possible that England would enter the Thirty Years' War.
42CSPD 1637, 144-5: 24 May 1637,' Roe to Elizabeth.
43Laud, vol. 7, 367: [Sept] 1637, Laud to Wentworth; Smuts, "Puritan Followers," 36-9.
"HMO, Sixth Report, vol. I, 281: 20 Feb. 1637, Windebank to Feilding.
4SSharpe, Personal Rule, 541 .
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On 27 February 1637, Charles signed the French treaty with some emendations. By its terms
he promised to declare war on the Habsburgs, authorized the recruitment of6,000 men for the French
service, and agreed to lend France thirty ships for a new campaign against the Emperor. In return,
France promised to sign no peace treaty with the Emperor, Spain, or Bavaria without the full
restitution of Charles Louis to the Palatine lands and dignities. They also made provision to invite
Sweden and the United Provinces to join the alliance at a conference to be held at either Hamburg
or the Hague.46 The King quickly vested the Earl of Leicester with powers to conclude the treaty.
It only required France's ratification to take effect.
These events heralded the departure of Clement Radolt, the Imperial envoy to the English
court Radolt had become increasingly uncomfortable as the hostility toward the Habsburgs
mounted. Convinced of the fruitlessness of the Emperor's attempts to come to an agreement with
the English King, he again requested his recall. The Imperial privy council, however, decided that
he should remain in England and deliver the Emperor's 29 January declaration on the Palatinate.47
By the end of February, the combativeness of the English had reached such a level that Radolt
thought it unadvisable to deliver the decree. If the King's reaction to the announcement of the
election of the King of the Romans was any indication of the reception it would receive, all Radolt
'"Elmer A. Beller, "The Mission of Sir Thomas Roe to the Conference at Hamburg, 1638-40,"
£7//? 41 (Jan. 1926): 61-2.
47HHStA, StK Vortrage, Kart. 2, Konv. 2, f. 2: 4 Feb. 1637, Opinion of privy council.
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could expect for his pains was another insulting answer.4* In any event, Radolt reasoned, Taylor
would communicate the decree to his King.49
In spite of the uproar at the English court about the bad offices of the Habsburgs, Radolt
continued to state confidently that it was unlikely that England would openly break with the
Habsburgs or enter into an alliance with France, because of the climate of suspicion between
England and France and the difficulty of raising money for war without Parliament.50 Although the
will to ally against the Habsburgs was not lacking, Radolt had hopes that England would continue
to be locked into safe neutrality. And, though most at court regarded the offer made in the decree
as wholly inadequate and saw the decrees simply as a device to win time, Radolt believed that in the
end the King would be satisfied with what the Emperor had offered in the Palatinate. The envoy
cautioned the Emperor, however, that he would gain little from England in exchange for these
concessions — neither a treaty, nor good friendship, nor even ill will.51
Radolt finally received his long-awaited recall at the beginning of March and left England
with as little ceremony as when he had arrived. He reported that neither the King nor his ministers
4* For the King's response to the election, see p. 452. Moreover, Arundel had criticized the 29
January decree, which Radolt took as an indication of how the King would react to it
4,HHStA, StA Palatina, Kart 12, Konv. 3: 27 Feb. 1637, Radolt to Ferdinand III; ibid.: 28 Mar.
1637, Opinion of privy council.
^CSPV 1636-9, 132: 27 Jan. 1637, Ballarinoto D&S.
51HHStA, StA Palatina, Kart. 12, Konv. 3: 27 Feb. 1637, Radolt to Ferdinand III; ibid.: 28 Mar.
1637, Opinion of privy council; ibid.: 26 Apr. 1637, Radolt to Ferdinand III. He also reported that Taylor
did not have the requisite powers to continue the negotiation at the Imperial court, and thus he could not
understand why the ministers there continued to negotiate with him. Radolt mentioned the same to the
Hojkammer President (ibid.: 27 Feb. 1637, same to same; ibid.: 9 Jan. 1637, same to Hofkammer
President).
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took much notice ofhis leave-taking, due to the bad feeling that the recent Imperial declarations had
elicited in England. The English, in turn, complained of the "sudden and dry" manner in which the
envoy took his leave. Eager to return home, Radolt immediately requested his passports without
soliciting an answer to the decree of 29 January, as he had been directed to do." In response to his
request, "the king wished him a pleasant journey and in his presence directed one of the Secretaries
of state to give him the passport he required."53 The King speedily granted the passports, but Radolt
was displeased because they were the same as those given to even "the most ordinary persons."54
The King's failure to give him letters in reply to those he had presented upon his arrival at court also
offended him. The King declined to do so in order to avoid addressing Ferdinand as Emperor, as
Charles refused to acknowledge an election from which his nephew had been excluded.55 On top of
this, when Radolt requested that an English ship convey him to Flanders, he was told that none was
available. The English authorities finally granted his request, however, after he wrote to Arundel
"He did not do so for the reasons given above. Ibid., StA England, Kart. 21, Konv. 2, f. 3: 5 Feb.
1637, Ferdinand II to Radolt; ibid., StA Palatina, Kart. 12, Konv. 3: 26 Apr. 1637, Radolt to Ferdinand
In; CSPV 1636-9, 155:6Mar. 1637, Correr to D&S; ibid., 168: 20 Mar. 1637, same to same.
aCSPV 1636-9, 155: 6 Mar. 1637, Correrto D&S; HHStA, StA Palatina, Kart. 12, Konv. 3: 26
Apr. 1637, Radolt to Ferdinand III.
54lbid., StA England, Kart. 5, f. 77: 5 Mar. 1637, Passport for Radolr, CSPV 1636-9, 168: 20 Mar.
1637, Correr to D&S. Radolt complained about a clause in his passports that instructed customs officials
to take care that he did not pass with prohibited goods, pointing out that this order ran counter to the
liberties of transport granted him in the passports. However, when it became apparent that they would not
be reissued, Radolt accepted the situation without further fuss (Finet, 2 13).
SSCSPV 1636-9, 168: 20 Mar. 1636, Correr to D&S. Or from which the Elector of Trier, whom
the Emperor had under arrest, had been excluded (HHStA, StA Palatina, Kart. 12, Konv. 3: 9 Jan. 1637,
Radolt to King of Hungary).
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soliciting this favor.56 Despite all of this, the King offered Radolt the parting gift of a gold chain
worth £210, which he sent to the envoy at Dover, "by which it is thought his displeasure will be in
great measure dissipated."57
As Radolt journeyed home in the spring of 1637, the French negotiations, which at first had
seemed so promising, began to flounder. France's ratification of the treaty proved slow in coming.
In March, Richelieu referred its approval — and not just the addition ofFrench allies as confederates,
as originally agreed — to the conference planned for Hamburg on the pretense that France must first
consult with its allies. In addition, the French complained about the minor amendments that the
King had made to the treaty. These developments greatly annoyed him, and Charles Louis
complained to his mother that "tis true the King propounded the meeting at the Hague, or Hambourg,
to draw in the States and the Swedes, after the league was ratified between the two kings alone;
which the French will not do without the approbation of all the confederates."5* It seemed to the
'"Ibid., StA England, Kart. 5, f. 79: 13 Mar. 1637, Arundel to Radolt; ibid., StA Palatina, Kart.
12, Konv. 3: 26 Apr. 1637, Radolt to Ferdinand IIT; Finet, 213. Radolt was obliged to wait at Dover 16
days before the ship arrived. He finally landed at Dunkirk on 23 March (HHStA, StA Palatina, Kart. 12,
Konv. 3: 26 Apr. 1637, Radolt to Ferdinand III).
"CSPV 1636-9, 168: 20 Mar. 1637, Correr to D&S; Finet, 2 12. When Arundel heard about the
chain that the King intended for Radolt, he remarked, smiling, "it is more by 40 £ than 1 had from the
emperor." Finet observed, "It was most true, though strange, that the emperors present to that great lord
sent ambassador to him his majesty, having been but a small diamond ring of 160 £, which was sought to
be excused by some tender of Austrian honour, with saying that the emperor gave it him as a regale of his
love and not of his acknowledgement. It was made a question by others whether it had not been better
refused then accepted." (ibid., 213). Their remarks are interesting, for Imperial treasury records say the
Emperor gifted Arundel a diamond ring worth 2,850 gulden, or about £400 (HKA, HZAB 83 [1636-7], f.
105). Radolt left a golden chain to his granddaughter Maria Franzl, but did not indicate that it was the
chain in question. He did, however, leave to his grandson Wenzel Ludwig an honorary medal the King of
England had given him (HHStA, Oberstmarschallamt, Kart. 625: original will of 5 Nov. 1668, revised
and corrected on 5 Sept. 1670, published on 7 Dec. 1670).
"George Bromley, ed., A Collection of Original Royal Letters, Written by King Charles the First
and Second. King James the Second, and the King and Queen ofBohemia; Together with Original
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English that France was merely playing for time to ensure their neutrality, just as Spain had.59
Windebank noted in April that, in the negotiations with France, the King "is hetherto very ill used,
and Car. Richelieu playes his prize excellently." However the Secretary still believed that they
would conclude a treaty, and he continued his thought with the remark that "though ifhe [Richelieu]
refuses the King now he deserves rather a fool's cap than that of a Cardinal."60
Given the delays of the French in ratifying the treaty that they had formerly so eagerly
pursued, the King once again began to consider Habsburg overtures. The King's acceptance of the
Anglo-French treaty roused the Spanish ambassador, the young Ofiate, from his complacency, and
he briefly revived discussions about the Palatinate in the late spring of 1 637. The English ministers
struggled to ascertain the meaning of Spain's elusive convenient ias. When they discovered that
Spain expected discussions for the return of the Lower Palatinate to be based upon the secret
Cottington treaty of 163 1 — which would require no less than an English declaration ofwar against
the Dutch and little less with France, as the elder Ofiate had informed Arundel in Regensburg — the
talks came to an abrupt halt.61 Far from winning Charles away from France, the young Ofiate's
Letters. Written by Prince Rupert, Charles Louis Count Palatine, the Duchess ofHanover. And several
other distinguished Persons; From the Year 1619. to 1665 (London: Printed for John Stockdale, 1737),
86.
'9Gardiner, vol. 8, 218.
"HMC, Sixth Report, vol. I, 282: 1 1 Apr. 1637, Windebank to Feilding.
"CSP, vol. I, 779: 4 July 1637, same to Aston; ibid., 782: 30 Mar. 1637,' Ofiate's answer, ibid.:
13 Apr. 1637, same to Charles I; ibid., 784: 15 Apr. 1637, Charles I to Ofiate; ibid.: 22 May 1637, same
to same; ibid., 785: 22 May 1637, Annotations to previous; ibid., 786: 23 May 1637, Ofiate's articles;
CSPV 1636-9, 181: 10 Apr. 1637, Correrto D&S; ibid., 198: 8 May 1637, same to same; ibid., 209: 15
May 1637, same to same; ibid., 215: 29 May 1637, same to same. This exchange was yet another
example of the conflicting expectations of the two powers working to prevent any meaningful negotiation
between them. England's understanding was that the entire Palatinate would be restored up front in
exchange for a declaration of war against the Dutch, though this was not specifically mentioned in the
486
manner of treating created even more ill will against him at the English court. This lends credence
to Taylor's assertion that the elder Onate had referred the negotiations on the Palatinate into his son's
hands with the aim of drawing them out to gain time and ensure English neutrality. Taylor also
claimed, not without reason, that Spain's fear that the Emperor and Bavaria might actually offer
England an acceptable compromise settlement motivated this move.
Although these negotiations were fruitless, they served to shake France from its inactivity.
Unwilling to lose the English alliance to the Habsburgs, Richelieu quickly dropped his previous
demands and again proposed concluding an Anglo-French league which they would invite the Dutch
and Swedes to join at Hamburg, as originally suggested. England would then make its demands
known to the Habsburgs, and if they refused to meet them, France and England would strike an
offensive and defensive league and enter the war against the Habsburgs together.62 Charles was
favorably inclined to this reconditioned proposal, and he quickly dispatched envoys to the
Netherlands and Sweden to encourage their participation in the projected league.63
In the summer of 1637, the treaty appeared to be back on track. Many at the English court
fully expected its conclusion before the end of the year. Richelieu, however, again showed himself
to be in no hurry to ratify the treaty, much to the chagrin of its English supporters.64 While Charles
Cottington treaty. If the Habsburgs were only willing to return the Lower Palatinate, England would
correspondingly restrict its concessions to providing naval assistance and allowing them to levy troops in
Britain. The English, for their part, preferred the draft agreement that had been negotiated with Necolalde
in 1634 to the Cottington treaty.
■"Collins, vol. 2, 497-9: 16 June 1637, Leicester to Coke.
"Sharpe, Personal Rule, 534.
"CSPD 1637, 321: 22 July 1637," [Roe] to Ferentz.
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waited, France's allies pursued their own interests, which were not necessarily congruous with those
expressed in the Angle-French compact: Sweden and the Emperor attempted to negotiate a separate
peace; and the Dutch, who had enough enemies without antagonizing the Emperor, continued to
assert their sea power at England's expense. It was apparent that political agendas of the would-be
allies would be difficult to reconcile.65
The slow progress of the negotiations in Paris and the King's subsequent embroilment in
domestic affairs eventually conspired to block the alliance and precipitated a dramatic change in the
direction of English foreign policy. In July 1637, Charles was forced to turn his attention inward
when riots broke out in Scotland over the introduction of a new, "high-church" prayer book. With
this crisis brewing north of the English border, he again became more amenable to achieving the
restoration of his nephew by diplomatic means. Consequently, as in 1635, negotiations with the
Habsburgs became a more attractive option than pursuing the treaty with France. In November 163 7,
Sir Thomas Roe — that indefatigable Protestant supporter of the Palatine cause and enemy of Spain
— lamented at the deterioration of relations between England and France:
though there be nothing more safe than to put a bridle in the teeth of the House of
Austria, nothing more honourable, no time so opportune, no work more easy and
profitable, yet this action must be left to more generous times, and another age, who
will wonder at our blindness and want of courage.66
In many ways the French treaty was the first casualty of the Scots troubles, as Kevin Sharpe has
observed. In any case, the rebellion made it increasingly doubtful whether the King would be able
to make the military contributions that the treaty with France would require. Not surprisingly, the
"Ibid., 554-S: 20 Nov. 1637," Roe to same; Sharpe, Personal Rule, 534-5.
"CSPD 1637, 554-5: 20 Nov. 1637,' Roe to Ferentz.
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relations between the would-be allies continued to deteriorate as time went on. The French
predictably kept drawing out the negotiations in the hope ofprofiting from the domestic tensions in
England. On top of this, the King and some of his ministers suspected that France may have
encouraged its "auld" allies, the Scots, to rebellion, and further that France and its allies were
covertly supporting the rebels.67 By the end of the year, both Roe and Elizabeth became convinced
that the treaty would not come to fruition.6* When the conference at Hamburg finally convened in
1638, the breakdown of the Anglo-French treaty was practically a foregone conclusion.69 By this
time, Richelieu's only concession regarding the Palatinate was his promise to incorporate its
restoration into any peace settlement France made with the Habsburgs. In return, he expected
England immediately to enter the war on the anti-Habsburg side.70 To the King and his ministers,
these terms hardly seemed more attractive than those ofthe Habsburgs, who actually had control of
the Palatine lands and dignities.
67Sharpe, Personal Rule, 826-7.
aCSPD 1637-8, 7: 14 Dec. 1637, Elizabeth to Roe. Roe represented England at the Hamburg
talks, a post for which both Elizabeth and Charles Louis supported his appointment (CSPD 1637, 201: 17
June 1637, same to same; CSPD 1637-8, 7: 14 Dec. 1637, same to same; ibid., 47: Dec. 1637, Charles
Louis to same).
"Perhaps if the treaty had been concluded before the onset of the Scots troubles, as Kevin Sharpe
has argued, Charles may have gone to war against the Habsburgs. Plans for a French treaty, the decision
to put Charles Louis to sea and license privateering in the West Indies, and other preparatory steps for
war put this in the realm of possibility (Sharpe, Personal Rule, 536). Arundel and Holland both supported
the King's "send[ing] out ships to annoy the Spaniards in the West Indies." (CSPD 1637, 252: 9 July
1637, Newsletter of C. Rossingham; ibid., 336: 29 July 1637," Roe to Charles Louis). In June, the King
appointed them to his council of war (ibid., 224: 27 June 1637, Charles I to Arundel, et al.). Still, in spite
of his bellicose moves, the King would have wished to avoid the military commitment that the treaty with
France would entail.
70Gardiner, vol. 8, 375-6.
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Negotiations at the Imperial Court, 1637
In spite of (or perhaps because of) the King's negotiations for a French treaty, his discussions with
the Habsburgs never came to a halt. Lord Aston continued to represent English interests at the court
of Spain, as did Gerbier at that of the Cardinal Infante. After the closing of the electoral meeting at
Regensburg, Taylor did his best to continue his negotiations at the Imperial court in Vienna, where
he had returned by late February 1637.71 However, this turned out to be a greater challenge than he
had bargained for. After the death of Ferdinand II72 on 15 February 1637, Charles I's refusal to
recognize the King ofHungary as the Emperor Ferdinand III severely limited Taylor's role. This was
because the King considered the election invalid on the grounds that his nephew had not taken part.
Taylor therefore found himself in a very uncomfortable position since the King would neither reply
to the Emperor's letters announcing his election or bis father's death, nor send Taylor fiesta
credentials to treat with the Emperor.73 The King would not allow Taylor publicly to give Ferdinand
the Imperial title, only that of Majesty, in recognition of his status as King of Hungary. IfTaylor
felt compelled to use the Imperial title, he should do so only as a private person and not as a
representative of the King of England.74
7lOn 10 February he was still in Regensburg and planned to leave in few days; he had returned to
Vienna by 4 March (PRO, SP 80/10, f. 8 1: 10 Feb. 1637, Taylor to Aston; ibid., f. 88: 4 Mar. 1637, same
to Secretary).
72 Lamormaini extolled the late Emperor's Catholic virtues in Virtutes Ferdinandi tt, which laid
the foundation for the dynastic myth of the pietas Austriaca. Ferdinand II had long been experiencing
health problems (see chap. 10, n. 93).
"CSP, vol. 1, 769-70: 20 June 1637, Taylor to Windebank; ibid., 773: 27 June 1637, same to
same.
74Aston was directed to do the same in April 1638 (ibid., vol. 2, 9: 3 1 Apr. 1638, Secret
instructions for Aston).
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In spite of these difficulties, during the following two years Taylor doggedly continued to
represent English interests at the Imperial court the best he knew how. He repeatedly requested
recognition of the new Emperor and official authority to negotiate, and encouraged serious
consideration of an alliance with the Habsburgs. He grew increasingly aggravated the longer these
requests went unheeded and did not omit to point out the injury this inflicted on the Palatine cause.75
In a characteristic put-off in April 1638, over a year after Ferdinand II's death, Windebank brusquely
replied to Taylor's repeated requests for credentials: "For [the] powers which you so earnestly desire,
his Majesty will enable you with such as shall be fit in bis own best time, and in the mean time you
must quiet yourself and submit to his wisdom."76 Taylor would wait in vain. Until his departure
from Vienna in the spring of 1639, the King and Windebank used his services only unofficially,
mainly for news gathering, gauging the political climate at the Imperial court, and exploiting any
opportunity to advance Palatine cause that might present itself. As before, bis optimism and
particularly his lack of full powers to negotiate a settlement limited his effectiveness in this role.
The result was that Taylor was no longer accredited as an envoy to the Emperor. At the
Imperial court he gave out that he was only staying on in Vienna in a private capacity — a perception
"PRO, SP 80/10, f. 93: 23 May 1637, Taylor to [?]; ibid., f. 98: 17 Oct. 1637, same to same;
ibid„ ff. 100-1: 22 Jan. 1638, same to same; Cambridge University Library, Dd. 8. 35, f. 93: 1639,
Taylor's relation of his negotiation, Nov. 1636-Apr. 1639; Bodl. Lib., Clarendon Mss. 14, f. 61: 12 May
1638, Taylor to Windebank; ibid., f. 113: 15 July 1637, same to same; CSP, vol. I, 769: 20 June 1637,
same to same; ibid., 771: 27 June 1637, same to same; ibid., 787: 8 July 1637, same to same; ibid., 790:
15 July 1637, same to same; ibid., 795: 22 July 1637, same to same; CCSP, vol. I, 140: 16 Sept. 1637,
same to same; ibid.: 23 Sept. 1637, same to same; ibid.: 7 Oct. 1637, same to same; ibid., 145: 16 Dec.
1637, same to same; ibid.: 29 Dec. 1637, same to same; ibid., 149: 9 Mar. 1638, same to same; ibid., 152:
5 May 1638, same to same; ibid., 154: 29 June 1638, same to same; ibid.: 7 July 1638, same to same;
ibid., 155: 7 Aug. 1638, same to same; ibid., 156:21 Aug. 1638, same to same.
76Bodl. Lib., Clar. Mss. 14, f. 22: 9 Apr. 1638, Windebank to Taylor.
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that the English government wished to perpetuate given its negotiations for a French treaty. In spite
of Taylor's attempts to uphold this artifice, however, neither the Imperial court nor the foreign
ministers in residence there believed it, as they knew that he continued to receive letters and
instructions from England.77 Francesco Zonca, the Venetian Secretary in London, hit the closest to
the mark when he stated that while Taylor did not receive fresh credentials, with the King's
connivance some ofhis councillors sent letters directing him to stay in Vienna with the intention of
sending him instructions and credentials once he made a promising opening.7* Also, Taylor sent
regular weekly dispatches back to England and was practically paid in full by the time he left
Vienna.79 A man of modest means, Taylor could not afford to stay in Vienna without financial
support. The fact that the financially strapped government of Charles I, which was notoriously
77For instance, Taylor often delivered his memorials to Count TrauttmansdorfF instead of directly
to the Emperor (HHStA, StA England, Kart. I, Konv. 4: 8 Apr. 1637, Taylor to Ferdinand III; ibid.: 13
Apr. 1637, same to same; and ibid., StA Patatina, Kart. 13, Konv. 1 : 25 Jan. 1639, same to same).
nCSPV 1636-9, 385: 12 Mar. 1638, Francesco Zonca, Venetian Secretary in England, to D&S.
"A warrant to the Exchequer of May 1 637 to pay Taylor £ 1,000, for instance. This document
referred to him as the "English agent at Vienna" and indicated that of the allotted amount, part was for
sums already disbursed by Taylor, but "the rest he is to disburse in our further service." In 1638, he was
paid for his exertions in the King's "secret service." (PRO, SP 16/355, f. 47: 13 May 1637, Warrant to pay
Taylor, ibid., Treasury 56, Various Warrants, vol. 12, f. 1: 13 May 1637, Privy seal to pay same; ibid., f.
12: 3 May 1638, same; ibid., Treasury 56/4, f. 54: 24 Oct. 1637, Warrant to pay same the remaining
£500; PRO, SP 80/10, ff. 103-6: 26 Jan. 1638, Taylor's accounts, Sept. 1635-Mar. 1638; ibid., SP 16/393,
f. 67: 2 July 1638, Notes of various payments made to Taylor upon privy seals dated lODec. 1633-3 May
1638). By January 1639, three months before he left Vienna, Taylor had received all but £66 of the
£3,566 he claimed during his three-and-a-half-year stay there (ibid., SP 80/10, f. 1 19: 5 Jan. 1639,
Taylor's accounts, Mar. 1638-Mar. 1639). Despite this, Taylor complained constantly of lack of funds. In
June 1638, he lamented "I have served now his Majesty these 10 years, where of! have not lived one
year at home, in continual journeys and dangers, without any reward at all; and am thereby become a
great deal poorer than I was, when first I came to his royal service. I see this business will be drawn
again out at length, which hitherto, like Sisyphus' stone, rolleth to the bottom of the hill, when it hath
been brought up. I do not refuse to serve, so long as I may be of any use, but my continual absence from
my wife and children is to me and them much a discomfort...." (Bodl. Lib., Clar. Mss. 14, f. 120: 21 July
1638, Taylor to Windebank).
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delinquent in paying its representatives, came through with Taylor's showed that maintaining his
presence there was considered a priority. As Zonca further observed: "He [Taylor] is paid from the
king's purse, he writes to Court, they write to him and he exercises every function of a minister of
the state, although they will not admit that he is one."*0 The Imperial ministers therefore continued
to consider Taylor's offers and regard him as the King's representative." Their willingness to do so
can be attributed at least in part to the Emperor's desire to reach an agreement on the Palatinate
question. Even when the young Onate's negotiation in England strained relations between England
and the Habsburgs, Taylor went about "fostering confidential relations with the [Imperial] ministers
here he has been observed, with great astonishment, to be negotiating at length with Count Slich
[Schlick], and in the midst of all the existing ill feeling he is well received and treated amicably."*2
Although it was apparent to all at the Imperial court that Taylor remained there by the King's
command and in his pay, the English ministers continued to uphold the artifice that he did so of his
own volition. This was done in part for the benefit of the French, who did not appreciate the
presence of an English envoy at the court of one of the very powers against which England and
France were ostensibly attempting to ally. IfTaylor were conducting any negotiations on Palatine
affairs in Vienna, the English ministers maintained, he was doing so in a private capacity without
sanction from London. The English government went to great lengths to emphasize this point, and
mCSPV 1636-9, 385: 12 Mar. 1638, Zonca to D&S.
*1CSPV 1636-9, 320: 14 Nov. 1637, Ballarino to same; ibid., 486: 8 /an. 1639, Giovanni Grimani,
Venetian ambassador in Germany, to same.
cIbid., 268: 12 Sept. 1637, Ballarino to same.
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Charles even went as far as to claim that ifTaylor were negotiating in his name, he would have him
hanged.*3
Although his government's refusal to acknowledge the true nature of his activities was
troublesome, Taylor loyally remained in Vienna for the following two years and continued to work
toward the realization of an Anglo-Imperial agreement on the Palatinate. He continued to try to
persuade the Emperor and his ministers that finding acompromise solution to the Palatinate question
was necessary and achievable. While Taylor retained his faith of the good intentions of the Emperor
and Maximilian toward the business, he was a good deal less sanguine about those ofthe Spaniards.*4
He declared their denial of the resolution taken at Regensburg and their stubborn insistence on their
convenientias before they made any restoration as the greatest impediment to an agreement in these
years.*' From Taylor's perspective, this behavior was particularly egregious after their earlier
professions of willingness to come to an agreement. The Spaniards in fact later admitted to having
S3Ibid., 191: 25 Apr. 1637, same to same; ibid., 228: 19 June 1637, Correr to same; ibid., 261: 4
Sept. 1637, same to same.
"Taylor was sure that the Emperor, who desired peace and was bent on settling the Palatinate
question, would readily assent to an agreement. Because of his willingness to treat and the Spaniards'
obstructionism, Taylor urged the Emperor to send an envoy of his own to England to remove the business
from the young Onate's hands. Taylor also maintained his confidence in Maximilian, who had shown an
inclination to compromise as well (PRO, SP 80/10, f. 97: 22 Sept 1637, Taylor to [?]; ibid., f. 101: 22
Jan. 1638, same to same). According to Taylor, at Regensburg Maximilian had agreed to greater
concessions than the Spaniards ever thought he would, thus putting them in the difficult position of being
the main obstruction to a settlement that would contribute to peace (ibid., f. 90: 16 May 1637, same to
same; ibid., f. 101: 22 Jan. 1638, same to same; CSP, vol. 1, 787: 8 July 1637, same to Windebank).
"PRO, SP 80/10, f. 90: 16 May 1637, Taylor to [?]; ibid., ff. 92-3: 23 May 1637, same to same;
ibid., f. 94: IS Aug. 1637, same to same; ibid., f. 97: 22 Sept. 1637, same to same; ibid., f. 101:22 Jan.
1638, same to same; Bodl. Lib., Clar. Mss. 14, f. 29: 31 Mar. 1638, same to Windebank; CSP, vol. 1,
771-2: 27 June 1637, same to same; ibid., 787: 8 July 1637, same to same; ibid., 790: 1 5 July 1637, same
to same; CCSP, vol. 1, 139: 2 Sept. 1637, same to same; ibid., 143: 18Nov. 1637, same to same; ibid.,
145: 16 Dec. 1637, same to same; HMC, Denbigh V, 57: 29 May 1638, same to Feilding.
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supported the Regensburg resolution, but declared it was secret.*6 Taylor wrote darkly in September
that "it is certaine that Spain and none butt Spain doth now hinder this business."*7 He accused the
Spanish ambassadors Ofiate and Castaneda in Vienna and particularly the young Onate in London
of impeding rather than promoting the settlement of the Palatinate question." Regardless, Taylor
had finally reconciled himself to the fact that there was no chance of obtaining full restoration for
Charles Louis, "notwithstanding all their [the Spaniards'] promises in black and white."*9 Despite
the obstacles posed by Spain's demands, Taylor still believed that the negotiations with the
Habsburgs presented the best opportunity for achieving a satisfactory compromise settlement.90 He
thought that an agreement with the Spaniards was possible, but that they currently were asking too
much in return for the satisfaction they would provide.
"PRO.SP 80/10, f. 101:22 Jan. 1638, Taylor to [?].
"Ibid., f. 97: 22 Sept. 1637, same to same.
MIbid.,f. 101:22 Jan. 1638, same to same; CSP, vol. 1,771:27 June 1637, same to Windebank.
'9BodI. Lib., Clar. Mss. 12, f. 99: 5 Aug. 1637, same to same; ibid., f. 162: 23 Sept. 1637, same to
same; ibid., ff. 192-3: 21 Oct. 1637, same to same.
Baylor made it clear that did not see the universal peace conference planned for Cologne as a
workable alternative to negotiating with the Habsburgs (CSP, vol. I, 769-70: 20 June 1637, Windebank to
Taylor, ibid., 792: IS July 1637, same to same; cf. CSPD 1637, 370: 24 Aug. 1637, Coke to Edward,
Viscount Conway and Killultagh). So long as the King did not ally with one side or the other, Leicester
did not believe he would receive satisfaction at the Cologne conference either (Collins, vol. 2, 434-S: 2
Nov. 1636, Leicester to Coke). The papal legate, Cardinal Genetri, arrived in Cologne in October 1636,
but none of the powers that had earlier professed (or feigned) interest in participating sent representatives
to meet him there. France and Spain did not trust in the Pope's impartiality, while the Protestant powers
rejected his mediation outright. For more on the Pope's promotion of a general peace in the 1630s and the
conference planned for Cologne, see: Konrad Rcpgen, Romische Kurie, vol. 1; Fritz Dickmann, Der
Westfalische Frieden (Munster: AschendorfF, 1972), 77-90; and Augusta Leraan, "Origines du Congres
de Cologne," Revue d'histoire ecclesiastique 19 (1923): 370-83. The conference never really got off the
ground because of the diplomatic conflicts around the question of passports for the allies of Sweden and
France (see below, n. 179).
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Taylor was not the only one whom the Spaniards' behavior disappointed. The Emperor and
his ministers also began to resent their moves to obstruct a settlement and denials of the Regensburg
resolution." It was true that the imperialists wished for Spain to profit from an agreement on the
Palatinate question, but they did not want the business to break over Spain's demands.92 For example
in June 1637, Count Schlick, the president of the Imperial council ofwar (Hqfkriegsraf), complained
bitterly to Taylor of Spain's extravagance in prolonging the war and the young Ofiate's proceedings
in England.93 The Austrians, who were still looking for a way to a reasonable and acceptable
agreement, moved to breathe new life into the negotiation "because they conceived that the
Spaniards had proceeded herein, much to the ostentation of their owne Greatnes and to the
disesteeme and lessning that of the Empire. This made them desirous to take more Authority unto
themselves then before they had."94 The Emperor was "unwilling that these warrs should by that
means [Spain's demands for convenientias] be continued and the whole empire for the quarrells of
Spain kept in continuall trouble and conbustion."95 Taylor took advantage of the situation to
encourage the Imperialists to "make themselves more Masters of the business then before they were,
which they had (and were sory for it) too much putt over to others."96 To this end, he spoke out
9lPRO, SP 80/10, f. 97: 22 Sept. 1637, Taylor to [?]; CSP, vol. 1, 770: 20 June 1637, same to
Windebank; ibid., 772: 27 June, same to same; ibid., 787: 8 July 1637, same to same.
92PRO, SP 80/10, f. 92: 23 May 1637, same to [?].
r'CSP, vol. 1, 772: 27 June 1637, same to Windebank.
wBodl. Lib., Clar. Mss. 16, f. 52: 1639, Taylor's relation of his negotiation, Nov. 1636-Apr. 1639.
9SPRO, SP 80/10, f. 101 : 22 Jan. 1638, Taylor to [?].
^Bodl. Lib., Clar. Mss. 16, f. 52: 1639, Taylor's relation.
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against the ill offices of the elder Ofiate in Germany and his son in England, which had brought the
business to "great distemper."97
Ferdinand III did not require much encouragement from Taylor. From the beginning ofhis
reign, he intended to be more independent ofhis allies than his father had been. Count Schlick told
Taylor that "the Emperor did much love and honour them [the Spaniards]; but as they could not turn
and twine him at their pleasure as they had done his father, and when he was once resolved he held
on his way whatsoever they said or did." The Emperor was encouraged to this by his closest
advisors, counts Stadion and Trauttmansdorff. Just as Trauttmansdorff and other moderates wished
the Emperor to place the interests of the Empire before those of religion where the two came into
conflict, they also wished him to do the same where dynastic interests were concerned. This was not
lost on Olivares, who resented the Imperial councillors who, as he saw it, were always diverting their
master from the dynastic line ofduty." Olivares complained that under TrauttmansdorfFs direction,
the Emperor's policy was becoming too Imperial: "His [Trauttmansdorff s] first maxim is that the
Emperor should not be a partisan of ours, but merely Imperial, and neutral in everything else."99
Thus while Ferdinand III was always happy to take Spanish money, he had no wish to let his
pocketbook dictate his policy. Peace was his priority. He had more than enough difficulties of his
"According to Taylor, Castaneda was also suspect. The English envoy complained that the
Spaniard resented his interference and "began to cunningly putt staves and hindrances upon my designes,
and as much as he could, went about also to discredit my person." (ibid.).
9*Albrecht, Maximilian /, 960. The Emperor's desire to break free of Spain's influence was soon
noted in England: "The new Emperor is very well spoken of, he is reported to be of a gentle and placate
disposition, hath removed many of his father's Counsellors, banished the Jesuits out of his Court, made
new ones of his own friends." (Strafford, vol. 2, 73: 8 May 1637, R. G. Garrard to Wentworth).
"Quoted in Elliott, Olivares, 544.
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own in Germany, particularly after the fall of Breisach in 1638, and the closer he drew to Spain, the
harder it would be for him to reach a peace settlement with France and Sweden. 100 Political
consideration of his own dominions and branch of the House of Habsburg reached its height when,
against his inclination, Ferdinand accepted the clauses pertaining to Spain in the Westphalian peace
treaty.101 His desire for an independent policy and wish for peace boded well for the English
negotiations. He continued to make attempts to move negotiations on the Palatinate question
forward, despite Spanish reticence, because he understood that its settlement would help lay the
groundwork for a durable peace.
Because he desired peace, the news of England's plans to join with the anti-Habsburg side
was most unwelcome to the Emperor. When he heard of the King's agitation against the Habsburgs
and bis negotiations for an alliance with the French and the Dutch reached Vienna, the Emperor and
his ministers became quite apprehensive ofan open breach.102 The Emperor received many reports
ofthe dangerous machinations ofEngland, France, the Dutch, Sweden, and their preparations for war
against the Habsburgs in the Empire and the Low Countries. 103 Maximilian related that England had
struck an offensive alliance with France, and that the King was supplying the Prince Palatine with
100Ibid.
""Konrad Repgen, "Ferdinand III., 1637-1657," in Kaiser der Neuzeit, 160-1. This move clouded
relations between the Emperor and Spain, though not permanently.
l02HHStA, StK Vortrage, Kart. 2, Konv. 2, ff. 9- 10: 4 May 1637, Opinion of privy council
regarding the King of England's agitation regarding the Palatinate; ibid., f. 11: 12 May 1637, Opinion of
privy council; ibid., RK KrA, Fasz. 121, Konv. 2, ff. 74-8: 19 Oct. 1637, same.
103HHStA, RK KrA, Fasz. 1 19, Konv. I, f. 1 13: 1 1 Feb. 1637, Elizabeth to Landgrave of Hesse-
Kassel; ibid., f. 160: 6 Mar. 1637, Michael von Mentzel to Ferdinand III; ibid., ff. 185-6: 28 Mar. 1637,
Elector of Cologne to same; ibid., ff. 272-3: 1 1 May 1637, Mentzel to same; ibid., ff. 380- 1: 30 June
1637, Ferdinand ID to Elector of Saxony.
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eight warships, 10,000 men, and £10,000. Further, he reported that England, France, Sweden,
Holland, and Hesse-Kassel were planning to meet in August in Hamburg to discuss their peace
terms. 104 Michael Mentzel, the Imperial resident in Hamburg, related that England would lend forty
ships to France, both France and Sweden had permission to levy troops in England and Scotland, and
the allies would blockade Flemish seaports and provide the Prince Palatine with 20,000 men.105
There were even more fanciful reports that the anti-Habsburg confederates would join with the
Ottomans, Tartars, and the Prince of Transylvania in an alliance against the Emperor aod attack
Hungary and the crown lands.106
On top of these reports, Radolt bad returned to the Imperial court, and in early May he made
a final relation describing the English court and government, including the King and Queen mad their
courts, the privy council, leading ministers and noblemen, the military establishment, and sources
of revenue. 107 He reported that the King took many important decisions himself, without tIme advice
ofhis councillors. Only a very tight circle ofcouncillors was involved in foreign affairs, an-d Radolt
thus had difficulty discovering their deliberations. Among them were Laud, Arundel, Holland, and
the two secretaries; sometimes the King consulted only one or two of them and many times none
104Ibid., Fasz. 119, Konv. 2, ff. 82-4: 16 July 1637, Maximilian I to Ferdinand III.
I05lbid., f. 103: 22 July 1637, Mentzel to same.
106Ibid., Fasz. 120, ff. 135-6: 28 Aug. 1637, same to same; ibid., ff. I72-3: 5 Sept 1637, JReport
about diplomatic negotiations; ibid., Fasz. 121, Konv. 3, ff. 73-6: 25 Nov. 1637, Report from a "trusted
person" in Stockholm; ibid., ff. 133-4: 12 Dec. 1637, same.
I07Ibid., StA England, Kart. 18, Konv. 1820, ff. 35-41: 5 May 1637, Radolt to Ferdinand HI. To
this relation Radolt appended documents on the King's annual income, royal palaces, the counties, the
status of Catholics, and epitaphs from St. Peter's (ibid., Kart. 5, ff. 88-91: 6 May 1636, Epitaphs from St.
Peter's; ibid., ff. 104-5: 1637, King of England's annual income; ibid., ff. 106-8: 1637, List of roval
residences and parks; ibid., ff. 109-12: 1637, English counties and their characteristics).
499
except a secretary. Windebank, who was generally well-affected to the Habsburg cause, was one of
the few English ministers who deigned to receive Radolt, and even he did not do so often. Since
Arundel's return to England, the King and most ofhis ministers had turned away from the Habsburgs
and toward France. Given the din of voices raised against the Habsburgs at the English court, even
Windebank was no longer openly advocating a Habsburg alliance. Regarding England's military
establishment, Radolt remained unimpressed by the land forces at its disposal. However, he
confirmed that the King commanded the most formidable navy in Europe, amounting to nearly 40
warships, which when supplemented by the merchant fleet totaled 100 armed vessels ranging from
five to 600 tons and outfitted with twenty to thirty or more pieces of artillery.10* If England and
France concluded an alliance, as at this point it seemed they would, these resources would be brought
to bear against the House ofAustria.
Taking advantage of the Emperor's worries that England would join France ifthe Habsburgs
did not take action, Taylor encouraged the Emperor to circumvent the young Ofiate by sending
another envoy to England to discuss the question of the Palatinate and a possible alliance. He
recommended the Emperor send Count Leslie, the Scottish soldier who had made a name for himself
in the Emperor's service, but in a private capacity in order to avoid the uncomfortable issues that
arose from the King's refusal to recognize the Emperor officially. Once the King had received some
satisfaction, Taylor believed, he would then recognize the Emperor and receive his ministers
publicly. He emphasized the urgency of the situation, as the French treaty was near conclusion, but
10*Ibid., Kart. 18, Konv. 1820, ff. 38-9: 5 May 1637, Radolt to Ferdinand III. Radolt estimated the
King's annual income at 6,975,200 florins or £1,162,533, from which the fleet was maintained, but still
suspected he was overspending (ibid., Kart 5, ff. 104-5: 1637, King of England's annual income).
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assured the Emperor that if he acted quickly the situation could still be salvaged.109 The Emperor,
however, decided against this idea, giving as his reason the King's refusal to answer his letters."0
If the negotiation on the Palatinate question was to progress, another way would have to be
found. The King adamantly refused to send another plenipotentiary to Vienna, as the Emperor had
requested, and he himself had decided against dispatching an envoy to England.1" The Emperor
therefore suggested to Taylor a conference of English, Bavarian, and Habsburg ambassadors at
Brussels to deal with the problem. While in Prague, where the Imperial court had moved in early
June, Kurz, who had become Vice Chancellor after the death of Stralendorf earlier in the year,
extended in the Emperor's name an invitation for England to participate in a conference at Brussels,
where the powers with an interest in the Palatinate would send ambassadors with plenipotentiary
powers finally to conclude a settlement on this question. Kurz declared to Taylor:
First that the King bis Master [the Emperor] had proceeded really and sincerely with
his Majesty in the business of the Palatinate, and that he desired nothing more than
to see a good and happy end of it: That it was certain, that at Ratisbone, a Resolution
was taken what to doe and how farr to proceed in it: That for the effecting of this, he
found that the best meanes wold be to meete at some place againe about it, and
because the King would not send to him, he thought Bruxels the most convenient"2
""HHStA, StA England, Kart. I, Konv. 4: 13 Apr. 1637, Taylor to Ferdinand III; ibid.: 8 June
1637, same to same; ibid.: 17 June 1637, same to same. He told the Emperor that France was making
very enticing promises and was willing to settle for a defensive league if the King would not enter into an
offensive one. Also, Radolt said that troops were being levied in England and Scotland, which the Swedes
were angling to obtain for their war effort. Finally, he pointed out that the fleet would set sail any day.
"°CSP, vol. 1, 771: 27 June 1637, Taylor to Windebank; Bodl. Lib., Clar. Mss. 16, f. 52: 1639,
Taylor's relation.
1"HHStA, StA Palatina, Kart. 13, Konv. 4: 21 Jan. I63S, Maximilian I to Ferdinand III.
"2Bodl. Lib., Clar. Mss. 16, f. 52: 1639, Taylor's relation. This was not the first Taylor had heard
of the proposed meeting at Brussels. Walderode had mentioned it before the court left Vienna in June:
"because this was a business which concerned divers, the Emperor, having often consulted it
, found,
nothing more convenient than (what formerly at Vienna he said unto me by the Secretary Walderode) that
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The Emperor promised that if Spain or Bavaria insisted upon unreasonable terms, he would use his
authority to moderate their demands. He declared that he and Maximilian were ready to send their
plenipotentiaries "as soon as they understood the King's liking unto it""3
The plan for a conference at Brussels to address the Palatinate question was first promoted
by the Habsburg side."4 It was a joint effort, for at the same time that the Emperor made an
approach to Taylor, the young Onate made one in England as well."5 Taylor claimed that at the
time, he voiced dislike for the idea, particularly because of the Spaniards' excessive demands.
Instead he continued to recommend that the Emperor send an envoy, preferably Leslie, to London
his Majesty would be pleased to send his Ambassador to Brussels, whither the Emperor also and Duke of
Bavaria would send...." (CSP, vol. 1, 771: 27 June 1637, Taylor to Windebank).
"3Ibid. In fact, at this time the Emperor already intended to send the representative he designated
for Cologne to Brussels as well. Taylor believed that Leslie, whom he had continually supported to lead
an Imperial mission to England, was designed for this post (ibid., 773).
"*There has been some debate about from which side this suggestion originated. Erhard Blesch
believes it came from the Princess Phalzburg (Erhard Blesch, Restitution der Pfalz und Beziehungen Karl
Ludwigs zu England [Heidelberg: Horning, 1891], 14). M. Koch, on the other hand, writes that Taylor
was the originator of the plan and that he approached the Emperor about it for the first time on 24
December 1637 (M. Koch, Geschichle des Deutschen Reiches unter der Regierung Ferdinands Til
[Vienna: Carl Gerald's Sohn, 1865-6], vol. 1, 93-4). Karl Schweinesbein, who relies on Koch, takes this
view as well (Schweinesbein, 4 1). The first approach to Taylor, however, was made by the Emperor. It
should be noted more generally that Koch's work is not always reliable and should be used with care.
Gardiner merely states that Taylor "put forward" the project without the authority to do so (Gardiner, vol.
8, 377). The editors of the Calendars ofSlate Papers Venetian maintain that Maximilian suggested the
referral of the Palatine's affairs to a conference at Brussels, after the tatter's exclusion from the Cologne
conference {CSPV 1636-9, xxxii). This may be so, but the idea for the conference did not emanate from
Maximilian.
"5In July 1637, Aston reported that the young Onate had informed the Spanish court that the
King had consented to treat at Brussels (BL, Add. Mss. 364S0, f. 142: 1 July 1637,' Aston to
Windebank). Windebank wrote in June 1639 that the young Onate had first put the proposition forward
(CSP, vol. 2, 48: 10 June 1639, Windebank to Charles I). Grimani later reported that Taylor's downfall
resulted from the fact that "he [Taylor] hath been too busy in the treaty at Brussels, taking it upon trust
from the Spanish ministers, from whom originally and not from him it had beginning." {CSPV 1636-9,
523: 9 Apr. 1639, Grimani to D&S).
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to remove the negotiation there from the young Oftate's hands. Still, be promised that he would
advertise their proposal to the King."6
After the Imperial court returned to Vienna later that summer, the Imperialists continued to
lobby for a conference at Brussels, but Taylor also continued to avoid giving an answer, quite
possibly because he had not received instructions from England on how to handle the situation."7
In October, the Emperor again renewed his invitation and reiterated his promise to hold to the
resolutions taken at Regensburg and moderate the demands of Spain and Bavaria.1" He also made
it known to Taylor that he would no longer entrust the negotiations with England to the Spaniards.
Thus he refused to send the Cardinal Infante the powers that he would need to negotiate on the
Emperor's behalf at Brussels. 119 Despite the Emperor's declarations, Taylor remained skeptical about
the proposed conference. The Venetian Ballarino observed that "he [Taylor] no longer listens to
their cajoleries having been deluded so many times in the past."1^
Although Taylor was unsure about the proposed conference at Brussels, he still considered
negotiations with the Habsburgs to be the most promising of the King's options for regaining the
Palatinate. Thus at the same time that Taylor was temporizing about the conference, he was
"6HHStA, StA England, Kart. I, Konv. 4: 8 June 1637, Taylor to Ferdinand III; ibid.: 17 June
1637, same to same; Bodl. Lib., Clar. Mss. 16, ff. 52-3: 1639, Taylor's relation.
117PRO, SP 80/10, f. 94: 15 Aug. 1637, Taylor to Windebank; ibid., f. 96: 22 Sept. 1637, same to
[?]'
"'Ibid., f. 98: 17 Oct 1637, same to same.
U9CCSP, vol. 1, 142: 28 Oct. 1638, same to Windebank. The Spaniards were apparently hoping
he would do so. Aston reported to Windebank in February 1638 that the Cardinal Infante was empowered
to negotiate and conclude a treaty for the Emperor as well as Spain (BL, Add. Mss. 36450, f. 179: 1 Feb.
1638,
"
Aston to same). The Spaniards' claims were later exposed as false.
™CSPV 1636-9, 320: 14 Nov. 1637, Ballarino to D&S.
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attempting to steer the King away from the alliance with France. Despite the failure of Arundel's
mission, Taylor remained optimistic that England could indeed reach a settlement with the
Habsburgs, and he lobbied vigorously against the impending alliance with the French and warned
repeatedly against their ambitions.121 He maintained that even if they managed to secure the area
west of the Rhine and restored Charles Louis to the Palatine lands there, he would become their
vassal rather than the powerful Imperial prince he should be, just as Frederick had become
subordinate to Sweden in 1632.122 If the French made peace with the Habsburgs, Taylor cautioned,
the former would be much more concerned with securing their own gains than the restoration of the
Prince Palatine. He pointed out that French troops tended to remain in the areas that they were sent
to protect and that they would not readily give up territory they had conquered. Taylor also pointed
out that if the King hoped to regain the Palatinate with French assistance, he would have to
contribute substantial military forces to the effort At the same time he gave these perceptive
evaluations ofFrench intentions, the envoy also encouraged his master to cease negotiating with both
sides in the hope of pressuring one of them to offer him satisfaction. If the King's demands were to
be taken seriously, he needed to come down firmly on one side or the other. 123 Taylor recommended
the Habsburg side as the most promising, in spite of the Spaniards' obstructionism, and he urged the
King to resume negotiations with the Emperor, who professed his good intentions toward the Prince
12lCSP, vol. I, 792: 15 July 1637, Taylor to Windebank.
122Bodl. Lib., Clar. Mss. 15, f. 59: 15 Dec. 1638, same to same; CCSP, vol. 1, 135: 26 July 1636,
same to same.
l23Bodl. Lib., Clar. Mss. t5, f. 59: 15 Dec. 1638, same to same; CSP, vol. I, 772: 27 June 1637,
same to same," ibid., 787: 8 July 1637, same to same; CCSP, vol. 1, 163: 22 Dec. 1638, same to same;
Sharpe, Persona/ Rule, 53 1.
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Palatine and promised to moderate the demands of his allies. Ifthe King would be content with the
Regensburg resolution — that is, the Lower Palatinate, an alternating electorate, and the Upper
Palatinate to be treated of — and Spain would be content with less than a war with the Dutch, Taylor
believed that reaching an agreement acceptable to both sides would be possible.124
By the summer of 1637, with palpable signs ofFrench reluctance to conclude the treaty with
England and the troubles in Scotland in any case impeding any English military action, the King was
reconsidering the diplomatic option for receiving his nephew's restoration. At this time Hopton
reported the King's improved disposition toward the Habsburgs. Ballarino also believed that
"England was developing a disposition to determine the present controversies by way ofnegotiation
rather than that ofarms. " He took a cordial letter sent to the Prince-Bishop ofVienna from Arundel,
who had recently been so truculent toward the Habsburgs, as a sign ofthe thawing relations between
their masters. 125
In spite of the improved relations between the two sides and Taylor's own belief that the
Habsburg option was preferable to the alternative, Taylor still avoided accepting the Emperor's
invitation to participate in the Brussels conference. In the winter of 1637, Don Francisco de Melo
came from Flanders to promote it, but Taylor remained unpersuaded. Responding to de Melo's
overtures, Taylor replied: "I told him I found many difficultyes in this, not only because the King
would not be drawne to new Treatyes, but because indeed their uniust and unreasonable
Conveniencias (which was the fattali word they used) kept us at this distance in which we were; and
"4CSP, vol. 1, 791: 15 July 1637, Taylor to Windebank.
™CSPV 1636-9, 253: 8 Aug. 1637, Ballarino to D&S.
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till they were removed, it was in vaine to meete any where, or in any manner to Treate."126 The
familiar squabble ensued, in which de Melo claimed that in zretum for Palatine restoration England
had promised a break with France and Holland, and Taylor accused the Spaniards of inferring too
much from the King's offer of an alliance for the peace off Christendom.127 De Melo, however,
maintained that Spain might reduce its demands.12* Taylor laud the blame for the continuance of the
war at Spain's door, and that of its former ambassador to E_ngland, the young Ofiate.12* De Melo
departed from Vienna soon afterwards for Italy.130
Not long after de Melo's departure, however, Taylor— finally responded to the overtures for
a conference at Brussels. In late December, not long after hds truculent interchange with de Melo,
Taylor accepted in writing the Emperor's invitation to soend a representative to the Brussels
conference, that is if the Emperor and his allies gave the KJng good grounds to believe that they
would provide satisfaction on the point of the Palatinate.1211 At the same time, therefore, Taylor
inquired what terms the Emperor would offer to England andB what concessions he would require in
return. Further, he strongly recommended that an Imperial »envoy be sent to England to make the
l26Bodl. Lib., Clar. Mss. 16, f. 53: 1639, Taylor's relations
l27Taylor explained the irrationality of the Spaniards' demands to de Melo: "What an
abhominable thing this [demand for convenientias] was, iniuriou.s even to be propounded; and how
contrary to all sense, since they could never obtaine it from thoses of their owne Howse in Germany."
(ibid.).
12Slbid.
n9CCSP, vol. l, 144: 2 Dec. 1637, Taylor to Windebank—
1"Cambridge University Library, Dd. 8. 35, f. 95: 1639, Taylor's relation.
mOn 24 January 1638, Spain and Bavaria supposedly deeclared their willingness to participate
and to discuss the restoration of the Lower Palatinate (Koch, 94)_
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Emperor's intentions known to the King, who would then decide whether there was a satisfactory
basis for him to send an English representative to Brussels. A few days afterward, Taylor wrote to
Windebank ofthe Emperor's goodwill in the Palatine business, and that Charles should acknowledge
the Emperor at once and send a representative to Brussels.132
The fact that Taylor changed his opinion about the Brussels conference so quickly suggests
that he was directed to do so. Also, soon after his acceptance of the invitation, he reported to one
of his correspondents that though the idea was at first "entertayned coldly" by the King, it was
communicated to Taylor that he was now showing a better disposition toward it. In fact, if the
Habsburgs made an acceptable offer, he had leave to return to England with it 133 The King's change
in attitude was likely connected with the troubles in Scotland, for the longer they persisted, the more
negotiation with the Habsburgs seemed the most viable course to effect the restitution of the Prince
Palatine.
Soon after Taylor delivered his memorial, the Emperor asked Maximilian to give his opinion
regarding it. Maximilian approved ofholding a conference at Brussels and planned to send his own
representative to negotiate there, particularly since the King adamantly refused to send
plenipotentiary powers to treat at the Imperial court after Arundel's experience. However, the Duke
recommended against the Emperor sending to England beforehand, as Taylor had requested, because
he believed that the King would press the Imperial envoy for the specifics about the concessions that
the Emperor and his allies were willing to make at Brussels, thus effectively moving the negotiation
1"HHStA, StA Palatina, Kart. 12, Konv. 3: 24 Dec. 1637, Taylor to Ferdinand III; ibid., Konv. 4:
21 Jan. 1638, Maximilian I to same; PRO, SP 80/10, f. 107: 24 Dec. 1637, Taylor to same; CCSP, vol. 1,
145: 21 Dec. 1637, same to same.
133PRO, SP 80/10, f. 101:22 Jan. 1638, Taylor to [?].
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to the English court and reducing the Brussels meeting to little more than a ceremonial afterthought
Also, with the ball solidly in his court, the King would almost certainly demand more for his nephew
and delay declaring whether he would treat at Brussels or not In any case, Maximilian reminded
the Emperor of the three levels of concessions he had outlined that they should observe in further
negotiations with England. 134 Finally, Maximilian advised the Emperor to hold offon reopening the
negotiations with England until they knew the result of efforts to mediate a peace between the
Emperor and Sweden; if they were successful, he would be at a better advantage in treaties with
England and France and thus could procure better terms where the Palatinate was concerned.135
While Maximilian pondered the Brussels meeting, the Habsburgs and their allies took
advantage of the improved disposition of the King to make a diplomatic overture on yet another
front. In December, the Princess Phalzburg, with Spain's encouragement, approached Sir Balthazar
Gerbier, the English resident agent in Brussels, with a proposition: she proposed to revive the
scheme for the restitution of the Palatinate linked with the similar return ofLorraine, an Imperial fief
that the French had annexed in 163 2 after the unsuccessful rebellion ofher brother, the Duke. 136 As
a means to effect the deal, she offered herself as an intermediary between Charles I and the
IMThe first being the insistence that the Palatine lands and titles remain with Bavarian line
permanently, the second being the restoration of the Lower Palatinate, but the electorate remaining with
Bavarian line (this was the offer made to Arundel in September 1636 and reconfirmed to Taylor in
January 1637), and the third being the return of the Lower Palatinate and the alternation of the electorate
after the expiry of Maximilian's direct line plus three further descendants of the Bavarian line. The Upper
Palatinate was not to be a subject of negotiation (HHStA, StA Palatina, Kart 12, Konv. 4: 21 Jan. 1638,
Maximilian I to Ferdinand III). See above, p. 471.
1"Ibid.
136PRO, SP 77/28, f. 23 1: [1638], Gerbier"s relation of negotiations with Princess Phalzburg,
1637-8; ibid., SP 77/27, f. 558: 6 Dec. 1637, Princess Phalzburg to Gerbier. Gerbier"s dispatches relating
to these negotiations are found in PRO, SP 77/27-9.
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Habsburgs, thus providing a secret channel of communication between them. In doing so, she was
attempting to draw England away from its projected league with the French. This would profit both
her brother's cause as well as that of the Habsburgs.137 Charles, for his part, was not against
reopening the negotiations in this way as long as he remained uncommitted, which using the Princess
as an intermediary allowed him to do. Thus Windebank instructed Gerbier to encourage her in these
activities, and if she made significant progress, the King might then treat openly in the matter,
through a representative. They saw these negotiations, therefore, as preliminary to a conference. I3*
Negotiations at the Imperial Court, 1638-9:
Plans for a Conference at Brussels
In late 1637, with the French treaty on hold and trouble brewing in Scotland, Charles I again began
to consider negotiations with the Habsburgs as the peaceful alternative for the recovery of the
Palatinate. As long as he was preoccupied at home and disinclined to stage a military intervention
in the Continental war, this was the best option to achieve his ends. In early 1638, therefore, he
reestablished amicable relations with the various Habsburg courts. In February, he decided to send
the newly knighted Sir Arthur Hopton back to Spain, this time as an ambassador. 139 In Brussels, the
English resident agent Sir Balthazar Gerbier was in contact with the Princess Phalzburg, who was
l37PRO, SP 77/28, ff. 219-21 : 1 Dec. 1637, Extract of Gerbier's audience with Princess
Phalzburg; ibid., f. 23 1: [1638], Gerbier's relation; ibid., f. 15: 20 Jan. 1638, Gerbier to Windebank; ibid.,
f. 147: 27 Mar. 1638, same to Aston. Treating with her also offered a special advantage in that she
allegedly could influence her cousin, Maximilian.
13SIbid., SP 77/27, f. 561: 7 Dec. 1637, same to same; ibid., SP 77/28, f. 48: 12 Feb. 1638,
Windebank to Gerbier, ibid., f. 63: 19 Feb. 1638, same to same; ibid„ SP 77/29, ff. 7-8: 14 Jan. 1639,
same to same. By late 1637, Olivares himself believed that the scene of Anglo-Habsburg negotiation had
been relocated to Flanders (BL, Add. Mss. 36450, f. 172: 28 Dec. 1637, Aston to Windebank).
'39CSPy 1636-9, 374: 19 Feb. 1638. Zonca to D&S.
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promoting Anglo-Habsburg negotiations for the exchange of Lorraine and the Palatinate there."0
Taylor, who had recently accepted the Emperor's invitation to treat at Brussels, welcomed the news
of the effective breakdown of the French treaty and the open reestablishment of fiiendly relations
with the Habsburgs.141
With England once again gravitating to the Habsburg option, it seemed as if Taylor's
negotiations were back on track. However it soon became apparent that his propensity to move
forward more quickly and publicly than the King would have liked presented a problem. In the
spring of 163 8, Windebank reprimanded Taylor several times for indiscretions in his conduct of the
negotiations. When a copy of his memorial of December 1637 reached England, Windebank
rebuked him for excusing the Prince Palatine's protestation against the election of the King of the
Romans on the grounds that the Palatine had issued it without the King's leave. Moreover, the
Secretary admonished him for using the title of Emperor without official sanction to do so.142
Windebank warned Taylor that the King commanded him "to make a direct answer whether you have
carried yourself thus or not, and it will concern you to clear ifH4} At the same time, however, he
informed Taylor that the King was not against the idea of sending a representative to the projected
H0CSP, vol. 2, 16: 2 Oct. 1638, Windebank to Charles I.
141Taylor first mentioned this news on 19 January, less than a month after he had accepted the
invitation to treat at Brussels (CCSP, vol. I, 148: 19 Jan. 1638, Taylorto Windebank).
H2When the Prince Palatine heard that Taylor had addressed Ferdinand with the Imperial title and
"suppressed" his protestation of the previous year, he made strong objections. His mother Elizabeth also
complained (Bodl. Lib., Clar. Mss. 14, f. 20: 9 Apr. 1638, Windebank to Taylor, ibid, f. 22: 9 Apr. 1638,
same to same).
143Ibid., f. 20: 9 Apr. 1638, same to same; ibid, f. 22: 9 Apr. 1638, same to same.
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conference at Brussels, but he could not acknowledge the way it was achieved, particularly as Taylor
had obtained no written promises from the Emperor.144
The situation worsened after news of Taylor's audience of 27 February and his follow-up
paper of 1 1 March reached England. Taylor had excused his master for not answering the Emperor's
letters and affirmed the King's willingness to send a plenipotentiary to Brussels to further the
proposed treaty, that is if the Emperor and his allies gave sufficient grounds that he would receive
satisfaction. He also avowed his willingness to join in the defense of Flanders if they settled the
business of the Palatinate in a satisfactory manner. He also complained of the delays of the
Habsburgs in preparing for the conference. 145 When Windebank got wind ofthis, he again upbraided
Taylor for the same reasons as he had earlier.146 Despite these indiscretions, however, Windebank
obviously had no thought of recalling Taylor, for at the end of April, the government issued a privy
seal to pay him for his services. 147 Apparently Taylor did not believe the paper would cause offense,
because he announced in his dispatches that he had delivered it. 14*
l44Beller, "Diplomatic Relations," 374-5. This was ironic given Charles I's policy of avoiding any
communication that was not oral and couched in the most general of terms. His avoidance of anything
specific or enduring confused not only Taylor, but other English diplomats at Habsburg courts as well.
l45HHStA, StA Palatina, Kart. 12, Konv. 4: 1 1 Mar. 1638, Taylor to Ferdinand III; Bodl. Lib.,
Clar. Mss. 13, ff. 148-9: 1 1 Mar. 1638, same to same; PRO, SP 80/10, f. 108: 1 1 Mar. 1638, same to
same.
146Bodl. Lib., Clar. Mss. 14, f. 36: 16 Apr. 1638, Windebank to Taylor. It is interesting that later
on, when his conduct was being investigated, Taylor claimed that Kurz had given these propositions to
him to justify the grounds for a treaty at Brussels to the King, and further that Kurz had asked him to
present them as his own (PRO, SP 80/10, f. 108: 1 1 Mar. 1638, Notation on Taylor's memorial, probably
by one of the examiners).
I47Ibid., Treasury 56/12, f. 12: 3 May 1638, Privy seal to pay Taylor.
l4*Bodl. Lib., Clar. Mss. 14, f. 18: 24 Mar. 1638, Taylor to Windebank; CCST*, vol. I, 149:9
Mar. 1638, same to same.
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Taylor defended himself against these accusations vehemently and at great length, answering
that he had only given the Imperial title in an unofficial capacity as instructed, and that he had never
uttered a word against the Prince Palatine's protestation.149 To have denied that the King had
sanctioned the protestation, Taylor pointed out, would have been ridiculous; far from intentionally
suppressing it
,
he was unable to deliver it publicly as his commissions had ceased with the death of
Ferdinand II:
As for the Manifest, I never spoke of it either one way or other, since I could not
deliver it, the Emperor being dead when I received it. And to have said that it was
done without the King's knowledge, what could have been more ridiculous? Did not
Radolt receive it in England? Was it not published in divers languages? Did not
Secretary Coke send me an order to have given it? So that both I and they knew it
was with his Majesty's leave and approbation, and I had been senseles to have said
any other.150
Furthermore, he could not have delivered it without appearing to approve Ferdinand HI's election.151
Taylor was not the only English diplomat left in the dark about the protestation and other
important issues that affected his mission abroad. The conscious decision of the King and
Windebank to withhold information caused constant problems for many of them, particularly those
at Habsburg courts, and understandably blunted their effectiveness. Aston believed that he could
have helped Arundel's negotiation if he had been better informed of the latter's proceedings. He
complained that everything was hidden from him except that Arundel was to demand full restitution.
1'"However, Taylor did give the Imperial title in his memorials. It may be that he technically
delivered them as a private person.
l50Bodl. Lib., Clar. Mss. 14, ft". 62-4: 12 May 1638, Taylor to Windebank.
151PRO, SP 80/10, f. 88: 4 Mar. 1637, same to Secretary.
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Embarrassingly, the only notice he received of it was from the Spaniards themselves.1" In the case
of the protestation, Aston had to refuse comment on the issue when Olivares inquired whether the
King had approved it. In a letter to Arundel, who could wholly sympathize after his experience in
Germany, Aston remarked acidly that he knew nothing about the matter of the protestation except
what he heard from the Spaniards.1"
Likewise, Taylor was not the only English diplomat engaged in secret negotiations with the
Habsburgs who received a tongue-lashing from Windebank. He rebuked all of them at some point
for discussing issues with ministers at the courts they served in less general terms than the King
would have liked. The King also discouraged his diplomats at Habsburg courts from giving their
propositions in writing, which posed a significant impediment to fruitful negotiation, particularly for
Taylor given the Imperial ministers' penchant for negotiation by papers. Windebank closely
monitored and summarily reprimanded them if they seemed to move toward involving Charles in
"undesirable commitments," which for the King was almost any obligation at all. Even the most
general expressions of commitment on his part could arouse his ire. Finally, Charles gave his
representatives no clear idea of what terms he would be willing to accept for his nephew or what he
would be willing to offer in return.
As spring wore on into summer, new obstacles to Taylor's negotiations introduced
themselves. The first was the negative impact of the Scots rebellion on the Habsburg negotiations.
By the summer of 1638, Taylor discovered that news of it had reached the Imperial court and was
152BL, Add. Mss. 36450, f. 104: 13 Dec. 1636,' Aston to Arundel.
1"Ibid., f. 127: 25 Apr. 1637, same to same.
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presenting a new impediment to his negotiation. Frustrated, Taylor wrote to Windebank that "There
are evil reports ofScotland . . . which do much hurt." 154 Taylor's negotiations were not the only ones
affected by the troubles in Scotland. Hopton reported encountering the same difficulties in
Madrid. 155 Spain was still quite interested in recruiting troops in Britain and securing the assistance
of the fleet in the Channel, but it soon became apparent that the King would not be able to spare
either. With his resources engaged against the Scots, he had little to offer in return for concessions
in the Palatinate. Although the Habsburgs still wished to secure England's friendship, or at least its
neutrality, they believed they could have it without making great sacrifices.156
The Prince Palatine's unsuccessful moves to arm himself, which excited apprehension and
bad feelings at the Imperial court, presented another obstacle to Taylor's negotiation.157 Elizabeth
had long favored her son asserting his rights in the Empire by military means. Prodded by bis
mother, he first tried to secure the troops of Landgrave William of Hesse Kassel, but negotiations
with the latter's widow fell through. IS* Charles Louis actually bought Meppen in Westphalia as a
magazine and base of operations, and guns and supplies purchased with English money were
forwarded there. By the summer of 1637, the army had grown to 5,000 soldiers. In May 1638,
however, the Imperialists took Meppen and its military stores, and the Prince Palatine's financial
'itCCSP, vol. 1, 156: 28 Aug. 1638, Taylorto Windebank.
1"Ibid., 154: 15 June 1638, Hopton to same.
156Sharpe, Personal Rule, 828.
'31CCSP, vol. 1, 153: 12 May 1638, Taylor to Windebank; ibid.: 19 May 1638, same to same.
1"Elizabeth pushed her brother continually to help her son secure this force(GS/>£> 1636-7, 131-
2: 29 Sept. 1636, Elizabeth to Laud; ibid., 199-200: 28 Nov. 1636, same to Roe; ibid., 204-5: 21 Nov.
1636,' same to Laud).
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resources dwindled rapidly.159 When the news reached Vienna, Taylor expressed disappointment:
"it hath made me madd, for they begunne to be very apprehensive ofhim." 160 Despite the misfortune
at Meppen, Charles Louis continued to levy troops for his army. In October he finally launched his
campaign, but it ended in disaster as he made his way toward the Palatinate, Imperial troops
defeated him at Vlotho on the Weser, and they took his brother Prince Rupert and supporter Lord
Craven as prisoners. Charles Louis himself barely made an escape.161 Consequently he had little
to show for his pains, and his bellicose yet ineffective moves only made the Emperor and his
ministers question his commitment to a peaceful settlement of his affairs and his trustworthiness if
he were restored.
With his negotiation slowing and his continued lack of credentials and money, Taylor
appeared only infrequently at the Imperial court and actually went as far as to request his recall
several times in the late summer of 1638. 162 He complained of the delays to the Imperial ministers,
who laid the blame on Spain and continued to assure him of the desire of the Emperor and Bavaria
IS9HHStA, RK KrA, Fasz. 122, Konv. 2, ff. 132-3: 15 May 1638, Albrecht to Schroder von
Eschweiler, CSPV 1 636-9, 461: 15 Oct. 1638, Giustinian to D&S.
160HMC, Denbigh V, 57: 29 May 1638, Taylor to Feilding.
161CCSP, vol.1, 160: 3 Nov. 1638, same to Windebank; CSPV 1636-9, 467: 28 Oct. 1638,
Giustinian to D&S; ibid., 469-70: 5 Nov. 1638, Corrcr to same. Rupert was in the custody of Count
Starhemberg at the Imperial palace at Linz. Taylor stopped to visit the prisoner on his way back to
England (Bodl. Lib., Clar. Mss. 16, f. 60: 1639, Taylor's relation; CSPV 1636-9, 488: 15 Jan. 1639,
Giustinian to D&S). The death of Bernard of Saxe- Weimar in July 1639 offered Charles Louis new
opportunities to take control of an army. After much temporizing, the King managed to scrape together a
sum of money for his nephew to do so. However, Charles Louis was taken prisoner traveling incognito
through France, and he was not released until March 1640 (HHStA, RK KrA, Fasz. 127, ff. 166-8: 2 Dec.
1639, Haussner to Trauttmansdorff; ibid., ff. 179-80: 9 Dec. 1639, same to same). By this time, the army
was firmly under French control (Hibbard, 132-5).
l62CCSP, vol. I, 155-6: 7 Aug. 1638, Taylor to Windebank; ibid., 156: 21 Aug. 1638, same to
same; ibid.: 28 Aug. 1638, same to same; Bodl. Lib., Clar. Mss. 16, f. 56: 1639, Taylor's relation.
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to reach a settlement. They in turn complained of the conduct of the Prince Palatine, Taylor's lack
of credentials, and King's refusal to recognize the Emperor. Taylor believed the Imperialists were
sincere, but adversely influenced by Spain.163
Taylor thus continued to denounce Spain for the failure for the negotiations on the Palatinate
question to move forward in any meaningful way, and retained his faith in the willingness of the
Emperor and Bavaria to come to terms. He believed that it was the Spaniards' express intention to
prevent the Emperor and England from coming to an agreement on the Palatinate question. He
therefore was highly insulted when they tried to lay the blame for the continuation of the war at
England's doorstep because the King had not yet assented to the Brussels conference. In response,
he attempted to expose the impostures of Spain and continued to encourage the Emperor to bypass
the young Oftate by sending his own envoy to England to treat.164
In late 1638, however, Spain found new reasons to step up the pace of its negotiations with
England. In spite of the Scots rebellion, over the course of the year the Spaniards were rediscovering
the need to secure England's friendship. Although Olivares's attempts to negotiate an alliance with
England had thus far been unsuccessful, he continued to covet an agreement that would bring
England's power — particularly its sea power — to bear against the French and Dutch. This scenario
was much more palatable to Olivares than one in which the King joined Spain's enemies to further
'aCCSP, vol. I, 159: 25 Sept. 1638, Taylor to Windebank. For instance, he considered
Trauttmansdorff, who was one of the Emperor's most influential councillors, to be well-meaning to his
business but too cautious: "he is as 1 have said a too saving man, dry, slow, dull, irresolute, apprehensive,
fearful. ..howsoever his virtues are many especially his true and upright dealing but I only [assess] those
parts of his mind which I observed for my own designs." (Bod I. Lib., Gar. Mss. 15, f. 59: 15 Dec. 1638,
same to same).
1"Bodl. Lib., Clar. Mss. 16, ff. 54-62: 1639. Taylor's relation.
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the Palatine cause, as it seemed he would do in 1637."" In addition, he sought permission to recruit
fresh troops from the King's dominions to serve in the Spanish army, which would be a great asset
to the Spanish war effort. To encourage better relations with England, he recalled the young Onate,
to whom both Taylor and the Imperialists had ascribed so much of the blame for the souring of
Anglo-Habsburg relations. Onate left England in May 1638, shortly after his replacement Don
Alonso de Cardenas arrived there, accompanied by Marie de Rohan, the Duchess ofChevreuse. She
was an opponent of Richelieu and intriguer for Spain, and as a close friend and relative of the Queen,
she was in a convenient position to advance Spanish interests at the English court. 166
In addition, the military defeats suffered by Habsburg arms in 1638 made English friendship
even more attractive to Spain. In February, Bernard ofSaxe- Weimar, who was leading a combined
army of German Protestants and French, initiated a campaign on the Upper Rhine. The next month
he dealt the Imperialists a decisive blow at Rheinfelden, in Swabia, and by May he had defeated
them in the Breisgau. He then proceeded to besiege the pivotal bridgehead of Breisach, which
commanded the only bridge over the Rhine between Strasbourg and Basel and guarded the vital
military corridors into the Empire and Flanders. In December, Breisach finally fell to Weimarian
forces. This was significant, for it resulted in the definitive closure of Spain's last overland route to
the Low Countries. France now entirely controlled the pivotal Alsace-Lorraine corridor. 167 The fall
1"Elliott, "Three Ambassadors," 167-8.
1"Hibbard, 85.
l67Parker, Army of Flanders, 55-6. France had taken Lorraine in 1633, and Bernard of Saxe-
Weimar had re-taken Alsace in 1637. Habsburg arms had not fared well in the preceding year either. In
September 1637, the French took Leucate, in Catalonia, and in the following month, the Dutch recaptured
Breda, in Brabant (Parker, TYW, 152-63).
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of Breisach left the English Channel as the only available route for Spanish reinforcements to reach
Flanders. And this lifeline was increasingly under attack from the Dutch navy under Admiral Van
Tromp. Thus, with Spanish reliance on the sea route, England's stance vis-a-vis Spain became all
the more critical, as J. H. Elliott has observed: "Only a fragile maritime route now linked Spain to
the Netherlands, and its very fragility drove home the critical importance ofEngland for the outcome
of the international conflict."16* The importance of England to Spain's top foreign policy priority,
the Dutch war, was apparent, as Elliott has explicitly stated: "The active support of England, or at
least of the English fleet, was regarded by Olivares as indispensable for the retention of those
maritime lifelines whose loss or conservation would determine the fate of his policy for reaching an
honorable settlement with the Dutch." 169 In a March paper presented to the council of state, Olivares
himself pointed out the importance of England to Spain in the current political situation: "our own
forces and those of our enemies are almost equally balanced ... so that one can clearly appreciate
1"Elliott, "Three Ambassadors," 168. After 1635, all Spanish troops were sent by sea to the Low
Countries. From 1621 to 1630, by contrast, only 17.1% were moved by sea; from 1630 to 1640, this
percentage jumped to 55.4%. Approximately 27,000 men were moved by sea between 1631 and 1639
(Parker, Army ofFlanders, 77, 279; R. A. Stradling, The Armada ofFlanders: Spanish Maritime Policy
and European War, 1568-1668, Cambridge Studies in Early Modern History, ed. J. H. Elliott, Olwen
Hufton, and H. G. Koenigsberger [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992], 241). Spain had been
using this route to transport men and materiel since the Treaty of Madrid was signed in 1630 and to
transport money since 1632. This was the case particularly after the outbreak of war with France in 1635,
when Spain became even more reliant on England's goodwill. Spanish troops were landed at Dover to be
ferried to Flanders in English ships. The English merchants and government profited considerably from
this arrangement (Taylor, "Trade," 240-52; Kepler, 262, 277; Alcala-Zamora, 352-7, 396).
169EIliott, Olivares, 535. Indeed the Marquis of Villafranca and other Spanish ministers held that
England's intervention would likely prove more decisive than that of the Emperor (ibid., 543).
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the enormous disequilibrium capable of being produced by the power of the King of England, so
formidable on the sea." 170
Spain therefore once again began to make overtures to England on the Palatinate question.
In July 163 8 , after months ofcircuitous negotiation after her initial approach to Gerbier, the Princess
Phalzburg finally presented him with a proposal for a league between England and the Habsburgs
against France, and the concurrent restitution of Lorraine, the Palatinate, and certain territories in
Italy. 171 This league would be directed against Bavaria as well ifMaximilian refused to concede the
Upper Palatinate. To address the problem of the electorate, two more would be created: the first to
compensate Maximilian for the loss of the Palatine electorate, which would be returned to Charles
Louis, and the second to maintain the odd number of electors. 172 In late September, Gerbier traveled
to England with these proposals, and presented them to the King, who made a cautious reply to
them.173 He would enter into the league with the Habsburgs only if they first restored the parts of
l70Archivo General de Simancas, Estado, Lcgajo 2053: [Mar.] 1638, Olivares on the Palatinate;
quoted in Elliott, "Three Ambassadors," 167.
171PRO, SP 77/28, ff. 223-30: [Apr.] 1638, Register of letters between Gerbier and Princess
Phalzburg, Dec. 1637-Apr. 1638; ibid., f. 202: 30 Apr. 1638, Windebank to Gerbier. Gerbier was
skeptical of success from the beginning, for he knew, like the other English diplomats at Habsburg courts,
that England would not recover the Palatinate for nothing (ibid., f. 20: 22 Jan. 1638, Gerbier to
Windebank). By April, he was demanding some conftrmation that the Princess had entered into the
negotiations by order of the Cardinal Infante, as she had claimed. She produced a letter of credence and
the talks continued (ibid., ff. 167-8: 12 Apr. 1638, Princess Phalzburg's memorial).
17!HHStA, StA Palatina, Kart. 12, Konv. 4: 23 July 1638, Propositions for treaty with England;
CSP, vol. 2, 16-7: 23 July 1638, 16 Oct. 1638, Princess Phalzburg's propositions and Charles I's response;
Bohumil Bad'ura, et al., eds., Der groJSe Kampf urn die Vormacht in Europa: Die Rolle Schwedens und
Frankreichs. Quellen zur Geschichte des Dreifiigjdhrigen Kreiges. 1635-1643, vol. 6, Documents
Bohemica Bellum Tricennale Illustrantia, ed. Josef Janacek, Gabriela Cechova, and Josef Koci (Prague:
Academia, 1979), 253-4: 23 July 1638, same.
mCSPV 1636-9,457: 1 Oct. 1638, Giustinian to D&S.
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the Palatinate that they held.174 The King authorized Gerbier to give his "modified assent" to the
proposals, but warned him not to give the Princess anything in writing or let his instructions out of
his hands. Charles would only agree to the proposal verbally, so he could repudiate it at will.1"
Like Spain, Bavaria was inclining further toward coming to an accommodation with England
on the Palatinate question, though for quite different reasons. Maximilian sought a negotiated
solution to end the war in the Empire, an effort that was principally motivated by his desire to secure
the Upper Palatinate and electorate for his line. As long as the war continued and his gains were not
anchored in a widely accepted and recognized general peace settlement, military fortunes might
dictate which of his Palatine gains he kept and which he must relinquish.176 Only peace would
guarantee the long-term possession of these gains to himself and his house. This was even more
pressing because he was nearing seventy and feared he would perish before he had attained this goal,
thus leaving his young sons an insecure inheritance that they would be in a difficult position to
maintain. He did not want their inheritance to be a constant source of contention.177 The Bavarian
ambassadors in Vienna clearly conveyed Maximilian's motivation to Taylor as well as to the
Emperor and his ministers: "the Duke was an old Prince and of great experience, and knew well
"4CSP, vol. 2, 16-7: 23 July, 16 Oct. 1638, Princess Phalzburg's propositions and Charles I's
response.
mCCSP, vol. 1, 160: 16 Oct 1638, Windebank to Gerbier.
176In March, France and Sweden had renewed their treaty of alliance for three years, thus insuring
the continuation of the war in the Empire.
177A!brecht, Maximilian /, 961-3; Bierther, 79; Blesch, 33. His second son, Maximilian Philipp,
was bom on 30 September 1638.
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what danger it was to leave Children in the Cradle with the inheritance ofa Warr, with so potent and
powerful Enemyes."17*
Maximilian recognized that finding an acceptable solution to the Palatinate question before
it was decided at a general peace conference, which might degenerate into a free-for-all, would not
only promote the speedier conclusion of peace but also would serve to secure Bavarian interests in
the Palatinate. After the electoral meeting at Regensburg, he had thus become very interested in
settling this question through negotiations of the affected parties, independent of a general peace
congress such as the one planned for Cologne.179 At a general peace congress, he would have to
reckon with the opposition of Sweden and the unpredictability of France on this issue, whereas at
special negotiations under Imperial leadership, like the proposed conference at Brussels, he would
have more control over the final settlement. He was successful in persuading the Emperor to his
17*Bodl. Lib., Clar. Mss 16, f. 57: 1639, Taylor's relation.
179Albrecht, "Krieg- und Friedenszicle," 264. In any case, the Cologne conference never really
got off the ground due to the diplomatic conflicts surrounding the question of passports for the
plenipotentiaries (CSP, vol. I, 792: 15 July 1636, Taylor to Windebank; ibid., 795: 22 July 1637, same to
same; CSPV 1636-9, 493: 1 Feb. 1639, Correr to D&S). France wished to build a strong anti-Habsburg
party at the conference and therefore requested passports for the plenipotentiaries of its allies to attend. At
first the Emperor refused, but he finally gave way and agreed to issue them for Sweden and the United
Provinces. France, however, continued to insist on passports for its German allies as well. The Emperor
then agreed to issue passports for the German princes who were "not yet reconciled" by the Peace of
Prague (nondum reconciliati), but he continued to exclude the Prince Palatine and the Landgrave of
Hesse-Kassel. In the late summer of 1639, the Emperor finally granted Charles Louis a passport, a move
which was urged by Maximilian after the breakdown of the Brussels conference. By this time, however, it
was apparent that little would be achieved at Cologne. The papal legate, Cardinal Genetti, was finally
recalled in October 1640 (HHStA, StA Palatina, Kart. 13, K.onv. 3: 18 Aug. 1639, Maximilian I to
Ferdinand III; ibid., RK FrA, Fasz. 21, ff. 80-1: 31 Aug. 1639, Imperial declaration granting Prince
Palatine passports; ibid., ff. 89-90: 6 Oct. 1639, Maximilian I to Ferdinand III; ibid., KrA, Fasz. 126,
Konv. 3, f. 5: 7 Sept. 1639, Passport for Prince Palatine; CSPV 1636-9, 583: 15 Oct 1639, Alvise
Contarini, Venetian ambassador in Spain, to D&S). On the long-fought question of the passports, see
Repgen, Rdmische Kurie, vol. I, 394.
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view, for Ferdinand told his diplomats that the Palatinate question should not be drawn into the
Cologne conference and refused to grant passports for the Prince Palatine to attend."0
Therefore, contrary to what one might expect, Maximilian was more than willing to discuss
the Palatinate question with England at the Brussels conference. He even sought to secure Spain's
agreement to the restitution of the Lower Palatinate beforehand, to increase the chances that England
would participate."1 While he supported the idea of the Brussels conference, however, he was
against addressing the restitution of the Palatinate and Lorraine together in this negotiation, because
it not only would cost more time but also would involve France. Maximilian thus believed that the
question of Lorraine was better addressed at the general peace conference at Cologne. 1(2
Given the pressure from Maximilian, the Habsburgs' precarious military situation, and the
destruction in the Empire in 1638, the Emperor was prompted once again to seek a compromise
solution to the Palatinate question with England. This may be attributed in large part to the
catastrophic effect the war was having on the German population and economy and to the increasing
moral and financial exhaustion of the integrated Imperial army. The loss of Breisach was a great
embarrassment not to mention an enormous military setback for the Imperialists. Even the
Emperor's own clergy criticized the way the Imperialists had handled its defense: Taylor reported
that a priest delivered a sermon at court likening the loss of the Savior by his parents to the loss of
"°HHStA, StA Palatina, Kart. 12, Konv. 4: 5 Aug. 1638, Kurz to Count Penzen.
1"Schweinesbein, 40-1. In March, he complained that Spain had not yet committed to restoring
its share and requested the Emperor's intercession (ibid., Kart. 13, Konv. 2: 18 Mar. 1639, Maximilian I
to Ferdinand III).
"2Ibid., Kart. 12, Konv. 4: Sept. 1638, Maximilian I's reasons why Lorraine should not be drawn
into the negotiation with England on the Palatinate.
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Breisach and the ignorant doctors of the Temple to Imperial ministers. Taylor was certain that the
fall of Breisach and the rising military power of the French would increase the chances that the King
would obtain satisfaction in the Palatinate. 1a In addition, the Emperor was sensible of the
heightened importance of English sea power to Spain's war effort. It was in his interests for Spain
to continue to engage the French along the Flemish border, to keep them from turning their full fury
on the Empire. All of these motives fueled the Emperor's interest in negotiating a settlement with
England.
The result ofthe renewed interest of the Habsburgs and Bavaria in negotiations with England
was that plans for a conference in Brussels finally began to move forward again in late 1638. They
intensified when Grimani, the Venetian ambassador in Vienna, pushed for passports for the Prince
Palatine to attend the Cologne conference. In order to avoid it being treated there, Maximilian acted
quickly and sent commissioners with plenipotentiary powers to Vienna to discuss the proposed treaty
in Brussels with Taylor. 1*4 They thrashed out the details of a settlement in Vienna with the help of
Prince Tomaso of Savoy, and meanwhile the Emperor took measures to secure the cooperation of
Spain.1" According to Grimani, they conducted this negotiation very secretly, and it eventually
yielded the following agreement: Maximilian would retain Upper Palatinate, as he had planned; the
Prince Palatine would be restored to the Lower Palatinate including Heidelberg, and Maximilian
would be financially compensated for his sacrifice; and the electorate would only be restored to the
1"HMC, Denbigh V, 65: I Jan. 1639, Taylor to Feilding.
1"Venice, which was acting as an intermediary between the Protestant and Catholic states to
promote the Cologne conference, was attempting to obtain passports for France's allies to attend.
"5In 1634, Prince Tomaso had been involved in fruitless discussions with Gerbier about the
restitution of the Palatinate (PRO, SP 77/24, f. 421: 2 Nov. 1634, Gerbier to [?]).
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Palatine line upon the extinction of Maximilian's direct line. In return for these concessions, the
Habsburg side expected England to help them drive French forces from Germany, restore Piedmont,
Montferrat, Alsace, and Lorraine, and promote a general peace. 116 Taylor purportedly told Grimani
that he believed that Maximilian and the Emperor had already settled the essential points of the
agreement, and that at this point they only required Spain's acceptance. The Emperor dispatched an
envoy, Don Hannibal Gonzaga, to solicit Spain's approval for the plan.117 Taylor, for his part,
believed that the negotiations might finally move forward now that all parties were interested in
pursuing them. 188 The King, however, withheld his consent until some of the Palatine's dominions
were restored and an agreement was made on the succession to the electoral vote."9
Spain, desirous of protection in the Channel and permission to levy troops in England, was
also making further moves toward reconciliation with England on the question of the Palatinate. In
February 1639, the Cardinal Infante discussed the matter with Philip IV. The former believed that
they could persuade Maximilian to relinquish his Palatine lands, though not the electorate, in return
for compensation, and that England might be willing to accept this compromise given its
entanglement in Scotland. The Cardinal Infante also pointed out to his brother that an English
mCSPV 1636-9, 503: 5 Mar. 1639, Grimani to D&S. By this agreement, Maximilian was
apparently successful in his aim to exclude Lorraine from negotiations on the Palatinate question in
Brussels (HHStA, StA Palatina, Kan. 12, Konv. 4: Sept. 1638, Maximilian I's reasons why Lorraine
should not be drawn into the negotiation with England on the Palatinate).
1"Ibid., RK FrA, Fasz. 43d, ff. 6-7: 9 Jan. 1639, Ferdinand UI to Gonzaga; ibid., StA Palatina,
Kart. 13, Konv. l:9Jan. 1639, same to same; ibid., Konv. 2: 19 Mar. 1639, Gonzaga to Ferdinand HI;
ibid.: 10 Apr. 1639, Philip IV to Gonzaga; ibid., Konv. 3: 1639, Gonzaga to Ferdinand III. Gonzaga
encountered many delays at the Spanish court.
1"Ibid., StA England, Kart- I, Konv. 4: 25 Jan. 1639, Taylor to same.
XKCSPV 1636-9, 517: 2 Apr. 1639, Grimani to D&S; ibid., 523: 9 Apr. 1639, same to same.
524
alliance would give Spain valuable leverage in obtaining an acceptable peace settlement with the
Dutch and French, despite the King's problems with his obstreperous Scottish subjects."0 These
propositions were not unattractive to the King, particularly as the Cardinal Infante had indicated to
Sir Henry Gage, an English colonel in his service, that Habsburg troops might be found to aid
England against the Scots in exchange for Irish levies for service in Flanders.1"
At the same time that the King was becoming more willing to listen to Habsburg overtures,
the Scottish rebellion and the suspicion that French aid was underwriting it prompted a political
reshuffling at the English court that was more favorable to Spain. The peace party, which had
imploded with Arundel's return from Vienna, reconstituted itself. Further, the French faction
changed its character. In an atmosphere in which Puritan sympathies were associated with
disloyalty, Henrietta Maria's party divested itself of its Protestant adherents and became more clearly
associated with Catholicism. Finally, the exiled Duchess ofChevreuse and Spanish envoy Cardenas
enjoyed some success in advancing Spanish interests at the English court, and thus helped to frustrate
the ambitions of the French party as well as those who favored the calling of Parliament."2
Meanwhile, the Emperor and Maximilian were making arrangements to send their
representatives to Brussels. In fact, as early as November 1638 the Emperor had appointed Hubert
Dhaem as his resident at Brussels in order to further the negotiations. Dhaem arrived there in early
"0Elliott, "Three Ambassadors," 168; idem, Oltvares, 543.
"1Hibbard, 105-7. Nothing came of this scheme to secure foreign troops, but it continued to be
discussed secretly in the years leading up to the Civil War.
1"Sharpe, 838-9; Hibbard, 85-6.
525
December.193 In March the Emperor appointed Johann Ludwig, Count of Nassau, as his
plenipotentiary for the Brussels conference. Nassau was also designated as the Imperial
representative to the Cologne conference."4 The fact that the Emperor named two representatives
underscored his commitment to the Brussels meeting and his hope that all the parties involved could
finally achieve an agreement Maximilian also appointed a deputation under the leadership of Vice
Chancellor Richel. The Bavarian plenipotentiary waited at Mainz in March and April for word that
an English representative was indeed coming to Brussels before striking out195 Given the
willingness of the Emperor and Maximilian to send powers to Brussels, an agreement did not look
unpromising.
193HHStA, RK FrA, Fasz. 20, ff. 203-4: 26 Nov. 1638, Instructions for Dhaem; ibid., ff. 212-15:
25 Dec. 1638, Dhaem to Ferdinand III; ibid., KrA, Fasz. 125, ff. 1-2: 1 Jan. 1639, same to same; ibid.,
StA Palatina, Kart. 13, Konv. 2: 9 Apr. 1639, same to same; ibid., Konv. 3: 23 July 1639, same to same.
Dhaem had served in Flanders earlier and had been in contact with Radolt about the English negotiations
during the tatter's mission (ibid., Belgische Korrespondenz, Kart. 18: 7 Jan. 1636, Cardinal Infante to
Ferdinand II; ibid-, StA England, Kart. 21, Konv. I, f. 22: 22 Mar. 1636, Ferdinand II to Dhaem.
1""Ibid., StA Palatina, Kart. 13, Konv. 2: 7 Mar. 1639, Ferdinand III to Nassau; ibid.: 23 Mar.
1639, Instructions, credentials, and powers for Nassau; ibid.: 23 Mar. 1636, Ferdinand III to Maximilian
I; CSPV 1636-9, 517: 2 Apr. 1639, Grimani to D&S.
195HHStA, StA Palatina, Kart. 13, Konv. 3: 18 Mar. 1639, Maximilian I to Ferdinand III. He was
back in Munich on 20 April 1639. In July, Maximilian assured the Emperor that the Bavarian
representative still stood ready to make the trip to Brussels (Schweinesbein, 42).
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In February 1639, Taylor bad received bis recall and was preparing to return to England.196
With the plans in place for a summit of the interested parties at Brussels and the Imperial and
Bavarian plenipotentiaries appointed, Taylor finally left in March."7 In one of his last dispatches
from Vienna, he announced to Windebank that he had never had better hopes ofthe business as now,
when all agree to advance it. "* He was to return via Brussels where he was to stop to ensure that the
Cardinal Infante really did have powers from Spain to treat and generally "see what is on the carpet
there about the Prince Palatine." "9 Upon bis assurance that the Habsburgs and Duke ofBavaria were
ready to treat the Palatinate question in earnest, they hoped that Charles would immediately dispatch
l96Bodl. Lib.,Clar. Mss. 15, f. 88:21 Jan. 1639, Windebank to Taylor. Taylor's letters to
Windebank do not indicate that he viewed his recall negatively. In fact, in the summer of 1638, Taylor
had requested his own recall (CCSP, vol. 1, 155-6: 7 Aug. 1638, Taylor to Windebank; ibid., 156: 21
Aug. 1638, same to same; ibid.: 28 Aug. 1638, same to same). It may have been due, at least in part, to
the capture of Cardenas's letter and the King's attempts to throw France off the scent of his secret
negotiations with the Habsburgs (see below, p. 524). The Emperor moved to detain Taylor in Vienna by
insisting that he remain for the Shrovetide entertainments. Taylor enjoyed a ballet performance, the
Emperor's galleries, and his rarity and jewel cabinets. The Emperor had drawings made of himself, the
Empress, and their children. He gave these drawings and a chain to Taylor as parting gifts (Bodl. Lib.,
Clar. Mss. 16, ff. 59-60: 1639, Taylor's relation).
mCCSP, vol. 1, 170:9Mar. 1639, Taylor to Windebank; CSPV 1636-9, 503: 5 Mar. 1639,
Grimani to D&S.
1nCCSP, vol. 1, 169: 2 Mar. 1639, Taylor to Windebank; Bad'ura, 289: 8 Mar. 1639, Ottavio
Piccolomini to Prince Tomaso of Savoy. Although Taylor had hopes for the conference, he remained
skeptical of Spain's commitment to reaching an agreement with England on the Palatinate question,
believing that the Spaniards wished to play for time to keep the Emperor from an agreement. According
to Taylor, one of their methods was to propagate reports that important negotiations were taking place in
other venues. The fact that he was ill informed of the King's proceedings elsewhere probably made this
seem all the more egregious. Because of this, Taylor continued to hope that the Emperor would instead
send Leslie to England to treat directly with the King {CCSP, vol. I, 164: 12 Jan. 1639, Taylor to
Windebank; ibid., 165: 19 Jan. 1639, same to same ibid., 167: 9 Feb. 1639, same to same).
1"Taylor suspected that the Cardinal Infante did not have powers to treat at Brussels, though he
claimed he did (ibid., 166: 26 Jan. 1639, same to same).
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a representative to Brussels.200 Taylor arrived there at the beginning of April, and he immediately
moved to discover whether the Cardinal Infante actually had powers to treat with the King.201 His
ministers protested he did, but Taylor claimed that he remained unconvinced of this. Under the
circumstances, he told them that he doubted that the King would treat publicly at the conference.202
Taylor's Return to England and his Disgrace
Shortly after Taylor's departure from Vienna, the treaty at Brussels was already encountering
difficulties due to unwelcome allegations that Charles 1 was secretly negotiating with the Habsburgs
in Brussels. Although they had conducted the preliminary negotiations with the utmost secrecy,
news of the plans to hold a meeting became known and was discussed at European courts throughout
the spring and summer of 1639.203 This added to the embarrassment of late 1638, when the Swedes
intercepted letters written by Cardenas, the Spanish envoy in London, to Castaneda, and Count Kurz,
the Spanish ambassador in Vienna and the Imperial plenipotentiary in Hamburg respectively, which
mentioned Anglo-Habsburg negotiations on the Palatinate question at Brussels and alluded to
concurrent discussions undertaken by Cardenas in England.204
**>CSPV 1636-9, 517: 2 Apr. 1639, Grimani to D&S
*"CCSP, vol. I, 172: 2 Apr. 1639, Taylor to Windebank.
*aBodl. Lib., Clar. Mss. 16, f. 60: 1639, Taylor's relation.
M3Ibid., ff. 141-2: 10 June 1639, Windebank to Charles I; CSP, vol. 2, 43: 28 May 1639, same to
same; CSPV 1636-9, 461: 15 Oct. 1638, Gieronimo Giustinton, Venetian Ambassador at the Hague, to
D&S; ibid., 493-4: 1 Feb. 1639, Corrcrto same; ibid., 502: 1 Mar. 1639, same to same; ibid., 517: 2 Apr.
1639, Grimani to same; ibid., 522: 8 Apr. 1639, Papal nuncio to Collegio; ibid., 538-9: 1 1 May 1639,
Correrto D&S; ibid., 561: 4 Aug. 1639, same to same.
""PRO, SP 94/40, f. 94: 25 June 1638, Cardenas to Castaneda; CSPV 1636-9, 477: 10 Dec. 1638,
Giustinian to D&S; Gardiner, vol. 8, 377.
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The King was furious at Cardenas' s indiscretion, because he had promised the French he
would not treat with the Spaniards as long as the negotiations for an Anglo-French treaty at Hamburg
continued.205 The French for their part were not pleased when they learned of his double dealing.
Pomponne de Bellievre, the French ambassador extraordinary, had repeatedly voiced his suspicions
of the secret negotiations at Brussels, which worked to the detriment of the Hamburg negotiations,
and the transport of men and money to Flanders in English ships.206 The King and his ministers
adamantly denied any such involvement with the Habsburgs and quickly suspended Cardenas from
activity at court207 Windebank summarized the King's policy ofdistance and disavowal regarding
the Habsburg negotiations and his strict adherence to the letter of the truth when making denials to
the French in a letter to Gerbier, who had been treating with the Spaniards secretly through the
Princess Phalzburg in Brussels:
you know there is no direct treaty at all between His Majesty and them, and that all
that has been done hath been by way of proposition moving from that side and
managed by second bands, His Majesty neither appearing nor being engaged nor
obliged to anything; and to this purpose His Majesty hath answered the French
Ambassador, namely, that some propositions have been made to him from that side;
but hath absolutely disavowed any formal or direct treaty at all, or that ever any
letters to this purpose have passed between himself and them; and this, besides that
it is a truth, His Majesty had reason to do, unless he were more sure of the success
that which hath been proposed from your parts, for by avowing that to be a treaty his
is sure to dissolve that with France, and so he may run hazard to lose both.20*
mCSPV 1636-9, 498: 18 Feb. 1639, Giustinian to D&S.
J06lbid., 525: 15 Apr. 1639, same to same; ibid., 539-40: 13 May 1639, same to same; ibid., 559-
60: 29 July 1639, same to same. Bellievre arrived in England in December 1637.
207When the French ambassador mentioned the treaty to Windebank in May 1639, the latter
replied "Upon the faith of a Christian there is no such treaty on foot." (CSP, vol. 2, 43: 28 May 1639,
Windebank to Charles I). Only in August did the King reinstate Cardenas.
20*PRO, SP 77/29, f. 7: 14 Jan. 1639, Windebank to Gerbier.
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The King's underhand edncss in disavowing Cardenas's statements did not escape the Venetian
ambassador Giustinian, who noted: "It is a lesson for those who have to deal with his Majesty in the
future to employ the pen rather than the tongue, in order to escape such heartbreaking incidents."209
Thus it was with good cause that no one believed Windebank's loud protests that Charles was
not carrying on negotiations with the Habsburgs at Brussels and that ifTaylor had agreed to any such
negotiations he had acted in defiance of his instructions. Since Leicester himself believed that
arrangements for the Brussels conference had been made with Charles's knowledge and
encouragement, it comes as no surprise that the French met his insistence that he was not negotiating
with the Imperialists with polite disbelief.210 The truth was that with the rebellion in Scotland, the
King could not afford to alienate either France, which he suspected ofcovertly supporting the rebels,
or the Habsburgs. Accordingly he made every effort to keep his options open with both sides so he
would be able to pick up his negotiations on his nephew's behalf without too much difficulty when
he was in a better position to do so.
While in March the King was considering participating in the Brussels conference, by May,
when his armies were marching north toward Scotland, he was retreating from this option.
Windebank counseled the King to avoid casting his lot with either France or the Habsburgs and at
the same time to avoid alienating either side until the Scottish troubles had subsided.21 1 In any case,
neither side was trustworthy. If he declined the negotiations at Brussels, the King Would be at the
^CSPV 1636-9, 481: 24 Dec. 1638, Giustinian to D&S.
210Ibid., 489: 21 Jan. 1639, same to same; ibid., 493-4: 1 Feb. 1639, Correr to same; ibid., 526: 13
Apr. 1639, Grimani to same; ibid., 548: 17 June 1639, Giustinian to same.
2UCSP, vol. 2, 48-50: 10 June 1639, Windebank to Charles 1.
530
mercy of the French, who had been evading a treaty with England for more than two years. But if
he accepted the Brussels propositions, it would be the death knell of the negotiations at Hamburg,
which would result in the King being wholly cast upon the Spaniards, who had likewise led him on
with amusing treaties:212
If your Majesty shall absolutely refuse the treaty at Brussels, your Majesty will be
wholly cast upon the French; and what sure foundation you can have there,
considering how you have been used in a treaty now above two years ....
Nevertheless, I am humbly of opinion, that it is equally dangerous, in this
conjuncture, to accept the treaty at Brussels, which must put an end to that at
Hamburgh: Whereof though there be little good to be expected, yet if it be once
known your Majesty hath deserted it, besides your being on the other side cast wholly
upon the Spaniard, (and what sure foundation can be expected there so many years
experience of their amusing treaties sufficiently shews) your Majesty will bring
yourself into jealousy with the French and Hollanders and most of the Protestant
party: Whereof, as your business now stands in Scotland, you have little need.213
He advised the King to come up with a "handsome put-oflf" fir Spain, and neither to accept nor reject
the conference. This advice played into the King's propensity to keep open as many options as
possible.
Caught red-handed by the French, Charles was forced to proceed more cautiously in his
proceedings with the Habsburgs in the future. He decided against sending a minister to Brussels for
the time being, as Windebank suggested.214 Regardless, he could not do so without acknowledging
the Emperor. Until the King settled his affairs in Scotland, Windebank suggested that he limit his
212Like Taylor, Windebank was skeptical of the Spaniards' intentions, and not without reason. He
wrote to Hopton in late April that the Cardinal Infante had disavowed the Phalzburg propositions. His
view at this point was that Spain's chief goal with the treaty was to separate Charles Louis from his allies
and gain time (CCSP, vol. I, 174: 29 Apr. 1639, same to Hopto«i).
2aCSP, vol. 2, 49: 10 June 1639, same to Charles I.
™CSPV 1636-9, 541: 20 May 1639, Giustinian to D&S; ibid., 543: 27 May 1639, same to same;
ibid., 545: 3 June 1639, same to same.
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action to secret negotiations in Madrid, which he had authorized Hopton to open in March on the
basis of the Princess Phalzburg's proposals.215 The King also continued secretly to lend an ear to
Cardenas's proposals, despite his banishment from court216
The French were not the only ones to question England's motives. The King's denials and
delays led the Emperor and Bavaria to do so as well. The Imperial ambassador Nassau was kept
waiting for the appearance of his English counterpart for months. Moreover, the Emperor was
surprised to learn that Leicester had asked the French to obtain passports for Charles Louis to attend
the Cologne conference at the same time Charles was purportedly considering sending an
ambassador to Brussels.217 Ferdinand thus decided to postpone his decision whether to grant the
passports or not until he could ascertain Charles's intentions.2" The Venetians, who were acting as
215"And besides, your Majesty hath put this business into another way in Spain; and until, by the
result of that private conference, there may be a surer foundation for some solid treaty, and some better
appearance of the clearness and reality of their intentions to the Prince Elector, it can be no way
counsellable that your Majesty should run hazard again of being amused with more treaties [at Brussels]."
{CSP, vol. 2, 33: lOApr. 1639, Windebank to Charles 1). From 1632 to 1636, Hopton had no powers to
negotiate about the Palatinate, and from 163S to 1638, Aston was only able to conduct very limited
exploratory discussions (ibid., 9: 3 1 Apr. 1638, Secret instructions for Aston). In late 1638, however,
Charles decided that Hopton should offer to conduct unofficial negotiations with the Spaniards in Madrid
on the basis of the Princess Phalzburg's propositions, and in March 1639 he was empowered to do so. As
with Taylor, Hopton was instructed to act in a private capacity, and he was to make it clear to the
Spaniards that the discussions were not binding. The rational diplomat was skeptical of success from the
beginning. In June the talks began, but they soon ran aground because of the perpetual tension created by
Spain's expectation for an alliance before it gave any satisfaction in the Palatinate and England's for the
restoration of the Palatinate before it would discuss a treaty. As usual, both sides were simply attempting
to wrest advantages from the oti\er(CCSP, vol. I, 163: 6 Jan. 1639, Windebank to Hopton; ibid., 166: 29
Jan. 1639, Hopton to Windebank; ibid., l71:5Apr. 1639, Instructions for Hopton).
™CSPV 1636-9, 54 1: 20 May 1639, Giustinian to D&S; ibid., 543: 27 May 1639, same to same;
ibid., 545: 3 June 1639, same to same.
2l7Ibid., 465: 26 Oct. 1638, Correr to same.
2l*Ibid., 526: 13 Apr. 1639, Grimani to same. Grimani believed this move was intended in part to
expose England's duplicity.
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mediators between the Protestant and Catholic states and were thus seeking passports for France's
allies, sought clarification from the King. Charles assured them that he had never agreed to the
Brussels conference and that Taylor had acted of his own accord, without commissions, and would
be duly punished when he returned to England.2"
Maximilian was also having doubts about England's commitment to finding an agreement
at Brussels. He suspected that the King's aim there was to determine what concessions he could
extract for his nephew and that he still intended for the Palatinate question to be treated at
Cologne.220 By July, the English had kept the Imperialists waiting so long at Brussels that
Maximilian became persuaded that Charles had no intention of sending an ambassador and that his
aim was to amuse them long enough to win advantages for himself.221 These suspicions seemed
substantiated because the King not only had kept them waiting two years for his answer whether he
wished to participate or not, but also had continued his requests for passports to the Cologne
conference for his nephew.222 By the middle of July, Maximilian became convinced that the Brussels
conference would not take place, and he therefore advised the Emperor to wait no longer for the
King's reply. At this point, the Imperial envoy Dhaem, who was still waiting at Brussels to see if
2"lbid., 538-9: 1 1 May 1639, Corrcr to same; ibid., 553: 1 July 1639, Giustinian to same.
^HHStA, StA Palatina, Kart. 13, Konv. 2: 18 Mar. 1639, Maximilian I to Ferdinand III; ibid.: 24
Mar. 1639, same to same.
221Ibid., Konv. 3: 14 July 1639, same to same; Schweinesbein, 41-2; Koch, 98-100. Koch actually
sees Charles's temporizing as an Anglo-French conspiracy.
222HHStA, StA Palatina, Kart. 13, Konv. 3: 14 July 1639, Maximilian I to Ferdinand HI. He also
warned the Emperor that France had threatened that if the Palatinate question was treated at Brussels, the
issue of Lorraine would be regulated in Paris.
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the King would send a representative, was inclined to agree that the conference would not come off.
He informed his master that the King was not interested in a public treaty.223
In any case, Maximilian no longer believed that England's participation in the Brussels
conference would hinder the Palatine interest from being represented at Cologne, which had been
his main motivation for promoting the Brussels meeting to begin with.234 He concluded that the
consideration ofPalatinate question at a general peace congress was unavoidable because the foreign
powers involved in the German war — France in particular — lately had shown too great a
commitment to the resolution of the Palatinate question to allow the Habsburg side to settle it in
separate negotiations with England.225 He thus determined that the optionofconfining the Palatinate
question to special negotiations was no longer practical. Moreover, if Bavaria continued to oppose
Palatine participation in the Cologne conference, it would be seen as an obstruction to peace and
would attract the displeasure of other states. For all of these reasons, by July 1639 Maximilian had
become one ofthe most zealous supporters ofPalatine participation at the Cologne peace conference.
He wanted to settle the Palatinate question once and for all, as this was the only way he could leave
a secure inheritance to his sons.226
^Ibid.: 23 July 1639, Dhaem to same.
224lbid.: 14 July 1639, Maximilian I to same.
"'ibid., Konv. 2: 24 Mar. 1639, same to same. In the past, Maximilian had believed that France
was not altogether serious about its demands to include the Palatine in the Cologne congress. The Elector
of Mainz had played a key role in convincing him that this route would best serve his interests. Chief
among the Elector's arguments was that Cardinal Genetti had promised not to allow a decision that would
disadvantage Bavaria, and further that Genetti would press for Bavaria's retention of the electorate
(Schweinesbein, 43-5).
226As lately as March, Maximilian would not give a positive answer to this question when
approached by the Emperor (HHStA, StA Palatina, Kart. 13, Konv. 2: 24 Mar. 1639, Maximilian I to
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The result of the King's policy ofduplicity and delay, therefore, was that both France and the
Habsburgs became suspicious of his motives and any fruitful negotiation on the question of the
Palatinate was obstructed. The King, however, was not the only one to blame. The Spaniards had
done little to foster the success of the negotiations. They delayed sending plenipotemtiary powers
to Brussels, upon which England had insisted prior to sending its own representative. They also
persisted in making exorbitant demands for the restitution of their share of the Lower Palatinate. In
April, Dhaem reported that Spanish ministers said their master would agree to cede it if Bavaria
would in turn agree to cede the Upper, to which they knew that Maximilian would never agree. 227
Spain's obstinacy, therefore, continued to be a major obstacle to an agreement. Under these
circumstances, it is hardly surprising that the Brussels conference came to nought. Because of its
failure to get off the ground and the King's denials of English involvement, it also comes as no
surprise that John Taylor found himself in quite an uncomfortable position.
In spite of Windebank's previous reprimands to Taylor, it seems that he was ire called at his
own request and no real blame was attached to his activities at the Imperial court until after his
Ferdinand TIT). In April 1639, the Emperor still declined to grant the passports. However they both
changed their minds. At Maximilian's urging, the Emperor finally gave way and granted Craarles Louis a
passport in the late summer of 1639 (ibid., Konv. 3: 18 Aug. 1639, same to same; ibid., RK FrA, Fasz.
21, ff. 80-1 : 3 1 Aug. 1639, Imperial declaration granting Charles Louis passports; ibid., KrA, Fasz. 126,
Konv. 3, f. 5: 7 Sept. 1639, Passport for Charles Louts; CSPV 1636-9, 583: 15 Oct. 1639, C-ontarini to
O&S). Still, this decision was not an easy one for the Duke, because he still feared that France and
Sweden might bring forward at Cologne demands on the Prince Palatine's behalf that he would find
unacceptable. Further, he still wished to resolve the problem as quickly as possible and was. worried that
it would become entangled in lengthy discussions for a general peace agreement (Schweine-sbein, 48-50).
"'HHStA, StA Palatina, Kart. 13, Konv. 2: 9 Apr. 1639, Dhaem to Ferdinand III.
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arrival back in England in late April 1639. 22* Although the news from Paris and London regarding
the envoy's recall was mixed, Grimani firmly believed that Taylor had left Vienna not in disgrace,
but to set on foot the new treaty at Brussels. He did not rule out, however, that the King may have
recalled Taylor to quell French suspicions. He also noted the discrepancy between Taylor's secret
activities in Vienna and official English representations in London and Paris:
Thus if England is speaking here in one way, by deeds and at London and Paris in
quite another, by words, I do not know what I can say on the subject, except that a
few weeks should clear away these fogs from the sky. I will say this much, however,
Teller [Taylor] has spoken here very unreservedly and in conversation with all his
friends he has expressed views and opinions far removed and utterly divergent from
those which issue from the mouths of all the other English ministers and from the
king himself as well.229
Thus the Venetians were wise to the King's underhanded tactics, and it is telling that Grimani did
not necessarily chalk up the inconsistency to wrongdoing on Taylor's part.
Still, there were ominous signs that Taylor had spoken too freely about aspects of the
negotiations that would best have been kept secret Cardinal Genetti wrote from Cologne in mid-
April to the French ambassador in Vienna that Taylor had declared the King's consent to the
Emperor's overture regarding the Palatinate to the Count ofNassau, the Imperial diplomat designated
for the Brussels conference. According to Genetti, Taylor had also reported that the ambassadors
of England and Bavaria were expected shortly at Brussels. Windebank, into whose hands a copy of
the letter had made its way, commented in the margin: "If this be true and sincere, Mr. Taylor is a
brave man, and I shall have no more to do here. But if it be false or feigned, only to propose a
'"Bodl. Lib., Clar. Mss. 15, f. 88: 21 Jan. 1639, Windebank to Taylor, CCSP, vol. 1, 174: 29
Apr. 1639, same to Hop ton.
^CSPV 1636-9, 523: 9 Apr. 1639, Grimani to D&S.
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specious excuse to exclude us from the general treaty, I leave it to my Master. Never was a greater
impudence on Taylor's part, nor more suffering of mine, that protests here the contrary. I hope you
will resent it."230 Thus it seemed that the King was still considering the Brussels meeting ifthe other
participants were prepared to treat, but if their intention was to exclude the Palatinate question from
a general peace treaty or was otherwise ill-meaning, Taylor would be held accountable.
Unfortunately for Taylor, he discovered that the Spaniards had not sent powers to the Cardinal
Infante to treat as they had claimed, the Imperial and Bavarian plenipotentiaries were still waiting
in Cologne for an English ambassador to arrive at Brussels, and the French continued to protest
against the King's treating with the Habsburgs and the resulting injury to the treaty at Hamburg.
By May, therefore, the King had found ample cause to distance himself from the Brussels
negotiations. In addition to suspending Cardenas from activity at court, the King felt obliged to
launch an investigation against Taylor to clear his name. The King instructed Coke to examine
Taylor about his role in promoting the conference, a command which Coke communicated to
Windebank:
[The King] understands as formerly, so now again, from the French Ambassador, that
Mr. Taylor is at London, and that both the King of Hungary and other Princes make
use of his letter to his dishonour for the treaty thereby set forward at Brussels. You
are therefore to call Taylor to account for it, and to examine him about that letter or
proposition, or whatsoever it is, that was delivered under his hand concerning the said
treaty, and upon what he shall acknowledge or produce to that effect you are to send
to his Majesty with convenient speed, that he may take further course to satisfy the
world ofhis royal and just proceeding, and remove the scandal which is everywhere
cast upon him.231
^CCSP, vol. 1, 173: 14 Apr. 1639, Genetti to Monsieur D'Avaux.
231PRO, SP 16/421, f. 62: 26 May 1639, Coke to Windebank; BL, Add. Mss. 64919: 23 May
1639, Coke's comments on Windebank's letter of same date.
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It was significant that the King launched the investigation through Coke, who was uninformed of
Taylor's secret negotiations in Vienna. Both the King and Wi ndebank, however, had been informed
of his proceeding all along. It is true that at times they did not approve of Taylor's actions at the
Imperial court, and duly reprimanded the envoy. However, their complaints were directed not so
much toward his promotion of the conference as to the way it was achieved, most particularly the
act of delivering papers to the Emperor when not officially accredited to do so. It is revealing that
despite their reprimands they did not recall him, not even when Taylor himself requested them to do
so.
It was also clear that, despite the King's public protestations to the contrary, Wi ndebank was
not entirely disappointed with the way Taylor had carried himself at the Imperial court. In response
to the King's command to investigate the envoy's conduct, therefore, Windebank reminded him of
the good offices Taylor had performed during his tenure there. In a letter to the King of 10 June, he
pointed to Taylor's efforts to maintain England's contacts with the Habsburgs, so that if an
opportunity presented itself it could be more easily exploited. Moreover, Taylor had sought to
entertain them with the prospect ofa special conference to keep them from making peace with their
enemies, which would result in the belligerents settling the fate of the Palatinate, perhaps without
reference to England or the Prince Palatine:
Certainly his endeavors to keep alive your Majesty's interests and intelligence with
the House of Austria and not to suffer them so to fall but that you might still have
power to take them up again, when you should find it for your advantage. And the
amusing them with a treaty at Brussels who had so long amused your Majesty, and
by that means the keeping them from making a peace with France, was no ill service
232
B2BodI. Lib., Clar. Mss. 16, ff. 141-2: 10 June 1639, Windebank to Charles L
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Windcbank also praised Taylor for exposing Spain's disinclination to conclude a treaty with England
at Brussels:
One service I am sure he did your Majesty which was to discover by the Imperialists
(upon whom the Spaniards had cast the fault ofnot restoring of the Palatinate) that
the Infante Cardinal had no powers to treat, when the Conde d'Onate advowed to
your Majesty he had, and therupon invited you to the treaty, which raised such a
difference between the Spaniards and Imperialists, that they charged each other with
hindering the restitution . . . .333
Windcbank, however, duly summarized Taylor's misfortune in the following qualification to these
statements. Although Windebank acknowledged that Taylor had undoubtedly done the King good
service by entertaining the prospect of the Brussels meeting, he also believed it "most unfit to be
advowed by your Majesty considering your treaty at Hamburg. But he [Taylor] was the fitter for it
,
having no powers, and so to be justly disadvowed at pleasure."234 The King, however, withheld
judgment until he had seen Taylor's account of his negotiations.235
In the end to satisfy the French, the King called Taylor to account for promoting the
conference with the Habsburgs at Brussels without the commission to do so. Taylor appeared before
the King and the foreign affairs committee, and they confronted him with copies of proposals that
U3Ibid. At the same time, he sent an account of Taylor's negotiations in Vienna to Coke, and
asked him to acquaint the King with it (BL, Add. Mss. 64919, f. 128: 10 June 1639, same to Coke).
^Bodl. Lib., Clar. Mss. 16, f. 141: 10 June 1639, same to Charles I.
"'On 14 June he noted in the margin of this letter, "When [ have seene it I shall send you my
pleasur concerning him." (ibid.). For Taylor's account of his negotiation, see: Bodl. Lib., Clar. Mss. 16,
ff. 52-63: 1639, "A Relation of John Taylor his Negotiation in Germany, from the second time of the Earl
Marshall's departure thence till this present 1639, April the 4th, that by his Majesty's Order hee is
returned home, wherein will appear his care, zeal and faithfulness towards his Majesty's service"; and
Cambridge University Library, Od. 8. 35, ff. 93-5, same, which is a fragment of the former. From all
appearances, Taylor wrote this relation, probably at Windebank's behest, with the aim of minimizing his
involvement in promoting the Brussels conference.
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he had presented to the Emperor. Taylor was obliged to concede that he had not received fresh
credentials to negotiate with Ferdinand HI. This was a situation that the King and Windebank had
been careful to maintain, so ifnecessary they could disavow him at will. Windebank, who knew full
wel 1 that Taylor had been encouraged to pursue discussions with the Emperor on this question, wrote
that Taylor, "ingeniously acknowledging that wherewith he was charged, and that he had delivered
papers in the pretended Emperor's Court concerning a treaty at Brussels without commission or order
from hence."236 Taylor avoided implicating the King and Windebank in his activities. Coke reported
to Roe that Taylor did little to defend himself: "he made no other defence but that he did it out of
his own head, out of a good intention to discover the impostures of the Spaniards, who he said had
never used any sincerity in their treaties with us."237
As a sign he never consented to the proposals, the King committed Taylor to the Tower in
early September.23* Windebank apparently felt quite guilty that Taylor took the fall for their secret
foreign policy, for Weckherlin reported to Coke in early September:
The french ambassador told me, that Mr. Secretary Windebanks owne tonne sayd to
One, His father had taken a certaine matter so to hart, that it made him sick. Yet doth
the ambassador not beleeve that it is Mr. Taylor's businesse, which is by him very
^CSP, vol. 2, 75: 9 Oct. 1639, Windebank to Hopton.
2"PRO, SP 81/48, f. 43: 25 Sept. 1639, Coke to Roe; quoted in Beller, "Diplomatic Relations,"
377. The Habsburgs, however, were the first proponents of the conference. Taylor also claimed that Kurz
had given him the propositions embodied in his paper of 1 1 March 1638 in order to justify the grounds
for a treaty at Brussels to the King, and further that Kurz had asked him to present them as his own. At
the same time, Kurz reassured him that the Brussels negotiations could proceed in conjunction with the
general treaty, which Taylor comprehended as "a Contradiction & a most apparent juggling." (ibid., SP
80/10, f. 108: 1 1 Mar. 1638, Notation on Taylor's memorial, probably by one of the examiners). It seems
the King indeed hoped that the Palatinate question would be satisfactorily settled at Cologne.
^'CSP, vol. 2, 75: 9 Oct. 1639, Windebank to Hopton.
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much . . . pressed and urged to bee brought to light, Whether or no he made his
propositions to the Emperor of himself or by commandment.239
It is not without reason, therefore, that the Venetian ambassador doubted the genuineness ofTaylor's
punishment: "Everyone recognises that this severity is designed to uphold the veracity of their
original declarations, and so people believe that the matter will end with a reward for that minister
instead ofpunishment."240 Taylor remained in the Tower for at least seven months. In dire financial
straights, he repeatedly petitioned Windebank for his release, which the King probably granted
sometime before the outbreak of the Civil War.241
Taylor therefore became the unwitting scapegoat for the King's double-dealing foreign
policy. Although Taylor did conduct negotiations with the Emperor without official sanction to do
so, overwhelming evidence points to the fact that the crown covertly encouraged his actions. He was
in regular correspondence with Windebank and regularly received payment for his services.
Although Windebank periodically reprimanded him for stepping beyond the bounds of the King's
comfort zone, his offenses were apparently not serious enough to warrant his recall. Windebank's
own comments bear out that he believed Taylor had performed valuable services during his tenure
at the Imperial court. However, the King's plan all along was to use the envoy's services for what
could be gotten and to maintain his unofficial status so he could be discredited at will. Thus the real
cause ofTaylor's disgrace was not his undertakings with the Habsburgs, but rather that their exposure
239BL, Add. Mss. 64921, f. 19: 4 Sept. 1636, Weckheriin to Coke.
24°CSPV 1636-9, 576: 30 Sept. 1639, Giustinian to D&S.
^1The next year, after Taylor had spent several months in the Tower, Windebank forwarded to
the King a petition from Taylor's wife pleading for her husband's release, and the Secretary urged the
King to show him compassion (PRO, SP 16/470, f. 164: [Oct.?] 1640, Windebank to Charles 0. For
Taylor's fate, see chap. 5, p. 214.
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prejudiced the King's relations with France, and more particularly Roe's negotiations for the French
treaty underway at Hamburg.242 In the end, his sacrifice did not matter, as Roe was unable to
accomplish anything of note at the Hamburg conference.
Taylor was not the only one who took the fall for the exposure of the King's involvement at
Brussels. The King was insistent that "some way bee found that my Honnor be cleered, that I gave
no way for the treatie of Brussels."243 In the summer of 1639, he persuaded Cardenas to confess
publicly that he was in error when he wrote to Kurz and Castafieda that Anglo-Habsburg negotiations
on the Palatinate question were underway at Brussels and London. The Spanish envoy made a
statement that the English had never given him reason to assert that the King had given way to the
Brussels treaty.244 To allay French suspicions, the King and Windebank adamantly maintained that
the proposal for the Brussels conference was first brought forward by the Habsburgs, and that the
King had never consented to it. Windebank said that he suspected Spanish ministers ofpropagating
the perception that he had consented in order to cause problems between the King and the anti-
Habsburg party.245 Still, at the same time as they were making these protestations to the contrary,
they continued to consider the conference as a way to address the question of the Palatinate.246
2i2CCSP, vol. I, 174: 29 Apr. 1639, same to Hopton. Charles continued to press for France and
Sweden to make no peace with the Habsburgs without the restoration of Charles Louis. They refused
unless England would commit to war against the Habsburgs on both land and sea. The Hamburg protocol
was signed only by Denmark and England, in April 1639.
243CSP, vol. 2, 62: 19 July 1639, same to Charles I, with latter's notation.
2"CCSP, vol. 1, 182: 26 Aug. 1639, same to Hopton.
24SCSP, vol. 2, 48: 10 June 1639, same to Charles I.
246PRO, SP77/29,f.7: 14 Jan. 1639, same to Gerbier, CSPV 1636-9, 548: 17June 1639,
Giustinian to D&S; ibid., 552: I July 1639, same to same.
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In spite of the discovery of plans for the Brussels conference and the King's subsequent
moves to reassure the French that he was not undertaking secret negotiations with the Habsburgs,
Charles clearly had no intention of abandoning them completely. In May, he bad given Windebank
leave to pursue discussions with Cardenas on the Palatinate."7 The following month, with Taylor
already under scrutiny, the King was perusing his diplomatic options for addressing the Palatinate
question, which included treating with Habsburgs in various forums.24* True to form, the King kept
open simultaneous negotiations with France and Spain, hoping to gain the advantage with one or the
other or at least to avoid alienating either one of them.349
The King's secret negotiations and his double dealing foreign policy, while perhaps
unpalatable to modem sensibilities, were not unusual for the time. However, his proclivity to leave
his own council and diplomats — even those involved in conducting the secret negotiations — in the
dark about these negotiations was detrimental to the success of his own foreign policy. This
approach, however, is what permitted Charles to shunt the blame off on Taylor when plans for the
Brussels conference were discovered, in a clumsy attempt to save face with not only the foreign
*7CSP, vol. 2, 48: 10 June 1639, Windebank to Charles L
M*The negotiating options enumerated were with the French and Dutch in Cologne, through
Hopton in Madrid, and through Gerbier in Brussels. The latter two were with the Habsburgs, so the King
apparently had not given up on that score. At this point both he and Windebank preferred to treat through
Hopton in Madrid (see n. 215), perhaps in an attempt to keep a lower profile. Despite this preference,
Windebank recommended that the Princess Phalzburg be encouraged to continue her good offices to see
whether she could draw Spain to a resolution on the Palatinate question. The negotiations in Brussels,
however, did not look promising since neither side would show its powers— or expose its lack of them—to
the other (CS7>, vol. 2, 59-60: 16 July 1639, Windebank to Charles I; ibid., 61-2: 19 July 1639, same to
same). In October, however, Gerbier was still negotiating a settlement with Spain in Brussels (Bad'ura,
334: 22 Oct. 1639, Piccolomini to Ferdinand US).
"9Richelieu had more on his mind than a treaty, namely health problems. Weckherlin told Coke
that the Cardinal had experienced a convulsion after taking an elixir for his hemorrhoids (BL, Add. Mss.
64921, f. 2: 18 Aug. 1639, Weckherlin to Coke).
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powers with which he was dealing, but also bis own ministers, opinion leaders in England, and
advocates of the Palatine cause. The King's true intentions, however, were revealed by the fact that
he continued his secret negotiations with the Habsburgs.
This is not to say that the secret negotiations were in principle incapable of producing
positive results. Taylor remained behind after Arundel's departure from Regensburg, and prospects
for the settlement of the Palatinate question through Anglo-Imperial negotiation continued. The
Emperor continued to desire peace, and both he and Taylor put forward compromise proposals in
an attempt to persuade Spain and Bavaria to make greater concessions in the Palatinate. Maximilian,
who realized that his young sons' inheritance could not be secure until the Palatinate question was
settled, was more open to making concessions than ever before. However, there was no
corresponding adjustment on the side ofSpain. Ifanything, the Spaniards became more recalcitrant
about demanding high rewards (their convenientias) in return for their share of the Lower Palatinate,
because they no longer could depend on Maximilian to obstruct a compromise settlement Without
a convenient scapegoat, the Spaniards were forced to rely more heavily on the device ofconducting
secret negotiations with England at various courts in order to give the impression that they were
willing to compromise in the Palatinate. In this way, they aimed to encourage the King's hopes that
they could settle the Palatinate question without resort to war — or a Parliament — and lock England
into a safe, pro-Spanish neutrality. This was imperative as the closure of Spain's overland routes
made it even more dependent upon English help in the Channel to supply its army in Flanders. In
spite of the potential leverage that England had with Spain on this point, there was no incentive for
the Spaniards to discontinue their delaying diplomatic policies or to relinquish the Lower Palatinate
unless England gave it reason to do so. On the ground in Vienna, even Taylor was painfully aware
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of the bad offices of the Spaniards, and he complained bitterly of the obstacles that they raised to an
agreement, particularly the elder and younger counts Ofiate.
During Taylor's last two years in Vienna, his negotiations progressed in fits and starts, with
short periods of intense diplomatic activity, often prompted by the fortunes of war, and long lapses
into inaction. The new Emperor Ferdinand III maintained his father's commitment to peace, and
therefore to the settlement of the Palatinate question. He relied on the cooperation of his allies but
was determined to be more independent of Spain. In an attempt to move the negotiation on the
Palatinate question forward, the Emperor proposed to Taylor that it be treated at a special conference
in Brussels. Although they did not immediately take up the proposal, in late 1638 the Habsburg side
found new motivation to negotiate with England in Brussels. In short order both the Emperor and
Maximilian appointed plenipotentiaries, and the King was seriously considering sending a
representative himself if the Spaniards also showed good faith. The Spaniards, however, continued
to play for time in secret negotiations and did not send the requisite powers to Brussels.
In any case, whether an agreement in Brussels was a possibility or not under the existing
circumstances quickly became a non-issue. By the time the conference broke down in the late spring
of 1639, the King was in the north of England preparing for war with the Scots, and he was more
concerned with re imposing his own authority in Edinburgh than he was in reinstalling his nephew
in Heidelberg. His embroilment in domestic affairs made it increasingly improbable that he would
reach an agreement on the Palatinate question with the Habsburg powers. With his resources —
particularly the fleet — committed to the Scots conflict, he could offer the Habsburgs little in return
for concessions in the Palatinate. With England's attention focused inward, and foreign affairs
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slipping down the King's scale of priorities, the Habsburgs had less to expect — or to fear — from
England than ever before.
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Epilogue
Even after Taylor's departure from Vienna in 1639 and his subsequent disgrace, Anglo-Imperial
diplomatic contact on the Palatinate question continued. In 1641 and 1642, Sir Thomas Roe
represented Anglo-Palatine interests at the Imperial Diet (Reichstag) held at Regensburg and then
in separate negotiations held at Vienna. The King instructed Roe, like Arundel, to insist upon the
full restoration of the Palatine lands and dignities. But ifhe met with firm resistance, he was to scale
back his demands to the Lower Palatinate and leave the questions of the Upper Palatinate and
electorate for a future settlement-1 From 1640 to 1645, Franz Paul, Baron Lisola represented
Imperial interests in England, but he limited his activities mainly to obstructing Richelieu's designs.2
The obstacles to an agreement on the Palatinate question in this period were even greater than they
had been previously. Spain was as unwilling as ever to yield its Palatine gains, and the Emperor
showed less of an interest in accommodating England because its mounting internal difficulties
rendered it increasingly incapable of providing assistance to the Habsburg cause. Maximilian,
however, continued to desire a settlement and thus to consider compromise solutions to this thorny
problem.
XCSPV 1640-2, 144: 10 May 1641, Giustinian to D&S; Michael J. Brown, Itinerant Ambassador:
The Life ofSir Thomas Roe (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1970), 243. For Roe's mission,
see also: R. B. Mowat, "The Mission of Sir Thomas Roe to Vienna, 1641-2," EHR 25 (Apr. 1910): 264-
75; and Michael Strachan, Sir Thomas Roe, 1581-1644: A Life (Salisbury: M. Russell, 1989), 253-64.
2On Lisola's mission, see: Hermile Rcynauld, "Le Baron de Lisola, sa jeunesse et sa premiere
ambassade en Angleterre (1613-1645)," Revue historique 27 (1885): 300-52; A. F. Pribram, Franz Paul
Freiherr von Lisola, 1613-1674, und die Politik seiner Zeit (Leipzig: Veit, 1894), 1 1-53; and T. Haller,
"Franz von Lisola, ein osterreichischer Staatsmann des 17. Jahrhunderts," Preufiische Jahrbucher 69
(Jan.-June 1892): 518-9.
547
Maximilian wished to come to an agreement on the Palatinate question as soon as possible.3
By 1640, he no longer felt that he could leave the resolution of the Palatinate question to a general
peace conference, as prospects for one in the near future did not look promising.4 The war seemed
to plod on, with no end in sight5 Maximilian's fears that the war would expand ifthis question were
not settled soon provided further motivation for him to seek an agreement In the winter of 1640,
he had received news that England was planning to enter the war ifSir Thomas Roe's efforts to effect
an agreement failed.6 Maximilian took the threat ofEnglish intervention in the war more seriously
than he had earlier because the King had issued a manifesto on his nephew's behalf, and it had
garnered the support of the Scottish Parliament and the Long Parliament which the King had to call
'This was even more pressing because of his age. He instructed his ambassador to represent this
view to the Emperor: " Wir stienden aber lenger je mer an und weren auch in ansehung unserer posteritet
und erben, mit welchen uns der Allmechtig gesegnet, in unserm hochen alter nit unbillich sorgfeltig und
perplex, wie doch aus disem labyrinth und gar zu fast vertieften calamiteten endlich zu kommen sein
rnechte." (Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, Kastenschwarz 3325E: 1 1 Feb. 1641, Instructions for Herwart;
quoted in Bierther, 79 n. 47). Maximilian, however, was committed to retaining the Upper Palatinate
and—to a lesser extent—the electorate for his line.
4He would also have to reckon with the demands of France at a general conference, and he did
not trust Richelieu to support Bavarian over Palatine interests.
'Since the late summer of 1639, with the Brussels negotiations on hold, Maximilian came to
favor dealing with the Palatinate question at the general peace congress at Cologne. Ferdinand III
eventually assented to this and accordingly granted passports to Charles Louis. The Cologne conference,
however, fell through.
6Maximilian was informed that the King would send 30,000 men into the Empire to attack
Bavarian territory (Bierther, 79).
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in 1640 to help quell the Scottish rebellion.7 The F.nglish military threat was even more troubling
to Maximilian because he did not trust in the Emperor's ability to defend Bavaria from attack.*
For all these reasons, Maximilian was willing to make considerable compromises on the
point of the electorate in the interests of resolving Palatinate question. By 1640, he had drawn up
a plan by which both the Duke ofBavaria and the Prince Palatine would be invested with the existing
electorate and would take part in the consultations ofthe electoral college. When it came time to cast
their vote for the King of the Romans, they would either agree upon a candidate or take rums
selecting one ifagreement were impossible.9
The Emperor convened the Imperial Diet in September 1640, with the goal of promoting
general peace. However, little progress made in this direction or in addressing the Palatinate
question. By this time, Maximilian again favored separate negotiations among the powers with a
stake in the Palatinate to address this issue, and he accordingly promoted this agenda at the Diet.
The Emperor, however, only agreed to this plan reluctantly, in order to please the electors, who
7His Majesties manifest touching the Palatine cause, and the votes of both Houses ofParliament
concerning the same (London: Printed by Robert Barker by the assignes of John Bill, 1641); Newes from
Scotland, his Mates ties manifest touching the Palatine cause, and Act ofParliament concerning the same,
read, voiced and past in the Parliament erfScotland, the 6. day ofSeptember 1641 ([London]: T. Fawcet
for T. Bates, 1641); Bierther, 79; Blesch, 33; Hibbard, 207. In July, both houses of the English Parliament
passed votes of support for Roe's mission. and the King's manifesto on his nephew's behalf, in which he
declared that the restoration of the Palatinate was his primary goal. In truth, Maximilian's fears were
largely unsubstantiated as Britain's internal struggles made aggressive moves regain the Palatinate highly
improbable.
'This seemed substantiated by his inadequate response to the attack of Baner's allied army on
southern Germany in January 1641. Ban&r actually shelled Regensburg while the Imperial Diet was in
session.
9Bierther, 8 1. He still did not support an alternation of the existing electorate or the creation of an
eighth.
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regarded the resolution of the Palatinate affair as a necessary step toward peace.10 Therefore, over
the protests of Roe, the Diet referred the Prince Palatine's claims to special negotiations planned for
Vienna."
These negotiations between England, the Emperor, Bavaria, and Spain, with representatives
ofDenmark and the electoral college serving as mediators, finally got underway in November 164 1 .
In the end, however, they made little progress toward achieving a settlement During his tenure in
the Empire, Roe did succeed in securing the release of Prince Rupert, whom the Imperialists had
been holding captive since 1638, but to his frustration he accomplished little else. Roe complained,
and with reason, that the widening rift between the King and Parliament as well as the infighting in
Parliament negatively affected his negotiation.12 On top of the troubles in Scotland, news came of
a violent revolt in Ireland. By this time Britain's internal struggles and its resulting weakness were
apparent to all, a fact that accordingly diminished its prestige abroad.13
Due to England's increasing inability in this situation to assist the Habsburgs in their
continuing wars, they became less willing to accommodate England in the Palatinate. Although the
Emperor had agreed to the Vienna negotiations, both he and Spain preferred to treat the Palatinate
question at a general peace conference, where they could use any concessions they made as leverage
l0Ibid.,219.
11Charles Louis was excluded from the general amnesty that was extended to most of the
remaining "unreconciled" German states. In addition to the Palatines, only Brunswick and Hesse-Kassel
kept fighting and refused to recognize Imperial authority (Parker, TYW, 150).
l2The Emperor was aware of events in England, as he received reports from correspondents there
(HHStA, StA England, Karts. 5, 18).
13Mowat, 271-5.
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to obtain a more favorable settlement from their adversaries.14 Still, Roe remained convinced that
the Emperor wished to give the King some satisfaction, and Ferdinand was willing to treat with
England as long as he believed some potential for an alliance existed.15 The Spaniards, however, had
no interest in negotiating the restoration of the Lower Palatinate. This was apparent when Roe
exposed the fact that the Spanish ambassadors did not have plenipotentiary powers to treat in Vienna
as they claimed. Maximilian, for his part, abandoned his compromise plan for the electorate after
he learned that England was prepared to accept less than he had originally thought. He thus
reconsidered his plan to share the electorate and instead stood upon its remaining longer with the
Bavarian line.16 On 6 May 1641, the Emperor made the following offer to Roe, in return for an
English alliance with the Habsburgs: the Lower Palatinate, the Upper Palatinate for 13 million
florins (Maximilian's war expenses), and the alternation of the electorate after the expiry of
Maximilian's direct line and three male descendants of the Bavarian line.17 Needless to say, Roe
declined the offer. He was recalled in May 1642 and returned to England empty-handed, as Arundel
had five years before.
In addition to Roe's unsuccessful foray into Germany, the Imperial envoy Franz Paul, Baron
Lisola maintained Anglo-Imperial contacts in England beginning in 1640. However, Lisola mainly
14Bierther, 221-2.
"HHStA, StA Palatina, Kart. 13, Konv. 3: 23 Aug. 1639, Kurz to [Trauttmansdorfrj.
16Bierther, 81 n. 55, 135,277.
17Steiner, 137-8. The Emperor would have to turn over this sum (« 8,666,667 thaiers) to
Maximilian to release Upper Austria from its mortgage, for which Maximilian was currently holding the
Upper Palatinate. Maximilian had no intention of relinquishing this territory, but knew he was safe in
making the offer as Charles would never agree to pay such an outrageous sum.
SSI
restricted his activities to intriguing against Richelieu in tandem with the Cardinal's French
adversaries and various Spanish diplomats in England." Lisola worked to obstruct French efforts
to obtain England's support and win it instead for the Habsburgs, or at least to preserve England's
neutrality. He even courted the Prince Palatine, whom he hoped the King would put into action
against France." Additionally, during Roe's negotiations Lisola worked to convince the King that
the Emperor's intentions toward the Prince Palatine were honorable, and thus to prevent any thoughts
the King might have of supporting bis nephew militarily.20 Ferdinand did not, however, empower
his envoy to make a binding agreement with the King beyond negotiating one for the release of
Prince Rupert.21
Lisola remained in England after Roe's return to England and the outbreak of civil war.
During the hostilities, an angry crowd plundered and demolished his house, which had become a
sanctuary for Catholics.22 This apparently unnerved the envoy, who in his own words no longer felt
safe living among people who were so hostile to Catholics and thought of nothing else but
decimating each other.23 The Emperor eventually granted Lisola's recall, and he gladly departed
from England in 1645.
"HHStA, StA England, Kart. 5, ff. 124-39: 1642, Lisola's response to Duke of Velada. In 1640,
these included the agent Cardenas and the ambassadors extraordinary Velada and Marquis Virgilio
Malvezzi.
"Reynauld, 322-6, 33 l-«.
*>CSPV 1640-2, 226: 18 Oct. 1641, Giustinian to D&S; ibid., 273: 10 Jan. 1641, same to same;
ibid., 282: 24 Jan. 1642, same to same.
21Pribram,22-3.
22Haller, 519.
23Pribram, 52-3.
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Charles's diplomatic attempts to regain the Palatinate and bis threats of intervention in the
Continental war had once again come to nothing. The failure ofhis foreign policy in this respect was
now complete. The settlement of the Palatinate question would have to wait until the conclusion of
the general peace settlement at Westphalia in 1648. Finding a solution to the problem of the
electoral dignity proved the chief impediment to the treaty. The war-weary parties finally decided
to create an eighth electorate. Though this step was contrary to the Golden Bull of 1365 and meant
a fundamental change in the constitution of the Empire, it had the support of the great powers and
the Emperor.24 As for the Palatine lands, the Emperor reinstated Charles Louis as a prince of the
Empire and restored him in the Lower Palatinate. The Upper Palatinate and electorate remained in
the hands of the Bavarian Wittelsbachs. Charles Louis accepted the loss of these lands as the final
solution to the Palatinate question. England, involved in its own internecine struggles, did not send
a representative to Westphalia and thus had no part in shaping the final agreement.
24From 1642, the creation of an eighth electorate for the Prince Palatine was on the Bavarian
agenda. In December 1645 Maximilian was successful in persuading the Emperor back to this view
(Albrecht, "Bayem und die pfalzische Frage," 464).
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CONCLUSION
English foreign policy in the later 1630s did have some potential for success. During this period,
Charles I consistently pursued his primary objective, the restoration of the Palatine house to
prominence in the Empire. Although he was willing to do what he could to recover the Palatinate,
Charles's antipathy to calling Parliament limited his options. Without Parliamentary funding, it
would have been impractical for him to commit England to full-scale military intervention on the
Continent, the option favored by his sister Elizabeth of Bohemia and many committed English
Protestants. In any case, it is unclear that this tactic would have brought him any closer to his
foreign policy goal. Even ifhe called Parliament and succeeded in extracting the outlay of resources
needed to support such an intervention (which was doubtful in light of their previous quarrels over
the aims to be pursued), there was no guarantee it would produce the desired result. Given bis
financial limitations and the realities ofEuropean politics, Charles chose a more pragmatic approach.
Instead of calling Parliament and joining the anti-Habsburg alliance in a risky attempt to win back
the Palatinate by force, he resolved to negotiate with the Habsburgs, since they were in the best
position to restore the Palatine lands and dignities peacefully. In any case, their ultimate buy-in was
essential if the Prince Palatine were to enjoy his restored lands and titles securely.
England's negotiations with the Emperor were an integral part of his Habsburg strategy, as
the Emperor alone possessed the authority to remove the ban and reinstate Charles Louis as a prince
of the Empire. In theory it was also within his power to restore the Palatine lands and dignities, but
in practice he needed to win the support of his allies, Bavaria and Spain, who held these prizes.
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Although this put the Emperor in a difficult position, he was the best placed to modify their demands
for the advantage of all involved. While the King and his closest advisors saw the Habsburg option
as the most promising, they did not confine their diplomatic dealings to the Habsburgs. Instead, they
chose to keep their diplomatic options open by carrying on concurrent negotiations with the anti-
Habsburg powers in the hope they would make a more enticing offer. If not, these negotiations,
particularly those with France, would at least serve to pressure the Habsburgs to reach a satisfactory
agreement with England.
By the mid- 1630s, prospects for the King's Habsburg foreign policy had improved
significantly due to the decline of the influence ofconfessional politics in Europe, war-weariness in
the Empire, and England's elevated status in the eyes of various Continental powers. The gradual
decline of religion's impact on international politics made it easier for the Catholic powers with a
stake in the Palatinate — the Emperor, Bavaria, and Spain — to negotiate with Anglican England for
the restoration of the Calvinist Prince Palatine. As the 1630s wore on, it became increasingly
apparent that European politics were headed in a more secular direction. Obvious signs of the
recession of confessional politics emerged during this period, such as the conclusion of the Peace
of Prague between the Emperor and the Protestant German states and of the anti-Habsburg alliance
between Catholic France and Protestant Sweden. Religion, of course, continued to be politically
important, but it no longer governed international relations as it had a half century earlier or even at
the outbreak of the Thirty Years' War.
Where England was concerned, religion had never played more than a minor role in Charles's
diplomatic strategy. The Stuarts had long conducted an undisputably secular foreign policy, one
overwhelmingly motivated by dynastic interests rather than confessional aims. In the 1630s, much
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to the chagrin ofthose who supported the calling ofParliament, many ofthem with Puritan leanings,
Charles limited the object ofEnglish foreign policy to the restoration ofhis nephew in the Palatinate
and adamantly refused to embark on a war to defend Continental Protestantism from Catholic
encroachment Moreover, he was prepared to deal with whichever powers were in the best position
to help him achieve his goal, whether Protestant or Catholic.
Although the King did not allow the confessional interests to intrude upon his foreign policy
strategy, he did use religion strategically to promote his dynastic objectives. He was certainly not
above appealing to the religious sympathies of others to achieve his political and diplomatic goals.
A prime example of this was his encouragement of Christian IV's intervention in the war in 1625.
Moreover, he sometimes employed this tactic when selecting diplomats, in order to increase their
chances for success. For instance, one reason Charles named Arundel as ambassador extraordinary
to the Emperor was that he realized that Arundel, as the head of one of the most prominent Catholic
families in England, would be more readily accepted as a negotiating partner at the Imperial court
and would better understand its milieu. Likewise, Charles selected diplomats with Catholic
sympathies, Taylor among them, to conduct his secret Habsburg negotiations.25
The secular nature ofEnglish foreign policy, while it enabled the Anglo-Habsburg dialogue,
was the constant in the diplomatic equation. Much more influential in improving the outlook for the
Anglo-Habsburg negotiations in the later 1630s was the declining influence ofconfessional politics
on the foreign policy of the Emperor and his allies. Since the beginning of the war, religious
interests had been much more important to them than to the Stuarts, but it became less of an issue
"Because of their religious leanings, these men were also likely to be adherents of the peace
party.
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in their foreign policy as time went on. However, even while the Emperor and Maximilian sought
to advance the cause of Catholicism, considerations of state came first for them. By the latter half
of the 1630s, both Ferdinand II and Ferdinand III were willing to compromise with Protestants in
the interest of peace, which the greater good of the Empire demanded. Ferdinand Q, with the
encouragement ofhis moderate ministers, had rejected the militant policy ofconfessional absolutism
at the Peace of Prague, thus marking a decided shift to more pragmatic, secular policies in Vienna.
Ferdinand Ill's outlook was even more practical than that ofhis father. He put the interests of the
Empire ahead of those of religion or the house of Habsburg as a whole. This would readily become
apparent during the negotiations for the peace of Westphalia, when he abandoned Spanish and papal
interests in favor of concluding a lasting peace in the Empire.
By the mid- 1630s, Maximilian had also moderated his confessional policies. Despite his
commitment to the Catholic cause, dynastic interests had always determined his foreign policy in
the first line. His principal goal was the consolidation ofhis position in the Palatinate, which he
pursued mainly to aggrandize the Bavarian state. Maximilian's acceptance of the Peace of Prague
showed that he was ready to compromise with Protestant princes in order to cement his hold on his
Palatine acquisitions and achieve a peace that would benefit the Empire. However, when it became
apparent that the Peace had failed to secure his gains, he showed a willingness to restore a portion
of the Palatine inheritance to the Calvinist Prince Palatine in order to consolidate his hold on the rest
The Spaniards, for their part, had always been more concerned with pursuing their main
foreign policy objective — winning their war with the Dutch, and later the French — than furthering
the cause of Catholicism. Philip constantly abandoned confessional goals in the Empire in favor of
his dynastic ambitions. Evidence of this can be seen in the continual pressure Olivares applied to
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the Emperor to retreat from the stringent demands of the Edict and negotiate a compromise peace
settlement with the Protestant states ofthe Empire in the hope that Imperial and League troops would
be released to support Spain's war against the Dutch.
The decline ofconfessional politics in international relations increased the chances that the
Anglo-Imperial negotiations of the later 1630s would succeed, and in turn the course of these
negotiations reveals evidence about the extent to which this process had affected the foreign policy
of the Emperor and his allies. The Emperor seemed more concerned with the state of Empire than
whether or not the Palatinate remained Catholic. Spain's negotiations with England in these years
revolved around garnering English assistance for its wars, and religious demands figured only
peripherally in their diplomatic dealings. Even Maximilian, the party who occasionally raised the
issue ofreligion during the negotiations, made his arguments against restoring certain of the Palatine
lands and dignities mainly on political grounds. Moreover, when he did raise them, they always
served to underline a course ofaction that benefitted Bavarian dynastic interests, namely retention
of the electorate and Upper Palatinate for his immediate line. Behind the scenes, religious
considerations infrequently entered into the allies' discussions on the Palatinate question. Their
offers to England included few religious demands, and even these were negotiable.
Surprisingly, the Catholic clergy — even some Jesuits — supported the Emperor and
Maximilian's retreat from confessional politics. Their Jesuit confessors, who had earlier encouraged
these rulers to pursue the militant Catholic policies most clearly manifested in the Edict, began to
moderate their advice in the mid- 1630s. Surveying the widespread distress the war had caused
without yielding a decisive victory for Catholicism, many Catholic clergy decided the cause would
best be served by consolidating their gains in a peace settlement. Lamormaini and Quiroga's
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expressed support for England's attempts to resolve the Palatinate question by diplomacy in the later
1630s revealed the clergy's modified attitude.
The war weariness that had led even some Jesuits to back away from militant confessional
politics permeated the Empire and contributed to the improved climate for negotiation between
England and the Imperial camp. After eighteen years of destructive war, Germany was desolated
As the princes of the Empire surveyed their devastated territories, their appetite for continuing a
confessional war dissipated. By 1635, the desire for peace was overwhelming. That year, they
attempted to end the hostilities in the Empire by signing the Peace of Prague. On a practical level,
however, peace would not come without the satisfaction of the interests of foreign powers, many of
which did not accept the solution for the Palatinate outlined at Prague. Finding a way to peace in
the Empire became a top priority at Imperial diets and electoral meetings. By extension, those who
favored peace focused on finding a settlement to the Palatinate question, because they realized that
a secure and lasting peace would not be possible otherwise.
In addition to their growing receptiveness to negotiation with England because of the
influence of deconfessionalization and war weariness, the Emperor and his allies began to value
England's favor more highly in 1635. In May, Charles increased his leverage in European diplomatic
circles when the first ship money fleet appeared in the Channel. Financed without Parliamentary
subsidies, the strengthened fleet — while it was of little use in recovering the landlocked Palatinate
by force — did raise England's military status in the eyes of the other European powers. Moreover,
France's declaration of war against Spain in May 1635, and the Emperor's against France in March
1636, enhanced England's desirability as an ally for both sides. With England's improved bargaining
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position, the outlook for Charles's Habsburg foreign policy was more promising than it had been in
a long while.
Just as the King's policy had potential for success, so did the spate ofmissions he sent to the
Continent in the later 1630s. By this time, all the players with a stake in the Palatinate were willing
to make some concessions in the interests of finally settling this nettlesome issue. Most importantly,
the Emperor and his allies were willing to yield more than most English historians have previously
supposed.
The Emperor was keen to come to an agreement on the question of the Palatinate. He
earnestly desired peace and knew that settlement ofthe Palatinate question was necessary to achieve
it. Further, he wanted to prevent England's entry into the war on the anti-Habsburg side, whether
by direct military intervention or by the provision of naval and financial support. The Emperor was
therefore motivated to find a compromise agreement that would satisfy both England and his allies.
The importance of this issue to the Emperor was demonstrated in the many representatives he sent
to Munich to persuade Maximilian to take a more flexible position and the fact that the English
negotiations were a major topic of discussion at almost every Imperial privy council meeting in
1636.26 Perhaps even more telling, the Emperor's desire to settle the Palatinate question resulted in
the most extensive diplomatic exchange with England since the reign of Henry VHI.
Maximilian of Bavaria, who had long been a staunch opponent of restoration of any sort,
also took a more conciliatory stance toward the settlement of the Palatinate question after 1635.
36For this year, 22 of the 26 extent privy council meeting minutes focus on England. The other
four are dated mid-February or earlier, before England brought increased pressure to bear on the
Emperor.
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Soon after the signing of the Peace of Prague, it became evident that the Peace would neither secure
his Palatine gains nor bring peace to the Empire, mainly because outside powers, including England,
remained dissatisfied. From this point, settling the Palatinate question and securing certain of his
acquisitions became the focus ofBavarian foreign policy. Maximilian shrewdly decided that making
some measured concessions that would satisfy Charles and ward off future claims to the appropriated
lands and dignities would be the most effective way to retain his hold on the Upper Palatinate and
electoral dignity for his immediate line. Settling the Palatinate question once and for all was
particularly pressing for the aging Maximilian, who was keenly aware of his mortality and wished
to secure his legacy for his two young sons. On top of these dynastic motivations, the Emperor and
other war-weary princes of the Empire pressured Maximilian to reach a compromise agreement with
England on the Palatinate question. He was certainly not insensitive to these feelings, as war had
ravaged his lands as well as theirs.
Spain, which occupied the Lower Palatinate west of the Rhine, also had good reason to reach
an agreement with England, particularly after the outbreak of its war with France in 1635. The
French occupation of the key territories of Alsace and Lorraine in the mid-1630s closed Spain's
overland military supply routes to Flanders, leaving it reliant on the sea route and the assistance —
or at least the benevolent neutrality — of England to maintain its war effort against the Dutch. In
1638, the importance of the sea route redoubled when the Habsburgs lost the bridgehead fortress of
Breisach. Under these circumstances, England had a great deal of leverage with Spain in principle.
Although the Spaniards preferred England's active support against their enemies (the convenientias
of the secret Cottington Treaty), they regarded the fleet's protection in the Channel as a key factor
in the maintenance of their supply route to the Netherlands. If Charles threatened to cut Spain's
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lifeline to Flanders by withdrawing this privilege and transferring it to France, the Spaniards could
not afford to ignore it
In addition to the motivations the Emperor and his allies had to compromise on the question
of the Palatinate, Charles's own flexibility for the terms ofrestoration further increased the likelihood
that Anglo-Imperial negotiations would prove successful. Despite what the King projected at times
for the benefit of the critics of his Habsburg policy — chief among them bis sister — he was willing
to accept less than the plenary restoration of his nephew. He realized that the Habsburgs would not
fully restore Charles Louis based on the assistance of the fleet, and he was not willing to take the
necessary steps to launch a full-scale intervention in the war. The King's willingness to accept a
compromise settlement is readily apparent in Taylor's instruction and Arundel's unofficial
negotiations at the end of his embassy.
The Anglo-Imperial diplomatic missions in the later 1630s, while they held out promise, also
faced some significant obstacles. Although the Emperor and his allies had reason to negotiate with
England, their interests were divergent and thus quite difficult to balance. The Emperor and
Maximilian both favored peace in the Empire, but for different reasons: the former wished to end
the devastation in the Empire, the latter to consolidate his wartime gains. Spain presented an even
greater problem, for it would derive little direct benefit from the settlement of the Palatinate
question. Since the fighting in Germany diverted French attention from the Netherlands, and it was
becoming increasingly apparent that no real help was forthcoming from the Emperor, the Spaniards
had little reason to promote peace in the Empire by relinquishing their hold on the strategically
situated Lower Palatinate. The Spaniards' resistance, however, was not insurmountable, for they had
reasons to mollify England. Not only did they look to the English fleet to keep open their vital
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supply route to the Netherlands, but also they sought permission to recruit British troops to replenish
their depleted army. Thus, Charles had significant bargaining power with Spain, at little cost to
himself, ifhe chose to exercise it When it came right down to it, the Spaniards would choose the
option that would afford the greatest benefit in their war against the Dutch and French, and in this
case the Channel supply route was ofgreater value than the retention the Lower Palatinate. Charles
simply needed to convince Olivares that he must make a choice.
In addition to the impediments presented by the conflicting interests of the Emperor and his
allies, the recalcitrant attitude of the Palatines also hampered a diplomatic settlement. Just as
Frederick's intrigues had played a part in thwarting James's Spanish negotiations in the 1 620s, so too
did Elizabeth's insistence upon restitution by right rather than grace hinder Charles's negotiations
with the Emperor. Charles Louis's refusal to make humble submission to the Emperor unless he
granted this demand further obstructed Charles's efforts to reach a settlement By the late 1630s,
however, the Palatines had become quite reliant on Charles to win back their patrimony, and they
would not have been in the position to reject whatever settlement he could have negotiated.
Thus, while the King undoubtedly faced a difficult political and diplomatic situation, the
obstacles to his foreign policy did not preclude an agreement with the Habsburgs on the Palatinate
question. It was feasible that an English monarch in the same situation and with the same foreign
policy goals — but with more foresight and fortitude — could have brought the negotiations to a
successful conclusion. The real problem was Charles himself and the way he made and conducted
his foreign policy. Unfortunately but characteristically, he failed to make the most of the
opportunities available to him and instead took steps that undermined the effectiveness of his own
foreign policy. The Habsburg states saw the advantages of English friendship, but the King did not
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give them the necessary incentive to make concessions in the Palatinate in exchange. This
circumstance is most obvious in the case of Spain and the fleet While English assistance in the
Channel was of the utmost importance to the Spaniards, Charles was unsuccessful at transforming
this need into concessions in the Palatinate for two reasons. The first was that he was too willing
to help them transport men and supplies to Flanders in return for financial benefits. He only tried
to extract concessions in return after the fact, without making any real threat to withdraw the aid of
the fleet27 The second reason was that the Spaniards were able to maintain an astounding "poker
face" about the value of the English fleet to their war enterprise. While they acknowledged that the
fleet's assistance was helpful, they claimed that its protective services alone were not enough of an
incentive to relinquish the Lower Palatinate. If the King were to change their minds, he needed to
convince them that England's help would be ofgreater value to winning their war with the Dutch and
French than the retention of the Lower Palatinate. However, the King did not take the steps required
to maximize his leverage — namely withdrawing the assistance of the fleet and offering its services
to the French and Dutch — and instead allowed the Spaniards to draw out their negotiations with him
He thus offered them no further inducement to make the concessions he sought and frittered away
the advantages he could have used to strengthen his bargaining position.
A further problem sprang from the way the King conducted his foreign policy with regard
to his own government. Through Windebank and a stable ofdiplomats — Taylor, Aston, and Hopton
included — he carried on with the Habsburgs secret negotiations that were hidden from the view of
27A similar situation was presented by the Treaty of Madrid (1630). The King was in a good
position to incorporate Spanish concessions into the Palatinate as part of the peace treaty, but he allowed
himself to be swayed by Spanish professions of goodwill and promises that the problem would be dealt
with at the next electoral meeting in the Empire.
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most courtiers, diplomats, and members of the foreign committee of the privy council (which was
charged with advising the King in matters of foreign policy), including Secretary Coke. While
keeping one's adversary guessing can be a good tactic in diplomacy, Charles often kept his own
representatives in the dark. From his perspective, this strategy alleviated some of the criticism of
his policies emanating from the war lobby, which included supporters of the Protestant cause and
an alliance with France, and allowed them time to bear fruit.
If leaving most ofhis councillors and diplomats in the dark about his secret negotiations with
the Habsburgs were not bad enough, Charles also kept vital information from the very envoys
conducting them. This seriously hampered the effectiveness of their negotiations. To make matters
worse, it was patently unclear to these diplomats how far the King was prepared to go to recover the
Palatinate. Other than the fact that he would not enter into an alliance that would commit him to a
land war, they could not get a clear idea of what terms he would accept or offer the Habsburgs in
return. The King's double dealing often impeded his diplomats' negotiations because they were
unaware or ill-informed about negotiations on the Palatinate being conducted at other European
courts. Charles's conduct of foreign policy, therefore, undermined rather than strengthened his
chances for diplomatic success.
One can only speculate about the King's motivations for his double-blind diplomacy. It is
possible that he was attempting to keep the diplomats conducting his secret Habsburg negotiations
on a short tether so they could not over commit him. This suggestion is linked with the similar idea
that he wished to keep all decisions where they were concerned in his own hands. Under the
circumstances, it was also quite likely that Charles was attempting to conceal his secret foreign
policy from domestic and international critics. He took great pains to do so, as can be seen in the
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public disgrace ofTaylor and Cardenas after the exposure ofplans for a conference at Brussels. By
limiting the number of people who knew of the true extent of his secret Habsburg negotiations to
himself and Windebank, they could more easily do damage control if word leaked out about one
negotiation or the other. Unfortunately for Taylor, this manner ofconducting foreign policy almost
invariably required a "fall guy," and the statesmen who were directing his efforts clearly saw his
reputation as expendable.
In the end, Caroline foreign policy did prove to be "futile diplomacy," as Gardiner declared.
Although it is certainly easy to criticize and difficult to avoid the conclusion that much of the
criticism is warranted, failure was not its necessary outcome. The King had more foreign policy
options in the later 1630s than historians have commonly assumed, and he could indeed have
achieved his main objective — the restoration of the Palatinate — through negotiations with the
Habsburgs, and therefore without active intervention in the war. Ifhe had exploited his advantages,
particularly given the military setbacks faced by the Habsburgs in the later 1630s, they could have
agreed upon a compromise solution to the Palatinate question similar to that eventually accepted at
Westphalia. Bringing this foreign policy to a successful conclusion, however, would have required
more artful and resolute direction than Charles Stuart could provide. The fact that many of his
subjects strongly disapproved of his negotiations with these Catholic powers, and some of them
eventually took up arms against the King, should not be allowed to obscure the fact that his foreign
policy held prospects for success.
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